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ABSTRACT
When Sir Eric Phipps arrived in Paris in April 1937 to begin his duties as
H.M. Ambassador at Paris, he had just completed four years service as HM 
Ambassador at Berlin where he had achieved a reputation as a staunch anti-Nazi 
and as an anti-appeaser. By the end of his tenure at Paris in October 1939, 
however, he was widely accused of being a "defeatist/appeaser" and his reputation 
has never recovered.
When Phipps left Berlin, German military power was in its ascendancy. He 
arrived in Paris at the age of 62 when French military preparations were at their 
nadir and the Popular Front was disintegrating. These factors led him to support 
that French political faction which was opposed to a resolute French policy and 
which by inclination was not Anglophile. This put him out of step with, and open 
to criticism from, the Foreign Office.
His consciousness of French economic, political and military weakness 
propelled Phipps into playing a role which French historians have termed that of 
"the English Governess" towards the French, pressing them into adopting British 
policies and interfering in their internal affairs. While this was within the general 
framework of his instructions from the Foreign Office, he pursued his conception 
of Chamberlain's appeasement policy with a zeal that seems to have been based on 
closer contact with the Prime Minister and his entourage rather than with his 
professional colleagues.
From the Spring of 1939 onwards, Phipps adopted a firmer attitude 
towards Germany bringing him more into conformity with the new orientation of 
British policy. On instructions from London, he took advantage of divisions in the 
French Cabinet to support Bonnet in bringing pressure on Daladier to make 
concessions to Italy which brought him into increasingly direct contact with 10 
Downing Street. At the onset of the war, Phipps was a resolute advocate of a total 
Anglo-French victory over Nazi Germany.
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CHAPTER1
INTRODUCTION; THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Diplomatists, it is generally, though by no means exactly agreed, 
form an important link in the process by which one group of 
national decision makers form their perceptions, obtain their 
information on, and communicate their intentions to their opposite 
numbers in charge of other states, whether potential allies or 
potential enemies. They reflect, to a certain extent, the value 
systems of those who have appointed them and to whom they 
report. At the same time, living in an enclosed milieu, apart from 
the state to which they are appointed and physically distant from 
their country of origin, they are subject to various deformations 
professionelles (the range of which would make a fascinating study 
in itself). They are at once prisms and heliographs. Moreover, the 
role diplomats play changes as the nature of the elites they represent 
also changes....(1)
Prior to 1914, British foreign policy decisions were taken by 'specific and 
easily identifiable individuals working within the confines of the foreign and
diplomatic service' and their 'background, personal beliefs and character were all of
(2)great significance'. '  After 1914, ambassadors and attaches tiad to operate in a
ry\
world where the familiar restraints of diplomacy were fast disappearing* and, in 
the period of appeasement, their traditional authority and influence appeared to 
have been further eroded.
By 1937, the British Government were faced with a declining economic and 
strategic position and a rapidly deteriorating international situation. The intensity 
of the international crisis, his personality, and his impatience with the Foreign 
Office increasingly led the new prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, to virtually
1) D.C. Watt, Foreword: the New International History* (to a special issue on Ambassadors & 
Attaches). The International History Review, DC 4, November 1987, p.519.
2) Keith Neilson, "My Beloved Russians: Sir Arthur Nicholson & Russia 1906-1914', ibid, 
p.521.
3) Alan Cassels: 'Afterword: Diplomats in an Age of Alien Ideologies and Bureaucratization', 
ibid, p.614.
take over control of British foreign policy himself. This led to his reliance on a 
personal entourage including Sir Horace Wilson and Joseph Ball whom he 
encouraged to bypass the normal channels. An obvious effect of this was that the 
conflict between 10 Downing Street and the Foreign Office became acute. 
Paradoxically, this, in turn, increased the importance and influence of certain 
diplomats frequently in uneasy equilibrium between the two, particularly in the 
crisis capitals. It is significant that the three most important British ambassadors of 
the period (towards all of whom Vansittart would be bitterly critical). Henderson 
(Berlin), Perth (Rome), and Phipps (Paris), were amongst the most ardent 
supporters of Chamberlain's appeasement policy. Phipps, for example, increasingly 
reported what he thought Chamberlain and Halifax wanted to hear. During the 
Munich Crisis this brought him on a collision course with the Foreign Office, and 
there were calls for his dismissal. His powerful protectors included Sir Warren 
Fisher and Sir Maurice Hankey and his detractors were led by Vansittart and Oliver 
Harvey. In the struggle over policy, he was able to ride out the storm albeit with a 
diminished reputation in Foreign Office circles.
In these circumstances, the informal aspects of the decision making process 
became increasingly important. In the case of Phipps, a close examination of his 
ambassadorship in Paris reveals that it was at least as, if not more, important than 
the traditional or formal machinery was frequently bypassed or ignored. There is, 
for example, the considerable amount of private and unofficial correspondence to, 
and from, the Embassy frequently amending, explaining or even contradicting 
official despatches and instructions which were intended for use 'off the record. Sir 
Orme Sargent, the assistant under secretary and superintendent of the Central
Department, was nominally his immediate superior at the Foreign Office. There 
were strong hints and suggestions in some of his private letters to Phipps of 
possible or desirable courses of action which, he hastened to add, should not be 
taken or interpreted as constituting official instructions. Furthermore, he 
occasionally sent Phipps copies of the confidential minutes which he had appended 
to his despatches with instructions to destroy them as they were intended 'for (his) 
eyes only1 which was highly irregular, to say the least. In theory, this not only 
enabled Phipps to obtain a unique insight into F.O. thinking but also to amend, 
suppress or develop his officially expressed views in accordance with those of his 
nominal superiors at the Central Department. However, as the European situation 
deteriorated, this increasingly conflicted with Phipps's growing conviction of the 
correctness of Chamberlain's views, and exacerbated his relations with the Foreign 
Office particularly vis-a-vis his brother-in-law, Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent 
under secretary and, later, chief diplomatic advisor to the Government.
To these examples of the informal decision making process must be added 
Phipps's large private correspondence with his old friend, Sir Maurice Hankey, the 
secretary of the cabinet and of the C.I.D. Hankey, who was instrumental in 
securing his appointment to Paris, sent him, in the strictest confidence, highly 
confidential information on British defence policy and strategic problems as well as 
reports on cabinet meetings. He also provided Phipps with high level intimate 
political gossip which enabled him to tread a careful tightrope between the Foreign 
Office and 10 Downing Street. This unusual source from London partially 
complimented the information on the French political scene which he had obtained
from personal and Embassy sources, and probably rendered him unique amongst 
the ambassadors of the late 1930s. J
Finally, as the Phipps papers show, letters were drafted at the Paris 
Embassy with instructions that copies should not be made and the originals should 
be returned to the ambassador in order that they should not enter the Embassy
archives/5^  In any case, Phipps frequently served as his own typist (his typing
skills constituted a permanent private joke between Hankey and himself)^ which 
greatly facilitated his ability to bypass the normal channels and control the flow of 
information emanating from the Embassy. With the assistance of Sir Charles 
Mendl, the Embassy's press officer, this latter aspect was extended during the 
Czech crisis and its aftermath to encompass the exclusion of certain British and 
French journalists from the Embassy, as well as collusion in Bonnet's attempt to 
expel the Times correspondent from France, and to gag any public/^ expressed 
criticism of Chamberlain's policy by prominent British visitors to Paris such as Duff 
Cooper. In short, Phipps's Paris Embassy serves not only as a microcosm of 
British appeasement policy in the late 1930s, but also as a study in the informal 
decision making process as well as an example of a possible deformation 
professionelle of a British diplomat during this period.
4) The Phipps-Hankey correspondence is located in the Phipps Papers at Churchill College 
Archives, Cambridge (hereafter referred to as PHPP), PH.3/3.
For correspondence with Sargent, see ibid PHPP.2/10, see also Sargent's private papers at the 
Public Record Office, Kew, F0.800/272-279.
5) For example: Phipps to Eden, 6 October 1937 contains the marginal note To be copied in 
chancery and returned to me unentered', PHPP. 1/19; Phipps to Eden, 12 October 1937 
contains the marginal note *Retum to me unentered then typed no copies, Minister) to see', 
PHPP. 1/19.
6) For example: Hankey to Phipps, 8 December 1933 (PHPP.3/3) and 8 March 1935 (ibid). See 
also Valentine Lawford, Bound for Diplomacy. London 1963, p.344.
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Anglo-French relations on the eve of the second world war have been
(T)covered in considerable detail in a number of excellent studies. The role played 
by Sir Eric Phipps, as depicted by the secondary sources had remained, however, 
almost entirely negative. Phipps was British ambassador in Berlin from 1933 to 
1937 and at Paris from 1937 to 1939. His two key ambassadorships thus span the 
crucial period between Hitler’s advent to power in Germany, and the outbreak of 
the second world war which makes them intrinsically important. A puzzling aspect 
of Phipps's career and of British diplomacy in the 1930s, is the contrast between his 
reputation as an 'anti-appeaser1 in Berlin and as an 'arch-appeaser1 in Paris. This 
contrast, which has never been satisfactorily explained, appears sufficiently striking 
as almost to constitute the activities of two entirely different individuals.
Dalton, who before the Munich crisis had regarded Phipps as one of the 
most able diplomats, quoted 'someone who knew him well' to the effect that
Phipps was a better man in Berlin'.^ Birkenhead wrote that Tie (Phipps) was
transferred to Paris where his former robustness succumbed during the Czech crisis
(9)to the atmosphere of defeatism that surrounded him'v J and, that 'the air of Paris
seemed to have produced a debilitating effect' on Phipps.*'10'* One could hardly 
describe his activities during the Czech crisis which included three meetings with
7) Most notably in Anthony Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War. 
London 1977; Robert Young, In Command of France. Harvard 1978; J.B. Duroselle, La 
decadence. Paris 1979, and Les Relations franco-britanniques 1935-39, Paris 1975.
8) Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years, memoirs 1931-45. London 1957, p.191.
9) Birkenhead, Life of Halifax. London 1965, p.358.
10) Ibid, p.387
Daladier and five telegrams to the Foreign Office, all on the same day (13 
September 1938), as evidence of debilitation.
Gilbert and Gott presented Phipps in Berlin as an 'anti-appeaser*, together 
with Vansittart, whom 'the Cliveden set' wished to replace in order to ameliorate 
Anglo-German relations; his activities in Paris, on the other hand, are conveniently 
descriptive with the moralizing and value judgements which accompany their 
earlier account, thus completely avoiding the problem of Phipps's apparent change
of attitude/11^  There is also Shirer's caricature of Phipps as 'a nervous little man
whose previous tour of duty in Berlin seemed to have left him with a mighty fear of 
(12)
Hitler's wrath'. '  This hardly corresponds to the Fuhrer's own reminiscences of 
successive British ambassadors to Berlin, as revealed in his table talk, in which he 
described 'Sir Phipps (sic)' as 'a complete thug'/13^  Despite the rise of a revisionist 
school, the traditional picture is still, overwhelmingly, a negative one, and 
'defeatist' is the pejorative most frequently employed to describe his despatches 
from, and his activities in, Paris.
The secondary sources have concentrated heavily on Phipps's negative role 
during the Munich crisis which meant that the older school of appeasement found 
him more than adequately suitable for inclusion amongst the legendary 'guilty men'. 
The traditional picture, which has remained constant for over fifty years has, in 
fact, been reinforced rather than altered by the additional new evidence of the
11) Martin Gilbert & Richard Gott, The Anneasers. London 1963. Compare for e.g. pp.37 & 45 
on Berlin with p. 142.
12) William Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic. London 1970 (Pan Books edition 1972), 
pp. 382 & 397.
13) Hitler's Table Talk. 1941-45. Introductions & new preface by H.R. Trevor-Roper. Second 
edition, London 1973, p.488.
extent of his interference into French domestic politics. Why has Chamberlain's 
role been reassessed and his reputation undergone a revision, whereas that of 
Phipps, admittedly a lesser figure but one of his most devoted followers, has 
continued to suffer? Why has Phipps been allowed to remain in the 'guilty men’ 
category by historians who are well aware that this is no longer an adequate 
explanation of British appeasement policy in the late 1930s?
Phipps's curious blend of cynicism, opportunism, realism and conviction as 
revealed in his letters and despatches from Paris has not improved his image. 
Neither has his hostility to the Popular Front dislike of communism and apparent 
anti-semitism, as well as his penchant for intrigue and for the most reactionary, 
defeatist or collaborationist elements in France such as Bonnet, Flandin and 
Caillaux, whose opinions he quoted at such length in his despatches. It would be a 
truism to remark that despite his unusual background and immense talents, he 
remained in many ways (particularly in his class-bound prejudices), a typical 
example of those limitations of the pre-1914 Foreign Office and diplomatic service
which Zara Steiner has described in her classic study/1 Coming from a narrow, 
privileged and wealthy strata of society, he appeared incapable of understanding 
the impact of the Popular Front on the hopes and aspirations of ordinary 
Frenchmen and French women less fortunate than himselfj and there was a 
supercilious and snobbish element in his frequent references to the French 
workmen. In this connection, the picture drawn by Lawford, who was a junior
secretary at the Paris Embassy during this period, is very revealing:
....Phipps moved through all the contemporary follies and horrors 
with the alert senses and expert steps of a Frenchman of the 
eighteenth century, seeing everything or more than most, and
14) Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy. 1898-1914. London 1969, passim.
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disliking much of what he saw, but reserving his real feelings for the 
shafts of wit for which (for good or ill) he had come to be well 
known.(15)
Nevertheless, the traditional picture as presented by the secondary sources 
tends to be one dimensional. Above all, it conveys the misleading impression that 
Phipps's activities in Paris, particularly his interference in French domestic politics 
and his pressure on the French Government to adopt British policies, were 
conducted almost entirely on his own initiative.
Given Chamberlain's domination of foreign policy, which was apparent
even before he became prime minister/16^  it was inconceivable that he would have 
allowed an ambassador to conduct a totally independent policy a la Stratford 
Canning. During Chamberlain's premiership, Phipps served under two different 
foreign ministers, two permanent under secretaries at the Foreign Office and retired 
at his own request, which can be taken as some indication that he was, in fact, 
carrying out official government policy.
To what extent were Phipps's other activities in Paris part of his official 
brief, and to what extent were they undertaken on his own initiative? As will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, Phipps inherited a situation in April 1937 where, after 
the victory of Leon Blum and the Popular Front ten months earlier, the Foreign 
Office, alarmed at the extent of French instability and financial weakness, had 
already revealed a strong temptation to intervene in internal French affairs. They 
also anticipated, and later shared, Phipps's dislike of certain French politicians 
associated with the Popular Front - especially Herriot, Paul-Boncour and Cot, 
whose attitude, particularly over Spain and Italy, was regarded as a danger to
15) Valentine Lawford, op.cit, p.344.
16) Documents on British Foreign Policy. 2,18, Preface by Professor Medlicott, p.v.
official British policy and campaigned as vigorously as the Embassy, for their 
dismissal.
Why should Phipps have been categorized as a defeatist by many of the
leading officials of the Foreign Office when, as has already been seen, they
appeared, very frequently, to have accepted many of his basis premises? Did their
objections towards Phipps relate solely to his style or were their differences more
profound? Was Phipps, as a lesser target, made a convenient scapegoat for their
hardening attitude towards the Munich settlement specifically, and Chamberlain's
appeasement policy generally?
Any study of Phipps's Paris Embassy will involve, almost inevitably, an
analysis of the conflict between 10 Downing Street and the Foreign Office. From
the outset, therefore, it is important, not only for the light it sheds on Anglo-French
relations on the eve of the second world war, but also on *the actual rather than the
(17)formal functioning of the British foreign policy making apparatus of the 1930s'. 
This thesis, therefore, will attempt to analyse three major problems raised by 
Phipps's Paris Embassy which makes the traditional view unsatisfactory:
1. Why is there such a contrast between Phipps's activities (and his reputation) in 
Berlin and Paris?
2. Given French dependence on the British, and British alarm at the French 
internal situation in the late 1930s, did Phipps play the role of *the English
17) Professor Watt drew attention to the need for a close investigation of this topic in 
'Appeasement: the Rise of a Revisionist School', Political Quarterly. XXXVI (1965), 
pp. 191-213. Also cited in Susan Bindoff Butterworth, Daladier and the Munich Crisis: a 
Reappraisal', Journal of Contemporary History 1974, vol.9, no.3, pp. 191-241 at p.91.
a8>)
Governess* as the French suggest, and what was the extent of his interference in 
French internal politics. How far was he acting in accordance with the spirit of his 
general instructions and within the framework of Chamberlain's appeasement 
policy? How far did the British Government and the Foreign Office share his 
prejudices, and to what extent were they prepared to intervene in domestic French 
affairs to achieve their aims?
3. When did the Foreign Office attitude towards Phipps change, and why?
It is hoped that an analysis of these themes, and the images of France which 
he conveyed to London in his despatches, will help to elucidate the ultimate 
question - how successful was Phipps's Paris Embassy, particularly in the light of 
the French collapse of 1940?
18) The expressions was coined by Bddarida. Francois Bddarida, TLa gouvemante anglaise', in 
Edouard Daladier. Chef de Gouvemement Avril 1938-Sentembre 1939. sous la direction de 
Rend Rdmond & Janine Bourdin, Paris 1977, pp 228-240.
CHAPTER 2
PHIPPS’S BACKGROUND. THE PARIS EMBASSY &  THE IMPACT OF 
BERLIN
A) Phipps’s Background
Sir Eric Clare Edmund Phipps, who was bom in Madrid in 1875, was the 
only son of Sir Edmund Constantine Henry Phipps, and he was descended from the 
wealthy Mulgrave and Normanby families who had a long and distinguished 
tradition of service in the navy, diplomacy and the colonies. His father, who had 
been a Minister at Brussels and a Minister Plenipotentiary in Paris was 'retired on a
pension' in January 1906.^ As a child, Phipps had accompanied his parents to his 
father's various diplomatic posts and he was educated privately in Dresden, Vienna 
and Paris. As Sir Orme Sargent pointed out::
This education gave a foreign and especially a French tinge to his 
character and tastes, which showed itself in the profound 
knowledge which he acquired of French politics and culture, and in 
the sympathy which he felt for France throughout his life/2'*
Phipps entered the diplomatic service in 1899 and he served in Constantinople, the 
Foreign Office, Rome, St. Petersburg and Madrid as well as three times as a 
secretary in Paris. A British delegate to the Paris Peace Conference (under 
Hankey) in 1918-19, he was also a counsellor in Brussels and, between 1922 and 
1928, a Minister Plenipotentiary under Lord Crewjat the Paris Embassy. In 1928 
he became minister at Vienna. His first ambassadorship was at Berlin in 1933 and,
1) Foreign Office List 1906. London 1906, p.326.
2) Dictionary of National Biography 1941-50. London 1959, p.670. The entiy on Phipps is by 
Sir Orme Sargent
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in April 1937, he achieved his life's ambition by being appointed British ambassador 
at Paris. ^
B) Phipps. Vansittart. Hankev &  the Paris Embassy
Phipps's continental background, his 'profound knowledge and sympathy 
for France', and the fact that he had served at the Paris Embassy three times
previously, made him appear 'pre-eminently qualified for the most prestigious job 
on the diplomatic list. His appointment to Paris, which Eden described as Phipps's 
spiritual home'/5\vas to be regarded as the fulfilment of his ambitions as well as 
the crowning achievement of his career before retirement.
Significantly, Phipps took up his ambassadorship in Paris in April 1937, a 
month before Neville Chamberlain became prime minister. Equally significantly, he 
was not the first choice for this coveted post which had been offered to Sir Robert 
Vansittart three times previously as a method of removing him from his post of 
permanent under secretary at the Foreign Office after the disastrous Hoare-Laval 
Pact for which he was held personally responsible. This he repeatedly declined 'on 
public and personal grounds', the latter because of the 'well-known predilection' of
his brother-in-law, Sir Eric Phipps, 'to take the Paris Embassy.^ There is no 
evidence, however, to support Norman Rose's inference that this was facilitated by 
Vansittart. From the outset, controversy, intrigue and personal rivalry surrounded
3) These two paragraphs are drawn from ibid, and also from the F.O. List for 1934 and 1937.
4) Ibid (DNB)
5) The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs. Facing the Dictators. London 1962, p.503.
6) Norman Rose, Vansittart study of a diplomat London 1978, p.200.
the Embassy appointment; its previous incumbent, Sir George Clerk, complained
bitterly that he was being removed under an age rule from Paris at the age of 63
CDand was being replaced by Phipps who is only eleven months younger1. '
In fact, Phipps had been Clerk's rival for the Paris Embassy when it became 
vacant in 1933/34 and had, instead, been appointed to his first ambassadorship in 
Berlin, replacing Rumbold. This had not deterred Phipps from fulfilling his 
ambition to obtain the Paris post, and in early January 1934, he had mobilized his 
extremely influential friend, Sir Warren Fisher, the Secretary of the Treasury, to 
write to Vansittart on his behalf. Fisher told Vansittart that he denigrated the idea 
of Clerk being sent to Paris (which had been Vansittart's idea), and that: 'it follows 
that we should have in Paris a man well-known to and strongly trusted by the 
French - conditions which are fulfilled in the person of Phipps' and that
The situation is far too serious in my opinion for us to allow 
personal predilections to influence us: and it is really is imperative 
to apply selection pure and simple in the filling of a key post as 
Paris.(8)
In the meantime on 4 January 1934, Phipps, somewhat impatiently, had 
sent an extraordinarily frank 'private and personal' letter to Sir John Simon, the 
Foreign Secretary, pleading his own case. Phipps told him that his 'great wish' 
would be to succeed Tyijbll at Paris and that he could 'do really useful work there 
in the difficult times ahead'; he had spent 'the greater part of (his) life and nineteen 
years of (his) official life there', and had served in Paris on four different occasions. 
After enumerating the French personalities whom he knew intimately, Phipps
added that the personal factor counted for nothing in Berlin, 'all is concentrated in
7) The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart edited by Kenneth Young, London 1973, vol 1, 
p.383.
8) PRO. FO.794/8. Warren Fisher to Sir Rbt Vansittart, 8 January 1934.
Hitler, whom one sees rarely and officially and in the presence of Neurath, and then
he shouts at me'. Phipps concluded that
This is, of course, only supposing you decided I was the best 
candidate for Paris. I feel sure that both Lord Crewe and Sir 
Austen Chamberlain, who was Secretary of State during the last 
four years of my last term of service at Paris, would tell you 
whether they considered that my services were really useful, and 
whether I inspired the French with confidence. (9)
Phipps's informal and unauthorised approaches to Simon, and especially to 
Fisher, proved counter productive. Sir Warren Fisher, as Secretary of the 
Treasury, was also the Head of the Civil Service and he 'extended this authority so 
as to interfere in the appointment of British Ambassadors and in the submission and
non-submission of Foreign Office advice to the Cabinet ' / 10^  Vansittart must have 
regarded Phipps's attempts to bypass him as a further attempted erosion of his 
authority as Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and was alarmed and 
irritated. In a long and savage reply to Simon, he temporarily destroyed Phipps 
hopes for the Paris post: Tyijfcll, he wrote had 'strongly recommended Sir George 
Clerk' which had been endorsed by the Promotions Board and there was little to 
choose in ability between Clerk and Phipps'. The latter 'only took up his duties at 
Berlin three months ago' and if he were moved to Paris 'at the end of so short a 
period' it would give the Germans the impression that Berlin was 'the inferior post' 
which was being treated with legerete'. Phipps should not have asked him (Simon) 
for the Paris Embassy 'almost immediately after he had obtained his first Embassy, 
and a very good one at that - probably the most important of all'. Vansittart added 
that
9) FO. 794/16. Phipps to Secretary of State (Sir John Simon), Private and Confidential', 4 
January 1934.
10) Frank T. Ashtnn-Gwatkin, The British Foreign Service. Syracuse University Press 1950, 
pp.26-27.
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There is one other point that I ought to add for your information 
and safeguard. Phipps alludes to having already had nearly 20 years 
service in Paris. This is true - and I think it may fairly be said that 
he did well during them. But in the service generally it gave great 
dissatisfaction that he did obtain 20 years in Paris by asking for it, 
and that he never did a distant post. This gave rise to complaints 
and allegations of injustice and intrigue. If again he were to obtain 
Paris by asking, we here all know very well what would be said and 
felt in the service. And that I should frankly deplore; and therefore 
I must needs counsel you to avoid it. (11)
Vansittart's remark that Phipps 'never did a distant post' was blatantly 
untrue since he, above all, must have known that Phipps's recorded diplomatic
service included Constantinople (in 1905) and St. Petersburg (in 1912)/12^  Apart 
from the personal tension between them, Vansittart was probably fighting to 
protect himself against any potential charges of nepotism and favourism. His own 
appointment as Permanent Under Secretary in 1930 had been controversial; it was 
described by one official as 'scandalous' and there had been rumours of 'string 
pulling' and intrigue by both Fisher and himself/13^  Like Phipps, he suffered bouts 
of insecurity and anxiety regarding his personal position which in both cases, albeit 
for different reasons, would increase after Neville Chamberlain became prime 
minister.
There was, however, some truth in Vansittart's allegations of 'complaints 
and allegations' at the Foreign Office since, at least on one occasion previously, 
Phipps had fought for and obtained a special dispensation for service rendered in 
Paris. In 1927, while Phipps was Charge d'affaires in Paris, Lord Crewe (the 
British Ambassador) had notified Austen Chamberlain that:
11) FO. 794/16. Vansittart to Sir John Simon CStrictly Personal1), n.d. but probably January 
1934.
12) Foreign Office List 1934. London 1934. Statement of Service (Phipps), pp. 375 & 376.
13) Rose, op.cit, p.69.
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 Phipps, I fear, is very much disappointed at being obliged to
refuse to Legion of Honour for the third time but I can see that
he is extraordinarily keen about this, no doubt from a very long and 
close connection with the life of Paris. Do you think it will be 
possible, at some time, to make an exception in his favour, as the 
circumstances are not likely to be repeated. The King would be 
more than willing to consent. (14)
Austen Chamberlain replied that '.... in recognition of the exceptional services 
which have been rendered by Phipps in Paris, I am ready to agree to a departure
from the customary regulations'^ 15^
It would be presumptuous however, to assume that, in 1936/37, Vansittart 
tried to make amends for his earlier savage intervention, even at the risk of being 
accused of nepotism, by finally recommending Phipps for the Paris appointment. 
Certainly, there was intense speculation amongst the French as to Clerk's 
successor, and the field appeared to be wide open. Corbin, the French ambassador 
in London, speculated that Cadogan had been recalled to the F.O. to be groomed
as Vansittart's successor and that
 si les bureaux (e.g. the F.O.) etaient maitres de preconiser un
candidat de leur choix, Sir Robert Campbell, actuellement Ministre 
a Belgrade, qui fut si longtemps Conseiller a Paris, aurait les plus 
grandes chances de l'importer1. (16)
Corbin accurately predicted that 'Sir Ronald Campbell conserve done de grandes 
chances pour l'avenir1 (in fact, he succeeded Phipps at Paris in October 1939) and
14) FO.794/16. Lord Crewe (Paris) to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 15 June 1927.
15) Ibid. Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord Crewe (Paris), 15 July 1927.
16) Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Quai, d'Orsay. Z series, 179. Z-274-5. 
Coibin (Ambasade de France a Londres) to Quai d'Orsay, 'Succession de Sir G. Clerk', 26 
Janvier 1937.
that: Dans ces conditions, l'on en vient a se demand si Sir Eric Phipps ne finira pas 
se mettre sur les rangs'/17^
In the event, under the F.O. rules of retirement, Phipps would be appointed 
ambassador at Paris for a period of only two years. His pleasure and gratitude 
must surely have been tempered with resentment at having received it virtually on 
the eve of his retirement. As Norman Rose pointed out, the controlled tension' 
which had existed between Phipps and Vansittart while the former was at Berlin 
was 'based more on an ambivalent family relationship than on differences in
policy1. The shadow of Vansittart continued to hang over Phipps. On the 
surface there were remarkable similarities between the two men. Both were of 
swarthy Mediterranean appearance and their personalities made them resemble 
continentals; both were passionate Francophiles and had served earlier at the Paris 
Embassy, both hated the Nazis and both had been widowers. Their second wives
were two sisters, the daughters of Herbert Ward, the artist who had left them a
(19)large trust fund. Vansittart had regarded Phipps as his man in Berlin, and their 
relationship, always uneasy, deteriorated rapidly after Neville Chamberlain became 
prime minister in May 1937, a month after Phipps's Paris appointment, which 
coincided with Vansittart's waning p restige .^  By 1938-39, Phipps's unswerving
loyalty towards Chamberlain's appeasement policy and his fear that Vansittart's
17) Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Corbin to Quai d'Orsay, 26 Janvier 1937, 
op.dt
18) Rose, op.cit, p.111.
19) Rose, op.cit, p.77.
20) Phipps Papers, Churchill College Archives Centre (hereafter PHPP), 3/3. Hankey to Phipps 
(Berlin), 2 January 1936.
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'subterranean activities* were undermining his position would lead to a final 
estrangement between the two men.
In the event, Eden informed Phipps on 15 January 1937 that Clerk's tenure 
of the Paris Embassy ended on 17 April and that he had 'decided to submit your
(22)name to the King as his successor1. Phipps assured Eden that his confidence in
(23')him was not misplaced^ and, as will be seen, his gratitude survived the tatter's
resignation. Phipps's two powerful fiiends, Fisher and Hankey, were delighted
with his appointment to Paris. Recent scholarship has suggested that while Fisher
retained powers over top appointments at the F.O., he had none over the
(24)appointment of ambassadors although, as been seen, he undoubtedly attempted 
to pull strings on Phipps's behalf in 1934. In his congratulatory letter, he 
disclaimed any credit for the appointment:
Wonders will never cease, do they? You know what IVe thought 
was right from the day of W(illiam) -v J T(yrell)'s departure - And I 
have cursed and expostulated in vain. Suddenly when I almost 
decided to give up hope, they belatedly and surprisingly have done 
the obvious thing. You really have nothing to credit me with, for 
normally if the F.O. think a thing is right they do the opposite'.(25)
21) The expression was coined by Phipps. PHPP, 3/5. Phipps (Paris) to Horace Wilson, 13 
December 1938.
22) PHPP, 1/18. Eden to Phipps (Berlin), 15 Januaxy 1937.
23) Ibid. Phipps (Berlin) to Eden, 18 January 1937.
24) Eunan OHalpin, Head of the Civil Service, a study of Sir Warren Fisher. London 1989, 
p.250.
25) PHPP. 3/2. Fisher to Phipps, 21 January 1937.
In fact, as their private and strictly unofficial correspondence shows, it was 
Phipps's close friend Sir Maurice Hankey, the secretary of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence and of the Cabinet, who secured the Paris appointment for him. 
As early as 2 January 1936 he told Phipps that 'if he (Vansittart) does not go to 
Paris will they send you there? I don't think I count for much in these
appointments but I will do my best.../26^  Phipps replied pessimistically that he was 
grateful to him
for what you say about my unworthy self, but I do not see how I 
can get to Paris for my three years are up in August 1936 whereas 
George Clerk's are only up in August 1937, although he is a year 
younger than me. Of course Paris has always been and will always 
be my dream for the simple reason that I honestly believe it to be 
the place where I could really be of use. The only other people I 
profess to understand are the French and their feelings and politics.
(27)
Throughout October, 1936, Hankey made oblique references to the 
personal affair1 and 'the other matter1 and that, as yet, there was no news. J By 23
December 1936, he told Phipps that
I hear that another effort has been made to get Van to Paris. My 
strong impression is that he has refused.... and I know his 
determination not to go and they will not force him to do so. I 
believe therefore that you still have a good chance... Anthony 
(Eden) has gone up north, so I have not been able to see him, but he 
took my last intervention on your behalf favourably if 
non-committally. (29)
Phipps's reply expressed his despair:
I shall never be able to adequately to express to you my gratitude 
for your belief in me and for all you have done on my behalf. Van 
has clearly made up his mind quite definitely that there are two
26) PHPP. 3/3 Hankey to Phipps, 2 January 1936.
27) Ibid. Phipps (Berlin) to Hankey, 14 January 1936.
28) Ibid. Hankey to Phipps, 9 & 15 October 1936.
29) Ibid. Hankey to Phipps, 23 December 1936.
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persons who shall not go to Paris: one being himself and the other 
me. (30)
He thought that Vansittart's 'natural inclination' would be to send Drummond fwho 
is a great friend and admirer of Lady Vansittart') or Cadogan fwho is perhaps an
(31')
mconvement understudy to himself in the F.O.'). * However, on 21 January 
1937, Hankey was able to tell Phipps that he was delighted that 'it has all come out 
right in the end', and that
It is always a delicate business for me to butt in this kind of thing, in 
which I really have no status. But I adopted a steady policy for 
years, in carefully sowing the seed and tending it as we near the
moment of possible harvest towards the end of the week I got a
further opportunity with the P.M. himself, and he went so far as to 
say "Perhaps when the appointments are made you will find some of 
them to your liking". ...I am quite certain that you are the ideal man 
for the job.(32)
In the aftermath of the Munich Crisis, Hankey would *butt in' again as a 
powerful defender of Phipps against his many vociferous critics (foremost amongst 
whom was Vansittart), who accused him of defeatism and campaigned for his 
dismissal. Phipps's road to Munich began during his ambassadorship in Berlin 
where he witnessed, at first hand, Hitler's consolidation of power and the extent of 
German rearmament. The impact of his experiences in Berlin cannot be 
underestimated, and it is to this that we must briefly turn in order to comprehend 
his role in Paris.
30) PHPP, 3/3. Phipps (Berlin) to Hankey, 29 December 1936.
31) Ibid.
32) Ibid. Hankey to Phipps, 21 January 1937.
C) The Tmpact of Berlin. 1933-37.
Despite his admirers, Phipps ambassadorship in Berlin was not universally 
regarded as successful and the evidence suggests that he himself regarded it as a
failure. ^  Baldwin's well-known observation was that Phipps's despatches
(34)contained too much wit and not enough warning* while Thomas Jones, the
assistant secretary to Baldwin's cabinet, urged the dismissal of Phipps (who loathed
(35)the Nazi leaders) as 'a preliminary to Anglo-German understanding. More 
relevant to Anglo-French relations, Laroche, the French ambassador at Brussels,
informed Delbos on the eve of Phipps's departure from Berlin that
le Vicomte Davingnon (Belgian ambassador at Berlin) a fait un 
grand eloge de M. Fran^ois-Poncet que les Allemandes tiennent en 
haute estime, il trouve par contre que sir Eric Phipps avait perdu de 
son autorite et il se demande si son successeur saura tenir a Berlin 
un langage digne de l'Angleterre.(36)
Phipps had probably 'perdu de son autorite' in Berlin because there were serious 
leakages of information at the Embassy and copies of his despatches had been 
obtained by the Italians. In 1936 this included Eden's confidential memorandum to 
the cabinet on 'The German Danger1, to which was attached a collection of the
embassy’s reports which, according to Eden
contained clear evidence of German policy under Hitler whose 
ambitions were defined as the militarization of the whole German 
nation and economic and territorial expansion so as to absorb those 
of German race who were citizens of neighbouring states. He 
concluded that it was "vital to hasten and complete our
33) Phipps's complaint to Simon (cited on p. 18) suggests that he realised, as early as 1934, that 
his Berlin ambassadorship was doomed to failure.
34) Cited in W.N. Medlicott, Britain & Germany, the search for an agreement London 1969, 
p.7.
35) Gilbert & Gott, op.dt, p.45.
36) Documents Diplomatiques Francais. Series n, vol.5, no.214, Laroche (Brussels) & Delbos, 3 
avril 1937.
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rearmament", and within a few weeks the Cabinet did indeed agree 
to a vastly larger programme(37)
This memorandum and the despatches were handed over to Hitler by Ciano, and 
included Phipps's description of the German Government as 'composed of 
dangerous adventurers' which, apparently, made 'a profound impression on the
Fuhrer'/38^
Earlier, in 1935, Phipps's despatches 'which had the usually fairly wide 
circulation to the Cabinet' were also probably leaked in Berlin. - His 'similarly 
devastating despatch' of 22 March 1935 describing Goering's wedding in sarcastic 
and derogatory terms was 'kept in the F.O. on Sargent's instructions in order to
prevent further indiscretion'/40^  The latter explained to him that
You may be wondering why your admirable despatch no.285 has 
not reached you in print. Well the truth is that we did not dare to 
circulate it lest Cabinet Ministers should give it the same 
embarrassing publicity as they gave to your bison despatch... lest 
the temptation to readers to pass on such good things to their 
friends might prove irresistible. ...We cannot count upon our 
Masters discretion so long as you continue to write such brilliant 
despatches.(41)
Hankey also reassured him that 'everyone speaks highly of you and your telegrams
(42)
and despatches'. J Nevertheless, by December 1935, Phipps was complaining to
him that his reports were being ignored:
Have you seen my despatches no 1344 of December 16 and 1359 
very confidential of December 19 (my conversation with Hitler and 
my impressions thereon) particularly the latter? Perhaps 1359 will
37) David Dilks, 'Appeasement and Intelligence' in Retreat from Power. vol.I, edited by David 
Dilks, London 1981, p. 152.
38) Ciano's Diplomatic Diaries, ed. M. Muggeridge, London 1948, pp.56-57.
39) Medlicott, op.dt
40) Ibid.
41) PHPP, 2/10. O. Sargent to Phipps (Berlin), 26 April 1935.
42) PHPP, 3/3. Hankey to Phipps (Private & personal), 8 March 1935.
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be suppressed'. If so I will send you a copy. My views are set forth 
"ad nauseam" in these and many other despatches & telegrams from 
here. I never get much back, however, and I should much welcome 
a few lines from you as to what the PM, Eden, and others
contemplate doing of course the eventual re-formation of the
Stresa Front would be the ideal solution....(43)
Vansittart too appreciated Phipps's despatches from Berlin, and told him
that 'everyone here, myself not least, appreciates enormously the excellent and frill
(44)reports you have been sending'. J However:
since Ribbentrop's visit there has been a sort of intangible 
whispering campaign started against you, based on nothing in 
particular but run, I think, by the ultra pro-German sections in this 
country. You need not, of course, pay the least attention to it. It 
represents nothing and, as you know, you have o f course full 
support here.(45)
He agreed with Phipps that 'the whispering campaign' may have been based on the
(46)suggestion *that I am a Germanophobe and have infected you to some extent'.
This was the highpoint of their personal relationship and their agreement over the 
German question which reached its apogee during Vansittart's visit to Berlin in 
August 1936, ostensibly to attend the Olympic Games, when he stayed, as Phipps's 
guest, as the British Embassy.
Hankey, Sargent and Vansittart were undoubtedly correct in appreciating 
the value of Phipps's despatches from Berlin. Despite Baldwin's unfair strictures he 
was under no illusions concerning the fundamental nature of the Nazi regime which 
he reported back faithfully to the Foreign Office. A typical Vansittart minute to 
one of his despatches from Berlin reads '.... Sir E. Phipps warns us once more and
43) Ibid. Phipps (Berlin) to Hankey, 30 December 1935.
44) PHPP, 2/18. Vansittart to Phipps (Berlin), 23 March 1936.
45) Ibid. Vansittart to Phipps (Berlin), 23 June 1936.
46) PHPP. 2/18. Vansittart to Phipps (Berlin), 23 June 1936.
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(47)as clearly as usual, Hitler will not bind himself to a fluid Europe'. In his four 
years in Berlin, Phipps moved from a simplistic description of the Nazi leaders as 
'gangsters' to a highly sophisticated analysis of the Third Reich. His views on the 
essential relationship between its built-in dynamics and its economic (as well as 
ideological and strategic) need for territorial expansion anticipates the later theories
of Tim M ason/48'* and are classics of their kind.
(49)Phipps's valedictory despatch from Berlinv 'summarised German aims 
which included: '(i) the absorption of Austria and other Germanic peoples, e.g. the 
German "fringe”); (ii) Expansion in the east; (iii) the recovery of the colonies'. 
After stating that German rearmament 'is now nearing completion and her entente 
with Italy has strengthened her position', Phipps warned that 'it is again dawning on 
the German consciousness that of all Europe countries perhaps the most 
inconvenient is Great Britain' and that 'some Nazi Party extremists have already 
come to the conclusion that the effort to conciliate England has failed and that the 
threat of force must be used to coerce her1. Regarding German co-operation with
England and Italy, Phipps quoted from Mein Kampf that:
.... this alliance would, on the other hand, give Germany the 
possibility of working in all tranquillity for the preparatory measures 
required, within the framework of such a coalition, for a final 
settlement with France.... Thus the mortal enemy of our country,
France, will be isolated'
German policy was 'to keep Italy deeply committed in Africa and the 
Mediterranean, so that she cannot interfere in Central Europe, and to exploit
47) Minute by Vansittart, May 1936, DBFP. 2,16, no.328.
48) Compare for e.g., Phipps's despatch to Eden, DBFP. 2, 17, no.350 with T.W. Mason's The 
Primacy of Politics: Politics and Economics in National Socialist Germany* in S.J. Woolf; 
The Nature of Fascism. London 1968, pp. 165-195.
49) DBFP. 2,18, no.399. Phipps (Berlin) to Eden, 13 April 1937.
Anglo-Italian differences, so that she remains tied to Germany*. His despatch 
concluded:
To induce Germany however to follow the narrow path of even 
relative virtue the following factors are essential:
1) The might of Britain. Any pandering to German threats or any 
slackening of our rearmament would, in my considered opinion to 
court disaster.
2) The might of France. If civil strife, so serious as to impair the 
efficiency of the French Army, were to break out, the temptation to 
Germany would be irresistible.
3) The maintenance of the closest Anglo-French friendship, 
amounting in all but name to an alliance.
Vansittart regarded this report as 'a very valuable conspectus' which should have 
cabinet circulation while Eden minuted that is was valuable.^
In Berlin, Phipps became associated with hostility to Nazi Germany, to 
such an extent, that in June 1937, in support of their suspicions that the British 
Government were changing their policy, the Soviet ambassador in London 'gave a 
number of instances beginning with the transfer of Sir E. Phipps from Berlin to
Paris'/51^  Nor did Phipps's basic attitude towards Nazi Germany change after his 
appointment to Paris. His relationship with Henderson, his successor at Berlin, 
was never cordial, and he even warned Halifax not to place any credence on
anything that the Nazi leaders should tell Henderson/52^  None of this is 
preparation for the traditional picture of Phipps in Paris as 'the arch 
defeatist-appeaser1. To what extent, therefore, did his views change?
There is no doubt that, in Paris, Phipps became increasingly pessimistic and 
that the deteriorating French situation, underpinned by his experiences in Berlin,
50) Op.cit (Phipps (Berlin) to Eden, 13 April 1937). The quotation from 'Mein Kampf is cited 
as p. 155 but the version is not specified.
51) DBFP. 2,18, no. 642. Eden to MacKillip (Moscow), 22 June 1937.
52) FO.800/315, XZXV/136. Phipps (Paris) to Halifax (’secret') 17 March 1938.
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were amongst the contributory factors. While in Berlin, he had maintained a keen 
interest in French affairs, and was well aware that Hitler regarded France as being 
'on the verge of collapse both politically and financially and he was counting upon
that collapse to smooth his path in E u ro p e .^  His despatches from Berlin, in fact, 
foreshadowed some of the fears, anxieties, attitudes and prejudices that he was to 
display in Paris.
In May 1936, for example, contemplating the Popular Front victory, which 
also alarmed the F.O., he wished he could be certain that Blum will not be run by 
Moscow and that the French socialist dog will not be wagged by the communist 
tail' and that 'if this does in fact occur and if Anglo-Italian relations do not soon
improve events will indeed be playing into the hands of Herr Hitler1/ 54^  As a 
personal letter to Eden in November 1936 shows, he was also aware that the 
serious political divisions in France could have dangerous consequences for
Britain, and that if Ribbentrop's attempt to Svoo Great Britain' failed
the "Party" will give up playing what the French call "la carte 
anglaise" and will strain every nerve to isolate us, and then "Gott 
Strafe England" will be their motto. To attain that object they hope 
(1) that France will go Communist and fall prey to civil war "a 
lEspagnol", or (2) that France will go Fascist and come to a 
separate arrangement with Germany. Here perhaps the German 
medicine men of the mind may make a wrong diagnosis, for it seems 
by no means certain that a Fascist France need necessarily turn her 
back on us or throw in her lot with Frau Germania. But in any case 
it seems absolutely essential for us that (1) a strong Government, 
capable of restoring and preserving order, should soon emerge in 
France, and (2) that we should continue to work in as close 
collaboration with France as possible. I hardly dare to advocate a 
(3), but at the risk of shocking you I will set down as an eventuality 
so blissful for a British dweller in the Wilhelmsti^se to contemplate 
as to savour of Paradise - a re-establishment of our traditional 
friendly and cordial relations with Italy. Then with an admittedly
53) DBFP. 2,18, Encl. in no.46. Gainer (Munich) to Ogilvie-Foibes (Berlin), 30 April, 1937.
54) DBFP. 2,16, no.343 Phipps (Berlin) to Eden, 27 May 1936.
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well-disposed Roosevelt America in the background, we could 
pursue the even tenor of our rearmament course without worrying 
too much over the German gangster's hot air and breath.(55)
In Paris, Phipps's remedies for the emergence of a strong government in 
France 'capable of restoring and preserving order1 would lead, with the connivance 
of his superiors if not at their actual behest, to his interference in French domestic 
affairs. A return to an Anglo-Italian alliance would, with Halifax's support, 
manifest itself in his attempts to pressurize the French into making concessions to 
Mussolini. Like Chamberlain, it is possible that Phipps regarded Mussolini as the 
key to Hitler. Certainly his concern with the Italian problem looms large in his
valedictory despatch from Berlin in April 1937:
If any one event may be said to have influenced the course of 
German policy decisively during recent years it was the imposition 
and subsequent failure of the League sanctions against Italy. It was 
the cause, direct or indirect of the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 
March 1936, of the gradual deterioration of Anglo-German 
relations, and of the Italo-German "rapprochement".(56)
Above all, the impact of his farewell visits to Hitler and Goering must have
haunted him in Paris:
Having duly impressed me with German might & wealth, General 
Goering compared the situation in Germany, where, under 
beneficent Nazi rule, there was an actual shortage of labour, with 
that in France & England, where unemployment was rife. He then 
remarked that, going from Berlin to Paris, I should have the 
opportunity of comparing the order existing in the former capital 
with the disorders and civil strife rampant in the latter. France was 
clearly falling into decomposition.... A forty hour week was an 
economic impossibility; a vicious circle would set in, prices would 
rise and then wages, and then prices again. When the worst 
happened perhaps Great Britain would at least realise that she had 
"backed the wrong horse". After all there were only two powers in 
Europe that really counted - Germany and Great Britain - and 
united, nobody could prevent them from doing what they 
wished(57)
55) DBFP. 2,17, no.365 Phipps (Berlin) to Eden, 10 November 1936.
56) DBFP. 2,18, no.399 Phipps (Berlin) to Eden, 13 April 1937.
57) F0.371/20726. (C2840A78/18). Phipps (Berlin) to Eden, 13 April 1937.
To which, despite Phipps's spirited reply, an F.O. official minuted that 
'General Goering is trying to make Sir E. Phipps's flesh creep'. By comparison,
Hitler's parting remarks were in a low key:
Referring to the endless strikes in France he (Hitler) said that the 
German pavilion at the Paris Exhibition was practically finished; the 
German workmen had returned to their country completely and 
healthily disgusted with conditions in France; but they had 
continued working all the time and had even succeeded in 
persuading the French workers in the Pavilion to join them.
 Germany needed peace... the French, however, as represented by
a number of lawyers and journalists carried on a poisonous press 
campaign against Germany and seemed to wish for war. The 
Bolsheviks always sought to make trouble everywhere.(58)
On the other hand, discussing Phipps's appointment to Paris, the leading 
article in Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was strangely sympathetic and even mildly 
encouraging:
.... that Sir E. Phipps should now go to Paris as British Ambassador 
is important in that he has experienced the great revolution in our
country this agreeable Englishman and his wife leave many
friends in Berlin who follow his further diplomatic career which it 
deserves. The delicate relations between Germany and England 
have not been clarified on all points as far as might be wished. An 
intelligent Englishman in Paris, who knows the new Germany, has 
the opportunity of rendering Europe a real service.(59)
58) F0.371/20710. (C2880/3/18). Phipps (Berlin) to Eden, 15 April 1937.
59) FO.371/20747. (C2960/1495/18). Ogilvie-Foibes (Berlin) to Eden, 16 April 1937.
CHAPTER 3
PHIPPS1 S UNSPOKEN ASSUMPTIONS AND THE PARIS MILIEU. 
ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS AND THE FOREIGN OFFICE
As indicated previously, Phipps's despatches from Paris became 
increasingly pessimistic, and his experiences in Berlin had led him to the conclusion
that Hitler could not be bluffed1,^ a  propensity of the French Government 
particularly during the Czech crisis. His awareness of Hitler's aims, and the extent 
of German rearmament, was reinforced by his knowledge of French economic, 
political, social and military weakness, particularly the inadequate state of the 
French air force and the deficiencies of its aircraft industry - a recurrent theme in 
his reports and those of the Embassy's air attache, Wing Commander Colyer.
Phipps's close friendship with Sir Maurice Hankey, *his old friend of the
(2)
Pans 1919 and the Hague 1929 and 1930 conferences 'remained extremely 
important. Hankey, as secretary of the cabinet and the Committee of Imperial 
Defence, was an immensely powerful and influential figure even after his retirement 
in late 1938. After his appointment to Paris, Phipps continued to obtain from him, 
in a purely private capacity, highly confidential information not only regarding 
British defence policy and strategic problems but also reports on cabinet meetings 
which were considered so confidential that he was instructed to destroy them
although Hankey himself, apparently, retained copies. ^
1) Roy Douglas, In the Year of Munich. London 1977, p. 128 (cited in).
2) Stephen Roskill, Hankev. Man of Secrets. London 1977, vol 1, p. 18.
3) Ibid, vol. 3, p.304.
Phipps's argument and convictions were, therefore, buttressed by
confidential and privileged information regarding Britain's political, economic and
strategic situation. Additionally, Sargent's confidential and highly unofficial letters
enabled him to obtain a unique insight into Foreign Office thinking. This latter
factor enabled Phipps to amend, suppress or develop his officially stated views in
thl
conformity with those of his nominal superiors at the F.O., at least untiljMunich 
crisis. Finally, it should be emphasized that his devotion to Chamberlain's policy of 
appeasement was not immediate. Again the question arises, why should his 
reputation have suffered so badly?
In his obituary of Phipps, Sargent stated that
By the time he reached Paris a serious demoralization was showing 
itself in what was still the governing class in France, Phipps clearly 
saw the implication of this moral breakdown and warned the British 
government of it, only to attain the unjust stigma of being 
"defeatist”. Where he failed, however, was in not appreciating that 
the demoralization he saw so clearly was confined to a special 
section of French life, and that there were other healthier elements 
which could assert themselves only after the collapse of 1940.(4)
To what extent did Phipps succumb to or share this demoralization and how far did 
his despatches reflect the views of only a narrow segment of society? The internal 
situation was complex and highly fluid, the amount of information available to the 
Embassy was huge, and there were severe problems of selectivity and compression.
This was a problem which had earlier affected Sir George Clerk's Paris Embassy:
I was horrified to see in the sections which arrived this morning the 
amount of space taken up by the telegrams from Paris, and I am 
afraid that this is not the first time that we have offended in this 
way. The fact is, the situation here is so complicated that one feels 
obliged, if you are to be kept informed, to report at some length, 
and, on the other hand, it changes so rapidly, almost from day to 
day, that reports by despatch are almost out of date by the time you
4) DNB, op.cit, p.670. The entiy is by Sir Orme Sargent
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get them. We will do our best to cut down the no. of telegrams and 
not be so long-winded in future.(5)
As the internal situation deteriorated, Phipps's Paris Embassy became even more 
guilty in this respect, and were severely admonished by Vansittart for wasting the
F.O's time and 'getting into the habit of reporting every ephemeral utterance at
inordinate length'.^ There was undoubtedly occasions when the Embassy were 
unable to see the wood for the trees. In 1938, for example, Barclay minuted that 
there was 'a serious mis-statement' in the Annual Report on France for 1937. and
that it was 'strange that Chancery should have allowed the statement that there is
(T)no pact or treaty binding the U.K. and France (para 363) to pass'.
During periods of crisis, Phipps's despatches were circulated to the Cabinet 
and their impact was profound. The question of objectivity, selectivity and the 
sources of his information in his reporting were, therefore, extremely relevant. 
Phipps approached the Paris ambassadorship at the age of 62 with a lifetime of 
experiences, personal convictions, prejudices and beliefs. As has been seen, he was 
already personally acquainted with the leading political personalities in France who 
still constituted its ruling classes. His unspoken assumptions and the Paris milieu 
were, therefore, extremely important.
5) FO. 800/274. Lloyd Thomas (Paris) to O. Sargent, 28 October 1936. Fr/36/2.
6) FO.371/20687. Minute by Vansittart, 30 October 1937 to Phipps telegram no.642, 24 
October 1937 summarizing Chautemps's speech at the Fifth Congress of the West Central 
Socialist Radical Federation. C7337/18/17.
7) FO.371/21611. (C686/686/17). Minute by Barclay.
The volume of telegrams received and despatched by the F.O. increased dramatically during 
this period. In 1936 it was 26,921; 1937 = 27,690, which swelled dramatically in 1938 to 
35,493. FO.366/1081 (X540/330/505). The Annual Report on France increased from 45 
pages in 1932 to 115 pages in 1936. FO.371/20697 (C1903/1903/17), Barclay minute to 
Ann.Rpt 1936.
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A. Phipps^ Unspoken Assumptions and the Paris Milieu
Andrew Rothstein a Communist propagandist of 'the guilty men* school 
noted that during the Munich crisis, Phipps had expressed views very similar to
those of Maurras in 1*Action Fran9aisev \  Earlier, the United States ambassador at 
Berlin, William E.Dodd, recorded that his British colleague, Sir Eric Phipps, had
'revealed more sympathy for the fascist crowd in Spain than I had noted before.... I
(9)believe now he is almost a Fascist'. J
I£ as has been seen, Phipps's France was not that of Blum and the popular 
Front, would it be unfair to conclude that his concept of the other France' was that 
of the anti-Dreyfusard tradition and the Action Fran9aise? Did his connection with 
the reactionary elements in France denote a genuine spiritual affinity (reinforced by 
his aristocratic background and his hatred of communism) or was it merely a 
tactical move in his attempts to get the French government to adopt British' (or 
rather Chamberlain's) policies? Would Flandin, who sent Hitler a telegram of
congratulation after the Munich settlement/1 °Vnd who became Minister for 
Foreign Affairs under the Vichy Regime, have called him as a defence witness at 
his post-war tr ia l? ^  Despite the frequency with which Flandin's views were cited 
in his despatches, Phipps's description of him is distinctly unflattering, 'perhaps the
most unpopular prime minister that France has ever known.... a man whom it is
8) Andrew Rothstein, The Munich Conspiracy. London 1958, p. 130.
9) Ambassador Dodd's Diarv 1933-38. edited by Wm E. Dodd Jr & Martha Dodd, London 
1941. Entry for 11 January 1937, p.383. It will be recalled that Phipps was bom in Spain.
10) For which, at ceremonies at the Arc de Triomphe, Flandin had his face slapped by Maitre 
Jacques Renouvin who 'declared that his presence would dishonour the Unknown Soldier's 
tomb'. FO.371/21600 (C14079/55/17), Phipps to Halifax, 17 November 1938.
11) Le proces Flandin devant la haute cour de justice. 23-26 iuillet 1946, Paris n.d. Phipps died 
in 1945.
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(12)difficult to like and dangerous to trust'. While elements of cynicism and 
opportunism are not lacking, perhaps the most relevant passage in the same report 
is, 'a reliable friend of England', confirming Cowling's observation regarding 
Phipps's ladder of reputability on which believers in the Entente come top and the
(13)advocates of "ideology" bottom'. '  There is, however, circumstantial evidence on 
both counts but against this there is Phipps's undoubted tendency towards 
anti-semitism which, while not precluding close friendships with individual Jews,
became more pronounced in Paris/14'*
Phipps's anti-semitism was that of the pre-1914 Edwardian variety, based 
perhaps more on religion and class than on race, and frequently associated with
G.K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc. The latter was a strong influence on Lady 
Phipps who was a convert to Catholicism, and was such a frequent visitor that the
upper entresol of the embassy became known, apparently, as Belloc's room '/15^  
Belloc was a vehement anti-semite of the catholic right and his book, The Jews. 
published in 1922, equated them with Bolshevism whereas Phipps equated them 
with the Popular Front. Belloc's anti-semitism was in the French tradition; he had 
been bom in France, completed his national service in French artillery, and had
12) FO.432/4 Confidential Print (France), no.4,6 January 1938.
13) Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler. British Politics & British Policy 1933-40. London 
1975, p.284.
14) Phipps's attitude in Berlin was ambivalent Remarks differentiating 'good' and bad' Jews are 
recorded in these despatches where systematic Nazi racial persecution (which his aristocratic 
disdain may have found vulgar) probably kept his personal prejudices in check. See 
particularly, FO. 408/65 Confidential Print on Germany, vol LXX, no.7, Phipps (Berlin) to 
Simon, 10 May 1935, and Ibid, vol. LXII, no.35 Phipps (Berlin) to Hoare, 24 Oct 1935.
15) Cynthia Gladwyn, The Paris Embassy. London 1976, p.219.
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horrowed his ideas and even his manner of expressing them from Drumont'/16^
Phipps himself frequently made strange references to individual Jews, whom he
delighted in identifying by their 'real' family names, especially those whom he
regarded as being opposed to Chamberlain's appeasement policy. Thus, 'it is
(17)curious that (General) Spears is a Jew and that his real name was Spiers'v 
(Spears's father's name was Charles McCarthy Spears/18')hardly a Semitic sounding
(19)
patronym) while Mandel is a Jew and his real name is Rothschild* (Phipps
admitted, however, that lie was no relation of the great banking magnates'/20^  He 
also conveniently quoted the views of others when it coincided with his own - 
hence Caillaux, the president of the Finance Commission in the Senate, after the
Munich agreement:
anti-Jewish feeling that had begun to shown itself during M. Blum's 
"lamentable" terms of office was now increasing because the French 
public realised that the chief war-mongers in the recent crisis were 
Jews (including the Paris Rothschilds) and the Communists. (21)
Phipps conveniently omitted to remind the F.O. that Caillaux's 'pacifism' during the
first world war consisted of being 'the chief of the defeatists' and Clemenceau 
Aww
hadjarrested for treason/22^  He reserved his own anti-semitism for his private
16) Friederich Heer, God's First Love. London 1967, p.342.
17) FO.800/311 (HZXIV/319). Phipps to Chamberlain, 4 November 1938.
18) Who Was Who, vol VH, 1971-80, London 1981, p.745.
19) FO.371/21601 (C15350/55/17). Phipps to Halifax, 6 December 1938.
20) For Mandel's ancestry, see John M  Sherwood, Georges Mandel and the Third Republic. 
Stanford, California 1970, p.l and pp.303-4. Even Phipps's old friend, Andre Maurois, 
failed to escape the former's obsession with unmasking Jewish names and was revealed in the 
Embassy's personality report as Emile Heizog. FO.432/4. Pt IX, no.4,6 Jan. 1938.
21) FO.371/21600 (C12965/55/17). Phipps telegram, 25 October 1938.
22) D.W. Brogan, The French Nation. London 1957, pp.241 & 243. In October 1938, Harvey 
reminded Halifax of Caillaux's treacherous activities in 1914 and 1915', see Chapter 8.
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letters to Halifax and Chamberlain and it would serve as a method of ingratiating 
himself on them. Those to the F.O. would be more discreet, mirroring, in a curious 
manner the divisions between 10 Downing Street and the Foreign Office.
Against this must be set Phipps's generous character description of other
French Jews such as Leon Blum/23^  Also his close friendship with the
(24)Franco-Jewish anglophile writer, Andre Maurois, who was the biographer of 
Disraeli, Byron and Shelley. Maurois, ironically, was also the hagiographer of 
Marshal Lyautey^(with whom Phipps had corresponded), ^26\vho was not only an 
ardent support of the Entente during the first Moroccan crisis in 1905 but also, in 
later life, of the Croix de Feu. Above all, there is his friendship with, and the 
influence ofj Sir Charles Mendl, the Embassy's press attache, who has been 
regarded as the eminence grise of the Embassy and whose role has never been
(27)
satisfactorily explained. J
Continuity between ambassadors was provided by Mendl, the son of a 
Bohemian Jew, and a somewhat shadowy, cosmopolitan figure who had been press
23) FO.432/4. Confidential Print (France) no.4,6 January 1938.
24) Andrg Maurois, Memoirs 1885-1967. London 1970. pp.200, 226-7, 257. Phipps had 
successfully recommended Maurois for a CBE in 1927. He then warmly recommended his 
further promotion to a KBE in 1937 for his literary work which was 'invariably inspired by 
real understanding and sympathy' for England. PHPP. 1/18. Phipps (Berlin) to Eden, 11 
March 1937.
25) Andrd Maurois, Lvautev. Paris 1931.
26) Index to the Phipps Papers, PHPP.3/4. Marshal Lyautey.
27) References to Mendl in this period are scarce. Apart from his correspondance with TyrnM 
the PRO); the 17th Earl of Derby (at Liverpool Record Office) and a few items in the Phipps 
& Spears papers (at Churchill College), only a few scattered documents survived and his 
private papers appear to have been destroyed. Mendl has therefore become the 'missing 
dimension' in any discussion of Phipps's Paris Embassy. For a brief description of his 
personality and activities, see Valentine Lawford, Bound for Diplomacy. London 1963, 
pp.309-313.
attache there since 1926 and who, it was rumoured, was a British intelligence 
agent. He was a close friend of the W indsors^and his wife was an immensely
(29)
rich American woman whose soirees were immortalized by Janet Planner. 
Mendl had build up an immense range of contacts in Paris from all walks o f life and 
had the reputation of being an intriguer and a 'fixer1. He was undoubtedly an 
important source of Phipps's information and his daily newsletter to the 
ambassador, which included, a digest of the French press as well as the latest 
political gossip in Paris, was regarded as invaluable. Mendl's function was *to 
observe and record from day to day, almost hour to hour, the ebb and flow of
many tides of French opin ion '.^  He was, as Oliver Harvey pointed out
in daily touch with everyone who knows anything, Cabinet 
Ministers, senators, deputies, editors, foreign correspondents, 
anyone of importance who happened to be passing through. He 
knew all Paris and all Paris knew him, and what is more he knew 
what Paris was doing, thinking and saying.... being less tarred with 
the official brush than members of the regular diplomatic staff (a 
fact that led me once to define his function as those of a Canard a la 
Press) he could put questions, express views or put things across 
with great authority but in a noncommittal way than we; many good 
services were performed by him in this manner(31)
Laval was convinced that he was 'in the pay of the secret service' and had leaked 
the details of the Hoare-Laval plan in order to sabotage it; Laval was also 
purported to have told the Italian press attache in Paris some years later than 
Mendl, 'had been heard to boast that his government has spent more money to
28) J. Biyan & C.J.V. Murphy, The Windsor Story. London 1981 (Granada paperback edition), 
p.473.
29) Janet Flanner, Paris Was Yesterday. London 1973, p.221.
30) Lawford, op.cit., p.309.
31) DNB (1951-60), pp.734/5. The entry is by O. Harvey.
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bring the Laval government down than on a colonial war^^H arvey, Halifax's
private secretary, bracketed Mendl with Phipps in his condemnation of the
(33)embassy's interference into French domestic affairs.
In fact, the problems raised by the press attache's role at the Embassy had
been anticipated earlier when, in February 1936, the question of Mendl's retirement
had been broached. The Standing Committee of Retirement Officers had agreed
that 'as a general rule unestablished staff should retire at 65', and that Mendl would
(34)reach this age in December and would have completed 15 years service'. '  In 
view of his subsequently increased influence at Phipps's Paris Embassy, Wigram's
minute was shrewd:
.... I do not, from my own experience of Paris, believe that the 
collection of information second hand through certain prominent 
journalists is altogether good - and I believe that it diminishes the 
first-hand contacts, which are important not merely for the members 
of the Embassy but for the French politicians themselves. On broad 
grounds then I recommend that, when Sir C. Mendl reaches 
retirement age, the position of Press Attache in Paris be abolished 
(35)
In the event, Mendl managed to escape these retirement restrictions, and remained 
press attache at the Embassy until 1940. A second minute to this paper had
a
Jcuriously prophetic ring:
There is an idea that the press officer is apt to weight too heavily in 
the councils of the Embassy, but this is not the case in Paris. It is 
not the business of a press officer to do political work but to collect 
information and to put the staff in contact with those whom it is 
useful for them to know. The press officer from long residence in
32) Geoffrey Warner, Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France. London 1968, p.213.
33) PRO. FO.800/311. Memorandum by Harvey to Halifax, 27 October 1938. H/XTV/307. See 
also The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvev 1937-40. edited by John Harvey, London 1970, 
appendix M, p.427 which reproduces this memorandum.
34) FO 366/966. Sir C. Mendl's retirement Minute by Keighley, 7 February 1936.
35) Ibid. Minute by Wigram, 11 Fdjruaiy 1936.
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the post may probably have a bias - that is perhaps inevitable, but it 
is the business of the more detached regular staff to use the 
information and correct the bias of the press officer (36)
After April 1937, Phipps and Mendl worked in tandem, and the tatter's 
views did 'weigh too heavily in the councils of the embassy*. Phipps's 'informal' 
activities involved him, to a certain extent, in the formulation of policy while 
Mendl's role became increasingly political. Harvey was therefore correct when he
(37)bracketed them together as both interfering in French domestic politics. 
Regarding the persistent rumours, doubtless encouraged by Mendl himself that he 
was a British Intelligence Officer, Commander Dunderdale, head of the British SIS 
station in Paris from 1926 to 1940 (and his exact contemporary there), stated 
authoritatively that Mendl did not have any secret service connections and really
(381was only the press attache at the embassy1.
B. Some Aspects of the Paris Milieu
The background to other important aspects of the Paris milieu which 
influenced and underpinned the Embassy's despatches included financial and 
business circles, the press, the military, the intellectuals (including literary and 
cultural circles) and diplomatic circles, and frequently overlapped. While the first
36) Ibid. The initials appended to this minute are illegible but the writer's comment, that 
'speaking now as the Private Secretary and not as the last head of Chancery in Paris', 
identifies him as Oliver Harvey.
37) Harvey, Diaries 1937-1940. op.cit, pp.427-428.
38) Interview with Commander Wilfred Dunderdale in London, 26 September 1984 in 
connection with the introduction to my English adaptation of Major General Rygor 
Slowikowski's memoirs, In the Secret Service. London 1988. Cmdr. Dunderdale later 
became MI6's liaision officer with the Free French and Polish Intelligence services during 
the second world war. The Germans, however, appear to have regarded Mendl as a British 
agent; his secretary was apparently arrested in German occupied Paris and a Captain Rostin 
of the Gestapo investigated Mendl's activities and his address books. FO.371/24314 
(C12516/65/17). Sir Noel Charles (Lisbon) to W.H.B. Mack (F.O.), 9 November 1940.
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three were traditionally the province of the commercial, press and service attaches,
whose specialized reports were frequently forwarded as enclosures, their
interlocking importance to the overall picture of the French (or rather the Parisian)
scene also made them an intrinsic part of the Ambassador's own despatches. The
Embassy’s almost total immersion in the richness and the intensity of the Paris
milieu made it appear, especially during periods of crisis, that a section of its
'aristocratie republicaine' spoke for all the France - thus narrowing still further the
base of its reporting.
a) The Press provided a rich source of the Embassy's information. French
newspapers were concentrated into a few hands, were frequently unprofitable, and
'tended to attract millionaires whose aim was not so much to increase wealth as to
win power and influence1; for example, Franfois Coty, the perfume manufacturer,
who bought Le Figaro in 1922 also subsidised several extreme right wing
newspapers including Action Franpaise and Le Flambeau, the organ of the Croix de 
(39)Feu. J As Osgood showed, the extreme right wing press were 'at the forefront of 
the attack on perfide Albion' and the 'real import of its campaign was its 
contribution to the process of demoralization which permeated France on the eve
of the second world w a r \^
The French press was also notoriously corrupt:
'les Etats etrangers ne s'y trompent d'ailleurs point, puisque les 
manoevres occultes sur certains organes de presse sont devenue de 
notoriete publique, les uns accusant l'argent tcheque ou polonaise,
39) Theodore Zeldin, France 1848-1945. vol 2, London 1977, pp.532-3.
40) S.M. Osgood, 'Anglophobia and other Vichy Press Obsessions', The Wiener Library Bulletin. 
xxn, no 3, new series no.12 (Summer 1968), pp.15 & 18.
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les autres les subsides allemands ou italiens de fagonner curiesement 
les mentalites fran?aises'.(41)
After the Munich agreement, the Embassy increasingly used selected quotations 
from some of the most venal sections of the French press as a method of 
denigrating certain French politicians and British journalists whom they regarded as
(42)being opposed to Chamberlain's appeasement policy.
b) Financial and Business Circles. Givejthe fact that the Franc was the 
Achilles heel of French policy1/ 43^  the almost legendary power of the two hundred 
families' and 'le mur d'argent' encountered by Blum's Popular Front Governments, 
financial and business circles were an important aspect of the Paris milieu. These
were particularly cultivated by Phipps especially, as Jeanneney has shown, because
(44)of the strong connection between business circles and the Quai d'Orsay. y Joseph 
Caillaux, whose views Phipps repeated so assiduously to London, was President of 
the Finance Committee of the Senate, and in this role was responsible for the fall of 
Blum's first Popular Front Government. Francis de Wendel, another of Phipps's 
regular sources, was the head of the great family of iron masters in Lorraine and 
was President of the Comite de Forges. Wendel was deputy then senator for
41) Rend Girault, La decision gouveraement en politique extdrieure' in Fdrmarri Daladier. chef 
de pouvemement sous la direction de Rend Rdmond & Janine Bourdin, Paris 1977, p.211.
42) For Phipps's hostility towards Cadett of The Times, see Chapter 8.
43) Adam Adamthwaite, Reactions to the Munich Crisis' in Troubled Neighbours, edited by 
Neville Waites, London 1971, p.17. Girault stated that French financial weakness gave the 
British Government a leverage over French foreign policy: Rend Girault, The Impact of the 
Economic Situation on the Foreign Policy of France', in The Fascist Challenge and the Policy 
of Appeasement edited by W.J. Mommsen & L. Kettenacker, London 1983, p.217.
44) Jean-Nodl Jeanneney, L'argent cachd: milieux d'affaires et pouvoirs politique dans la France 
du XXe siecle. 2nd edit, Paris 1984 especially pp.47-50 and 118-168.
Meuthe-et-Moselle and associated with the Union Republicaine group, and he was
(45)a major shareholder m several newspapers including Temps.
c) The Military, with whom the Embassy enjoyed excellent relations, both 
on the level of their service attaches and Phipps's friendship with General Gamelin 
and other high ranking officers. This had three aspects:
i) The traditional role of the French armed services, i.e. in defence and security 
particularly in the light of the French attempts to involve the British Government in 
staff talks and to obtain a military commitment to France.
ii) The increasing involvement of the military in diplomacy which became an 
increasingly important aspect of the French decision making process during this 
period. Marshal Petain became the first French ambassador accredited to Franco's 
Spain; General Weygand led a political-military mission to Rumania and Turkey 
while General Doumenc led the French military negotiations in Moscow in August
1939 with virtual carte blanche/46^  The military remained, however, technicians'
(47)rather than 'decideurs. '
iii) Civil-Military relations, as it concerned the internal situation, given than'role o f 
the army in France has always been difficult'/48^  General Gamelin, the French Chief 
of Staf£ who described himself as a liberal and a Dreyfiisard, was originally
45) FO.432/4. Part IX, 4, Personalities Report for 1937.
46) Girault CLa decision), op.cit, p.210; Andre Beaufre, 1940. the Fall of France. London 1967, 
pp.89-144.
47) Girault fLa decision), op.cit, p.210.
48) D.C. Watt, Too Serious a Business. London 1975, p.35; P.C.F. Bankwitz, Maxim Wevpand 
and Civil-Military Relations in Modem France. Harvard 1967, passim.
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(49)appointed as a political counterweight to his predecessor, General Weygand. '  In 
this connection, the reported conversation with the ex-head of the Deuxieme
Bureau in June 1937 is relevant:
(Colonel Lainey) spoke of possibility of disorders in the event of the 
fell of the Front Populaire government... danger spots were SW 
France particularly neighbourhood of Toulouse which had been 
contaminated by Spanish poison and Paris itself. First act of prime 
minister who succeeded Blum should and would be to declare an 
"etat de siege" whereby the forces of law and order, the army, 
garde-mobile and police, would automatically pass under the 
supreme control of the general officer commanding the Paris 
district.... If the country were left at the mercy of the Front 
Populaire government for another year or two, it would be the end 
of law and order and there would be a real danger of civil war.(50)
The Embassy's reports on the Cagoulard conspiracy^51 \vhich involved high ranking 
army officers (including a member of Petain's personal staff) also illustrated the 
fundamentally unstable internal situation in France during this period. In the light 
of subsequent events, Phipps's concluding remarks in his introduction to the
Annual Report on France for 1938 have a certain irony:
At this juncture it is less about the qualities of the country that 
doubt arises than about the adequacy of its leaders. That doubt is 
felt by Frenchman themselves is shown by the frequent discussions, 
whether if a strong and stable government cannot be secured 
otherwise, some form of political directorate may not, if events take 
a serious turn for the worse, be less impossible than might be 
supposed. The name most often mentioned in 1938 as leader, if 
only nominal, of such a directorate was that of Marshal Petain.
Time, however, plays against him for he is 82. (52)
49) Bankwitz, op.cit., p.3 9 & 76. For Gamelin's desire to preserve harmonious civil-military 
relations with the Popular Front, see Martin S. Alexander, The Republic in Danger: General 
Gamelin & the politics of French defence. 1933-1940. Cambridge 1992, pp.80-109.
50) FO.371/20686 (C4517/18/17). Phipps to Sargent (enclosure by Lloyd Thomas), 18 June 
1937.
51) These can most conveniently be found in FO.432/3, Part vm  Nov & Dec. 1937.
52) FO.371/22934 (C1667/1667/17). Annual Report on Fiance for 1938.
d) Given the extraordinarily influential role of the French intellectuals, 
literary and cultural circles remained an extremely important aspect of the Paris 
milieu. They constituted a fraternity and maintained close links with the ruling 
classes of which, frequently, as in the case of Blum, they themselves formed a part. 
The tradition of the involvement of French men of letters in politics is also strong. 
To cite only two examples: Phipps's friend, Andre Maurois, served as an unofficial
publicist for the Entente Cordiale^^while Alexis Leger, the General Secretary of 
the Quai d'Orsay, a poet of great distinction under the pseudonym St. John Perse 
and a recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature, provided Jean-Paul Sartre with
confidential information regarding the Munich crisis which he incorporated into his
(54)trilogy. Les chemins de la liberte. J
The impact of ideas, their power to influence and change society, is an 
important factor in modem French history and does not need any further 
elaboration. The political commitment of the French intellectual in modem times, 
revealed sharply by the Dreyfus affair, was intensified by the rise of communism 
and fascism and reached its zenith during the Popular Front period. The 
demoralizing effect of certain French right wing writers associated with the fascist 
leagues, was an important part of the intellectual milieu in Paris on the eve of the 
second world war. For example, Celine's notorious Bagatelles pour un massacre 
was discussed in an Embassy despatch as a serious symptom of anti-semitism in 
France/55^  The activities of Otto Abetz, who played a key role in Nazi propaganda
53) Andrd Maurois, op.cit, pp.200-2,225-7.
54) Martin Gilbert & Richard Gott, The Apneasers. London 1963, p.419.
55) FO.432/4. Part IX, no.42 Phipps to Halifax, 13 April 1938. The Annual Report on France 
occasionally contained a Books of Interest1 section.
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in France, is also relevant. Abetz, who was head of the French section of the 
Hitlerjugend and Ribbentrop's consultant on France, promoted the Comite France 
Allemagne and other cultural organisations favouring exchanges and
cooperation.^ He was the patron of Drieu la Rochelle, and his activities were
(57)supported by Brasillach and the Je suis partout group. '  Abetz was appointed 
Ambassador to France during the German occuptation where, as a pre-war pioneer 
of the *New Europe', his 'ready-made circle of French contacts' stood him in good
stead/58^
e) Diplomatic Circles were obviously an essential part of the Paris milieu. 
The British Embassy's web of relationships extended not only to the leading French 
politicians, the Quai d'Orsay, and the ambassadors of the other great powers in 
Paris but also to the British and French ambassadors accredited to the other 
important capitals notably Berlin and Rome. There were 12 embassies, 46 legations
and 4 general consulates in Paris^and the amount of work in which the Embassy 
was involved was considerable. As indicated previously it is hardly surprising that, 
in a highly fluid and complex situation, there were times when they were unable to 
see the wood for the trees.
Given the instability of the Third Republic, the Quai d'Orsay played a 
unique role in maintaining the continuity of French foreign policy, and its power 
and influence were legendary. Alexis Leger, its Secretary General between 1933
56) Herbert Lottman, The Left Bank. London 1982, p. 142.
57) Ibid, pp.69 & 142. Brasillach was executed for treason in 1945.
58) H.R. Kedward, Occupied France. Collaboration & Resistance 1940-44. Oxford, 1985, p. 12.
59) J.B. Duroselle, La decadence 1932-1939. Paris 1979, p.276.
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and 1940, served under eight successive foreign ministers and was regarded, 
almost inevitably, as 'the permanent master of French policy in this period'/60'1 At 
the onset of Phipps's Paris Embassy, Leger's reputation was at its zenith and his 
influence on the foreign policy of Blum's Popular Front Government was regarded
as decisive/61'1 As will be seen, his apparent hostility to a Franco-Italian
rapprochement, alleged intransigence towards compromise with the dictators, and
\
his close association with Vansittart, led Phipps, increasingly, into a hostile attitude 
towards him.
Intertwined with the activities of the Paris Embassy were those of its 
French counterpart in London, who were equally energetic in pursuing French 
policies, and with whom Phipps increasingly regarded as rivals. Corbin, the French 
ambassador, who was extremely well informed, was hostile to the Munich 
agreements, had a close relationship with Leger, and was friendly with Churchill,
Eden, Amery, Duff Cooper and especially Vansittart who were 'francophiles'<'62'>- a 
euphemism in Phipps's eyes for those whom he regarded as attempting to sabotage 
Chamberlain's appeasement policy. As with Leger, Phipps's relationship with
Corbin who, it was alleged, was 'instigating Daladier to be obstinate about Italy'1'63'1 
also deteriorated and became increasingly hostile.
60) This paragraph has been drawn largely from Elizabeth R. Cameron's excellent (but 
somewhat dated) essay on Leger in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, The Diplomats 
1919-1939. Princeton 1971, Vol.2, pp. 378-405.
61) Ibid, p.392.
62) Duroselle, op.cit., p.278.
63) DBFP. 3,5, no.76 Perth (Rome) to Halifax, 6 April 1939.
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Amongst the important ambassadors in Paris, Phipps's relationship with 
Bullitt was, perhaps, the most problematic. In a tense European situation, the 
British Government were concerned to retain the benevolent neutrality of the 
United States. Like Phipps, Bullitt, the United States ambassador, had close 
personal relationships with a whole variety of French politicians across the political 
spectrum. He was also the intimate of Roosevelt, 'with whom he had daily
protracted telephone conversations'. '  Bullitt reported personally to him and 
acted as his roving emissary in Europe. The freedom of action accorded to him 
gave him the opportunity to affect policy in Paris and London', ^ a n d  the Embassy 
regarded him as insincere, instinctively anti-British, and 'a man to be carefully 
handled'/66^
C) Anglo-French Relations on the eve of Phipps's Paris Embassy
France's security situation deteriorated rapidly after March 1936 and, by 
April 1937 when Phipps arrived in Paris, the demoralization in French circles to
which Sargent had alluded had already begun. ^  The German remilitarization of
64) FO.432/3. Confidential print France Part VII, no.33. Report on the Heads of Foreign 
Missions in Paris for 1936) (written in Oct 1936).
65) Wm. W. Kaufmann, Two American Ambassadors: Bullitt & Kennedy', in Craig & Gilbert, 
vol 2 (op.cit), pp. 653 & 655-6.
66) Reports on the Heads of Foreign Missions for 1936, op.cit., ibid. Phipps shared Sir George 
Clerk's views on Bullitt, consequently the entry in the 1937 report remains virtually 
unchanged. FO.432/4 Part IX, no.l.
67) See Ch. 3, p.34.
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the Rhineland on 7 March 1 9 3 6 ^  had revealed a French loss of will (particularly 
disturbing to its East European allies), and the contradiction between its defensive 
strategy and its commitments in Eastern Europe which became more pronounced 
during the Czech crisis. The Belgian Government had denounced the 
Franco-Belgian alliance on the previous day, and had declared their neutrality.
The Treaty of Locarno was in disarray while the half-hearted French sanctions
against Italy at the behest of the British had alienated Mussolini from France/69'* 
ending all possibility of Franco-Italian military co-operation against Germany.
On the domestic front, French political, social and economic weakness had 
become apparent in 1936 and, together with the British reaction, had acted as a 
restraint on her policy. The election of the Popular Front Government in May with 
its consequent wave of strikes, factory occupations, loss of production, and a run 
on the Franc had weakened France still further. It would be a truism to state that 
France was on the brink of civil war with the country almost equally divided 
between left and right - a situation which, as Phipps was aware, was extremely well
known to H itler^and to Mussolini.
With the outbreak of the Spanish civil war in June 1936, a new and 
dangerous situation arose. Anti-fascism was the raison d'etre of the Popular Front 
which had been formed after the Stavisky Riots to combat the fascist leagues.
68) J.T. Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis of 7 March 1936. London 1977, is the most 
comprehensive work on this topic.
69) Frank M. Hardie, The Abyssinian Crisis. London 1974, passim.
70) See Phipps's farewell conversations with Hitler & Goering in ch.2. This factor was also 
envisaged by Hitler in his war plans against Czechoslovakia in the Hossbach Memorandum. 
Documents on German Foreign Policy. D, 1, no. 19.
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(71}French domestic and foreign policy appeared to be irrevocably intertwined.
Fearing that the civil war would spread to France (and under indirect British
(72)pressure), Blum initiated a policy of non-intervention m Spam. '  Nevertheless the 
Spanish civil war had brought Mussolini closer to Hitler and, together with the 
remilitarization of the Rhineland, the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis and the
Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan, by the end of 1936 Germany had seized the
(73)diplomatic initiative and had become the dominant power in Europe.
In the aftermath of the Rhineland Crisis, the British Government still 
regarded themselves as being bound by the Locarno Agreements and, on 19 March 
1936, had 'joined a mutual guarantee with Belgium and France against unprovoked
aggression'/74-* The Anglo-French staff talks which followed were, however, only 
of a perfunctory nature and disappointing to the French who wanted a more 
binding military commitment by Britain. Eden's speech at Leamington on 20 
November in which he stated that 'if the occasion presented itself the British army 
would be used for the defence of France and Belgium' helped to redress the balance 
and, while it did not imply any additional obligations towards the French, 'special
importance was attached to it in France'/75^  The French reciprocated on 4 
December when Delbos made a voluntary assurance in the Chamber that 'all the 
land, sea and air forces of France would be spontaneously used for the defence of
71) J. Nere, The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945. London 1975, p. 196.
72) David Carlton, Eden, Blum & the Origins of Non-Intervention', JCH. VI, 3,1971.
73) G.L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe. 
1933-1936. Chicago 1970, passim.
74) DBFP. 2,16, no,144.
75) FO.371/20697 (C1903/1903/17). Annual Report on France for 1936, p.4.
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Great Britain and Belgium as well, against unprovoked aggression* '  and, as Sir
George Clerk pointed out, *No French Government since the war had given so
(77)unrestrained an undertaking to come to the defence of Great Britain. '  The 
Embassy's Annual Report for 1936 concluded that Franco-British relations had 
been 'transformed from the atmosphere of suspicion and recrimination' which had
existed at the beginning of the year, and that
it was, however, gradually realized in this country (i.e. France) that 
the threat to French security occasioned by the action of Germany 
was best met by close co-operation with Great Britain and that the 
interests of the two countries coincided in all essentials. This was 
the view consistently held by the Front populaire government which 
came to power in June, and which, from the beginning expressed an 
almost pathetic desire to walk hand in hand with HMG and to work 
in close harmony with them. (78)
Despite these sanguine comments, both Sir George Clerk, Phipps's 
predecessor in Paris, and the Foreign Office were deeply concerned at the internal 
situation in France. Phipps would, in fact, inherit a situation in April 1937 where, 
after the victory of Blum and the Popular Front ten months earlier, some of the 
leading members of the F.O. had already revealed a strong temptation to intervene 
in French internal affairs. Their initial concern was summarized in Clerk's warning 
from Paris that 'the preliminary to Communist victory is the establishment of what
is called the Popular Front' and that
although it is premature at the present juncture to speak of the 
"Sovietisation" of France, the trend of recent developments in this 
country is not yet such as to create an atmosphere in which, given 
certain conditions, a successful attempt at "Sovietization" might be
76) Ibid, p.5.
77) Ibid.
78) FO.371/20697. (C1903/1903/17) Annual Report on France for 1936, p.4
79) FO.371/19859 (C6238/1/17). Encl. in Sir George Clerk's memorandum to A  Eden, 8 
September 1936 on the Sovietization of France.
Clerk's views had been anticipated earlier in a minute by Sargent in August 1936 in
which he strongly advocated British intervention in French internal affairs:
We ought to be able to strengthen the French Government in its 
efforts - or indeed bring pressure to bear to force it- to free itself 
from Communist domination both domestic and Muscovite. Even 
though this might involve at a certain stage something like 
interference in the internal affairs of France, surely it would be 
worth while running this risk? ... all these considerations seem to 
indicate the importance of (1) our prevention France by hook or by 
crook from 'going Bolshevik' under the influence of the Spanish 
civil war; and 2) our freeing Italy from the feeling of isolation & 
vunerability which the Abyssinian affair has left her with. (80)
Points 1) and 2) read almost like guidelines for Phipps's future brief in 
Paris. Additionally, the British decision makers were alarmed at the extent of 
French instability and financial weakness. Apart from disliking the Franco-Soviet
Pact/81\here was an underlying British anxiety concerning the commitments of
France ('with whose future our European strategic position is closely linked')v 
with Poland and the Little Entente. In February 1937, they were specifically 
mentioned in the Committee of Imperial Defence's review of factors which may 
lead to war:
(they) involve great probability that in any struggle in the east or 
south-east of Europe she will become involved. If France becomes 
involves by a decision for which we should have no part, we, owing 
to our geographical and strategical position, are in danger of being 
drawn into a general European war, even though at the moment it 
might be highly dangerous for us.(83)
80) DBFP. 2,17, No. 84. Minute by O. Sargent on The Danger of a Creation of Rival Ideological 
Blocs in Europe, 12 August 1936.
81) DBFP 2,18, Appendix I, Review of Imperial Defence by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee 
of the C.I.D., 22 February 1937, Part I, p.967.
82) Ibid. Partll. Review of Factors which may lead to war, p.969.
83) Ibid. The Italics appear in the printed documents.
Their most immediate fear, however, was that Franco-Italian relations 
would continue to deteriorate because of the ideological tension between a Popular 
Front France and a Fascist Italy. After de Chambrun's resignation as French 
ambassador at Rome in October 1936, the Popular Front Government refused to 
send his successor there on the grounds that he would be accredited to the King of 
Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia' (an indirect admission of Mussolini's conquest) and, 
for the next two years, the French would only be represented there by a Charge
d'affaires, Jean Blondel/84^
By April 1937, this tendency was regarded as potentially dangerous, 
foreshadowing the Committee of Imperial Defence's well-known warning of the 
emergence of three potential enemies (Germany, Italy and Japan) against whom
Britain, lacking adequate resources, would be unable to fight simultaneously/85^  
Neville Chamberlain, who already dominated British foreign policy, would seek a 
rapprochement with Italy, not only to lessen the number of Britain's potential 
enemies but also because Mussolini was regarded as the key to Hitler1 and an 
agreement with Germany was the ultimate aim of his policy. Franco-Italian 
relations were, therefore, regarded as crucially important by the British 
Government especially in the context of the Spanish Civil War where its official 
policy was to  prevent the civil war from developing into a European war, and to
maintain the integrity of Spain'/86^
84) Duroselle, op.cit., p.296.
85) CAB.23/90A Cabinet Conclusions, 8 December 1937. Warning given by the Chiefs of Staff 
Sub-Committee (CID paper no.l366B).
86) DBFP 2,18, Appendix I, Review of Imperial Defence 22 February 1937, op.cit., p.969
Despite divided counsels, most of these precepts were shared by the 
leading officials of the Foreign Office who anticipated, and later shared, Phipps's 
dislike of certain prominent French politicians associated with the Popular Front, 
particularly Herriot, Paul-Boncour and Cot, who were regarded as either 
'hopelessly anti-Italian' or who wished to intervene in Spain or both. According to 
Sargent, Herriot and the extreme left were 'of course, in the pockets of the
(87)Bolsheviks and playing the Russian game with the aid of Russian money*. 
Pierre Cot, who was considered responsible for the deficiencies of the French 
aircraft industry, was singled out for particular vilification.
Blum himself was exempt from these strictures and was, on the contrary, 
the recipient of their almost universal admiration tinged with some anxiety. 
Sargent, in a 'personal & secret' letter to Phipps in December 1936, recounting his 
recent visit to Paris (which he found 'somewhat subdued and frightened') wrote 
that
  the monde is extraordinarily bitter on the subject of Blum.
When I suggested that he had steered them through a social 
revolution without a drop of blood being shed, they replied hotly 
that he was out to ruin the country at the behest of Moscow, and 
that the only man to save France was Daladier. I suggested that 
Daladier has been traitre et assassin no.l only two years ago, and 
that at this rate two years hence they might be acclaiming Blum as 
the saviour of France. But they would have none of it. (88)
The Embassy regarded him as being 'most attractive intellectually1, and 
thoroughly honest'^w hile Lloyd Thomas, the Embassy's minister, told Eden that 
Blum 'is a man of passionate conviction and complete integrity of mind and
87) DBFP 2,16, no. 129 Minute by Sargent, 18 March 1936.
88) FO.800/274 (Fr/36/4) Sargent to Phipps (Berlin), 29 December 1936. Sargent had stayed in 
Paris with Victor Perowne, head of the Embassy's Chancery.
89) FO. 432/4. Part IX, no.4. Report on the Leading Personalities in France for 1937.
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purpose'/90^  Delbos, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose views were
close to those of Blum, was also regarded as 'a convinced exponent of close
(91}co-operation with Great Britain.
Nevertheless, the evidence previously cited suggests that, even before 
Phipps's arrival in Paris, the F.O. were not adverse to using discreet pressure on the 
French Government to achieve their own ends. The most striking example was 
Clerk's advice to Delbos on 7 August 1936 (which the Foreign Office hoped would 
be followed 'as strictly as possible') regarding the supply to Spain of French aircraft 
ordered before the outbreak of the civil war. Clerk warned Delbos not to take any 
action which would make 'close co-operation' between their two countries 'more
(92)
difficult* This interview took place immediately before the French Cabinet 
meeting which then decided to 'observe an attitude of strict non-intervention' in
Spanish affairs/93'* According to Lloyd Thomas, 'the general opinion amongst the
(94}diplomatic corps' was that Clerk's intervention had been decisive. Strong 
elements of continuity therefore existed between the Paris Embassies of Clerk and 
Phipps although *the English Governess' aspect only reached its fruition under the 
latter. Ironically, the decline in Phipps's reputation at the F.O. would occur when 
he appeared to be faithfully carrying out some of their basis precepts.
90) FO. 371/20685. (C2775/18/17). Lloyd Thomas (Paris) Eden, 12 April 1937.
91) FO. 432/4. Part DC no.4. Leading Personalities in France for 1937. Delbos & Blum lived 
in the same block of flats in Paris which reflected their close relationship. This is described 
in John E. Dreifort, Yvon Delbos at the Onai d'Orsav. London 1973 passim.
92) FO. 371/20528 (W7964/62/41). Sir G. Clerk (Paris) tel., 7 August 1936 and minute by 
Shuckburgh, 8 August 1936, who 'approved Clerk's language'.
93) Ibid. W8055/62/41). Clerk (Paris), tel., 8 August 1936.
94) FO. 371/20531. (W8676/62/41). Lloyd Thomas (Paris) to Cadogan, 11, August 1936.
CHAPTER 4
THE FIRST FIVE MONTHS fAPRIL-SEPTEMBER 19371
A) The French Internal Situation (I. To the Fall of Blirnil
In the interregnum preceding Phipps's arrival in Paris, the internal situation 
became increasingly unstable. The riots at Clichy on 16 March had resulted in five
deaths and several hundred injured, ^ ^and Colonel de la Rocque was charged with
(2)
reconstituting the illegal Croix de Feu. Blum's problems had increased with
strikes at Lyons^and in Paris, ^demands from the CGT for more public w orks,^ 
and the possibility that *ultimately he would be forced into a "showdown" with the 
Communists'/6^  Nevertheless, Clerk, in his final despatch,^and Lloyd Thomas,^ 
the Embassy's' Minister who was deputizing for the Ambassador, both continued to 
adopt a sympathetic attitude towards Blum.
Phipps's first long despatch on 28 April outlining the internal situation was
sober, cautious and descriptive, in low key, and without his customary hyperbole
or wit. Despite following the French internal situation closely from Berlin, it is 
possible that the reality may have come as something as a shock to him.
1) F0.371/20685 (C2348/18/17). Lloyd Thomas to A  Eden, 24 March 1937.
2) Ibid (C2604/18/17) Ibid, 6, April 1937.
3) Ibid (C2630/18/17) Lloyd Thomas, 7, April 1937.
4) Ibid (C2941/18/17) Ibid, 19, April 1937.
5) Ibid (C2902/18/17) Lloyd Thomas to A Eden, 16 April 1937.
6) Ibid (C2837/18/17) Ibid, 14, April 1937.
7) FO.371/20685 (C2499/18/17). Clerk (Paris) to Sargent, 30 March 1937.
8) Ibid. (C2775/18/17). Lloyd Thomas (Paris) to Eden, 12 April 1937.
Nevertheless, he concluded that it appeared possible to  regard the immediate
(9)future with rather less pessimism than a few days ago'.
On 4th June, the Embassy transmitted a memorandum by Sandford, a 
moderate right wing socialist and Paris correspondent of the Daily Herald, on the
plight of the French middle c lasses.^  Phipps's comments on Sandford's views 
provided a unique glimpse into his own image of France. They amounted to a 
passionate defence of the French petit-bourgeoise, and there was no doubt where
his sympathies lay:
As regards Mr Sandford's statement that the little men, the real 
"classes movennes" are likely to disappear from France, it should be 
remembered that small landowners, shop keepers etc. with not more 
than 5 employees, independent artisans and persons engaged in the 
liberal professions account in France for nearly 50% of die occupied 
population. To the protection of die interests of this numerous class 
successive Radical Governments have given special care. But it is this 
class more than any other which is likely to suffer from die application 
of the new social laws and, indeed, the whole trend of the social & 
economic policy of the Front Populaire Government is inimical to their 
interests and may well result ultimately, as Sir G. Clerk pointed out in 
the encl. to his despatch no.1164 of September 8th 1936, in their 
,,proletarianisation,,. Such a process is likely to be painful and such a 
prospect is to be deplored on many counts, not least because it is this 
class with its individualistic conception of life which has been 
responsible in the past for so many of the most characteristic 
productions of the French spirit (11)
The Foreign Office were impressed with both Sandford and Phipps's 
observations. Sargent minuted that although approving of the French Government's 
policy 'in a great many particulars' it was well to bear in mind their warnings that 
the French Government's policy was likely in its ultimate results to bring about a 
general proletarianisation of the French nation' and that 'this might well have
9) Ibid. (C3206/18/17). Phipps to Eden, 28 April 1937.
10) FO.371/20686 (C4042/18/17) Phipps to Eden, 4 June 1937 (enclosure in Memorandum by 
Sandford on the plight of the French Middle Classes.
11) Ibid. Clerk's despatch on the Sovietization of France is cited in chapter 3.
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serious and far reaching repercussions on this country (and Europe)'. Vansittart, 
presumably with the German example in mind, minuted 'not might but will most
certainly have such repercussions'.^
Phipps reported on the 11th that Joseph Caillaux, the Chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee, whose reactionary views he would report to London
(13)so zealously over the next sixteen months, and who would play an important
role in bringing down Blum's government a fortnight later
takes a very gloomy view of the financial situation and advocates 
formation of a government of National Defence. Says the 
Government itself tom in different directions. Some of its own 
members are anxious to leave it and disapprove of its policy.
Caillaux does not believe it possible for Blum to extricate himself 
from his acute financial difficulties. Blum is a "doctrinaire" who 
does not know France, outside Paris, and does not realize 
completely different circumstances obtain in the various provinces. 
MCaillaux, however, admits, and even admires the great ability of 
M.Blum. M.Mandel whom I have seen twice lately is even more 
pessimistic.(14)
The reference to 'not knowing France outside Paris' is ironic, given the Foreign 
Office's subsequently severe criticism of the Embassy precisely on this point. As 
later reports confirm, Caillaux was undoubtedly an extremely important influence 
on Phipps and his views coloured the fetter's perception of the French internal 
situation to a markedly unbalanced extent.
12) FO.371/20686 (C4042/18/17). Minutes by Sargent & Vansittart.
13) For the F.O.'s extremely low opinion of Caillaux during the Munich crisis, and his 
involvement with high finance, see chapters 7 & 8.
14) FO.371/20689 (C4247/53/17). Phipps tel., 11 June 1937.
Baudouin of the Bank d'Indochine & Exchange Committee confirmed to Rowe Dutton, the 
Embassy's financial adviser, that the French Government were facing their gravest 
(financial) crisis so far', ibid. (C4220/53/17). V. Perowne (Paris) tel. 10 June & minute by 
Ashton Gwatkin, 15 June 1937.
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By mid-June, the Embassy was bombarding the F.O. with telegrams, five 
being sent to London on one day alone (21 June). The crisis was sufficiently severe 
for Phipps himself to attend the debate in the Senate on the 20th when the Senate
supported Caillaux's refusal to agree to the Government's proposals/15^ Blum 
resigned on the night of 20/21 June, and the Chautemps agreed to President
Lebrun's request to form a new government/16'* the support if not the participation
(17)of the socialist bemg a 'sine qua non" to his formation of an administration. y
(18)Meanwhile strikes continued with a building strike declared on the 21st. 
However, the disorders following the fall of the Front Populaire Government and 
the need to declare an 'etat de Siege' which Colonel Lainey, the ex-head of the
Deuxieme Bureau, had gloomily prophesied to Lloyd Thomas/19^  never 
materialized. After a strong appeal by Blum, the socialists supported 
Chautemps/20^  Always a great stickler for legality, Blum was reported by the 
Embassy as
doing all he can to ensure that the transfer of power from himself to 
Chautemps should proceed smoothly. Most newspapers have given 
prominence to Blum's appeal to all for calm in order that the 
transfer of power may take place in accord with republican legality.
(21)
15) FO.371/20686 (C4442/2/18/17) Phipps tel. 20 June 1937.
16) Ibid. (C4453/18/17). Phipps tel. 21 June 1937.
17) Ibid. (C4462/18/17). Ibid. 21 June 1937.
18) Ibid. (C4486/18/17). Ibid. 21 June 1937.
19) Ibid. (C4517/18/17). Phipps to Sargent, 18 June 1937. Colonel Lainey's views are cited in 
chapter 3.
20) Ibid. (C4487/18/17). Phipps to Sargent, 21 June 1937.
21) Ibid. (C4489/18/17). Ibid. 21 June 1937.
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B) The French Internal Situation (JL The Chautemps Administration!
Phipps reported that most of the important portfolios remained in the same
hands^including Daladier and Delbos at Defence and Foreign Affairs 
respectively. The notable exception was Georges Bonnet, the new Minister of 
Finance, whom the Embassy regarded as, 'able and industrious an authority on
finance' but 'not in the heroic m o u ld '.^  Cot, the Radical Minister of the Air, a 
particular bete noir of the Embassy and of the Foreign Office, who was regarded 
by them as being personally responsible for the deficiencies in the French aircraft 
industry, was retained by Chautemps in the same post. Phipps subsequently 
reported that
I learn on reliable authority that, when M. Chautemps was forming 
his Government, the President of the Republic strongly opposed the 
retention of M.Pierre Cot at the Air Ministry. M. Chautemps was 
quite prepared to drop him, but the socialist ministers made it a sine 
qua non of their support that M.Cot should not only be included in 
M.Chautemps Government but that he should be retained at the 
Ministry of the Air.(24)
Caillaux assured Phipps that Chautemps would be supported by the Senate, 
and would follow Blum's policy of friendship towards Britain but that he would try 
to improve relations with Italy as Blum 'was possessed of a violent hatred towards
Mussolini as being the murderer of Matteoti'.^25^  Phipps confirmed on 23 June that 
'in certain circles the new government is considered to be the first in a series of 
ephemeral administrations' but that, on the whole, it had received a good reception
22) Ibid. (C4547/18/17). Phipps tel., 23 June 1937.
23) Ibid. (C4512/18/17). Phipps tel., 22 June 1937.
24) FO 371/20686 (C4778/18/17). Phipps tel., 1 July 1937. The F.O. were puzzled to find the 
socialists insisting on the retention of a minister who is a radical' (Ibid, minute by Barclay). 
Mandel provided Phipps with the explanation on 6 July, see p.79.
25) Ibid.' (C4515/18/17). Phipps tel., 22 June 1937.
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in the press/26^  The demonstrations in Paris by the Rassemblement Populaire 
including speeches by Thorez, the Communist leader, and Jouhaux, the CGT
(2j\
leader, did not bode well for the new Government. J The socialists continued to 
criticize the Senate's role in 'provoking' Blum's resignation and insisted that the 
Government maintain the programme of the Front Populaire/28^  Blum conciliatory
as always, explained that he had resigned in order to save France from 'grave social
(29)disturbances* '  while President Lebrun appealed for 'calm, order and discipline 
and the abandonment of partisan politics in the interests of the country as a 
whole'. ^
In these circumstances, German and Italian assessments of the French 
internal situation which the Embassy conveyed to London in July, were regarded as 
extremely important. Despite the outward signs of turmoil, both Dr Schacht (who 
was in Paris for talks with the Government) and Count Welczeck (the German 
Ambassador in Paris) considered that these manifestations of French internal 
weakness were superficial. In a very confidential telegram on 12 July, Phipps 
reported that Cerruti, the Italian Ambassador in Paris, had told him that
Dr Schacht had been impressed by the complete order which he had 
found reigning in Paris, and had scoffed at the idea that France was 
trembling on the brink of Communism and drew attention to Count 
Welczeck's impatience with his Government. So annoyed was he 
that on 11 July he had sent his considered opinion to Berlin on the 
recent change of Government in France and had added in his report
26) Ibid. (C4548/18/17). Phipps tel., 23 June 1938.
27) Ibid. (C4643/18/17). Phipps tel., 26 June 1937.
28) Ibid. (C4678/18/17). Phipps tel., 28 June 1937.
29) Ibid. (C4887/18/17). Phipps tel., 5 July 1937.
30) FO.371/20686. (C4886/18/17). Ibid, 5 July 1937.
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that public opinion in Germany had been misled in this matter by 
foolish reports issued in the Nazi press.(31)
There appears to be no reasons to doubt the veracity of their remarks. 
Cerruti, a former Italian Ambassador to Germany, was an old colleague of Phipps 
from his Berlin days. He had a Jewish wife, disliked Nazism and had 'spoken his 
mind too plainly about Hitler1 who, regarding him as an obstacle to good relations
(32)with Italy, had obtained his removal from Berlin in 1935. J Count Welczeck, the 
German Ambassador in Paris, an aristocrat and a career diplomat of the old school 
who was 'much liked by the Quai d'Orsay', was believed by the Embassy to  have 
no sympathy with some of the tenets of the German regime, but to be so valuable 
as a diplomatic representative that, although this is recognized in Germany, it is
(33)unlikely to interfere with his career1. '  Phipps added, T believe that his reports 
occasionally annoy Hitler, for he writes what he believes to be the truth about 
France and not what the Nazis wish to hear1/ 34^  As early as December 1936, in the 
midst o f the Popular Front Government's severe problems, Welczeck had reported 
to Berlin that
If the sum total of all factors necessary for a successful war is taken 
into account, France's position can be described as strong... the 
dangers of a communist revolution, in which well informed people 
have never believed, appears to have been banished.(35)
31) Ibid. (C5081/18/17). Ibid, very confidential, 12 July 1937.
32) Esmonde M. Robertson, Mussolini as Empire Builder. London 1977, p.42 and pp. 142-3.
33) FO.432/4, C.P.France, Part IX, no.l Reports on Heads of Foreign Missions in Paris for 1937. 
The entry was written (presumably by Clerk) in 1936.
34) Ibid, addition by Phipps in 1937.
35) Documents on German Foreign Policy. Series C, Vol VI, no. 110, Ambassador Welczeck to 
Foreign Minister Neurath, 26 December 1936 (sent 6 January 1937).
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Schacht too, according to the German documents, had expressed his reservation to 
Berlin concerning supposed French social, political and financial weakness/36^  
Circumstantial evidence would indicate, therefore, that their remarks concerning 
the French internal situation were genuine. Sargent minuted shrewdly that, 'the 
trouble is that however strong France may really be, the outward and visible signs 
which she at present displays are those of weakness rather than strengths', to which 
Eden added 'Yes, even my colleagues in the Government feel this, and I confess it
is difficult always to deny the justification'^ - sentiments with which Phipps 
would have probably agreed.
On 2 July, the Chamber and the Senate gave Chautemps the full powers
which they had denied to Blum/38'* In his detailed commentary to Rowe Dutton's 
analysis of Bonnet's financial programme, Phipps agreed that his attempts at 
financial reform were 'honest and whole hearted', the Government realized that 
vigorous action was needed and that capital should not be frightened away:
... if social progress is to be continued within the framework of the 
democratic system, the acquiescence of both labour and capital 
must be secured in certain sacrifices. M. Blum fell because he failed 
to secure the co-operation of capital. M. Chautemps with the same 
majority & the same programme, but under Radical instead of 
Socialist direction, has equally to command these two elements if he 
is to succeed. His appointment of MBonnet, a man who was 
considered to enjoy to a considerable extent the confidence of 
capital and of the Right, and to be on terms of trust & friendship 
with banking interests, gave rise to the hope that M. Chautemps 
would be more successful than M.Blum. Meanwhile, his left flank
36) DGFP. D, vol. I, no.72 Schacht: Memorandum on visit to Paris May 25-29, 1937. Schacht 
added that Political dependence (by France) on England is extraordinarily great'.
37) FO.371/20686 (C5081/18/17) Minutes by Sargent & Eden, 15 & 16 July 1937.
38) FO.371/20690 (C4864/53/17). Phipps to Eden, 2 July 1937.
- 6 6 -
was protected by the acceptance by M.Blum of the post of 
Vice-President du Conseil.(39)
Phipps reiterated that other observers also feared that the government
would not last long and that it would be succeeded by 'a number of transitory
(40)governments representing the same majority in different forms'. Unless they had 
the support of both capital and labour 'national unity and confidence' would be 
weakened
and at a moment when labour is in ferment and its future 
organisation & relations with the political world are undetermined, 
the prospect of drastic financial reforms having eventually to be 
undertaken by a Government much further to the Right which did 
not enjoy the confidence of labour would be disquieting. A great 
deal depends on the extent to which M.Chautemps can count on the 
Socialist Party. (41)
(42)Phipps was correct in his diagnosis although unlike Noble Hall, and 
others, his sympathies lay almost entirely (and uncritically) with 'capital', and his 
most severe strictures were reserved for labour1. Noble Hall and Strang's severe
39) FO.432/3. C.P. France, part VIII, no.3 Phipps to Eden, 12 July 1937.
40) Ibid.
41) Ibid.
42) On 20 April, Lloyd Thomas had forwarded a memorandum from Noble Hall, the Secretary 
of the Travel Association of Great Britain in Paris, a somewhat shadowy organization with 
links to the British Council and the Secret Intelligence Service, on public opinion in the 
French provinces. Noble Hall emphasized that the plutocratic interests believe that the social 
revolution now in progress is the most serious France has ever known and they are so 
thoroughly alarmed that they would sacrifice even the interests of their country to save their 
skins', and that 'some of the most prominent industrialists would rather see the establishment 
of fascism in France with the armed support of Hitler & Mussolini than submit to the 
dictation of labour, others equally influential & perhaps more numerous would rather run the 
risk of another war1. Gudgeon, HM Consul at Lille, endorsed Noble Hall's reference to the 
unpatriotic attitude of the economic & financial interests' while Strang minuted that 'the 
moneyed classes... will apparently sacrifice the national interest for the sake of their pockets'. 
F0.371/ 20685 (C2990/18/17). Lloyd Thomas to Eden, 20 April 1937 (Encl. memo by Noble 
Hall), and minutes by Ashton Gwatkin & Strang, 30 April 1937. For the Travel Association, 
which was used by MI6 and British clandestine propaganda, see Nicholas Pronay & Philip 
MTaylor, 'An Improper Use of Broadcasting1, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 19 no3, 
1984, pp.357-383.
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criticism of the 'plutocratic interests' and the 'moneyed classes' was an element
(43)which would be entirely missing from his subsequent reports from Paris.
C) FQREIGH AFFAIRS
a) The Schacht Discussions and the Western Pact
The Schacht discussions illustrate that Phipps's resistance to appeasing
Germany remained consistent both in Berlin and in Paris throughout 1937. They
reveal that his views had not yet converged with those of Chamberlain but were,
however, still very acceptable to Eden and the Foreign Office particularly to its
(44)Assistant Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Orme Sargent. J
Initially the Foreign Office regarded colonial discussions with Dr Schacht, 
the German Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, as a 
distraction from their real task, the creation of a new Western Pact to replace the 
Locarno agreements. While in Berlin, Phipps had reiterated that the subject of 
colonies had become a monomania with Dr Schacht' and was merely a ploy 'in 
order to retain the Chancellor's good will' which would not deflect Hitler from the
course of expansion in Eastern Europe outlined in Mein Kampf. . / 45^  He admitted,
43) It is significant that after his retirement from the F.O., Phipps became a director of the 
Midland Bank. Who was Who. Vol IV. 1941-1950, London 1952, p.912.
44) Sargent was also the Superintending Under Secretary of the Central Department (headed 
by William Strang) which dealt with France and Germany. FO.371/19930 (C7870/97/18), 
Phipps (Berlin) telegram 4 November 1936 and ibid (C7894/97/18) 5 November 1936.
45) Phipps (Berlin) to A.Eden, 19 October and 22 October 1936 quoted in Andrew J, Crozier, 
Appeasement and Germany's Last Bid for Colonies London 1988, p. 184.
however, that if Schacht succeeded in initiating negotiations then he (Schacht) 
would be in a position to influence Hitler.
On 2 February 1937, Sir F. Leith Ross, the British Government's Chief 
Economic Advisor, had provided Phipps with an account of his discussions with Dr
(47)Schacht at Badenweiler. y Phipps's reply on 11 February, revealing his opposition 
to colonial discussions with Germany, had created tension inside the Berlin 
Embassy and has provoked an unprecedented and a highly irregular intervention by
a member of his own staff. Phipps reported that
The question of the return of the colonies to Germany is one of high 
politics for decision by HMG. My own views on this subject have 
been set forth more than once and I will not inflict them upon you 
again. There is one point, however that I think should be 
remembered. If HMG essentially decide in favour of the return of 
certain colonies I hope they do so with their eyes open and without 
harbouring any illusions regarding possible "guarantees" from 
Germany that she will never establish air or submarine based there 
or train black troops etc. (48)
Pinsent, the Financial Adviser at the Berlin Embassy, told Leith-Ross 
privately on 10 February that he, and another member of the staff, had both 
understood Phipps's draft to mean that 'Germany would not keep any agreements 
she makes therefore it is useless to conclude agreements with her*. Pinsent had 
argued that this was 'a sterile and dangerous attitude' but Phipps had told him that 
'his meaning was quite different' and, despite its ambiguity, he had refused to 
change the text. Pinsent informed Leith-Ross that he was
46VDBFP- 2,18 no.53 Phipps (Berlin) to Sir Orme Sargent, 11 January 1937.
47) T188/169. Leith-Ross to Phipps (Berlin), 4 February 1937. This also contains the former's 
congratulations on the tetter's appointment to Berlin.
48) T188/169. Phipps (Berlin) to Leith-Ross, 11 February 1937.
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a little alarmed at the possibility of the F.O. reading it in the first 
sense above and taking it as E.P's final word. If this should occur, 
could you possibly, without giving me away, raise a query as to the 
Ambassador's meaning and ask the F.O. to verify it.
I have never written on any important point without the 
Ambassador's knowledge and I only do it this time because I have 
his own word for what he means, though he refused to take the hint 
and express himself more clearly. (49)
On 13 March, Phipps forwarded the German reply to the British note of 19 
November 1936 regarding the Western Pact negotiations which amounted to a
virtual rejection of the British offer/50^ and this was discussed at the. meeting of the 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy on 18 March. Chamberlain, who was still the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, was adamant that no opportunity should be lost to 
reduce international tension and, following Leith-Ross's earlier talks with Schacht 
it was decided to begin exploratory talks with the French to initiate a joint
approach to Berlin/51^  It was further agreed on 6 April that, since Schacht's 
demarche was regarded as crucial and Phipps would not arrive in Paris until the 
25th, Lloyd Thomas, the Embassy's Minister would open the discussion with 
Delbos.^
Phipps, who had taken over Lloyd Thomas's brief immediately on his arrival 
in Paris, notified Eden on the 2 6 th ^  that during his first interview with Delbos
49) Ibid. Pinsent (Berlin) to Leith-Ross, 10 February 1937. The identity of the second member of 
the staff, referred to as 'Brian', has proved impossible to trace. According to the F.O. List for 
1937 none of the staff at the Berlin Embassy bore this Christian name.
50) DBFP. 2,18, no.280. Phipps (Berlin) to Eden, 12 March 1937.
51) CAB.27/622. Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy, F.P.(36) Concl. 7th meet 18 March 
1937.
52) Ibid Cab. C/tee on For.Policy, F.P.(36) Concl. 8th meet 6 April 1937.
53) FO 371/20707 (C3139/1/18). Phipps tel., 26 April 1937.
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(and as instructed) he had been careful to emphasize that 'we did not ask the 
French Government to consider the possibility of weakening in any way the 
operation of France's existing obligations'. Eden reiterated to Phipps on the
27thv that while there was uncertainty as to Schacht's exact authority, 'every 
advantage should be taken to explore the possibilities of an agreement with 
Germany*. He suggested a joint Franco-British communication seeking a German 
assurance that the negotiations would ultimately include, inter alia, a treaty to 
replace Locarno, limitations on armaments, and Germany's return to the League of 
Nations. The French Government should regard the communication as highly 
secret, and Phipps was instructed to seek their views but not to leave any written 
communication with them.
Fortunately, Phipps had achieved a close rapport with his old acquaintance, 
Blum, and with Delbos, in the short time he had been in Paris. He had had four
meals with Delbos in less than a w eek^and, at 'a very friendly luncheon' with 
Delbos and Blum at the fetter's house on 2 May, they were mostly in agreement 
with the British views/56^  However, they dug in their heels over the possible 
transfer of the French mandates (Togoland and the Cameroons) and Phipps felt 
that 'in view of the Minister's reaction to our enquiry, it would be desirable to let
the matter drop'/57^ Delbos, he reported, was even more opposed to the cession of
54) CAB.27/626. Cab. C/tee on For.Policy F.P.(36). Eden to Phipps (Paris), 27 April 1937. 
Eden's despatch was based on the final version of drafts circulated to the Cabinet earlier and 
especially on Chamberlain's 'Outline Programme' with F.O. revisions.
55) FO. 371/20735 (C3362/270/18). Phipps (Paris) to Eden, 4 May 1937.
56) Ibid.
57) FO.371/20735 (C3362/270/18) Phipps (tel) to Eden, 4 May 1937. Also CAB27/626. 
F.P.(36)30
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the French colonies than Blum/58^  There was consternation at the Foreign Office
and intense discussion over their next move. Cadogan and Vansittart felt that it
would be better to abandon the colonial idea altogether rather than 'disappoint' the
Germans' to which Eden minuted 'attractive, but I think impossible, like 
(59)isolation* '  In reply Sargent's request to clarify his remark about letting "the
matter drop'^Phipps replied that he
only meant that we should let the question of a possible cession of 
Togoland and Cameroons drop, in view of the strong objections of 
the French Ministers to making what French opinion would 
consider a one sided sacrifice on the part of France. (61)
Phipps clarified this further on 10 May, that in order to bring about 'a 
satisfactory and final general settlement with Germany, the French ministers would 
not refuse to consider the cession of certain mandates - providing the British 
Empire should 'make at least as great territorial sacrifice as France with a view to
that general settlement'/62^  Eden thought that it was undesirable for Leith-Ross to 
meet Schacht as it would attract unwelcome publicity, and he was opposed to 
Bullitt, the United States ambassador, being drawn into the
conversations/63 ^ Phipps, who regarded Bullitt with intense suspicion, had
58) Ibid. (C3362/270/18. Phipps (letter) to Eden, 4 May 1937.
59) Ibid. Marginal comment by Eden to Cadogan's minute.
60) Ibid. Sargent to Phipps, 7 May 1937.
61) Ibid. Phipps tel. 8 May 1937.
62) CAB.27/626. F.P(36)31. Phipps to Eden, 10 May 1937.
63) Ibid. Eden to Phipps, 11 May 1937.
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critidzed his earlier for 'advocating talks with Hitler1 and for 'being convinced of
his ability to work political w onders',^now  renewed his attack on him:
Mr Bullitt is inconveniently active here and has established relations 
of greatest intimacy with the French Government. He will certainly 
see Dr Schacht in any case; but I did indicate that conversations 
proposed by M.Delbos between Mr. Bullitt & Dr Schacht should 
have no connection with those the French wished to have with the 
latter and French Ministers agreed. Mr Bullitt is, however, known 
here to be in the President's confidence, and I fear in future, as in 
the past, it will prove difficult to prevent him from putting his finger 
into every pie. Efforts to do so would almost certainly become 
known to him, and might make his into an even more awkward 
enemy than he may... (65) x
Phipps was criticized at the Cabinet Committee on Foreign M icy  meeting 
on 10 M ay/66-* Sir Samuel Hoare the First Lord of the Admiralty thought that he 
liad not pressed the French Ministers very hard at his meeting with them on 3 May 
and asked, somewhat sharply, *what exactly Sir Eric Phipps meant by his 
concluding remark that "in view of the French Ministers reaction to our enquiry it 
would be desirable to let the matter drop". Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer,
agreed that Sir Eric Phipps did not appear to have stressed the 
Government's point of view strongly at the meeting in question. He 
seemed to have accepted the French Ministers' "non possumus" too 
readily. After all, M.Blum had stated that France would not refuse 
to consider the return of German colonies in the last resort and in 
return for a final settlement. (67)
It is significant that, at this early stage of his ambassadorship at Paris, 
Phipps was accused of 'not pressing the French Ministers very hard'. Subsequent 
criticism of him was the reverse, and he would be accused of interfering too much
64) PHPP. 1/19. Phipps to Eden, 2 May 1937.
65) CAB.27/626. F.P(36)31. Phipps to Eden, 11 May 1937.
66) CAB.27/622. Cab.Comm, on For.Pol. Concl. of 10th Meet, 10 May 1937.
67) Ibid.
in internal French politics. An interesting insight into Phipps's real views during his
early ambassadorship in Paris was provided, ironically, by Bullitt himself in two 
despatches of 30 April 1937. While Phipps regarded Bullitt as unreliable, these 
reports of their two conversations have the ring of authenticity (including Phipps's 
cynicism and pessimism), and confirm that his views on appeasing Germany had
been formed in Berlin:
(At lunch with Delbos & Phipps) Phipps who had just been 
transferred to Paris from Berlin exhibited a hostility to Germany and 
the German Government surprising to me. I questioned him with 
regard to Germany's colonial demands. He said that the German 
Government had informed him that it would be satisfied with 
nothing less than the return of all the colonies taken from Germany 
by the Treaty of Versailles. He went on to say that he considered 
Hitler a fanatic who would be satisfied with nothing less than 
domination of Europe.
There was much conversation between Delbos & Phipps on the 
theme that peace might be preserved in Europe if England and 
France should show their teeth to Germany and have behind them 
the benevolent neutrality of the United States.... They agreed that it 
was now desirable to attempt to push conversations with regard to 
settlements in the matter of armaments not because they thought 
that any result would be achieved but because they felt it would be 
desirable to keep Germany talking about something while Britain 
rearmed.(68)
Bullitt's account of his long conversation with Phipps that afternoon was 
even more revealing. Phipps has stated that he 'did not see the faintest possibility 
of coming to any agreement with Hitler1, and that his Berlin experiences had shown 
him that *the only thing which would impress the Germans today was military 
force':
He (Phipps) believed that any negotiations which might be begun 
today with Germany by England or France would end in failure 
unless France and England should be prepared to accord Germany 
absolute domination of the international situation. .. it was his 
opinion and that of his Government that the only chance of 
preserving peace was for Great Britain to rearm as fast as possible 
and during the period of rearmament try to keep Germany quiet... it
68) Foreign Relations of the United States 1937. vol 1, nos 556-557, pp.84-85.
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would be absolutely impossible for Great Britain to promise to 
come to the support of Czechoslovakia if Czechoslovakia should be 
attacked by Germany... Germany could take Austria at any time she 
liked... Sir Eric then said he was somewhat disappointed to find that 
there were people in Paris who still believed that it might be 
possible for France to come to terms with Germany. He considered 
this totally impossible...(69)
There is no doubt, therefore, that Phipps had no faith whatsoever in 
negotiations with Germany at this stage, i.e. while Britain's rearmaments were still 
in a state of unpreparedness, and that he was not, as yet, fully committed to all of 
Chamberlain's views. This, plus his intense sympathy for the French viewpoint, 
particularly over the colonial question, had rendered him psychologically unable *to 
press them' over concessions to Germany.
In the event, Phipps's reservations had proved correct. On 23 May, he 
reported that Neurath had stated that French should not take Schacht's declarations
too seriously '.^ Even more authoritatively, Goering had reiterated Neurath's
'identical words' that the colonies were T)r Schacht's hobby but were not regarded
by Herr Hitler or himself as of the same immediate importance' and that as the
Fuhrer's representative in charge of the Five Year Plan, Schacht 'came under his 
(71)orders'. * The discussions themselves on 28 May were something of an 
anti-climax. Blum told Schacht that 'in the first instance a general political 
settlement must be reached, after which economic discussions, with or without
possible colonial concessions, could fo llow '.^  Schacht was 'uncharacteristically
69) Ibid, nos 563 & 565, pp 85-86.
70) FO.371/20710 (C3738/3/18) Phipps (tel) 23 May 1937.
71) T188/169. Henderson (Berlin) tel, 25 May 1937.
72) PREM. 1/330. Conversation with Dr Schacht about a general settlement 1936-37. F.O. 
Memorandum, 22 January 1938.
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mute', he did not hurry to report the results to his superiors, and it was obvious
that 'his initiative had run its co u rse '.^  Leger informed Phipps that the German
(74)press had been ordered 'to make as little of the Schacht visit as possible'.
b) Phipps. Dodd and Henderson
As a footnote to the Schacht discussions, the brief affaire Dodd illustrates 
the pitfalls facing Phipps as an ambassador and his skills as a diplomat. Despite
their ambivalent relationship,^5^ his ex-colleague, William E. Dodd, the United 
States ambassador at Berlin, wrote privately to him on 1 July asking whether there 
was anything they could do to  limit the pressures in the direction of war1. ^  Dodd 
was concerned by the excessively pro-German attitude of Sir Nevile Henderson, 
Phipps's successor at Berlin, and whether his views represented official British 
policy. Phipps, for his part, was particularly disturbed by Dodd's comment that 
German pressure 'for English approval of German control, and actual annexations, 
of the Danube-Balkans zone is greater than at any time since my residence began', 
and that:
I can see how English public opinion might even favour that rather 
than a risk of war. Your Ambassador here has said more than once 
to me that English public opinion for such "Bismarckian" expansion 
is the proper thing and even asked if the United States would not 
approve such a move and join a moral triple alliance.
73) Crozier, op.dt., pp 204 & 205.
74) T188/169. Phipps (Paris) tel. 29 May 1937.
fcAt
75) Apart from anything else, Dodd disliked Phipps's sympathies for I fascists in Spain. See 
chapter 3.
76) FO.371/20711.(C5541/3/18). William E. Dodd (U.S. Embassy Berlin) to Phipps (Paris), 1 
July 1937.
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Dodd was unable 'to give any intimation1 (presumably to Henderson) that 
Roosevelt's government would consider 'such a combination' and neither would 'a 
reactionary regime in the United States'.
Well aware of the sensitivity of Dodd's information, Phipps saw Vansittart 
on 28 July. On 11 August, he told the latter that he had written to Dodd promising 
him a lengthy reply and that, in the meantime, he had assured him that 'the policy of 
HMG... was by no means as that derived by him (Dodd) in conversation with
Nevile H enderson'.^ He also sought material from Vansittart for his promised
f78)reply. '  Vansittart was unhappy with the F.O.'s suggested draft reply which 
Phipps would be authorized to sign, and was adamant that a misunderstanding had 
not occurred (as Phipps had discreetly suggested) since *this sort of language
accords with what... Henderson has written in papers I have seen’. He was
most anxious that this should not get to the USA in the guise of any 
view representative of this country... it is a melancholy reflection 
that we should have to spend any time in thinking how to protect 
ourselves against our own Ambassador. (79)
The Foreign Office concluded that as far as Phipps was concerned, there is nothing 
more that need be done'^and Phipps for his part, was relieved to let the
77) FO.371/20711 (C5541/3/18). Vansittart to Phipps, 11 August 1937.
78) Ibid.
79) Ibid. Minute by Vansittart, 4 August 1937, Vansittart had bitterly critized Henderson's views 
on Anglo-German relations and the League as expressed to Garnett of The League of Nations 
Union, and had minuted that This kind of thing cannot go on.— Sir NHenderson seems to 
have foiled so far to grasp the responsibility of his position, and we shall have to recall it to 
him'. Vansittart concluded In 35 years experience I cannot recall such a series of incidents 
created by an ambassador - and in so short a while. He is exceeding his functions and 
exceeding them light headedly*. FO 371/20736 (C5377/270/18) Henderson to Sargent, 20 
July 1937 (Enclosure: Henderson to Garnett (League of Nations Union), and minute by 
Vansittart, 30 July 1937.
80) FO.371/20711 (C5541/3/18). Vansittart to Phipps, 11 August 1937.
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'correspondence' drop/81^  Vansittart sent him the Central Departments
'compendious' draft letter for him to sign, and made no secret o f his anxiety at
(%2)Henderson's 'injudicious expression of his views'. J In the event, Eden decided 
not to send the drafts to Henderson at Berlin and Lindsay at Washington but to 
'discuss the matter orally* with Henderson instead, and he was instructed to come
to London at the beginning of September.
C) Intervention in Spain
Any French Popular Front Government would be bound to produce 
tensions in Anglo-French policy towards Spain not least over the extent to which 
Italian intervention could be tolerated. While ideological considerations were of 
lesser importance for Chautemps than for Blum, there were grave strategic reasons 
for French anxiety. This aspect tended to be underestimated by the British 
Government which feared the spread of the civil war beyond the confines of Spain, 
and whose official policy was to localize it by means of the Non-Intervention 
Committee which discriminated against the Republican Government. Above all, as 
they perceived it, they had no intention of allowing themselves to be sucked into a 
Franco-Italian conflict which could lead to a European war.
For this reason alleged French violations of the Non-Intervention
(84)Agreement (which the Italians had already seized upon), 'albeit considerably
81) Ibid. Phipps to Vansittart, 12 August, 1937.
82) Ibid. Vansittart to Eden, and to Phipps, 12 August 1937.
83) Ibid. F.O. minute, 16 August 1937.
84) For e.g. FO.371/21330 (W6624/7/41). Drummond (Rome) tel., 5 April 1937.
more modest than those of the Axis powers, were of particular concern to the
Cabinet and to the Foreign Office. Information concerning these French breaches
were reported by the Embassy, where possible, to the latter. It was public
knowledge, for example, (mostly through the sensational French press reports on
the 'arms traffic') that Cot, the Minister of the Air, and an ardent supporter of the
Spanish Republic had organized aircraft shipments to Spain in July 1936 and that
(85)part of the Spanish gold reserves were used as a guarantee for the payment.
On 4 June, the Embassy's Air Attache reported a conversation with a 
representative of the British Aircraft Company in Paris regarding aircraft supplied
to Spain by foreign countries, and Group Captain Colyer concluded that
When I asked Captain Bartlett whether it could really be be true 
that M. Pierre Cot would deprive his own Air Force of the aircraft 
which it so badly needed in order to hand them over to the Spanish 
Government, he said that unfortunately it was capable of proof 
beyond any possibility of doubt that was in fact what he was doing.
(86)
Vansittart described this as
not only... a shameless breach of faith & honour by the French 
Government in the person of this young crook - it is a deliberate 
weakening of a French Air Force that is already in a pretty poor 
way. And, since we are bound to France by pledges that they value 
in eventualities that cannot be excluded in Western Europe, we have 
more than an interest, we have a locus standi in some sort in 
considering it not only compromising to France's reputation but to 
her security if all these new machines are to be sent & used up in 
Spain, and only the crocks retained in France. (87)
85) Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War. London 1965 (Revised Penguin edition) p.295.
86) FO.371/21335 (W10771/7/41). Memorandum by Grp Capt Colyer (Air Attache, Paris), 4 
June 1937.
87) Ibid. Minute by Vansittart.
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Eden, who was surprised that Phipps 'had not commented at all upon this story*, 
initially considered taking up the matter in Paris but it was decided not to proceed
/gg\
beyond Vansittart's 'oral communication' to Corbin.
Georges Mandel confided to Phipps (in Bonnet's presence) that the
aeroplanes despatched to Spain by Cot were sent with Blum's permission:
on mention being made of the stories of the despatch by M.Cot of 
aeroplanes to Spain a year ago, M.Mandel... stated that the 
machines had been sent by the French authorities with the. explicit 
permission of M.Blum and that it was because of this "skeleton" 
between them that M.Blum had insisted upon the inclusion of 
M.Pierre Cot in the Chautemps Government. (89)
In fact, throughout his tenure of office, Cot continued to send arms deliveries to 
(90)Spain. Additionally, as will be seen, he was also bitterly attacked by the Foreign 
Office over the deficiencies of the French military aircraft industry for which he 
was held personally responsible.
The divergence between the British and French attitude was highlighted by 
the Embassy’s despatch of 23 September which Eden circulated to the Cabinet on 
the 29th which
explained the point of view of the French Government, which was 
very generally held at Geneva. It brought out what M.Chautemps 
had now emphasized, that the Spanish Question had ceased to be 
one of politics of the Left or of the Right in France, but had become 
 one on which the General Staff predominated.(91)
88) Ibid. Minute by Eden.
89) FO.371/21340 (W13091/7/41). Phipps tel., 6 July 1937.
Duroselle described Blum as practicing 'la pieuse supercherie de fermer parfois les yeux sur 
des passages clandestins d'armes, et de munitions a travers les Pyrenees-Orientales'; Auriol, 
Cot & Moch were in charge of this Ires modeste operation' which qualified as 'contrabande 
officielle'. J.-B. Duroselle, La Decadence 1932-1939. Paris 1979, p.318.
90) Hugh Thomas, op.dt, pp.305 & 332.
91) FO.371/21345 (W18656/7/41). Cabinet Conclusions: Spain, 29 Sept 1937. Chautemps had 
emphasised this in his long conversation with Eden who had passed en route through Paris 
on his way home from Geneva. Eden had provided the Embassy with an account of their 
conversation including Chautemps's threat to reopen the frontier if the Italians obtained bases 
in the Balearics & the Canaries and if French communications were threatened.
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The F.O. were unsympathetic to French fears that Italian intervention in Spain 
threatened their security, and they were in general agreement with Sargent's long 
minute on the dangers of the situation which would form the basis o f his 'strictly
private' letter to Phipps in October^outlining their views on the situation.
Phipps was aware of divisions in the French Cabinet - Bonnet, in particular,
had informed him that 'General Franco would win' and criticized French and British
(93)policy Tor not knowing which side they wished to see triumph'. * Divisions in the 
British Cabinet - over how to deal with the Italians and the opposition to Eden's 
Spanish policy, were described by Sargent in a second private letter to Phipps in
October/94^
Phipps's despatch of 28 September came, therefore, at a sensitive moment. 
Leger had told him that the French Government were convinced that Mussolini 
would support Franco until he was finally victorious; Italian assurances only meant 
that this support would not be directed against France and that more 
reinforcements were on the way to Spain. Leger was 'more violently anti-Italian 
than ever1, and had no confidence in Italian good faith - they were 'brigands and
(95)pirates and all possible precautions should be taken against them'. J Vansittart
FO.371/21345 (W17810/17853/7/41) Eden to Lloyd Thomas (Paris), two tels., 22 September 
1937.
92) FO.800/274 (Fr. 37/6). Sargent to Phipps CPrivate), 8 Oct. 1937. see ch.5.
93) FO.371/21340 (W13081/7/41). Phipps tel., 6 July 1937.
94) PHPP H.2/1. Sargent to Phipps CPrivate), 15 October 1937. See Ch.5. By July 1937, 
Chamberlain had lost confidence in Eden's ability to ameliorate Anglo-Italian relations and 
had begun to bypass Eden and the F.O., preferring to deal directly with Mussolini'. Jill 
Edwards, The British Government & the Spanish Civil War 1936-39. London 1979, pp 119 
& 153.
95) FO.371/21345 (W18099/7/41). Phipps tel., 29 September 1937.
sent a 'strictly private' letter to Phipps on the 29th (with instructions that it should 
be destroyed) stating that the passages referring to Legeris anti Italian feelings may 
have added to our difficulties' and that 'interesting and valuable information of this 
kind' should be contained in a despatch or else in a letter to Eden or himself. Both 
he and Eden felt that 'these passages are likely to be fastened upon to the exclusion
of others by some of our critics'/96^
Following Vansittart's advice, Phipps elaborated on his conversation with 
Leger in a 'private and confidential' letter to Eden on 30 September. Leger had told 
him that Hitler would 'swallow up' Austria without force whereas 'a general 
conflagration' would be required for Mussolini to obtain Valuable Mediterranean 
booty1. According to Phipps, Leger's ‘whole tone' regarding Italy was Unbalanced 
and almost hysterical'. He contrasted him with Chautemps, who lias no more 
illusions regarding Mussolini than any of us' but who was sufficiently realistic to  
feel that it is advisable for the present to conceal that fact from the Duce'. Phipps 
was
so acutely aware of the importance of not giving the Quai d'Orsay 
the impression that I wish to work on Chautemps behind their backs 
that I asked Leger himself to arrange my interview with Chautemps, 
and even went so far as to express to him the hope that he (Leger) 
should be present thereat. He was not present, however.
Phipps reminded Eden that if the franc suddenly dropped sharply, 'we shall have a 
Government of National Union here' - in which case, Chautemps amongst others,
would have 'a great deal to say in all big decisions'/97^  The Autumn of 1937, 
therefore, marked the beginning of the informal aspects of the decision making
96) PHPP.2/18. Vansittart to Phipps ('Strictly private*), 29 September 1937. Despite Vansittart's 
injunction, this letter was preserved amongst Phipps papers and is reproduced in DBFP. 2, 
19, p.335, f.3.
97) PHPP.1/19. Phipps to Eden (Private & Personal*), 30 September 1937.
process as it affected Phipps's Paris Embassy, which would increase as the 
international situation deteriorated.
D) The Condition of the French Armed Services and of France*s Security
The British Government still regarded themselves as being bound by the
Treaty of Locarno and the question of French security and the condition of its
armed services was, therefore, of vital interest to them. This was monitored closely
by the Embassy's service attaches and their reports were forwarded to London via
Phipps who was thus fully appraised of the French military situation and its
preparedness for war. Foremost amongst their concerns was the poor state of the
French Air Force and its military aircraft industry which had recently been
nationalized. These considerations were amongst the primary factors underlying
Phipps's pessimistic reports during the Munich crisis.
Throughout this period, Group Captain Colyer, the Embassy's Air Attache,
(98)forwarded a series of pessimistic reports on the state of the French Air Force
which were confirmed by the Industrial Intelligence Centre and Air Staff
(99)Intelligence. These, in turn, produced increasingly bitter attacks by the Foreign
98) Colyer's reports of 14 May, 24 June, 17 Aug. & 13 Sept.1937 are in FO.371/20694 
(C3571/C4601/C5966/C6436/122/17).
99) FO.371/20694 (C5215/122/17). Industrial Intelligence Centre. Report on the situation & 
production capacity of the French Aircraft Industry (signed by D.Morton), 26 June 1937.
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Office on Pierre C ot/100\he  Minister of the Air, whom they regarded as being
personally responsible for its deficiencies/101^
These attacks on Cot culminated in Colyer's report in September - that 
sections of the French press had accused Cot of being a Comintern agent but that it 
was 'difficult to see what advantage the Comintern would reap from a weakened
France'^ 102\vhile Lloyd Thomas found it 'impossible' to believe the allegations/103^  
The British delegates travelling to Geneva via Paris were provided with copies of 
Colyer’s reports in case an opportunity arose of discussing the matter privately with
Delbos/104^  Rumbold minuted that
... this report must finally dispose of any illusions we might still have 
on the subject of the French Air Force, for Capt. Colyer now 
frankly describes it as "a broken reed". In their report to the CID in 
July (C5604/G) the Air Staff said that it was safe to assume that the 
French Air Force would not be fit to engage in a European War for 
another year. At the same time it appeared from their report that the 
French Air Force would, regarded numerically, become 
progressively more inferior to the Germans as time went on...
100) Two examples in June 1937 are Sargent's remark that 'I wish for our own safety that M.Cot 
could be got rid of, and Vansittart's description of Cot as 'a remarkable liar*. 
FO.371/20694 (C5049/C5215/122/17). Minutes by Sargent & Vansittart, June 1937.
101) The excessive French self confidence in their air superiority, to which Cot had greatly 
contributed, lasted until the end of 1937. Patrick Fridenson & Jean Lecuir, La France et la 
Grande-Bretagne face aux problemes aeriens 1935 - mai 1940. Vincennes 1976. p. 14.
102) FO.371/20694 (C6436/122/17). Lloyd Thomas to AEden, 13 Sept. 1937 (Enclosure in: 
Grp.Cpt. Colyer to Grp.Cpt. Buss (Director of Operations & Intelligence, Air Ministry), 7 
September 1937.
103) Ibid. Lloyd Thomas to Eden, 13 September 1937. Transmits copies of Air Attache's report 
of 6 Sept. together with his covering letter of 6/9/37 to the Air Ministry. Lloyd Thomas's 
observation was probably correct No conclusive evidence appears to exist proving that Cot 
was a Comintern agent; he did, however, virtually become a fellow traveller after 1945.
104) Ibid.
Vansittart minuted that he had already spoken to Corbin 'unofficially and 
personally' on the subject and Eden stated that he had expressed his concern twice
to Delbos.^105^
In a wide ranging conversation with Phipps in July, General Gamelin told 
him that the French Army was in excellent condition and well supplied. The 
Germans, on the other hand, would 'never build anything as formidable as in 
Maginot Line' and they would be unable to sustain a long war. Responding to 
Phipps's question regarding the French air force, Gamelin stated that it would, 'in 
conjunction with the British, prove a match for the Germans'. Phipps also asked 
him 'what would happen in the event of an attack by Germany on Czechoslovakia', 
and derived 'the strong impression' that France would respond. Gamelin was 
certain, however, that Germany 'would not move as long as our two countries 
remained strong and united'. In the light of subsequent events, Phipps conclusion
was unintentionally misleading:
The general impression that I derived from my talk with General 
Gamelin is that he is a man of quite remarkable common sense and 
sang-froid and unlikely ever to give way to any kind of panic or 
undue pessimism. 106)
Phipps's elaborated his own views on the probable French reaction to any 
potential German aggression against Czechoslovakia or Austria in a despatch to
105) Ibid. Minutes by Rumbold, Sargent, Vansittart and Eden. The C.I D's report on the French 
Air Force dated 7 July 1937 was printed together with a paper on the Progress of German 
Air Rearmament F0.371/ 20734 (C5604/185/18). Its other main conclusion was that the 
French Air Force was 'generally inferior' to the Luftwaffe and could 'no longer be 
considered superior to the Italian Air Force'. Strang and Cadogan had found its 
comparisons and conclusions 'disquieting'.
106) FO.371/20696 (C4888/822/17). Phipps tel., 5 July 1937. Phipps's 'strong impression' that 
the French would respond to a German attack on Czechoslovakia was at variance with the 
view of the Embassy's military attach .^ Comparing the French military position to that of 
Germany in July 1937, Colonel Beaumont-Nesbitt noted cryptically that 'the reluctance to 
resort to war as a solution to political or national problems is shared by the French General 
Staff. Ibid. (C5048/122/17) Col. Beaumont Nesbitt (Military Attache, Paris), 5 July 1937.
Eden on 13 July. This was included in a collection of papers circulated to the 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy which met on 29 July to discuss possible 
German action in Central Europe. Adopting a reproachful tone towards Blum for 
having given reassurances to the Czechs that the French would assist them (and 
referring to Blum's 'somewhat facile optimism towards political and social
problems'), Phipps concluded on a careful note:
It would be outside my province to express an opinion on the 
efficacy of any assistance which the French could afford to 
Czechoslovakia in present circumstances, but since the German 
occupation of the Rhineland, I admit that I have found competent 
and impartial observers to be generally sceptical on the subject. As 
regards Austria I can speak with much less confidence, France has 
no treaty obligations towards her. ... The strategic difficulties of 
French intervention on behalf of Austria, would, I understand from 
my military attache', present even greater difficulties in the eyes of 
the French General Staff than in the case of Czechoslovakia...
Phipps did not see at the present time how the French Government 'could do 
otherwise than once more accept the painful fait accompli/ 107^  This prophetic 
despatch, written eight months before the Anschluss and almost eighteen months 
before Munich, shows that, despite his eulogy of Gamelin's supposed qualities, 
Phipps was under no illusions regarding the limitations of France's military power 
or her strategic dilemma.
107) FO.371/20711 (C5126/3/18), Phipps to Eden, 13 July 1937. Also in CAB.27/626 Cab.Com. 
on For.Pol. F.P. (36)36 Meet 29 July 1937, Possibility of Action by Germany in Central 
Europe.
CHAPTER 5
THE DECLINE OF THE POPULAR FRONT AND THE ANSCHLUSS 
fOCTOBER 1937 - MARCH 10.19381
This period, which included the French ministers' visit to London and 
Delbos's visit to Eastern Europe) marked Phipps's emergence as a convinced 
Chamberlainite. The decline in the French international situation plus the 
deterioration in the international situation coincided with two important changes 
which had a profound effect on his Paris Embassy.
a) In early 1938, Eden's resignation as Foreign Secretary marked 
Chamberlain's temporary ascendancy in the field of foreign policy making. Eden's 
dislike of Mussolini was well-known and his views on Spain were criticized by the 
Cabinet. Phipps, who had been appraised of the background privately by Sargent 
and Hankey, was caught between these changing and conflicting views. After 
Eden's resignation, he was able, more openly, to advocate the pro-Italian views 
which he had consistently held since his Berlin days, and this was facilitated by his 
more relaxed relationship with Halifax.
b) Vansittart was relieved of his post as Permanent Under Secretary and 
was replaced by Cadogan. Theoretically this removed an important source of 
personal tension since it ended Phipps's quasi-subordination to Vansittart. 
However, towards the Munich crisis, in his less influential role as Chief Diplomatic 
Advisor, the latter emerged as one of his bitterest critics.
Anglo-French differences over the question of Italian intervention in Spain 
intensified with the French threatening to reopen their frontier thus nullifying the
Non-Intervention Agreement. The Sudeten problem (which had been simmering 
throughout 1936 and early 1937) also began to emerge as a second, and potentially 
more serious bone of contention. Chautemps's Government fell in March 1938 and 
the Anschluss, which pointed to the direction of Hitler's next target, 
Czechoslovakia, occurred while France was without a Government. This interim 
period, and the political instability which followed, was the prelude in March 1938 
to the Embassy's first major interference in French internal affairs.
I) 1 October to 31 December 1937
A) Informal Aspects and Cross Currents in London
Sargent's three personal, informal and highly irregular letters to Phipps 
provided him with a rudimentary framework which generally underpinned many of 
his official reports to the F.O. during this period.
The background to Sargent's first letter was the increased Franco-Italian 
tension in late September/early October 1937. Mussolini and Ciano had visited 
Berlin, references had been made to 'the solidarity between 115 million Germans 
and Italians'/1^  and French anxiety had increased.^ Almost simultaneously, 
Colonel Stone, the British military attache in Rome, had personally presented his 
report on the movement of Italian forces in Abyssinia, Libya and Spain which the
F.O. considered important. Sargent, who regarded it as proof that Mussolini
1) FO.371/21175 (R6538/200/22). Phipps tel. 1 October 1937.
2) Ibid. (R6444/200/22). Lloyd Thomas tel. 28 September 1937.
3) FO.371/21169 (R6799/69/22). Movements of Italian forces overseas, Colonel Stone, Military 
attach^ Rome), 1 October 1937.
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would reinforce his Volunteers' if the French frontier was opened, wanted it to be 
made clear that
we are not going into any adventures with them (i.e. the French) in 
Spain and that all we can expect is to get Mussolini to implement 
his promise to declare openly that he had no territorial ambitions in 
that country.(4)
Sargent's concern was that the opening of the French frontier would amount to a 
denunciation of the Non-Intervention Agreement, and he concluded that *we shall 
have firmly to take the lead, so as to prevent any foolish or precipitate action on
the part of the French'.^
This F.O. minute formed the basis of Sargent's 'personal and private' letter
to Phipps on 8 October in which he admitted that
it is very irregular of me to be writing to you in this way so don't 
refer to this letter either in any despatches or private letters which 
you may write to me. On the other hand, it may be of use to you, if 
you decide to report further on French policy: to have in mind the 
various questions which are preoccupying some of us here, while of 
course, personally, I need hardly say how very much I should like to 
know what your own views and impressions are on this important 
subject.(6)
Sargent's private letter was precipitated by the joint British and French notes to the 
Italian Government on the 1st reminding them of their assurances regarding the
CT)Balearic Islands and the despatch of further Volunteers' to Spain. J Above all, it
4) Ibid. Minute by Sargent, 4 October 1937.
5) Ibid.
6) FO.800/274 (Fr/37/6). Sargent to Phipps (Paris), 8 October 1937.
Sargent had been guilty of similar ,irregularities, at least twice. In December 1936, when he 
had forwarded to Phipps in Berlin a minute which he had 'conveyed to the Secretaiy of State' 
(presumably appended to the former's despatch) with instructions to destroy it 'as it had better 
not enter the Embassy archive'. Ibid (Fr/36/4) Sargent to Phipps (Berlin), 29 December 1936. 
Later, in a 'secret' letter to Phipps in May 1937 regarding the colonial discussions, he had 
enclosed a copy of the minute he had appended to one of his telegrams with the comment Tor 
your own veiy private ear & eye (only)'. Ibid. (Fr/37/4) Sargent to Phipps (Paris), 7 May 
1937.
7) DBFP. 2,19, no.216 F.O. to Perth (Rome), 1 October 1937.
was prompted by alarm at Delbos's remarks to Phipps on the 5th that, in the event 
of a negative reply, they should consider taking some prise de gages, open the 
frontier, and permitting the Spanish Government to obtain arms and ammunition in
(8)transit across France'.
Sargent confided to Phipps that he was unhappy about the way in which the 
British Government, 'more or less at the instance of the French', were trying to 'get 
Mussolini to withdraw his volunteers without waiting for a Franco victory1, and he 
was uncertain whether the French were bluffing. He was concerned that, if the 
French publicly opened their frontier they would be tearing up the non-intervention 
agreement' and the Italians could send further reinforcements and legally this time'. 
Would the French then intervene militarily, and would Hitler remain neutral? I t  
however, the Italians remained there permanently, 'it would become another Nazi 
state taking orders from Hitler and Mussolini and threatening the flanks of France 
and Great Britain'. The main question, however, was whether the French were 
prevaricating:
In fact, are they proposing the "reopening of the frontier", against 
their better judgement and fully conscious of developments it may 
lead to, only because it is the gesture demanded by their Socialist & 
Communist supporters? If so, would they welcome a firm veto by 
HMG as a pretext to use with their own people for not opening?
And, lastly, in all these calculations how much are the French 
influenced, by their wish to prevent, for purely ideological reasons, 
the establishment of a dictatorship of the Right and to facilitate the 
establishment of one of the Left?(9)
As requested by Sargent, Phipps did not reply directly to any of these questions, 
but there is evidence that he bore these aspects very much in mind.
8) Ibid. no.220, Phipps (Paris) to Eden, 5 October 1937.
9) FO.800/274 Fr.37/6). Sargent to Phipps, 8 October 1937.
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On 12 October, Delbos, who considered that the Italian reply to the joint 
British and French notes could hardly have been more negative in essential points', 
read Phipps a summary of his instructions to Corbin for his interview with Eden on
13 October/10^  He wanted both governments to state jointly that withdrawal of 
volunteers should begin immediately and a reinforced system of control instituted. 
If these proposals were rejected they should consider the Non- Intervention was 
'suspended' and both governments should 'authorise temporarily the transit of arms 
to the Spanish Government through our own countries and from our own
countries'/11^  Eden informed Phipps that he had told Corbin that 'it was asking a 
lot of us' to suggest that, if this attempt failed, arms should be supplied to the 
Spanish Government only* as there was 'much attachment' in Britain to the
non-intervention policy. Eden concluded that
On the other hand, if this final attempt to secure progress in their 
Committee were to fail, I thought the French Government would be 
justified if they decided to allow the transit of arms across their 
frontier to Spain, but it was one thing to ask us to endorse that 
decision and another to ask us to take similar action to that which 
the French Government might decide upon in respect of the export 
of arms to Spain.(12)
Two days later, with Delbos's demarche (and Eden's response) very much 
in mind, Sargent sent Phipps a second, far more revealing, 'private' letter with the
10) DBFP. 2, 19, no.240 Eden to Phipps, 12 October 1937. The quotation from Delbos appears 
in both the English & French texts of his instructions to Coibin and the tatter's interview 
with Eden. There is a curious discrepancy in the passage which follows. The English text 
continues: 'It ruled out, though in the most friendly manner, each of the proposals that we 
made' (Ibid). However, the French original states: *Non seulement il ecarte les propositions 
qui lui avaient &e faites en termes amicaux...' (DDF, 2e series, VH, no.55). This distorts 
(and softens) Delbos's remarks which were that the French conducted their proposals in a 
friendly way, not that the Italians rejected them in a friendly way. It seems doubtful whether 
Coibin deliberately disregarded Delbos's instructions by changing their meaning. The 
question arises whether the mistranslation was intentional (for the record) or a 
straightforward error.
11) DBFP. 2,19, no.240 Eden to Phipps, 12 October 1937 (Note 1, p.391).
12) Ibid.
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(13)
plea that, 'for heavens safe keep all this to yourself and tear up when read'. 
According to Sargent, Eden's Spanish policy had met with 'considerable opposition'
from a number of his (cabinet) colleagues who:
1) Refused to believe in the urgency, gravity or inevitableness of the 
Italian danger; (2) object to having our Spanish policy dictated by 
France (& particularly a socialist France); and consider the French 
plan of frontier opening... as provocative without being effective, 
and (3) hold that it is essential (having regard to Germany) for this 
country to be friends with Italy & that an offer of friendship is a 
better way of averting the Spanish danger than direct action.
Sargent included Hoare, Kingsley Wood and the Chiefs of Staff amongst the
opposition, and he regarded Chamberlain as the 'conciliation' between Eden and the
opposition. Eden and Vansittart had apparently returned from their conversations
with Chautemps and Delbos (at Geneva and in Paris) convinced that the French
were united in believing that the Italians must leave Spain. Sargent, who appeared
to be contradicting or reversing his earlier view that the British Government should
not involve themselves in 'adventures' with the French in Spain, now stated that
We were in honour - and in interest - bound to give the French 
Government all possible support in the measures they wanted to 
take in defence of French security, on the grounds that in the 
present state of Europe French security was identical with British 
security and that any sign of disagreement between Great Britain &
France at the present moment would be fatal.
Furthermore, Eden and Vansittart now believed that a Franco victory, 'above all a 
Franco victory this year1, would be contrary to British interests because he would
13) PHPPII2/1. Sargent to Phipps, 15 October 1937.
- 9 2 -
'never be able to maintain himself without his Italian allies who would dig 
themselves in '/14'* The only hope was that this victory would be delayed until the
Italians buckled under the strain:
But meanwhile we have committed ourselves to the threat of 
"resuming our liberty of action" and the impending problem is how 
to save our faces if when challenged we do not put the threat into 
force and if we do put it into force we do so effectively. (15)
Sargent's letter was indicative of the confusion reigning in Foreign Office 
circles. Confirmation concerning the disarray caused by Eden's attitude towards 
Spain was provided to Phipps privately by Hankey who told him that 'an official of 
one of our departments' was distressed because 'a member of the Staff of the
French Embassy1 had complained to him that
his chief was much bothered because he didn't know whether, when 
Anthony (Eden) talked to him he was speaking the views of HMG 
as a whole or his own. This enabled me to talk with great freedom 
to Van. The latter had received a similar message through the 
mouth of (queer emissary!) a supposedly discreet joumalist.( 16)
Hankey further informed Phipps that he had appealed to Vansittart that 'an effort 
should be made to bring about the complete agreement and coordination that is 
vital in these dangerous times'. Vansittart had agreed (a) to advise Eden, inter alia. 
to 'exercise great care in the correctness of all information given to the Cabinet or
14) Eden reiterated these views to the Cabinet on 29 September, adding that it would not be a 
Spanish victory because of Franco's dependence on the Italians who would stay in Spain 
indefinitely after the war ended. He agreed with the French General Staff that Italian motives 
were to obtain submarine bases Tor bargaining purposes or pressure' in the event of war. 
DBFP. 2,19 no.208 Cabinet Conclusions 35(37), 29 Sept- 1937. Chamberlain's officially 
expressed view at the Cabinet Meeting on 13 October 1937 was that 'it did not matter which 
side one so long as it was not a German or an Italian victory... if we could secure the removal 
of the volunteers it would become a Spanish civil war ,and not a foreign war1. CAB.23/89, 
Cabinet meeting 13 October 1937 (p.290) 37(37). Chamberlain appears to have relied solely 
on appeasing Italy to achieve this aim. According to Keith Feiling, he *pressed* the 
application of non-intervention to the full*, Life of Neville Chamberlain. London 1946, 
p.299.
15) PHPP.H. 2/1. Sargent to Phipps, 15 October 1937.
16) PHPP.3/3. Hankey to Phipps, 11 November, 1937.
the French and avoidance of tendencious information on matters o f fact', and (b) to
suggest to the French that they should keep their frontier closed. Hankey who had 
'prepared the ground' via Horace Wilson 'at the other end' and had urged that Eden
should meet privately with Chamberlain before the cabinet meeting, told Phipps
(17)that this was the best' he could do.
Sargent's third 'irregular' letter to Phipps, written on the eve of the visit of 
the French ministers to London in late November, illustrated clearly the struggle 
which was continuing in London over the direction of policy. It also echoed 
Vansittart's warning to Phipps in late September to be careful about what he put in
saving telegrams which were circulated to the Cabinet:
A word of warning. When you want to tell us what critics of the 
present French Government say about the latter, don't send your 
information in a Saving telegram but in a private letter or despatch.
Saving telegrams on political subjects (except telegrams 
summarizing the press) receive a wide distribution. This means that 
they go automatically to Cabinet Ministers, certain of whom are 
only too glad to quote and exploit any criticism of that terribly 
pseudo-Communist Government in France, to the coat tails of 
which our F.O. is usually tied, when it would be so much nicer and 
more proper to have it tied to the good conservative and 
anti-communist coat-tails of Hitler and Goering. This kind of thing 
gives the poor Secretary of State unnecessary fil a retordre. for 
which we would like to save him. (Indeed it is he who asked us to 
write to you in this sense...(18)
Phipps, whose views on Italy were closer to Chamberlain than to the F.O., 
did not reply directly to Sargent's irregular' letters. He reserved his personal views
for a private letter to his old friend, Hankey:
Chautemps is really like an English liberal, bound for internal 
reasons, to Labour & Communist allies. Franco British union will 
not necessarily be served by blindly following the foreign policy of 
the extreme Left Wing (under Blum) of the Front Populaire 
Government. On the contrary, a majority of the French people,
17) Ibid.
18) FO.800/274. (Fr/37/7). Sargent to Phipps, 29 November 1937.
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including Chautemps, bless us today for appointing agents to 
Franco, and would dearly like to follow our good example.(19)
Like Sargent, Phipps also professed to admire Blum (who had initiated 
non-intervention) and was well aware that neither he nor Delbos were 'extreme left 
wingers' and that the French strategic dilemma was real. This period, the 
conclusion of which marks Phipps's emergence as a convinced follower of 
Chamberlain's views, also marks the zenith of his personal relationship with 
Sargent. In the small closed circle of the Foreign Office and diplomatic service, 
Sargent obviously regarded him not only as an old colleague but also as a close
confident and possibly as a friend/20^  After March 1938, their private
correspondence becomes sparse and the informal aspects, as they relate to the Paris 
Embassy, shifted away from the Foreign Office and closer to the real centre of 
power at 10 Downing Street.
Meanwhile, despite Hankey*s letter of 11 November, Phipps may not, at 
this stage, have been appraised of the full extent of the divisions over policy which 
were taking place in London. Hankey had been concerned at F.O. gullibility about 
stories of Italian reinforcements to Spain', an d had prepared a note to the Prime
Minister/21^  He had omitted to tell Phipps that Chamberlain had asked him 
'privately1 to do anything he could to stress to the F.O. the importance of 'better
19) PHPP.3/3 Phipps to Hankey, 25 November 1937.
20) In December 1937, for example, Sargent told Phipps (somewhat touchingly) that 1 am 
distressed to think that I shall not see you and Frances (i.e. Lady Phipps) when I come to
Paris for Xmas'. PHPP.2/1. Sargent to Phipps, 4 December 1937.
21) PREM. 1/360. Hankey to Horace Wilson, 6 October 1937.
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relations with Italy'. ^  Neither had he conveyed to Phipps the intensity of his
remarks to Vansittart:
... perhaps I am wrong to say what follows, and I only do so 
because I know that some other people feel the same, namely a 
doubt as to whether the F.O. are really convinced from the bottom 
of their hearts that we ought to make friends with Italy or that we 
can do so. It would obviously require a good deal of effort on the 
part of the whole Office including especially the Press Dept. It is 
the sort of effort that can only be made by people who are 
absolutely convinced. ...my only excuse for writing is that from the 
point of view of Imperial Defence some development of the kind to 
be vital to the existence of the Empire & of the U.K. as a first class 
Power. (Hankey's italics). We must have it even if it is only for a 
few years while we rearm.(23)
However, Hankey told Phipps that he had 'discreetly passed on' what he 
had said about Chautemps and 'the risk of blindly following the French right' (sic), 
and added that
Strictly between ourselves, I think it probable that an attempt will 
be made at the same time to get a little bit further at the other end 
of the "Berlin-Rome axis". Van has now come round to the point of 
view that it is desirable and by no means impossible to do something 
at the Rome end. I do not think he is equally hopeful of the Berlin 
end. He thinks the fundamental difficulties are too great. At heart I 
do not think his Chief thinks there is very much doing at either end.
Bum this. (24)
In any case, given their close friendship and the similarity of their views over 
Germany and Italy, Hankey's ideas were part and parcel of Phipps's own unspoken 
assumptions. As will be seen, they were expressed more openly and confidently 
during this period.
22) CAB.21/558. Hankey to Horace Wilson, 5 November 1937.
23) Ibid. Hankey to Vansittart, 3 November 1937.
24) PHPP.3/3. Hankey to Phipps, 26 November 1937.
The reference to the dangers of blindly following the French Right' is surely a Freudian slip, 
and Hankey intended to write'... French Left'. As has been seen, Phipps habitually ignored 
injunctions by Hankey, Vansittart and Sargent, to bum or destroy their personal, private or 
'irregular1 communications to him and, fortunately, many of them are still extant Given the 
intricacies of British foreign policy in the late 1930s, he presumably retained them as an 
insurance policy rather than out of sentimentality.
Phipps was not, however, merely the passive recipient of these 'irregular1 
and 'private 'letters. Apart from those to Hankey, his two personal and secret 
letters to Eden in October also fall into this category.
(1) On 6 October, Phipps reported his conversation with Buneau-Varilla,
(25)the owner of the Matin and an old acquaintance^ who told him 'under the seal of 
secrecy1 that:
Delbos, soon after taking over the Quai d'Orsay told him that Leger 
was in the pay of the Soviets. B.V. advised Delbos to kick Leger 
out at once, but this he has failed to do. The other day Delbos 
infuriated B.V. by remarking: "Jaime mieux etre Russe qu' 
Allemand".
Buneau-Varilla further alleged that Sauerwein had been sacked from the Matin 
because he had discovered that Leger was paying him 'about 30,000 francs a 
month'. Phipps concluded that 'of course B.V. (like Rothermere) has a bee in his 
bonnet over Bolshevism, but nevertheless I feel I must let you know1. The marginal 
note on the draft in Phipps's handwriting read: 'To be copied in Chancery & return 
to me unentered'. This was a blatant attempt to denigrate Leger (who was rapidly 
becoming Phipps's bete noir) and Delbos who both favoured a more militant 
attitude towards Italian intervention. Phipps knew that Buneau-Varilla was an 
extremely unreliable source. His rule at Matin was characterized by nepotism, 
corruption and hypocrisy and Theodore Zeldin, who described him as 'representing 
the mad dictator type of press magnate', stated that 'his conceit verged on
megalomania'/26^  Phipps himself had reported in May that Buneau-Varilla's 'fear 
of communism, combined with his admiration of force leads him to favour undue
25) PHPP.1/19. Phipps to Eden, Personal & Secret', 6 October 1937.
26) Theodore Zeldin. France 1848-1945. vol 2, Oxford 1977, pp. 531-2.
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weakness to the Fiihrer1, and that he had stated that Britain was 'on the brink of
(27)
Bolshevism'. '  His mild observation that he had 'a bee in his bonnet over 
Bolshevism' was a deliberate understatement. By omitting to remind Eden of his 
previous despatch and by refraining from clarifying Buneau-Varilla's personality 
and career, Phipps was misleading Eden as to the reliability of his information.
(2) On 12 October, Phipps informed Eden that Flandin had told him that 
Fran9ois-Poncet, his ex-colleague in Berlin, was very depressed about the 
rapprochement between Hitler and Mussolini' even though there was 'little personal
(28)sympathy' between them. J The draft contained a marginal note in Phipps's 
handwriting, 'Return to me unentered then typed no copies... M inister) to see'. 
Given Mussolini and Ciano's recent and apparently successful, visit to Berlin, it 
appears puzzling that Phipps had chosen to be so secretive about such a 
comparatively inconsequential piece of information, unless he was attempting to 
influence Eden's views. Flandin was known as a strong supporter o f the 
appeasement of Italy and was adamant that the French frontier should remain 
closed. It may be possible that Phipps was attempting, in some way, to reinforce 
certain of Flandin's views prior to their forthcoming conversation on 19 
October/29^
27) FO.371/20710 (C3348/3/18). Phipps tel., 2 May 1937.
28) PHPP.1/19. Phipps to Eden, 12 October 1937.
29) Seep.99.
B) Foreign Relations
While Sargent had informed Phipps privately that Eden and Vansittart were 
convinced that 'all sections of French society were united in their belief that the
Italians must leave Spain'/30\here was by no means any agreement in Paris on how 
this should be achieved. Phipps had reported that Delbos and Leger had advocated 
a more militant line against Mussolini. The Embassy regarded Chautemps's views, 
as reported in September, as being more satisfactory, and Phipps had insinuated his
own views into the conversation:
Chautemps did not conceal his profound distrust of Mussolini but 
agreed that distrust must be concealed from latter as much as 
possible. He also agreed that the price we should pay at Italian end 
to avoid a maximum working of Rome-Berlin axis would be 
infinitely smaller than at the German end. (31)
Even before Sargent's 'irregular1 letters on the Italians in Spain, Phipps was 
cautiously attempting to mould the views of certain prominent French politicians 
along the lines of 'official' British policy. His dispatches outlining important 
conversations now frequently also described his own responses and were not 
merely one sided reports of his interlocutor's views. In this he was assisted by his 
long acquaintance with the leading French personalities which gave these reports 
an informal aspect. This was particularly striking in the case of Blum on 10 
October to whom he gave the misleading impression that their conversation was 'a 
friendly and entirely private one' and which he then proceeded to report in its
entirety to London/32^
30) See p.91.
31) FO.371/21175 (R6460/200/22). Phipps tel., 29 September 1937.
32) FO.371/21162 (R6741/1/22). Phipps tel., 10 October 1937.
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Blum made it clear that the Berlin-Rome Axis was unshakeable and Phipps 
therefore urged great caution and the avoidance of giving Mussolini 'any pretext 
for causing a clash' while British rearmament was nearing completion and during 
the transitional state of the French air force. Phipps then attempted to undermine 
his credibility by emphasizing his unworldliness by drawing attention to Blum's 
'astonishment' at his (Phipps's) remark concerning the poor state of the French air
force. Blum assured him that
he was passionately anxious to avoid war but felt that the best way 
of doing so was that France and Great Britain should not give any 
undue impression of weakness in the face of Italian aggression. To 
this I naturally agreed.(33)
Phipps's hand was firmly on the tiller and he was not adverse to borrowing the 
views of those on the left (including Blum) when his interlocutor veered too far to 
the 'right' as was the case with Flandin.
Flandin's reaction to the threat to reopen the frontier was, in fact, probably 
the strongest. On 19 October, he told Phipps that if it was opened for arms 
shipments to the Spanish Republic, he would demand the immediate summoning of 
Parliament adding that Chautemps and Bonnet were cautious and that the majority 
of French people were absolutely opposed to being dragged by Russia into a war
over Spain'. Flandin emphasised:
how vital it was to show great caution in present incomplete state of 
British rearmament and in present highly unsatisfactory state of 
French military aviation... French production now only amounts to 
70 aeroplanes per month, and will not be more for many months to 
come. (34)
Flandin's arguments echoed those which Phipps had himself used to Blum 
in their conversation of the 10th. Phipps, in a diplomatic balancing act, then
33) Ibid.
34) FO.371/21347 (W19342/7/41). Phipps tel., 20 October 1937.
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proceeded to quote Blum's words almost verbatim as if they were his own views. 
He warned Flandin that it was important to avoid giving Mussolini the impression 
of French and British weakness. Flandin agreed but strongly objected to 'a
one-sided opening of the French frontier:
the result of which would be to afford excellent pretext to Mussolini 
for sending more troops to Spain, or even for taking some step 
opposed to really vital French or British interests such as effective 
occupation of Majorca. (3 5)
According to Phipps, Caillaux also wanted non-intervention to continue unless 'a 
great power* installed itself in Spanish territory and threatened the vital interests of
France/36^
President Lebrun, who had invited Phipps into his box at the opera on the 
22nd, spoke 'rather feelingly1 about the uphill fight he had been waging for some 
time against "certain ministers" who had been inclined to pursue a policy of
adventure in Spain'. Such a policy, he told Phipps, had
no majority in the country and there would be no majority even in 
the present Front Populaire Chamber: five sixths of the Socialist 
Radical Party would in the last resort vote against it... M.Lebrun 
told me that it had been his endeavour throughout the Spanish 
conflict to remain completely neutral and impartial. He declines to 
believe that Franco's victory need necessarily be against the interests 
of France, or that Franco would seek to purchase that victory by the 
surrender of Spanish territory. The President's calm & dispassionate 
view of the Spanish war does not, however, imply that he ignores 
the grave danger to the peace presented by Mussolini and his brutal 
methods.(37)
Bonnet went further and told Phipps that he was grateful for the way in which the 
British Government had kept the French government on the right lines regarding
35) Ibid.
36) Ibid. (W19440/7/41). Phipps tel., 21 October 1937.
37) FO.371/21347 (W19542/7/41), Phipps tel., 23 October 1937.
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Spain' and referred to *the uphill fight he had waged against most of his colleagues 
of the French Cabinet1 Z38"*
The British Cabinet had, in fact, concluded on 20 October that, HMG 
should tell the French that they could not agree to sell arms to Spain... that they
should continue the policy of non-intervention'/39^  However, Delbos told Phipps, 
presumably with his forthcoming visits to Eastern Europe in mind, that 'any undue 
weakness on our part' would produce a very bad effect on the smaller powers, and 
that
the only way he can see for France & G.B. to "resume their liberty 
of action" is for both to declare that they will permit freedom of 
transit for arms & munitions to Spanish Government territory only 
(France by land & G.B. by sea). For G.B. merely to approve such 
French action without taking it herself would be a lamentable 
confession of disunion. In that event France would probably decide 
not to open her frontier and would have to resign herself to 
becoming a second class power. If HMG have any other plan to 
suggest in event of a breakdown, the French Government will be 
only too ready to consider it.(40)
(41)Delbos was reiterating the views expressed to Eden via Corbin on 13 October 
which were anathema to Phipps. The latter replied somewhat lamely that the 
quantities of arms which the British could send 'would probably be small', to which 
Delbos retorted that this was unimportant 'what was essential was the close
38) Ibid. (W19656/7/41). Phipps tel., 23 October 1937. It is curious that the expression *uphill 
fight' which is attributed to President Lebrun on 23 October was also ascribed to Bonnet on 
25 October. There are other such similarities in Phipps's reports of his conversations with 
French personalities. They were conducted in French, presumably written up from memory, 
and were then translated by him for his despatches which were in English Some interpolation 
may have occurred, intentionally or unintentionally.
39) FO.371/21347 (W19573/7/41). Extract fiom Cabinet Conclusions (38/37) 20 October 1937.
40) FO.371/21347 ((W19543/7/41). Phipps tel., 23 October 1937, and Ibid. (W19609/7/41). 
Phipps tel., 25 October 1937.
41) Delbos had read these instructions to Phipps who had also received Eden's report of the 
interview. DBFP. 2,19, no.240 Eden's to Phipps, 12 October 1937.
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solidarity of France and Great Britain'/42^  Delbos's remarks carried an added 
urgency during the Italian troop concentrations in Libya in October which was 
sufficiently serious for the Commander in Chief Mediterranean Fleet to ask Eden 
whether it called, at least temporarily, for 'special measures being undertaken for
the defence ofEgypt'/43^
The Embassy received a further, unwelcome, reminder of the difficulties 
involved in appeasing Italy. The French had been without an ambassador since the 
Comte de Chambrun had left Rome in October 1936. On 30 October 1937, unable 
to tolerate the resulting "disparite" any longer1, the Italian Government recalled
(44}
Cerruti. J Phipps, whose tenure at the Berlin Embassy had overlapped with that 
of Cerutti, regarded him as 'a loyal and friendly colleague' who had always reported 
the truth' to Rome, he anticipated a further deterioration in Franco-Italian
relations^and in fact the Italian press attacks on France intensified/46^  The 
Italian perception of French weakness (which the Italian press had emphasised)
was again raised by Cerruti during his farewell conversation with Phipps:
when last he (Cerruti) saw Ciano the latter had reproached him for 
being alone in sending optimistic reports about France and that in 
reply he told the Count that in spite of internal difficulties the
42) FO.371/21347 (W19610/7/41). Phipps tel., 25 October 1937.
43) FO.371/21169 (R6972/69/22). Cmdr. in Chief Mediterranean, 16 Oct 1937. The Italian 
naval reservists had been called up on 7 October. The French naval attach^ at Rome thought 
they were probably 'confined to certain specialists who are needed to serve on the anti-piracy 
patrols when they are finally started' but McDermott minuted that 'our latest information 
suggests less satisfactory conclusions'. FO.371/21168 (R6703/69/22) Phipps tel., 8 October
1937.
44) FO.371/21182 (R7260/2143/22). Phipps tel., 30 October 1937.
45) Ibid. (R7216/2143/22). Phipps tel., 28 October 1937.
46) Ibid. (R7369/2143/22). Perth (Rome) to Eden, 1 November 1937, and (R373/2143/220) 2 
November 1937.
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French Army was the finest in the world and untouched by 
communism.(47)
Phipps, who commented that all the Italian 'unofficial agents' regarded France as
weak and who recalled Goering's similar remarks to him in Berlin, had warned
Cerutti that 'such wild prophesies were positively dangerous' and could result in
'foolish policies' being pursued towards France by Hitler and by Mussolini. Cerruti
had agreed and had told him that Welczeck was in a similar position 'owing to the
absurd reports sent to the Nazi big wigs such as Goering, Goebbels and Rosenberg
by their agents in France, who tell their masters what they wish to hear and not
what they ought to know1; Welczek and the German military attaches, who had
reported 'in a similar sense to himself, had warned Berlin that 'it would be several
(48)years before the German Army could hope to equal the French'.
However, in a second despatch on 1 November, Phipps notified Eden that:
shortly before leaving Paris, Cerruti told an intimate friend, who 
repeated it to Pertinax, that he (Cerruti) was convinced that 
Mussolini wanted to make war upon GtBritain, and that it was the 
purest illusion to think that he could be detached from Hitler it 
would, however, be possible to detach Hitler from Mussolini.
Cerruti also said that Mussolini counted very much upon 
Stoyadinovitch in case of war.(49)
According to Phipps, this information had been passed on to the Embassy by an 
Italian source which had *hitherto been trustworthy1. Vansittart told Eden that the 
prime minister and the cabinet should be informed, and he may have exceeded his
authority by adding that
a great deal of your colleagues, and the public servants who work 
with them, have no idea of the real urgency and danger o f our 
position. Nothing but a really great shake-up in the Cabinet seems
47) Ibid. R7304/2143/22). Phipps tel., 1 November 1937.
48) Ibid. Phipps tel., 1 November 1937. For Cerruti's earlier conversation with Phipps on this 
topic, see p.63.
49) FO.371/21162 (R7531/1/22). Phipps to Eden, 1 November 1937. Stoyadinovitch, the prime 
minister of Yugoslavia, had concluded an agreement with Italy in March 1937.
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to me capable of getting the necessity of rearmament seen in the 
right light.(50)
Eden showed Phipps's despatch to Chamberlain who refused to allow it to be
circulated to the Cabinet/51'* The latter was convinced that the best insurance
(52)against the possibility of Italy starting war would be a friendly Germany1, '  and
(53)additionally relied on his personal contacts with the Italians.
By 5 November, the Italian threat to Tunisia or Egypt appeared to have 
subsided, and Leger told Phipps that General Gamelin had concluded that, 
Mussolini's aggressive behaviour was primarily due to (the) fear... of being 
attacked himself, furthermore he doubted his intention to attack within the next
(54)year as Hitler would not support him. '  Nichols minuted that
Generally speaking, this telegram... seems to show the French once 
again have, to some extent, shifted their ground, whereas a few 
weeks ago they were extremely apprehensive in regard to the 
possibility of Italian action in the Balearic Islands, they are now as 
cool on the subject as they were a year ago. The moral seems to be 
that we should trust our own judgement and not be too perturbed 
by recurrent fits of depression and perturbation in Paris.(55)
The calm in Paris was short lived and, within a week, Phipps was 
compelled to reassure the French Government over a number of issues, most 
importantly the official announcement on 12 November that a British agent, Sir 
Robert Hodgson, had been appointed to General Franco which was criticized in the
50) FO.371/21162 (R7531/1/22). Vansittart minute to Eden, 6 November 1937.
51) Ibid.
52) FO.371/21160 (R4963/1/22). CID Meeting, 5 July 1937 & minute by P.Nichols.
53) On 3 November, Chamberlain told the House of Commons that his correspondence with 
Mussolini was 'personal' but that he had 'no objections' to telling the House 'the purport of 
it',. FO.371/21162 (R7342/1/22), 3 November 1937.
54) FO.371/21169 (R7380/69/22), Phipps tel., 5 November 1937.
55) Ibid. Minute by P Nichols, 8 November 1937.
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Commons as 'constituting official recognition' of Franco's regime/5^  The 
Embassy's Annual Report stated blandly that this 'caused impatience with HMG by 
certain left sections of French opinion'/57^  In fact, Chautemps was extremely
disturbed at the British decision^especially as it coincided with Halifax's 
impending visit to Berlin which was regarded with suspicion by the French press 
and alarm by Delbos who feared that Czechoslovakia and the colonial question
would be discussed/59^  These events precipitated Chautemps's visit to
London^w hich occurred while the Italian press campaign over Campinchi's 
speech concerning *the defence of Corsica from Italian aggression' was at its most 
violent.^
French concentration on the Italian problem had partially obscured the 
Sudetendeutsche problem which had been simmering throughout 1936 and 1937 
which can be summarised by Delbos's statement to Krofta, the Czech foreign
minister, in October 1937 that:
Czechoslovakia could always rely on French loyalty honouring their 
engagements between the two countries, and that in any clear case 
of German movements against Czechoslovakia, France would be 
compelled to go to the tatter's assistance unless she were content to 
become a second-rate power. (62)
56) DBFP. 2,19, p.471, tfnote 2.
57) FO.371/21611 (C686/686/17). Annual Report on France 1937, p.28 (para.113).
58) FO.371/20698 (C7847/3285/17). Phipps tel., 14 November 1937.
59) F0.371/20751 (C7852/7324/18). Eden to Phipps, 13 November 1937, also in CAB.21/542, 
folio 68.
60) CAB.23/90. Cabinet meeting of 24 November 1937, folio 163.
61) FO.371/21182 (R7935/2143/22). Perth (Rome) to Eden, 29 November 1937 and ibid 
(R7928/2143/22) Phipps tel., 29 November 1937.
62) FO.432/3 (Confidential Print France, July-Dee. 1937). no. 13 Phipps to Eden, 7 October 1937.
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Delbos's refusal to put pressure on the Czechs to make concessions to their 
German minority was a further source of Anglo-French friction. On 20 October, 
Phipps admitted to Sargent that, in his conversation with Delbos, he had 'used all 
the arguments I properly could out of the brief etc' but that he 'could not shake 
him'. Delbos had insisted that 'it would be unreasonable to expect the (Czech) 
Government to take into their midst any of the Sudetendeutsche Party proper, who 
openly demand autonomy, nor could he recommend the Czechs to do this'. Phipps
reported that all he could do was:
to make him (Delbos) promise he would give reasonable advice at 
Prague with a view to the Czech Government showing themselves 
as conciliatory as possible towards the Henlein Party, and thus 
removing one of the chief pretexts for German aggression or even 
aggression. I laid great stress upon the extreme desirability of our 
both giving similar advice to the Czechs, whom we had always 
urged and would continue to urge to, be forthcoming and 
conciliatory to their German minority.(63)
Following the arrest of the Sudetendeutsche deputies, Phipps had seen Delbos 
\vho offered very scant hope of French advice in Prague similar to our own'. 
The F.O. regarded the French as 'pursuing a most unsatisfactory line in Prague in 
regard to the Sudeten question'/65')and Sargent suggested that Phipps make 
another approach to  make MDelbos see reason'/66^
63) FO.371/21131 (R7005/188/12). Phipps tel. 19 October 1937. Delbos's account of their 
conversation corresponds in its essentials to that of Phipps. DDF. 2e, VII, no.136 Delbos aux 
Representants Diplomatiques de France k Prague, Londres, Berlin, 25 octobre 1937.
64) FO.371/21131 (R6981/188/12). Phipps tel., 20 October 1937.
65) FO.371/21130 (R6258/188/12). F.O. Memorandum. Minute by Bramwell, 14 Sept 1937.
66) FO.371/21131 (R7107/188/12) F.O. Memorandum on the Germany Minority in 
Czechoslovakia, 21 October 1937. Minute by O.Sargent Corbin reported the F.O.'s 
dissatisfaction with the way the situation in the Sudetenland was developing and that Sargent 
had told his colleague that 'Cette situation nous pr&ccupe tellement que nous avons pri6 sir 
Eric Phipps d'en entretenir MDelbos car votre credit k Prague est plus grand que le notre1. 
DDF. 2e, VII. no. 124 Corbin k Delbos, 21 octobre 1937.
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C) Perceptions of France on the eve of the French Ministers* Visit
The Embassy was in danger of being swamped by the sheer volume of 
reports which they felt necessary to send to London, and there were severe 
problems of selection and compression which they were unable to solve. This was
a problem which had earlier affected Clerk’s Paris Embassy in 1 9 3 6 .^  In October 
1937, Phipps's Paris Embassy was savagely attacked by Vansittart for 'reporting 
every ephemeral utterance at inordinate length' and he minuted that they must be
told to exercise more judgement in what is reported at all, ; Strang drafted a 
milder version of this criticism adding gently that, *we, of course, do not want to 
damp the zeal of the chancery1/ 69^
The Embassy's task became increasingly difficult. German and Italian 
perceptions of French internal weakness, alluded to earlier, were of considerable 
concern to the British Government. It coloured their own perceptions to a certain 
extent (which veered between optimism and pessimism), and was an added reason 
for the necessity for continual assessments of France's strength and stability in a
67) Lloyd Thomas's explanation is cited in chapter 3.
68) FO.371/20687 (C7337/18/17). Phipps's long telegram of 24 October 1937 'summarising' 
Chautemps's speech at the Fifth Congress of the West Socialist Radical Federation at 
Chiteauroux. Minute by Vansittart, 30 October 1937.
69) Ibid. Draft letter by Strang (F.O.) to Perowne (Paris), 1 November 1937. Strang may have 
been recalling Talleyrand’s advice to an aspiring diplomat, 'surtout pas trop de zele'. The 
Embassy's zeal was dampened in July when Phipps told Sargent he had asked the military 
attach^ to make him a 'short analysis from the strategic point of view, of possible Italian 
action arising out of the present situation in Spain & the Mediterranean' and send it privately 
to the War Office. Nichols minuted that 'it did not necessarily represent W.O. views.... 
accordingly no distribution has been given'. FO.371/21175 (R4959/200/22). Phipps to 
Sargent, 15 July 1937.
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highly fluid situation/70^  Two of the Embassy's reports immediately prior to the 
visit o f the French ministers to London, were particularly important:
(1) The Embassy's military attache's memoranda on the attitude of the 
French General Staff concluded that despite the Italian problem, the German peril 
looms ever menacingly in the background' and ultimately determined the French 
attitude towards all important questions'. The naval and air attaches added that the 
obsession of the French navy and air force with the German menace is hardly less
than that of the French army1, and the tatter's comments were sombre:
My impression is that now the attitude is becoming one of 
somewhat fatalistic resignation to the inevitability of war in which 
the French losses will be frightful. It is far from being panic and I 
feel that the French believe that they will ultimately emerge 
victorious, probably with our assistance, but that in winning the 
victory, and especially in the opening stages when Germany will 
have the initiative in the choice of the hour to strike, she will be 
exposed to blows which will seriously shake the foundations of her 
a life.(71)
Colyer had touched upon the crucial question of French morale, and his 
conclusions did not bode well for the future. French losses in the Great War were 
10% of its active male population; it was the kind of war which they knew they 
could never fight again and, as the Rhineland crisis had shown, pacifist feeling was
deeply rooted in F ran ce .^
70) At the C.I.D. Meeting on 1 December, Eden had concluded that 'the outstanding feature of 
the present situation was its extreme fluidity*. DBFP. 2,19, no.378. Cabinet Conclusions.
71) FO.371/20712 (C7386/3/18). Phipps to Eden, 26 October 1937 (Enel: Memorandum by 
Military attache: 'Attitude of the French General Staff towards Germany'; Ibid (C7576/3/18) 
Phipps tel.,. 3 November 1937 (Enel: Comments by naval & air attaches to the military 
attache's memorandum).
72) Pacifism in France came from the Left and from the Right Maurras's slogan during the 
Rhineland crisis, 'surtout pas de guerre', was effective and was the forerunner of Deat's later, 
more specific, slogan 'mourir pour Danzig?' Jean Renoir's classic anti-war film, La Grande 
Illusion was released in France in 1937.
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2) Phipps, in his long summaiy of the situation in France, appears to have 
anticipated Sargent's remarks (in his private letter of 29 November) regarding the 
negative effect of some of his reports on the French internal situation. In view of 
his previously expressed views, and even allowing for his appreciation of
Chautemps's 'moderate policies', its conclusions were somewhat surprising:
... there are signs that the violent swing towards the extreme left is 
spending itselfj and the country is settling back to a moderate left 
line, which since the war has been the axis of health o f French 
politics. (This has been particularly observable as regards foreign 
politics). Moderate Left governments in France have shown 
themselves anxious to co-operate with HM Government, and to 
have a grasp of European needs and realities. On the other hand the 
further to the Right the Government, the more narrowly French and 
the more shortsighted, especially towards Germany, has the policy 
been, and the less easy has been co-operation with HM*s 
Government).
Eden, in a pencilled note to the passage in italics, commented that 'this is very true'. 
Echoing the views of Cerruti and Welczeck, Phipps stated that it was 'astonishing' 
to see how France's difficulties had been magnified in the German and especially in 
the Italian press:
Viewed at any rate from Paris, the financial and economic 
difficulties of France appear to be, both actually and potentially less 
grave than those of Italy and Germany. France has survived the war 
and the years that followed it, as well as the world economic crisis, 
without disaster... Whatever her financial vicissitudes she has 
maintained an immensely powerful army, the second, perhaps even 
still the first in Europe, which is in a high state of efficiency and 
reasonably free of political influences. Opinions may vary as to 
whether her present troubles are symptoms of decadence to 
growing pains, but it would be foolish to deny her abiding vitality or 
to under-rate her fundamental strength.
While French relations with Italy were poor, Phipps admitted that this was 'perhaps
France's misfortune rather than her fault' and that it
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is really not open to the French Government to take any concrete 
action which could be hoped to place French relations with Italy on 
a satisfactory footing at the present time.(73)
Phipps's report was extremely well received by the Foreign Office, and his 
reputation and his professed optimism regarding the internal situation were both at 
their zenith. Barclay noted that Phipps saw little signs of economic recovery but 
that he takes on the whole an optimistic view of the French internal situation and
on France's streng th '.^  Eden regarded it as 'most 'most useful'^w hile Strang 
replied warmly that it was 'of special value' and would be 'of more permanent 
service to my Department for the purposes of reference'.^
(D) December and the Balance Sheet for 1937
Sargent told Phipps on 4 December that the Anglo-French conversations 
were 'a most timely antidote after the Halifax visit', and that the French had been
(77)reassured by Chamberlain. 7 They had no objections to the opening of
(781Anglo-Italian conversations' and Non-Intervention in Spain would be continued
(79)by both sides. J The French Ministers had also explained that they intended to
73) FO.371/20687 (C8134/18/17). Phipps's despatch of 25 November 1937. Phipps repeated that 
'the current of political life seemed to be shifting back to the moderate Left line, which in 
recent years has been the axis of health in France' in his Introduction to the Annual Report 
on France for 1937. FO.371/21611 (C686/686/17).
74) FO.371/20687 (C8134/18/17). Minute by Barclay to Phipps’s desp. of 25 Nov.
75) Ibid. Minute by Eden, 28 November 1937.
76) Ibid. Strang to Phipps, 4 December 1937.
77) PHPP, n.2/1. Sargent to Phipps, 4 December 1937.
78) DBFP. 2,19, no.355. Text of conclusions after conversations of Nov. 29-30.
79) Ibid. Annex to 354. Communique issued at concl. of conversations. Sargent stated that most 
of it had been prepared by Strang and himself before the conversation began'. PHPP.11,2/1 
Sargent to Phipps,, 4 December 1937.
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purchase a considerable quantity of materiel for their air force in the United 
States,^consequently the F.O. considered that it was no longer necessary for
Phipps to take up the matter in Paris/81^
The F.O. were, however, still deeply concerned at the Italian image of 
French weakness. They reemphasised that the Italian Government were ignoring 
the reports of their own embassies and recalled that their 'false values' had been
deplored by Cerruti:
while Italian technical experts seem to be convinced, as also are 
HMG, of the excellence of the French Army and the efficiency of 
the French General Staf£ Sr Mussolini and the Italian Government 
themselves appear to discount this on the grounds of the French 
political situation... it would be a great pity if Sr. Mussolini were to 
entertain any illusions as to the inherent strength & efficiency of the 
French Army and of the spirit behind it. Whatever the political state 
of France may be, the army is hardly effected by it. The more this is 
rubbed into the Italians the better.(82)
The discovery of the Cagoule conspiracy, which Phipps had reported on at some 
length/ 83 \vas proof that the army was affected by 'the political state o f France' and 
that Italian involvement, and close contact with its leaders, did tend to reinforce 
Mussolini's 'illusions'.
In November, further caches of arms had been discovered in Paris, Lille and 
Dieppe belonging to the Comite Secret d'Action Revolutionnaire or Cagoule and
80) CAB.23/90A, Cabinet 45(37). Cabinet meeting of 1 December 1937.
81) FO.371/20694 (C8237/22/17). Minute by Sargent, 6 Dec. 1937, Phipps had reported his 
information 'from a reliable source* that Chautemps had sent for Cot and had told him that 
there was 'a deep preoccupation in England' with the inadequate state of the French air force. 
FO.371/20694 (C8551/122/17). 13 December 1937.
82) FO.371/21163 (R8571/1/22). F.O. memoranda on Anglo-Italian relations, 22 Dec. 1937. 
Memo prepared for Perth for use in connection with Lord Lloyd's visit to Rome. Part E: The 
Inherent Strength of France.
83) Phipps's reports on the Cagoule in Sept 1937 are in F0.371/20686.
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General Duseigneur, amongst others, was arrested. Chautemps personally 
confirmed to Phipps that the arms were of German and the ammunition was of 
Italian make while Delbos had added that the latter had been brought into France
from Spain. '  In December, M. Moitessier, head of the Paris Surete, furnished 
Pertinax with a histoiy of the movement which he passed on to the Embassy; its 
origins lay in the dissolution of the (fascist) Leagues in 1936, it had some 
5,000-6,000 members in Paris alone, and it had been responsible for several
murders including the Rosselli b ro thers.^  Phipps's impression, however, was that
the Cagoulard plot need not be taken too seriously1. ^  Even the information in 
January from M.Pironneau, the editor of the right wing Epoquer to 
Beaumont-Nesbitt that the personal staff of Marshal Petain had been seriously
(88)implicated' although the Marshal himself was entirely unaware of the fact, 
failed, it appears, to change Phipps's views.
In fact, the Cagoule not only sought to overthrow the Republic and instal a 
dictatorship, but it also had a close relationship with the Italians and the 
Franquistes. Acting in close collaboration with General Roatta, head of the Italian 
Servizio Informazioni Militari, it undertook on Mussolini's behalf the assassination 
of the Rosselli brothers and other prominent Italian anti-fascist exiles living in
84) FO.371/20687 (C800/18/17) Phipps tel. 20 November 1937; ibid (C8060/18/17) 23 Nov; 
ibid (C8086/18/17) 24 Nov, ibid (C8089/18/17) 24 Nov.1937.
85) Ibid. (C8130/18/17). Phipps to Eden, 24 November 1937.
86) F0.371/20688 (C68563/18/17). Phipps to Eden, 13 December 1937.
87) Ibid.
88) FO.371/21598 (C478/55/17). Phipps tel., transmits memo by military attach^ 21 January
1938.
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France/89^  Its activities included sabotaging French aircraft destined for
Republican Spain (at Toulouse and elsewhere), and signalling the movements of
(90)ships destined for Spanish Republican controlled territory at French ports. '  As 
Boudrel said, la  cagoule a besom du mythe du peril communist pour se justifier1,
and it therefore received financial backing from certain French industrialists
(91)including Lemaigre-Dubreuil. '  Major Loustaunau-Lacau, a member of Marshal
(92)Petain's personal staff, was the founder of its military wing, the Corvignolles, 
whose supposed task was to ferret out communist cells in the army. Petain himself 
was discreetly involved, and its activities were known to Daladier (the Minister of
(93)War) and Generals Gamelin and Georges. J Marshal Franchet dEsperey was 
extremely active in its ranks, and was responsible for introducing Loustaunau to
Eugene Deloncle, the head of the CSAR, in order to facilitate a fusion between its
(94)military and civilian wings. General Gamelin later stated that, on Daladieris
orders, he asked individually each member of the Conseil superieure de la guerre,
(95)with exception of the Marshals, whether they had had relations with the CSAR.
89) Philippe Boudrel, La cagoule. Paris 1970, pp. 144-5.
90) Boudrel, op.cit, pp. 137,139-40.
91) Ibid. pp. 110,111.
92) Ibid p.181. P.C.F. Bankwitz, Maxime Wevpand and Civil-Military Relations in Modem 
France. Harvard 1967, pp.268-9.
93) Boudrel, p. 192. For P&ain's involvement see ibid p.206 and Bankwitz pp.272-6.
94) Boudrel, op.cit, pp 195-6.
95) Ibid., p.204.
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Given Phipps's close relationship with General Weygand, who once told 
him that, Mon cher ami, vous ne me derangez jam ais',^and with General 
Gamelin, and also his profound knowledge of the Third Republic including its 
traditionally tense civil-military relationships, it appears surprising that Phipps did 
not appear to be better appraised of the implications of the Cagoule affair. Neither 
is there any evidence that Mendl, with his extensive Parisian connections, appeared 
any more enlightened. General Weygand was closely connected with the Croix de
Feu when it was founded in 1927 and remained friendly with Colonel de la Rocque
(97)who had been his subordinate on Marshal Foch's staff. J Phipps had been a 
Minister Plenipotentiary in Paris during this period and must have been aware of 
Weygand's involvement. Similarly, it was well known that, in the events of 6  
February 1934, Marshal Lyautey had threatened to march on the Chamber at the 
head of the extreme right wing Jeunesses Patriotes to overthrow the
Government/98^
It is possible, however, that Phipps knew more than he was prepared to
reveal at this stage. His own intensely anti-communist views, his desire to appease
Mussolini, and his strongly held pro-Franco sympathies should not be entirely 
(99)discounted. '  More feasible, however, is that, as an ardent francophile, he was
96) PHPP.3/5. Weygand to Phipps, 8 October 1937.
97) Bankwitz, op tit, p. 180.
98) Ibid, p. 178. Alexander Werth, The Twilight of France 1933-1940. London 1942, p.20. 
Manrois, Phipps's close friend, omitted to mention Lyautey's political activities in the revised 
edition of his biography of the latter published in 1938.
99) In January 1938, Phipps appeared to be more concerned with the retired French army officers 
who, it was alleged, were assisting the Spanish Republic rather than with any potential threat 
from the Cagoule. FO 371/22635 (W394/83/41) Phipps to Chamberlain, 8 January 1938.
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reluctant to add fuel to speculation regarding French internal weakness. Certainly
his pessimism appears to have been repressed over the following months. It spilled
out briefly during Eden's resignation, and more openly in his 'all that is best in
France is against war* telegram on the eve of the Munich crisis in which he asked
himself the rhetorical question, 'it may be asked why I have not reported 
,(100)sooner...
Nevertheless, despite the Cagoule, the Italian withdrawal from the League 
on 12 December 1^01 ^ and their build-up in Libya, December and the balance sheet 
for 1937 was regarded, on the whole, optimistically, both by Phipps and by the 
Foreign Office. Even a general strike in Paris in the last days of December which
resulted in a sharp fall in the franc^102Vailed to dispel this mood. Phipps wrote 
optimistically, even lyrically, in his introduction to the Annual Report on France for 
1937 that:
France is neither dominated by Communist views, nor trembling on 
the verge of revolution. Nor is she weak. She has maintained an 
immensely powerful army, untainted by communism, comparatively 
free of political influence and in a high state of efficiency.... 
Reforms, sufficiently radical to constitute social revolution, have 
been introduced without upsetting her political framework... She 
remains the most difficult country for a foreigner to understand.
Perhaps that is why she is so worthy to be understood... Paradoxical 
the French are, and presumably always will be... They prefer 
freedom to the massed efficiency of the robot. They are only too 
ready, in close agreement with ourselves, to make reasonable 
sacrifice that may be necessary to bring about a general settlement 
with Germany. If  reason and sacrifice prove alike unavailing, they 
will be prepared in the last resort to fight again, magnificently as
100) DBFP- 3,2, no,1076, Phipps to Halifax, 24 September 1938.
101) FO.371/21179 (R8295/655/12). Phipps tel., 12 December 1937.
102) FO.371/20688 (C8883/C8901/C8902/C8903/C8920/18/17. Phipps tels of 29 December 
1937.
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before, to preserve that freedom, physical and spiritual, without 
which after all life would not be worth living.(103)
n  1 January_-liL>lan;lLl?.?g.
A) The Internal Situation and Foreign Relations
Despite the F.O's eager acceptance of Phipps's more optimistic assessments
(which Chamberlain never shared)/104\here was a deep undercurrent of anxiety 
and an unspoken assumption on both their parts that, in actual fact, France was 
fundamentally weak and unstable. These doubts, which surfaced, occasionally, 
were confided to Phipps by Cadogan during the preliminary preparations in
January for King George Vi's proposed State visit to Paris in the Summer:
No-one can forsee what will happen in France between now and 
next Summer. There may be changes of government; there may be a 
serious deterioration of the international situation it may perhaps 
not even be out of the question that some extreme elements might 
use the occasion of H.Ms visit to stage a kind of general strike as 
they did at Xmas time, in order to exhort concessions at 
inconvenient moments. If therefore you have any qualms at all 
about the desirability of a State visit by H.M. to Paris next summer,
I hope that you will express them now.(105)
On 14 January, Chautemps unexpectedly resigned and Phipps correctly 
prophesied that 'another Front Populaire but under Socialist Radical direction' was
likely/106^  It was not until the 18th, however, that Chautemps was able to form 
his fourth ministry with a slightly more right wing orientation, the Socialists and
103) FO.371/21611 (C686/686/17). Phipps to Eden, 24 January 1938. Introduction to the 
Annual Report on France for 1937.
104) Chamberlain, on the other hand, readily accepted Phipps's most pessimistic reports. For 
Chamberlain's view of France see, for e.g. pp.125-126 and passim.
105) FO.371/20698 (C8797/8427/17). Cadogan to Phipps, 7 January 1938. Phipps's reply does 
not appear to have been recorded.
106) FO.371/21598 (C240/55/17). Phipps tel., 14 January 1938.
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Communists finally supporting him in order to maintain the Front Populaire.^107^  
Delbos and Daladier retained their portfolios but, much to the relief of the Embassy 
and the F.O., La Chambre replaced Cot as Minister of the A ir/108^
The British and Soviet Governments were both blamed by the French press
for interfering in the political crisis and Phipps reported on the 18th that
There is a growing and rather alarming tendency here to consider 
that Great Britain and in particular our press is too much inclined to 
give advice and take sides in the present French crisis. Despatch will 
reach you by bag tomorrow morning, Meanwhile if possible it 
would be advisable if leading articles in the British press tomorrow 
morning would confine themselves to mere comment.(109)
Barclay admitted that there had been 'a great deal of advice to avoid exchange 
controls' while the F.O.'s News Dept, felt that there was nothing 'especially 
objectionable' to the French in the British press but they had 'taken such action as is
possible'.^110^
Phipps further reported that, following Chautemps's resignation,
there have been widespread rumours in the lobbies of the Chamber 
of Deputies to the effect that HMG had intimated to the French 
Govt, that the institution of exchange control would not only mean 
the termination of the Tripartite Monetary Agreement but might put 
an end to close co-operation between the two governments in other 
fields as well. It was also rumoured that HMG had let it be known 
that it would welcome a Ministry without Communist co-operation, 
and the formation of a Government of concentration.
107) Ibid. Phipps's telegrams of 14-18 January 1938; Henri Dubief, Le Declin de la Hie 
Republique 1929-1938. Paris 1976, pp.214-215.
108) Ibid. (C363/55/17). Phipps tel., 19 January 1938. Vansittart minuted that Svith Sir Eric 
Phipps I join in giving thanks that MCot has gone'. FO.371/22636 (W1150/83/41), 25 
January 1938.
109) Ibid. (C333/55/17). Phipps tel., 18 January 1938.
110) Ibid. Minutes by Barclay & Baxter, 18 January 1938.
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Comert, the head of the Quai d'Orea^s press section, and Jacques Kayser, the Vice 
President of the Socialist Radical Party, were worried by the extent of the rumours 
which they attributed to Flandin. Keyser was concerned by its effects on the Left 
which blamed Britain 'for having prevented France from following a more forward
policy during the past 18 months' and
M.Kayser added that pressure was supposed to be brought to bear 
through banking and perhaps also through diplomatic channels and 
through the Press. M.Palewski, the ex-Chef de Cabinet of M.Paul 
Reynaud confirmed M.Kayser*s statements.
Thorez also claimed that the Grand Patronat and the English conservatives had 
conspired to bring about Chautemps's fall1 and LUumanite and the Right wing 
Ordre repeated the rumours. The Socialists and Radical Socialists had also greatly 
resented the Daily Telegraph's leader stating that all of France's present problems 
were caused by Texperience Blum' and that 'any Government capable of 
surmounting the present crisis must command support wider than the Popular
Phipps considered that it was advisable that 'any appearance of interference 
by the British press should so far as possible be avoided' and, in view of his 
subsequent role after Chautemps's fall in March 1938, his conclusions were of
particular interest:
Only a few days ago I was approached by a well-known writer of 
the Right and an old friend of mine, who suggested that I should 
seek an interview with the President of the Republic and impress 
upon the latter the extreme desirability of the speedy formation of a 
Government of National Union. I need hardly say that I scouted this 
suggestion, which indeed merely confirms me in my conviction that 
it is essential from the point of view of Anglo-French relations that I 
should continue, as heretofore, to abstain carefully from conveying
111) FO.371/21598 (C340/55/17). Phipps to Eden, 18 January 1938.
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the impression that I am in any way intervening in French internal 
affairs.(l 1 2)
Peake minuted that whenever the French Left were compelled to adopt 
unpopular policies they blamed the British Government for 'coercing them' but that 
the News Department would try and tone down criticism of the French
Government in the press'/113^  Strang felt that while comment in the British press 
naturally followed party lines (and the city were obviously not well disposed
towards the Front Populaire)
what is outrageous is the suggestion that HMG have used their 
influence to secure the exclusion of the Communists from power or 
the formation of a government o f concentration; or have suggested 
that the introduction of exchange control would put an end to the 
existing co-operation between GB and France.(114)
Sargent, who had been in the forefront of those advocating intervention in French 
internal affairs in 1936, suggested that there was nothing they could do *to 
contradict these misrepresentations of HMG' and that the rumours would die
down/115^  The Foreign Office's indignation was premature. While there is no 
evidence to suggest that either they or the Embassy intervened in January 1938, 
their interference in French internal affairs during (and after) Blum's second 
ministry was, as will be seen, quite blatant.
Fortunately for the Embassy, these rumours were being replaced in Paris by 
those concerning the role of the French Communist Party. The right wing Petit 
Parisien alleged that their attitude in the Chamber had been 'dictated by reasons of
112) Ibid.
113) FO.371/21598 (C340/55/17). Minute by Charles Peake, 20 January 1938.
114) Ibid. Minute by William Strang, 20 January 1938.
115) Ibid. Minute by Sargent, 27 January 1938. For his suggested British intervention in French 
internal affairs in 1936, see Ch.3, part C.
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foreign policy*; Chautemps and Delbos were unenthusiastic about extending the 
Franco-Soviet Pact and Moscow feared 'a settlement of general European
questions without the USSR'/116^  Delbos had, in fact, spoken *bitterly* to Phipps 
about the recent Communist attacks on him, and had summoned Suritz to the Quai 
d'Orsay to complain about Moscow's intervention in French affairs'/117^  In a 
somewhat waspish minute, Strang noted that 'some of M.Delbos's recent remarks 
to Sir E.Phipps have been nervy and petulant and this is one of them '/118'* 
Generally speaking, the F.O. also disliked Delbos, whom they regarded as 
anti-Italian and, as subsequent minutes reveal, would have been delighted to have 
seen him replaced.
B ) Informal Aspects and Reactions to the F O. Changes
Vansittart's removal as permanent under secretary had been mooted for
some tim e/119'* and his new appointment as Chief Diplomatic Advisor to the
Government was officially announced on 31 December 1 9 3 7 / 120) On 9 January, 
Phipps sent two private letters to Hankey which had been typed by himself 'and
116) FO.371/21598 (C341/55/17). Phipps to Eden, 18 January 1938.
117) FO.37/21598 (C395/55/17). Phipps tel., 20 January 1938.
118) Ibid. Minute by Strang, 21 January 1938.
119) Eden had spoken to Chamberlain in May 1937 about the necessity of replacing Vansittart; 
Chamberlain agreed but thought it would 'obviously be wise to wait a while'. The 
Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvev. 1937-1940. edited by J.Harvey, London 1970, pp 43 & 
44.
120) DBFP. 2,19,408, Press notice re new F.O. appointments 31 Dec. 1937.
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have not been seen by anyone here'. The first 1^21 ^ explained that he was writing 
because Hankey's chief was acting head of the F.O. in Eden's absence and it would 
be awkward for him to write to Cadogan. Churchill had invited himself to the 
embassy, and had told him that Vansittart's 'displacement' was very dangerous as 'it 
would be represented as a victory for the pro-Germans in England'. The French 
press, on the other hand, exaggerated his importance as 'a big victory for the 
pro-French party in England'. Phipps himself had no idea of the significance of
Vansittart's new post and was concerned:
the danger is that, divested of all routine work, he will spread 
himself unduly and end by causing trouble, unless put on the right 
lines from the start. I feel sure that you will realise that if... Van was 
in fact charged with a mission by the P.M. I would do all in my 
power to help.
Phipps's second le tte /122W essed that the French public opinion and the 
press were 'magnifying in a really alarming manner the importance o f Van's new 
appointment'. The latter, who proposed to stay at the Embassy for a few days en 
route from Monte Carlo, wanted him to arrange interviews with Chautemps and 
Daladier and, in any case, would be seeing Leger. Phipps needed Chamberlain's 
agreement otherwise 'the exaggerated press campaign' would give the visit 
'altogether undue importance' as if he (Vansittart) were 'charged with a special and 
highly important mission by the prime minister1. He therefore enclosed his letter to 
Vansittart for Hankey to show to Chamberlain.
Hankey replied that Chamberlain was away, he was reluctant to show it to 
Cadogan, but that Horace Wilson had agreed with him that it would be inadvisable 
for Vansittart 'to meet all the bigwigs in Paris'. He assured Phipps that 'the
121) PHPP.3/3. Phipps to Hankey, Personal & Very Confidential, 9 Jan.1938.
122) PHPP.3/3. Phipps to Hankey, 9 January 1938.
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fantastic ideas of the French press' were without foundations123^  Meanwhile, 
Phipps had already told Vansittart that the French press would misrepresent his 
visit, it would arouse 'all kinds of misapprehensions and anxiety, and advised him
not to come to ParisS124^  It was a storm in a teacup. Vansittart readily agreed and
would postpone his trip 'till next time'S125^
Meanwhile, like Phipps, Hankey had written two letters to him on the same 
day, 11 January. His second, handwritten, letter marked 'most secret and
personal'^ 126^ informed him that 'my typewritten letter is a discreet one, which I can 
show to the P.M... this is not so discreet and more informative', and it gave the 
background to Vansittart's dismissal. Vansittart's ability had not been questioned be 
he was apt to  get rather jumpy1 and paid too much attention to the foreign press
and the secret service:
He got on a good many people's nerves and there is an idea about 
that F.O. suspiciousness has prevented us from taking advantage of 
opportunities to get on better terms with Italy and perhaps with 
Germany. The present re-organisation is a way out of the difficulty.
After briefly outlining Vansittart's division of responsibilities with Cadogan,
Hankey concluded that
Van is immensely popular with us all. I personally am immensely in 
his debt for help with the defence programmes, and no-one wanted 
him thrust into the outer darkness where (to put the matter at its 
lowest) he might be dangerous. Meanwhile his great abilities ought 
to be put at the service of the state.
123) PHPP3/3. Hankey to Phipps (Personal & Confidential), 11 January 1938.
124) Ibid. Phipps to Vansittart, 9 January 1938.
125) PHPP.n.2.1. Vansittart to Phipps, 12 January 1938.
126) PHPP.3/3. Hankey to Phipps, 11 January 1938.
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Phipps had hastened to supply Cadogan with the French newspaper 
cuttings regarding Vansittart's new role. Cadogan replied that he did not think it 
possible *to prevent the press or public from writing and talking a lot of rubbish'
most of which he regarded as harmless, but
What is appearing in some quarters here is definitely dangerous... 
the suggestion that Van has direct access to the P.M. (which is not 
the case), with the implication that the latter, with Van's aid, is 
going to run a foreign policy of his own in rivalry with the Secretary 
of State. I am doing what I can to scotch such rubbish here.(127)
Eden's resignation, however, had more impact in the short run on Phipps 
personally and on the French Government. He was summoned to the Quai d'Orsay 
on 20 February and confronted with an alarmed Chautemps, Delbos, Leger and 
Corbin who demanded reassurances from the British Government, and he was
so badly shaken that he sent off) in Cadogan's words, 'a wild S.O.S' to the Foreign
029)Office. J.P L. Thomas, Eden's parliamentary private secretary, who had 
accompanied the latter to the south of France, threw an interesting light on 
Phipps's state of mind at this juncture:
127) FHFP.2/1. Cadogan to Phipps, 11 January 1938.
128) FO.371/21590 (Cl 192/13/17). Phipps (telephoned), 20 February 1938.
129) The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-45. ed. by Dilks, London 1971, p.52.
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Good news all round. Eric Phipps in despair and thought of 
resignation himself when he heard that Anthony (Eden) had gone. 
Anthony told him not to be foolish and to stay and hold the 
fort.(130)
Was Phipps's despair due the apparent disarray of British policy in the face 
of potential German and Italian aggression, French internal weakness, and 
impending French governmental crisis? It appears that, at least temporarily, he 
may have panicked - a situation which would repeat itself during the Munich crisis. 
Additionally, there may also have been a more personal element:, gratitude, and
perhaps loyalty, towards Eden for having appointed him to Paris/131'* Almost 
inevitably, his stalwart friend, Hankey, came to his rescue and, in his most 
protective manner, told Phipps that, 1 imagine that, as usual, you are left almost in
the dark as to what is going on, so I will send you some account'/132^
Hankey reminded Phipps that he had warned him previously that 'matters 
must come to a head' over the Italian question since Chamberlain had been 
determined from the outset of his premiership to improve relations with Italy 'and
Germany, if possible', on the other hand,
The Foreign Secretary was always chopping & changing, blowing 
hot one day, cold the next... He went to Paris & Geneva and did 
good work in preparing the way for recognition (of Ethiopia) as 
part of a general bargain of reconciliation. When he got back he 
seemed to have gone back on the whole idea... A.E. refused to 
budge an inch. The Prime Minister is rather a stiff man, but he is 
mobility itself compared with his late colleague. Anyhow, he has
130) Oliver Harvev Papers. British Library (BriLMuseum). Add 56402. J.P.L.Thomas 
(St.Jean-Cap-Ferrat) to O.Harvey, n.d. but circa March 1938.
131) Eden appreciated Phipps's concern, and replied that they 'may have a talk about it one day: 
Meanwhile I am happy to think that you are where you are. It is a real consolation in these 
difficult times; nor can I forget how much I owe to your unfailing help in two difficult 
years'. PHPP.3/2 Eden to Phipps, 1 March 1938.
132) PHPP.3/3. Hankey to Phipps (Private & Personal'), 21 February 1938.
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gone. Fond as I am of him on personal grounds, I woke this 
morning with a strange feeling of relief... Today I felt there was just 
a possibility of peace. I only hope I am right.(133)
As usual after an intervention by Hankey, Phipps was reassured, his
self-confidence was speedily restored, and he replied with bravado that
It is very good indeed of you to keep me posted and I am most 
grateful: it makes all the difference, for otherwise one is working in 
the dark. I quite see that A's departure was inevitable. You know 
what I preached consistently from Berlin from the very start of the 
fatal sanctions policy. I bellowed in vain that the only one to gain by 
that would be Hitler.
Phipps then reiterated that an anti-Italian policy after sanctions had broken down 
was sterile, and referred sardonically to the French Left's allegiance to the tottering
League (of Nations)'/134^  If J.P.L. Thomas's description of Phipps's despair and 
his threat to resign is accurate, and there is no reason to doubt it, then Phipps's 
subsequent account of Delbos's reaction to the news of Eden's resignation is ironic
and an unintentionally amusing piece of psychological projection on his part:
... poor Delbos's collapse when he heard of A(nthony)'s going, and 
his first impulse (was) to retire himself. Now however, the first 
panicky impression has subsided...(135)
Neither should the French have been entirely surprised by Eden's 
resignation. Corbin had reported to the Quai d'Orsay in September 1937 that from 
the outset of his premiership, Chamberlain had 'montre la resolution du controler
directement la politique etrangere du Royaume-Unis', and that
M.Eden ne prendra desormais aucune initiative qu' il n'en ait 
delibere par avance avec M. N. Chamberlain; mais il en resulte aussi 
necessairement que toute decision du Secretaire dEtat a re$u par 
avance l'approbation du Chef du Gouvemement, et sera done 
couverte par lui.(136)
133) Ibid.
134) PHPP.3/3. Phipps to Hankey (’Private'), 23 February 1938.
135) Ibid.
136) MFA (Quai d'Orsay). Z series, Z284-1. Corbin (Londres) & Delbos, 23 septembre 1937.
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In the aftermath of Eden's resignation in March, Corbin reemphasised that since 
becoming prime minister, Chamberlain had become increasingly active in the field
of foreign policy, and that
Des cette epoque, un element nouveau etait intervenu dans la 
politique anglaise: la personnalite de M.Chamberlain. Celle-ci est, 
comme chacun le sait, tres marquee, et l'introduction de ce nouveau 
facteur ne pouvait manquer d'avoir des repercussions, sinon sur 
l'orientation generate de la politique anglaise, du moins sur ses 
methodes et ses precedes. Depuis deja plusieurs mois, M.Eden 
n'etait plus le seul chef du FO, et quelques orateurs on fait 
remarquer, non sans apparence de raison, au cours des recents 
debats parlementaires, qu'il aurait du demissioner non pas en Fevrier 
1938, mais des Juillet 1937.(137)
Corbin failed to record, or may have been unaware of, the depths of 
Chamberlain's suspicion and contempt towards France which dated back, at least, 
to the Ethiopian crisis when he recorded that the 'the French have been as disloyal
as they could' / 13 On 16 January 1938, Chamberlain told a friend that
Unhappily France keeps pulling her own house down about her 
ears. We are on excellent terms with her. With the Chautemps 
government... we found ourselves in general agreement about all 
aims and objects. But France's weakness is a public danger just 
when she ought to be a source of strength and confidence, and as a 
friend she has two faults which destroy half her value. She never 
can keep a secret for more than half an hour, nor a government for 
more than nine months'.(139)
Eden's plea to him on 31 January may well have fallen on deaf ears:
I believe, moreover, that there is a tendency among some of our 
colleagues to underestimate the strength of France. I am myself 
convinced, however, and Phipps and others better qualified than I to 
express an opinion share that conviction, that the French Army is 
absolutely sound, and surely, if we had to choose between France 
and Italy as an ally, we could not hesitate for a moment.(140)
137) Ibid. Coibin (Londres) tel., 14 mars 1938.
138) Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain. London 1946, p.268.
139) Feiling, op.cit, p.323.
140) PREM. 1/276. Eden to Phipps, 31 January 1938.
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After the fall of Chautemps's third ministry in March 1938, Chamberlain's 
contemptuous attitude towards the French became more open and culminated in
his harsh and bitter verdict on them in June 194o/141^
Q  Anglo-French Tensions on the Eve of the Anschluss
In mid-February the British Government decided to make: (a) 'soundings' in
B erlin,^^and (b) a demarche in Rome for unilateral conversations. Coming 
against the background of Eden's resignation, and an impending German threat to 
Austria (and ultimately to Czechoslovakia), these British initiatives were of 
considerable concern to the French Government. Phipps, who was also shaken by 
Eden's resignation, regarded it as his self-appointed task to reassure them that no 
major British decision would be taken without prior consultation with them.
On 20th February, the French press expressed general dismay at Eden's 
resignation and, amongst others, Pertinax and Tabouis concluded that any attempts 
to weaken Rome-Berlin Axis by coming to terms with Mussolini would be
unsuccessful/ 143"1 As mentioned previously, Phipps was summoned to the Quai
d'Orsay and confronted with an agitated Chautemps, Delbos, Leger and Corbin
(1441who sought reassurances^ and in Cadogan's words, he sent 'a wild S.O.S'. to the
141) See postscript (Ch.9).
142) F0.371/21655 (C1027/42/18). Eden Phipps, 14 February 1938.
143) F0.371/22403 (R1568/23/22). Phipps to Eden, 20 February 1938.
144) FO.37/21590 (Cl 192/13/17). Phipps to F.O. by telephone, 20 Feb.1938.
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F.O. 'earnestly begging' them to authorize him to give it to them /145'* Cadogan 
drafted a 'soothing reply1 which Chamberlain accepted, it was telephoned back to 
Phipps and he was able to state that HMG certainly intend to remain in close
consultation with them '/146"*
Chautemps regarded Eden's resignation and Hitler's 'Austrian coup' as an 
Axis victory, and he told Phipps that Suritz, the Soviet Ambassador, had
reproached him for 'treating the Russians like poor relations'/147^  Phipps 
successfully urged Chamberlain (via Halifax) to make a friendly reference to France 
in Parliament which would be 'warmly appreciated here'/148^  While this had been 
received *with great satisfaction', he warned that there was still 'intense anxiety1 in 
Paris regarding the possible consequences of Eden's resignation/149^
As anticipated, the Cabinet had decided on 19 and 20 February to make a 
demarche to the Italians for unilateral conversations^150\vhich did nothing to 
assuage these French anxieties. Despite the British reassurances, Delbos was 
'disturbed' to discover that he had not been consulted 1^5 ^ and he feared that unless
145) Ibid. Cadogan's diaries, op.cit., p.52.
146) FO.371/21590 (Cl 192/13/17). F.O. to Phipps by telephone, 20 Feb. 1938: see also 
Cadogan, op.cit, p.52.
147) Ibid. (Cl 193/13/17). Phipps to Halifax, 21 Februaiy 1938.
148) Ibid.
149) Ibid. (C1235 & C1250/13/17). Phipps tels, 22 Februaiy 1938.
150) CAB.23/92. Cabinet Conclusions, 19 & 20 February 1938.
151) FO.371/22403 (R1696/23/22). Halifax to Phipps, 23 Februaiy 1938.
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he was appraised of Perth's instructions, he would be compelled to admit in the 
forthcoming foreign affairs debate in the Chamber that he was ignorant of their 
nature which would cause 'a storm of indignation'. Phipps, who reported that 
Delbos appeared to be under considerable strain, urged Halifax to provide them to 
him^152^and, in a telephoned message to the F.O. the 25th, he again stressed the 
importance of taking the French Government fully into their confidence. 
Remembering the resentment of the moderate French Left caused, by the rumours
of British interference during Chautemps's resignation, he was concerned that
The French Government are unlikely to last much longer and when 
they go I feel it is essential that their going should not be attributed 
to the slightest weakening of Anglo-French solidarity. It must be 
remembered that the axis of French politics has for many years been 
based on and is now based on the Left The approval of M.Flandin 
would therefore be small compensation for creating distrust in 
moderate French circles.(153)
Strang was unsympathetic and minuted that it was 'a familiar gamble of 
French foreign ministers to tell us that unless we do something or other, the French 
Government would fall'. He thought that any new French Government could be
formed on a wider political basis and that
I£ as a result of the change we were to see M.Chautemps at the 
Quai d'Orsay, the change would be all to the good. M.Chautemps is 
much more in sympathy with, and has a greater understanding o£
British policy than M.Delbos.(154)
152) FO.371/22404 (R1784/23/22). Phipps to Halifax, 24 February 1938.
153) FO.371/21590 (C1300/13/17). Phipps telephoned tel., 25 Februaiy 1938. Flandin, who had 
been frightened by his visit to Germany in December 1937, had emerged as an arch 
advocate of the appeasement of Germany & of Italy. His views were regarded with grave 
suspicion by both the French Left and the F.O. See chapter 6.
154) Ibid. Minute by Strang, 25 Februaiy 1938.
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Strang's prognosis proved incorrect - Delbos would be replaced by Paul-Boncour 
whose appointment as Foreign Minister was regarded by the Embassy and by the 
F.O. as a complete disaster and whose strident anti-fascist views were anathema to 
them.
Despite Phipps's entreaties, Halifax informed him that he did not want 
Perth's instructions to be divulged but that they would keep the French
Government informed of 'all major questions' concerning common interests/155^  
Delbos, who dined with Phipps on 4 March, was 'still greatly perturbed over
Austria and told him that
once Hitler had seized Austria he will undoubtedly proceed to 
attack Czechoslovakia, and in that case France will faithfully and 
unhesitatingly carry out her engagements towards the latter. This 
means war, in which France will be fighting for her existence, and 
Gt. Britain will not be able to stand aside/156'*
After Perth's instructions had been partially revealed to Corbin, the French 
Government made a series of requests via Phipps including eventual participation
in the conversations/157^  On 10 March, and following Perth's advice closely/158^  
Halifax instructed Phipps to inform Delbos that there can be no question of 
"conversations a trois', and that the French Government could 'consider the 
possibility of bilateral conversations whenever proposals are made affecting French
interests'/159^  This situation never arose. Early that morning (the day after the
155) FO.371/22404 (R1784/23/22). Halifax to Phipps, 25 Februaiy 1938.
156) F0.371/22313 (R2097/137/3). Phipps to Halifax, 4 March 1938.
157) FO.371/22405 (R2117/23/22). Phipps to Halifax, 5 March 1938.
158) Ibid. (R2188/23/22). Perth (Rome) to Halifax, 7 March 1938. Perth was 'greatly disturbed' 
by the French requests and feared a blank refusal' from the Italians.
159) Ibid. (R2188/23/22). Halifax to Phipps, 10 March 1938.
Austrian plebiscite), Chautemps resigned and France was still without 
government on 13 March when Hitler announced the annexation of Austria.
-132-
CHAPTER 6
THE MAY CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH (11 March - 31 August 1938)
L Blum’s Second Ministry (13 March - 8 April 19381
A) The Internal Situation
Blum's second administration, formed on 13 March, was greeted with
dismay both by Phipps and by the Foreign Office/1^  Paul-Boncour, who had 
replaced Delbos as Foreign Minister/2\vas regarded as excessively anti-fascist 
(especially in the context of the Spanish civil war) and over zealously pro-League. 
Barclay minuted that his appointment 'seems particularly deplorable' and that Blum, 
who had also retained the Finance Ministry, was 'notoriously incapable of 
comprehending finance and that a further fall in the franc could be expected'. 
Strang agreed that Paul-Boncour was 'not a happy choice' while Sargent was even 
more vociferous:
This is the most deplorable Ministry that could possibly be imagined 
in present circumstances. A typical Front Populaire administration, 
composed of little men in the wrong places. The appointment of 
Paul-Boncour to the Quai d'Orsay is particularly bad. fHopeless' - 
AC.). We can only hope that they will fall very soon: indeed, the 
best thing of all would be for the Chamber to refuse to give them a 
vote of confidence... but that, I am afraid, is too much to hope for. I 
am not at all sure that the moment may not be coming when we will 
have to convey tactfully to the French that if they expect us to enter 
into closer co-operation with them in order to deal with the 
international crisis, we in turn expect to be able to deal with an 
administration which really represents the true strength of France 
and not merely ephemeral combinations of parliamentary groups -
1) The exceptions to this universal dismay were Daladier & La Chambre's reappointments at 
Defence and Air respectively.
2) FO.371/21598 (C1728/55/17). Phipps tel., 13 March 1938. According to Duroselle, Delbos 
was 'completem&nt decouragd' by the political situation and did not wish to participate in 
Blum's new cabinet because of its fragility; Blum therefore offered the Quai d'Orsay to 
Paul-Boncour. J.-B. Duroselle, La Decadence 1932-1939. Paris 1979, p.329.
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an administration, in fact of'concentration nationals which will give 
us satisfactory guarantees of authority and durability.(3)
Cadogan commented, "that really is an element with which we must reckon... until 
France can pull together under a strong Government, she is really rather a broken
reed '.^
Phipps himself regarded Paul Boncour's appointment as detrimental to 
Franco-Italian relations since the latter had described Mussolini, at the onset of his 
power, as 'ce Cesar de Carnival' and 'this is not been forgotten either in France or
in Italy1,^and  he commented acidly that
The general sentiment, in fact, is one of surprise and even disgust 
that France should have been unable to produce anything more 
impressive in her hour of need. The new Cabinet is far from 
receiving a good press this morning, and generally regarded as 
being one of transition.
That M.Blum himself should have taken one of the financial 
Ministries is regarded as surprising, since he does not claim to be a 
financial expert... In any case the Cabinet is not expected to last and 
it is thought that it will soon give way to one of national union...
The appointment of Paul-Boncour as MFA is in many quarters 
considered to be a "gaffe" and to be a gesture of defiance to 
Mussolini .(6 )
The Paris markets were very weak on 14 March and the franc slumped in
CD
value against sterling. Phipps, who had dined with Franfois de Wendel, the 
senator and President of the Comite des Forges, and Louis Marin, the right wing 
deputy for Nancy, reported that they were both extremely pessimistic about the
3) Ibid, Minutes by Barclay, Strang & Sargent
4) Ibid Minute by Cadogan, 16 March 1938.
5) FO.371/21599 (C1751/55/17). Phipps tel., 13 March 1938.
6) Ibid. (C1748/55/17). Phipps tel., 14 March 1938. Phipps confirmed that Blum had 
originally wanted a government 'k l'image Rassemblement Populaire' including the 
Communists which alarmed the Radical Socialist and *he fell back on (the) concept of a 
narrower basis la image du Front Populaire'. Ibid. (C1731/55/17), 13 March 1938.
7) FO.371/21599 (C1994/55/17). Phipps tel., 22 March 1938.
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political situation although he carefully added that they are both, however, too far 
to the right to judge dispassionately1/ 8^  Barclay minuted that it was clear that the
new French Government could not last long and that 'it would perhaps be no great
(9)misfortune if they were defeated in the Chamber tomorrow.
In the event, on 17th March Blum received the vote of confidence in the 
Chamber which the F.O. had hoped he would be refused/10-* and Phipps reported 
that his administration 'continued to be regarded on all hands as an ephemeral and, 
in the circumstances, even somewhat embarrassing phantom'/11^  Blum had made a
further appeal to the minority groups for national union which floundered on the
(\2\
opposition of Flandin (of the Republicaine de Gauche)v and, on 24 March, the 
Socialist Populaire warned that 'certain elements of the Right' were attempting to 
form an anti-socialist Government of Public Safety and it warned the
(13)ex-servicemen' not to allow themselves to be exploited.
8) Ibid. (C1748/55/17). Phipps tel., 14 March 1938. However, Francois de Wendel & Marin 
had assured Phipps that 'the Communist danger was now practically negligible in France1, 
most French workers took 'a much more realistic view1 of recent events in Russia, and that 
large scale strikes were 'no longer to be feared'. Ironically, unlike the supposedly 'liberal' 
Chautemps, the right wing Marin was staunchly opposed to the armistice in 1940. 
Maj.-Gen. Sir Edward Spears, Assignment to Catastrophe. London 1956, pp. 528, 531, 549, 
562 & 570.
9) Ibid. Minute by Barclay, 16 March 1938.
10) FO.371/21599 (C1830/55/17). Phipps tel., 17 March 1938 & minute by Barclay.
11) Ibid. (C1870/55/17). Phipps tel., 18 March 1938. Mendl's 'chief lobby correspondent' wrote 
that the new Government would be forced to resign 'before the end of the month' particularly 
because of the financial situation. PHPP.2/21 Mendl (Newsletter) to Phipps, 17 March 1938.
12) FO.371/21599 (C1868/55/17). (Phipps tel., 18 March 1938.
13) Ibid. (C2036/55/17). Phipps tel., 24 March 1938. This was obviously a reference to the 
P.S.F. (formerly the Croix de Feu) which remained a formidable organisation.
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Phipps's concern with the image of weakness which the French were 
projecting was reinforced by his conversation with Ward Price, the journalist, who
told him on 26 March that he had interviewed Goering who
had urged (like he did to me in my Berlin days) that Great Britain 
was now at the parting of the ways and should enter closer 
collaboration with Germany in which case the world would be at 
their feet. When Mr Ward Price mentioned France the Marshal 
contemptuously remarked that she counted for exactly nothing and 
no longer existed as a Great Power.(14)
Herriot appeared 'excessively complacent1 about the internal situation, and Phipps 
therefore informed him of Goering's derogatory remarks concerning France and 
urged on him *the necessity for a strong French Government' broadly based and 
stable which would 'confound the foreign critics and reassure the foreign friends' of 
France. Herriot replied that he himself would be unable to form a 'national Union 
Government' but that he would 'recommend a certain person' whom Phipps
suspected was Reynaud and he
spoke rather slightingly of Chautemps, whom he described as an 
eel. That may well, be, but I am partial to him for his wrigglings 
were, at any rate so far as foreign policy was concerned, in the right 
directional 5)
Barclay commented acidly that in view of Heniot's opinions on foreign policy (he 
was an ardent supporter of a military alliance with Russia and advocated 
intervention in Spain), 'it is perhaps just as well that he would not consider
accepting office at the present moment'. Strang minuted that he wished he
could see a ray of hope for the formation of a stable government: 
but with the Chamber in its present composition and with the lack 
of goodwill between employers and employed to collaborate in the 
national interest, it is difficult to believe that a government of 
national union is possible. M.Daladier has his own ideas about what 
to do next, and he would propose to use the dissolution. (The
14) Ibid. (C2142/55/17). Phipps tel., 26 March 1938.
15) FO.371/21599 (C2142/55/17). Phipps tel., 26 March 1938.
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consent of the Senate is required for a dissolution). It is pretty clear 
that some drastic course of this kind is what is really required.(16)
Flandin was extremely active during this period, and the Embassy's 
unflattering description of him has been quoted earlier.^1 ^ His private visit to Berlin
in December 1937 was regarded with suspicion by the F .O .;^  Vansittart had
fl91commented succinctly that lie has come back frightened and, on his return, he
had become the arch exponent of the appeasement of Nazi Germany/20^  Phipps, 
who equally distrusted him, continued to repeat his views - necessarily at this 
stage, but at excessive length, and to the exclusion of a wider rage of views, 
towards the Munich crisis.
On 27 March, in a conversation at the Embassy with Flandin and Churchill
(211(whom Halifax had instructed Phipps to keep an eye on while in Paris), the 
former stated that he did not believe in *the likelihood of a Government of National
Union or in its efficacy if it were formed'. Flandin's suggested remedy was:
briefly, for a Government of Socialist-Radicals and Centre, after the 
break-up of the Front Populaire, to obtain parliamentary assent (he 
admits by a majority of only about 2 0  votes) for government by 
decree for a certain specified time, perhaps the next general 
elections in May 1940. He admitted that a General Strike might well
16) FO.371/21599 (C2142/55/17). Minute by Strang, 28 March 1938.
17) FO.432/4. PtlX, no.4 Personalities Report, 6 Jan. 1938. See Chapter 3.
18) DBFP. 2,19, no.388 Henderson (Berlin) to Eden, 14 December 1937. Minutes by Strang & 
Eden, 22 & 23 December 1937.
19) Ibid. no.478. Minute by Vansittart
20) Alexander Werth, The Twilight of France: 1933-1940. London 1942, p. 154. During a 
foreign affairs debate in the Chamber in Februaiy 1938, the Left and especially the 
Communists, 'rose to their feet and greeted (Flandin) with the Nazi salute, shouting "Heil 
Hitler!" "Heil Flandin!" and "ABerlin!" and "Seyss-Inquart!". Ibid, p. 160.
21) Seep.151.
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be declared as a result, but affected to be hopeful of being able 
easily to crush it.(22)
Churchill warned Flandin that, 'such a procedure would alienate all Left sympathies 
in Britain' but, according to Phipps, the latter 'did not consider that a dissolution 
would be preferable and added that a general strike would be quite likely to break 
out during the electoral cam paign'.^
Daladier confided to Phipps on 7 April that he had warned Blum that if the 
strikes did not end immediately, he would resign as the present situation was 'a 
national danger1. Phipps accurately prophesied that, the days of the Popular Front 
now seem to be numbered' since, in this eventuality, Daladier could govern *with 
the support of the Socialist Radicals and the Centre against the Socialists and the 
(24)Communists'. In a virtual rerun of the events of 20 June 1937, the full powers 
which the Chamber had voted to Blum on 1 April 1938 were, again at Caillaux's 
instigation, overwhelmingly rejected by the Senate on 7 April. As Dubief said, le 
temps etait loin ou l'euphorie ouvriere pouvait mobiliser plusieurs centaines de 
milliers de personnes dans les rues de Paris',^and the transition to Daladieris 
ministry proceeded reasonably smoothly on 12 April.
B) Paul-Boncour and Foreign Affairs
The initial French reaction to the Anschluss jas to attempt to involve Britain 
in a joint protest to Berlin and, more importantly, in their obligations to
22) FO.371/21599 (C2187/55/17). Phipps tel., 27 March 1938.
23) Ibid. Considering Churchill's role during the General Strike of 1926, there were elements of 
irony in his concern for Left sympathies in Britain'.
24) FO.371/21599 (C2660/55/17). Phipps tel., 7 April 1938.
25) Henri Dubie£ Le dfolin de la Hie Republique 1929-1938. Paris 1976, pp.216-7.
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Czechoslovakia which was perceived as being Hitler's next target. The British 
Government, for its part, evinced a growing determination to avoid becoming 
involved in France's East European commitments. Delbos had reaffirmed the 
French commitment to Czechoslovakia on 12 March and had urged HMG to
consent to a warning, preferably a joint warning' to G erm any.^ However, as 
Duroselle remarked, the British Government preferred 'les demarches unilaterales'
(27)
and, in the event, it was a parallel rather than a concerted demarche.
Paul-Boncour, who had succeeded Delbos on 14 March, told Phipps on the 
15th that HMG should declare publicly that, if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia 
and France went to the latter’s assistance, Great Britain would stand by France. 
Phipps gave him his personal opinion (with which the F.O. agreed) that, in view of 
the French and Russian alliances with Czechoslovakia, German 'absorption' could 
materialize through terribly severe economic pressure forcing the 
Czechoslovakians themselves to ask for some Customs Union with Germany1, and
he concluded that
In any case, again speaking personally, I thought the French should 
not try to press HMG unduly to make a declaration that they could 
not make in advance. Controversy on the subject might arise in 
Great Britain and this would be unfortunate, and would only give 
satisfaction to the Germans. I do not pretend to have convinced 
Paul-Boncour.(28)
The Embassy was advised that, continuing the French pressure on the British 
Government, Corbin had asked Halifax on the 15th why Chamberlain had not been
26) FO.371/22337 (R2453/162/12). Phipps tel., 12 March 1938.
27) Duroselle, op.cit., pp.327 & 328.
28) FO.371/22337 (R2674/162/12). Phipps tel., 15 March 1938, and minutes by MJ.Curwell, 
A.M. Noble & C.N.Stanley.
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(29')'more explicit about Czechoslovakia in the event of German aggression'. 
Phipps, in turn, had reported that Chamberlain's speech had led to 'some 
underlining disappointment' amongst the French/30^
In fact, the French image of British prevarication masked the most intense 
internal discussions in London on the Sudeten problem. This had begun almost 
from the outset of the Anschluss which had been privately greeted with relief in
some Foreign Office circles/31'* The Chiefs of Staff circularized a pessimistic 
survey of the military implications of German aggression against Czechoslovakia, 
concluding that Britain Gould 4o nothing to save her from defeat or occupation and 
that, 'an attempt to do so must involve war with Germany, and if that took place
Italy and Japan would certainly join in'. * Furthermore, their report gave a
(3 3 )
'deplorable account' of the French air force and the French aircraft industry.
29) Ibid. (R2672/162/12). Halifax to Phipps, 15 March 1938. Corbin had also pressed Sargent 
on 14 March, ibid (R2610/162/12) minute by Sargent, 14 March 1938; curiously no trace of 
this meeting has been preserved in the French archives, see DDF. 2e, Vm, editor's note (1) to 
doc.441.
30) Ibid. (R2650/162/12). Phipps tel., 15 March 1938. Mendl had reported to Phipps that 
Chamberlain's speech Vill not satisfy those Frenchmen who had hoped for a more definite 
decision on Czechoslovakia'. PHPP.2/21, Mendl (newsletter) to Phipps, 15 March 1938. 
Following Mendl's information, Phipps reported to the F.O. that Pertinax had interpreted 
Chamberlain's speech as a warning to Germany 'although it lagged behind the magnificent 
speech of Winston Churchill' but it showed that HMG \vere moving in the right direction'. 
FO.371/22337 (C2649/162/12) Phipps tel., 15 March 1938.
31) For a description of 'the enormous flurry of activity in policy-making sectors of the British 
Government in the last half of March', see Williamson Murray, The Change in the European 
Balance of Power. 1938-1939. Princeton 1984, p. 157.
32) CAB.53/37. C.O.S.698 (Revise) of 28 March 1938.
Commenting on the Military Attache's conversation with General Gamelin, Roberts minuted 
that the French Generals seem to take it for granted that Italy will fight with Germany in a 
European war'. FO 371/21674 (C2018/132/185) Phipps tel., 19 March 1938.
33) FO.371/21713 (C2040/1941/18). Cabinet Conclusions 15(38) 22 March 1938. Their report is 
in ibid (C2038/1941/18). Foreign Policy Committee FP(36) 57th meeting: Military 
implications of German aggression against Czechoslovakia, 21 March 1938. Report by 
Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, C.I.D.
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Anxiety concerning France's internal weakness, her commitments to 
Czechoslovakia (which could drag Britain into war) and the composition (and 
policy) of Blum's Government extended, therefore, to the highest levels of the 
British decision making process. Chamberlain pointed out, during the Foreign
policy Committee's discussion on 18 March that
the French had always relied on the argument that whatever might 
be the position under the Locarno Treaty, we in fact could not 
afford to see France destroyed and we must therefore come to her 
aid if she was attacked by Germany.(34)
Chamberlain considered that it was hopeless to give 'any effective help' to 
Czechoslovakia, British armaments were in 'no position' to engage Germany in a 
war and 'it would be dangerous for us to do so'. He concluded with a gloomy 
prognosis of the French situation based partly on his interpretation o f the Paris
Embassy's reports:
No doubt France's army was good and would fulfil expectations but 
in other respects e.g. finance, air, the domestic political situation,
France was at present in a hopeless position. Her relations with 
foreign countries, Germany, Italy & Nationalist Spain were bad, 
while her influence in Eastern Europe was steadily declining. In 
these circumstances he would have thought that the policy of 
France would have been directed to giving us whole hearted 
support in an attempt to find a peaceful solution to avoid any risk of 
an outbreak of war. (3 5)
Despite the potentially dangerous Czech situation, Paul-Boncour's attitude 
towards Spain was regarded as being of more immediate concern. On 16 March, he 
had summoned Phipps to inform him that Spanish Government forces were being 
overwhelmed by the massive Italian and German intervention. The Spanish 
ministers wanted an armistice; Paul Boncour thought that if mediation took place, 
it should be attempted by Britain, and he stated that
34) CAB.27/623. Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy, F.P.26 Meet 18 March 1938.
35) CAB.27/623. Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy, F.P. 26 Meet 18 March 1938.
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(The) French Committee of National Defence was meeting this 
afternoon to consider the whole Spanish question, with its grave 
implications for French security. If Franco's forces broke through 
towards the north on Aragon front, they would be quite close to 
French frontier, and question would soon arise as to whether French 
should not intervene actively with men & material on Government 
side in order to counterbalance the more and more massive Italian 
& German intervention in favour of Franco.
Phipps urged him not to make any hasty decision,^^and his telegram (which 
included Paul-Boncour's erroneous statement that the Germans were sending 
30,000 regular troops to Spain) was discussed at the Cabinet meeting of 16 March
(37)where it was concluded that Trench intervention would make war inevitable.
Almost simultaneously, Phipps warned the F.O. that there were 'persistent
rumours' that Blum was finding it increasingly difficult to \vithstand (the) pressure
of extremists' to intervene in Spain, and that the French were 'already closing their
(38)eyes more than before to the passage of arms and ammunition to Spain'. He was 
instructed to inform the French Government immediately that HMG were 'gravely
36) F0.371/22639 (W3363/86/41), Phipps tel., 15 March 1938 (6.35pm). The F O. advised 
Phipps that he should discourage the idea of British involvement in mediation. Ibid. FO. to 
Phipps, 25 March 1938. Meetings of the Comitl permanent de la Defense Nationale (like its 
predecessor the Haut Comite' militaire) were 'curiously spasmodic... it had only 13 meetings 
in 3 years (1936-39)... in the crisis year 1938 it met only twice'. Anthony Adamthwaite, 
Trance's Government Machine in the Approach to the Second World War1, in France & 
Germany in an Ape of Crisis 1900-1960: Studies in Memory of Charles Bloch, ed. by 
H. Shamir, Leiden 1990, p.207. Paul -Boncour told Phipps that it had originally been 
summoned only in order to discuss Czechoslovakia. F0.371/22337/(R2674/162/12) Phipps 
tel., 15 March 1938.
37) FO.371/22639. (W3539/83/41). Cabinet Conclusions 14(38)3. 16 March 1938.
38) FO.371/22639. (W3423/83/41). Phipps tel., 16 March 1938. (7.25pm).
On 16 March, Phipps had urged Sir Walter Citrine and two other members of the 
International T.U.C. 'not to be encouraged by the French to violate the non-intervention 
agreement'. He told them that non-intervention was 'perhaps a misnomer and that it should 
be called more or less partial and limited intervention which had been practised by all except 
us* and that it was 'better than open & visible intervention which must end in general war*, 
Ibid. (W3422/83/41). Phipps tel., 16 March 1938 (7.30pm).
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concemed at the rumours' and to ascertain their response to *the recent events in 
Spain'/39-*
Phipps, who had been dining with General Gamelin when the F.O.'s 
telegram arrived, immediately went to see Paul-Boncour at his private residence. 
He reported that his interview with the latter was 'most unsatisfactory* and that it
had left a bad impression' on him. He had spoken to him
very strongly indeed as to the folly of abandoning non-intervention 
at this stage, and said that HMG absolutely relied on (the) French 
Government not do so. He repeated ad nauseam the arguments 
reported in my tel. no. 83. I pointed out that there was no 
confirmation from any source of 30,000 Germans supposed to be 
on their way to Spain. He replied that he had every reason to 
believe the report true, and (die) French Government could not 
tolerate any longer presence of Germans & Italians in Spain. They 
must be got out at once and he wished to know what plan HMG 
had to deal with situation. I urged that time should be given for our 
conversations in Rome to bear fruit, but M.Boncour would not 
agree to this.
Herriot, who had been waiting in another room, had suggested to Paul-Boncour 
that the British and French ministers should meet over the week-end to discuss 
Spain and Czechoslovakia. Phipps advised the F.O., that he would 'frankly 
deprecate any step calculated to prolong the life of the present Ministry and
(40)particularly that of M.Boncour'.
Sargent supported 'most strongly1 Phipps's view that the French Ministers 
should not be allowed 'to come to London during the week-end to discuss Spain 
and Czechoslovakia', and added that
39) Ibid. (W3379/83/41). F.O. to Phipps, 16 March 1938 (8.40pm).
40) Ibid. (W3424/83/41). Phipps tel., 16 March 1938 (1.10am). Gamelin had assured Phipps, 
immediately prior to his interview with Paul-Boncour, that 'there was no question of French 
intervention in Spain which would indeed not be tolerated by French public opinion'. Ibid. 
Henderson was unable to confirm the despatch of 30,000 German troops to Spain & the 
German Embassy in Paris issued a denial. Ibid. (W3487/W3493/83/41) FO. to Henderson 
(Berlin); Henderson tel & Phipps tel. 16,17 & 19 March 1938.
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M.Paul-Boncour at the Quai d'Orsay is a disaster and an invitation 
to him would only strengthen his position, whereas it must be our 
sincere wish to see him out of office at the earliest possible moment.
In fact, I should go so far as to say that anything we can do to 
weaken the present French Government & precipitate its fall would 
be in the British interest.
Cadogan agreed and would also 'deprecate a conversation with Paul-Boncour1 
while Halifax approved Sargent's minute. Phipps was advised that the F.O.
(411confirmed that such a meeting was 'inadvisable'.
On 17 March, Phipps saw Blum and told him of HMG's 'grave anxiety at 
the possibility of abandonment by the French Government of non-intervention in 
Spain. Blum had stated that *two heavily mechanized Italian divisions' and 
'considerable numbers' of Italian and German aeroplanes had led to the Spanish 
Government's defeat. In the circumstances, all that Phipps could extract from him 
was that
although M.Blum promised faithfully that no open & public 
infraction of non-intervention policy would be committed by French 
Government he could not undertake that no help of any kind would 
be sent. Such intervention as there was would be of a "hypocritical 
questionable nature" as he curiously put it.
Blum had admitted that there was a Violent division of French public opinion over 
Spain', which enabled Phipps to emphasise that this was only 'an additional reason 
to follow (the) common policy hitherto pursued by our two countries with anyhow
relative success/42^
In this situation, both Phipps and the Foreign Office were convinced that 
any Anglo-French attempt at appeasing Mussolini would be doomed to failure
41) FO 371/22639 (W3424/83/41). Minutes by Sargent & Cadogan & F.O. to Phipps, 17 March 
1938. L£ger told Phipps that he should not 'take too tragically the unreasonable attitude of 
M.Boncour1 who was new at the Ministry and 'had not yet quite grasped the situation', and 
that he (Leger) had succeeded in getting his view that non-intervention should continue, 
accepted by the French Cabinet Ibid. (W3491/83/41). Phipps tel., 17 March 1938.
42) Ibid. (W3484/83/41). Phipps tel., 17 March 1938. (12.45pm).
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while Blum's weak and anti-Italian administration remained in office. In mid 
March, Phipps received Sargent's carefully worded and very informal advice that 
they (the F.O.) would be Very pleased' if the French Government fell and 
Paul-Boncour was replaced as Minister for Foreign Affairs which was not to be
interpreted as an official instruction.^ As will be seen Phipps's intervention in 
French internal affairs was successful and he obtained Halifax's approval. In the 
meantime, part of this pressure consisted in refusing to allow the French ministers
to visit London on the assumption that it would only strengthen their position/44^  
(45)Like Paul-Boncour, J Herriot had again pressed Phipps who replied that
speaking frankly but confidentially, such a meeting seemed to me 
quite useless until the days of transitoiy French Governments were 
over: when a strong and durable Government appeared here they 
would, on the other hand, be very useful.
Barclay and Sargent minuted that Phipps had 'returned the right reply*/4^
Phipps provided additional justification for the F.O.'s chilly attitude towards 
Blum's Government. He reported on the 21st that his trusted friend', a French 
official, had told him that the Quai d'Orsay were convinced that 'if France goes to 
the assistance of Czechoslovakia were (the latter) attacked by Germany, Great 
Britain would be obliged to come in whether she liked it or not'. Phipps warned 
that, this state of mind for the Quai d'Orsay to be in with such a completely 
unsound and foolish Minister as M.Boncour, is clearly dangerous', and he
43) FO.800/274 (Fr/38/1), Sargent to Phipps, 17 March 1938, see p. 149.
44) FO.371/21590 (C1832/13/17). Halifex to Phipps, 17 March 1938.
Ibid (C2256/13/17), 25 March 1938.
45) Ibid (C2042/13/17). Phipps tel., 24 March 1938 & minute by Barclay.
46) FO.371/21590 (C2133/13/17). Phipps tel., 26 March 1938 & minutes by Barclay & Sargent
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suggested that Blum, Corbin and the Czechoslovak Government should be
warned/47^  Roberts minuted that
The Quai d'Orsay have for many years believed that we should be 
bound to support France in any major European struggle. 
MBoncour might well act upon this conviction. The public 
statement of policy and the proposed note to the French now under 
consideration should be sufficient warning and perhaps the action 
suggested by Sir E. Phipps is not therefore necessary.(48)
In a situation of considerable internal instability, and with what was 
universally regarded as a transitional French Government, it was imperative for 
Phipps to report the views of prominent French politicians who, in theory, could 
become the future French decision makers. At this stage, Phipps reported a range 
of views but his overt hostility towards those of Paul-Boncour, and Herriot, were 
fully shared by the Foreign Office.
Herriot's views on foreign affairs were, in fact, even less reassuring to the 
Embassy and the F.O. than those of Paul-Boncour. Herriot told Phipps on 26 
March that it was 'absurd' to ignore Russia and, in reply to the latter’s comment 
regarding the effect of the mass executions in the (Red) Army1 on its efficiency, he 
appeared
genuinely shocked... and he reminded me of the wonderful 
efficiency of the French revolutionary armies at a time when French 
generals etc. were being guillotined in considerable numbers. In this 
connection Herriot, who would hesitate to destroy a fly, expressed 
keen regret that several more French generals had not been 
executed in 1793 and 1794.(49)
According to Herriot, Italy was tied hand and foot' to Hitler and he (Herriot) 
despised her so much that 'any engagement she makes is valueless and that G.B.
47) FO.371/21674 (C1936/132/18). Phipps tel., 21 March 1938 'Very Confidential’.
48) Ibid. (Minutes by Roberts & Mallet, 23 & 27 March 1938.
49) FO.371/21612 (C2134/1050/17). Phipps tel., 26 March 1938.
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demeans herself by talking to her as an equal'. Phipps, who would reserve his more 
vehement criticism of Paul-Boncour and Herriot for his semi-private letters to
Halifax, commented that
his (Herriot's) hatred of Fascism in general and of Mussolini in 
particular is such that communication with him on the subject 
quickly leads into a blind alley. The French Left have adopted that 
attitude towards the Duce from the start. Years ago at a big 
dinner-party, I remember M.Painleve shouted out that the 
assassination of Mussolini would cause him "savage joy".
Herriot stated that Britain and France should be Velded together* into one great 
defensive machine against Hitler; non-intervention in Spain was 'profoundly 
immoral' (and all surplus arms and ammunition should be sent to the Government 
side), and that the 'fait accompli' of Manchukuo, Ethiopia and Austria should not
be recognized/50^
Strang minuted that Herriot 'cut across our policy at almost every point' 
while Sargent found his views 'quite deplorable' and hoped that Tie will not be
called upon to "save" France'/51^  Sargent, Cadogan and Halifax were concerned 
whether Phipps had made it clear to Herriot that 'his policies would at practically 
every point be in direct conflict with those of H M G '/^and Phipps confirmed that
he had indeed pointed out to Herriot that HMG's policy
was directly opposed to his own but in most cases these have been 
superfluous as Herriot made his various points in plaintive criticism 
of the policy advocated and pursued by HMG. We should not take 
this too tragically, however, so long as the "Jelly Fish" (as Ramsay 
MacDonald used to call him) is not at the Quai d'Orsay. If  and when
50) Ibid.
51) FO.371/21612 (C2134/1050/17) Minutes by Strang, Sargent, Cadogan & Vansittart, 28
March & 2 April 1938. Vansittart wondered whether there was 'anything dreadful or silly* 
about Herriot's views on Russia whose weaknesses could be 'exaggerated'.
52) Ibid. Sargent to Phipps, 6 April 1938.
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he is he will have to put water into his wine. The danger spot 
directly the wretched Paul-Boncour took over was Spain.(53)
As a contrast to Herriot, Phipps must have found Flandin's views on foreign 
policy considerably more reassuring. Flandin told him that 'the great majority* of 
the French people were opposed to intervention in Spain but that huge quantities 
of arms and ammunition continued to 'pour across the frontier*. He insisted that
Czechoslovakia was 'impossible to defend', it would therefore be 'folly* to attempt
(’541to try to do so, and that it would be Very wise to enter talks with Italy*.
Some of Laval's views, which were reported without comment by Phipps 
on 1 April, were also congenial to the Embassy. Not withstanding Laval's advocacy 
of a Committee of Public Safety under Marshal Petain which would rule by decree 
with himself as Foreign Minister or Minister of the Interior (which directly 
anticipated the Vichy Regime founded in June 1940), he was convinced that only a 
renewal of the Stresa Front (which was one of Phipps's own cherished beliefs) 
could save the peace. Laval regarded himself as the only prominent Frenchman 
*whom Mussolini trusted' and he was certain that if he were given a free hand he 
could 'come to terms with him'/55'*
Two of the Embassy's despatches during the twilight of Blum's second 
administration illustrated the powerful influence of certain French journalists as a
conduit for rumours, information or misinformation in their reports/56^  Because of
53) Ibid. Phipps to Sargent, 7 April 1938.
54) Ibid. (C2188/1050/17) Phipps tel., 27 March 1938.
55) FO.371/21612 (C2459/1050/17). Phipps tel., 1 April 1938. Laval became Deputy Prime 
Munster in Marshal P&ain's Vichy Regime from July to Dec. 1940 & from April to Aug 
1944; Flandin was Vichy's Foreign Minister.
56) For the corruption of the French press, see Ch.3.
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its importance and the need for speed, some of their information had, of necessity, 
to be conveyed to London unchecked.
a) Phipps reported that Laval had told Osusky, the Czech minister, that 
Ribbentrop had informed de Brinon, the French journalist, that 'if the French 
Government intervened in Spain, Germany would attack Czechoslovakia'. Osusky, 
who had immediately relayed this information to Blum, Herriot and Boncour, told 
Phipps that he 'deplored French attempts to induce Britain to make some 
declaration about Czechoslovakia'. Phipps further reported that Laval had heard 
this information from de Brinon himself and was careful to state that the latter was
(57)regarded in France as 'an avowed pro-German if not actively a German agent'v
b) Jules Sauerwein, another French journalist, informed Phipps that he had 
recently returned from Czechoslovakia and that Benes Tiad no intention of stopping 
the persecution of the "various minorities". Sauerwein was going to impress upon 
the French Government the dangers inherent in the situation' and tirged that they 
should be pressed by HMG to warn Benes'. Strang regarded this as Very 
disturbing' while Sargent was concerned that \ve must not allow the idea to grow
(5$)up that we have given a sort of unconditional pledge to France and Benes'.
57) FO.371/21713 (C2002/1941/18). Phipps tel., 23 March 1938. Fernand de Brinon, who was 
one of the first foreign journalists to interview Hitler in 1933, was probably a German agent 
With Otto Abetz of the Dienstelle Ribbentrop, he was a founder of the Comit6 
Franco-Allemagne in 1935. (Duroselle, op.cit, pp.207-8). He became Laval's agent in 
Paris in 1940 & then the official Vichy Government's delegate in (occupied) Paris. Robert 
Paxton, Vichv France. Old Guard & New Order 1940-44. Columbia (paperback edition) 
1982, p.380.
58) FO.371/21713 (C2186/1941/18). Phipps tel., 28 March 1938 & minutes by Roberts, Strang 
& Sargent For Buneau Varilla's allegation that Sauerwein had been receiving funds from 
L£ger while working for Matin, see Phipps's personal & secret letter to Eden of 6.10.37, see 
p.96.
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The Embassy forwarded further examples of increasing resistance in certain
(59)French circles to honouring their commitments to Czechoslovakia. Mann and 
de Wendel, two of Phipps's regular sources, who had ^gain dined with him at the
Embassy, both told him that
at a luncheon party last week there was a rather painful scene 
between M.Caillaux and the Czech Minister. It seems that 
M.Caillaux shouted out angrily to M. ©susky that France was not 
bound and would not fight Germany on behalf of 
Czechoslovakia.(60)
Caillaux's outburst was a foretaste of things to come. The Foreign Office was 
obviously reluctant to become involved in France's East European commitments. 
Increasingly, therefore, the Embassy began supplying them with what they thought 
they wanted to hear - that 'all that is best in France' was against war. Foremost 
amongst these exponents, to be quoted ad nauseum by Phipps, was Caillaux 
himself Flandin and also Bonnet. The immediate problem in Anglo-French 
relations as they perceived it, however, was the removal of Blum's Government 
and especially the replacement of its foreign minister, Paul-Boncour. Additionally,
as Halifax told the Cabinet on 6 April:
he had noticed a tendency in France rather to over-rate the 
likelihood of our rending assistance to that country in coming to the 
aid of Czechoslovakia. He proposed to take the opportunity to 
instruct H.M. Ambassador in Paris to correct this view. (61)
59) For example, Phipps forwarded Aime Berthod's article in Depeche de Toulouse (regarded as 
a leading organ of Radical opinion) examining the validity of French obligations to 
Czechoslovakia. Malkin, the F.O.'s Legal Advisor, agreed with Roberts that this was 
unaffected by the German denunciation of Locarno and added that the important point was 
•what the two parties... regard the existing situation as being*. The Embassy was advised 
accordingly. Ibid. (C2801/1941/18). Phipps tel., 5 April 1938 & minutes by Roberts, Mallet, 
Strang & Malkin; Ibid, Strang to M R. Wright (Paris), 3 May 1938.
60) FO.371/21714 (C2572/1941/18). Phippstel., 5 April 1938. For a brief description of Marin 
and de Wendel, see Ch.3.
61) Ibid. (C2664/1941/18). Cabinet Conclusions 18(38), 6 April 1938.
- 150-
C) The Informal and Semi-official Aspects
The Embassy's intervention in internal French politics during this period 
should not have come as a surprise to the French Embassy in London who were au 
courant with the pessimism in British decision making circles regarding the 
situation in France. Corbin had spoken of Timpression penible' produced in Britain
by the French inability to form a government of national unity. ^  Roger Cambon,
the Charge d'affaires, had informed Massigli that
Le fait que nous n'ayons pu constituer une union nationale a ete 
pour eux une grande deception. Actuellement, ils se demandent ce 
que durera le cabinet Blum, et par quoi il sera remplace. Notre 
credit politique baisse chaque jour et dans les circonstances 
actuelles le risque devient vraiment trop grand... Au Foreign Office, 
la situation est qualified de tragique, pour nous et aussi pour ce pays 
et son empire. Avant hier, on me disait: si vous n'arrivez pas a 
constituer un gouvemement fort et durabler Dieu sait ou nous 
allons tous.
In such a situation, Cambon continued, their adversaries in the Cabinet felt that it 
would be 'une pure folie' to be closely allied to France, and that 'nous offions 
certainement le plus utile pretexte a ceux qui tergiversent et ne veulent au fond rien
faire'/63^  The Foreign Office, however, in collusion with Halifax, decided to act.
Phipps's green light to intervene in French internal affairs was provided by 
Sargent in an informal letter on 17 March. After enclosing ('in strict confidence1) a
minute to one of Phipps's despatches, he continued that:
you may very properly be shocked at the suggestion that we - or 
rather you - should do anything which might embarrass or weaken a 
French Government, even if it be in the hope that it will as a result 
be replaced by a government more adequate to the critical situation 
which we are all faced. But you need not - indeed you must not - 
take my minute, or even the Secretary of State's approval thereof)
62) DDF. 2e, VIE, no.416 Corbin a Delbos, 13 mars 1938.
63) DDF. 2e, Vm, no.481, Roger Cambon, Charg6 d'affaires de France & Londres, & MMassigli, 
Directeur des Affaires politiques au Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, 17 mars 1938.
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as representing in any way an instruction as regards this particular 
matter. Officially you have not seen it, or heard of it. But if the 
present Government falls and is speedily replaced by a 
gouvemement nationale with a strong, sensible, reasonable Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, we shall be very pleased. Voila tout.(64)
Sargent's letter was based on his minute of 17 March which had the agreement of 
Cadogan and the approval of Halifax, and was cited earlier/65^  Assent to the 
Embassy's intervention in internal French politics, therefore, took place at the 
highest levels of the British decision making process.
Phipps's informal channel to Halifax enabled him to express many of his 
views openly. At the latter's request, the Embassy kept an eye on prominent British 
visitors to Paris who were associated with opposition to Chamberlain’s 
appeasement policy and reported their movements back to London. Phipps, who 
later described Lloyd George as indulging in 'mischievous pro-war propaganda' 
during his visit to Paris, reported the latter's interview with Blum, Paul-Boncour, 
Herriot and Cot, and his own efforts to impress upon Leger that he should notify
'all the French parties' that Lloyd George only represented h im self.^  Halifax was 
appreciative, he showed the reports to Chamberlain, and was Very grateful' to 
Phipps for the line he took about Lloyd George's visit. ^
64) FO.800/274 (Fr/38/1). Sargent to Phipps, 17 March 1938.
65) F0.800/274 (Fr/38/1). Minute by Sargent, 17 March 1938.
66) FO.800/311 (HZHIV/270 & 272). Phipps to Halifax, 18 & 22 March 1938. Phipps later 
reported that at a large luncheon, and in Bonnet's presence, Lloyd George had 'urged the 
French to go to war against the dictators and assured them of full British support'. 
FO.371/22650 (W9551/83/41) Phipps tel., 16 July 1938.
67) Ibid (H/XIV/273). Halifax to Phipps, 25 March 1938. Phipps had ample opportunity to 
display his legendary wit in these private letters to Halifax. This was particularly successful 
at the expense of Churchill's enthusiastic but notoriously fractured spoken French.
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Churchill was another important visitor to Paris. Phipps was apprehensive 
about his stay at the Embassy and his scheduled meetings with Herriot, Reynaud,
Blum, Paul-Boncour, Flandin and Leger, and he told Cadogan that
I fervently hope that all these meetings will not unduly excite the 
French. In any case I shall do my best to calm them down and to 
convince them that Winston is not the arbiter of our destinies.(68)
Churchill had told Herriot, Blum and Paul-Boncour that 'a solid Anglo-French bloc 
against Germany' was urgently needed with 'a kind of Central European and Balkan 
Grand Alliance joined thereto as the next step', and he advocated 'close and 
immediate' Anglo-French air, military and naval talks and the placing 'at our
disposal' of all French ports in the M editerranean.^ Phipps commented that these 
suggestions Tell in the main on willing ears' (although Herriot had apparently 
shown 'commendable caution'), and he had again emphasised that Churchill 'only
speaks for himself and a very small section of British public op in ion '.^  Halifax
had read Phipps's letter to the Cabinet^ 71 ^ and he told him that some members
were disposed to be a little critical of my having encouraged you, as 
I think I did, to show hospitality to him and generally to keep an eye 
on his movements. I still think it was better so, and the P.M. was on 
the whole of the same opinion.(72)
Churchill had visited him on his return to London and Halifax thought that Phipps 
should warn those with whom he had come into contact ('especially perhaps
Daladier and Herriot') that
the right source from which to ascertain British Government policy 
is the declarations of the British Government, rather than Winston's
68) PHPP.2/1. Phipps to Cadogan, 24 March 1938.
69) FO.800/311 (HZXIV/276). Phipps to Halifax, 27 March 1938.
70) F0.800/311 (HZXIV/276). Phipps to Halifax, 27 March 1938.
71) F0.371/21590 (C300/13/17). Cabinet Conclusions 17(38), 30 March 1938.
72) F0.800/311 (H/XIV/278). Halifax to Phipps, 30 March 1938.
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exuberant interpretations of it. I am always a little bit anxious lest 
his enthusiasm should lead him, quite unwittingly, to misrepresent 
HMG's attitude.(73)
Reverting to the internal French situation, Phipps confided to Halifax on 30 
March that he would 'breath easier next week if we are rid of that alarmingly light 
weight Paul Boncour1, and he again drew attention to the latter's description of
Mussolini as 'ce Cesar de C am aval'.^ On 11 April, Phipps was able to report that 
he had intervened successfully to prevent Daladier, the Prime Minister designate,
from reappointing Paul-Boncour: as Minister for Foreign Affairs:
We were nearly cursed by having Paul-Boncour again at the Quai 
d'Orsay. Not only the Socialists, but also Herriot wanted him to 
remain there. I therefore had Daladier & Reynaud informed 
indirectly that it would be most unfortunate if Paul-Boncour were 
to remain, not only because of his mad hankering after intervention 
in Spain, but because it seemed highly desirable for France to get on 
better terms with Italy, and this author of "ce Cesar de Carnival" 
would be unable, even if he were not unwilling to do so.(75)
73) Ibid.
74) Ibid. (HZXTV/279). Phipps to Halifax, 30 March 1938. The Embassy's personality report 
described Paul-Boncour as: 'a vain & somewhat futile personality... studiously cultivates 
resemblance to Robespierre by wearing long white hair... he may, possibly be sea green, but 
it be doubted whether he is entirely incorruptible (associated with Mme Stavisky in 1934)'. 
FO.432/4, Pt IX, no.4, 1938. In fact, in a later discussion of German subversion, Claude 
Cockbum stated in The Week that the General Staff regarded the Union Sodaliste 
R6publicaine 'not as a French political party, but as a bought agent of the German 
Government' and that Paul-Boncour was an Tionourable exception'. FO.800/274 (Fr/39/2) 
Chas. Peake to Sargent, 27 July 1939. Both the Embassy & the F.O. freely levelled charges of 
bribery against those French politicians whom they regarded as being too pro-Soviet, e.g. 
Herriot, Cot & Moch.
75) FO.800/311 (XZXIV/281). Phipps to Halifax, 11 April 1938 Private & Confidential. Phipps 
had strongly expressed his views on intervention in Spain in a conversation with the Duchess 
of Atholl, who was a staunch Republican sympathiser, on 31 March 1938. While refraining 
from actually supporting General Franco, he told her that 'if it was her wish to make a 
preventive war on Hitler plus Mussolini it was now too late' and that they would not 'allow 
France & England to defeat them quietly in Spain without proceeding to general hostilities'. 
Foreshadowing his fears during the Munich crisis, Phipps added that this would presumably 
entail 'aerial bombardments of Paris & London*. Blum had confirmed to him that public 
opinion in France was extremely divided over Spain, and Phipps thought that 'a civil war 
would, in such a case, be quite within the bounds of probability'. FO.371/22641 
(W4309/83/41) Phipps to Halifax, 1 April 1938.
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Reynaud, who was apparently convinced by Phipps's argument, 'used his influence' 
with Daladier 'who hesitated a great deal' for political reasons and finally appointed 
Bonnet. Phipps, who displayed extraordinary self-confidence, told Halifax that he 
would have 'much preferred' Chautemps but they must he grateful for being spared 
Paul-Boncour, who was a positive danger to the peace of Europe'. He added that 
he was 'always most particularly careful' to avoid intervening in French internal 
affairs but that it had been *his duty to take a small risk as his messages were 'quite 
indirect' and could easily be disavowed. Phipps concluded by suggesting that, 'if 
Daladier does well and Bonnet shows himself to be sound', they could be fortified
by being invited to L ondon .^
Halifax was 'most grateful' for Phipps's action, and agreed that
if Paul-Boncour had remained at the Quai d'Orsay it might have 
been disastrous. Certainly Bonnet is not an ideal choice but I should 
imagine that his weaknesses are more the result of personal 
ambition than of misguided principles. In other words, he is far less 
dangerous! I agree that you are right in being most careful to avoid 
intervening in French politics; but I have not the slightest hesitation 
in warmly approving the hint you conveyed to Daladier on the 
subject of the late Foreign Minister.(77)
76) FO.800/311 (X/XIV/281). Phipps to Halifax, 11 April 1938. Paul-Boncour believed that 
there was an orchestrated campaign against him and that Phipps was influenced by 'les bruits 
mensongers qui avaient ete repandus et qui allaient si directement a l'encontre de la politique 
de son gouvemement*. He appeared to have been unaware of Phipps's involvement in his 
failure to be reappointed MFA which he attributed to differences with Daladier over foreign 
policy. Paul-Boncour*s severe criticism was reserved for Mendl whose zeal, he considered, 
served interests 'qui n'gtaient ni ceux de l'Angleterre ni les notres'. J.Paul-Boncour, Entre 
deux guerres. vol 3, Paris 1946, pp.90-91 & 100-101.
77) F.O.800/311 (H/XIV/283). Halifax to Phipps, 13 April 1938 (Personal). Additionally, 
Halifax was influenced by Phipps's information on 7 April (which incensed the latter) that 
his Dutch colleague in Paris had told him that Marshal Petain had confirmed that the French 
Government ('on or about March 16r) had wanted to send two French Army divisions to help 
the Barcelona Government General Gamelin & other Staff officers had threatened to resign 
if this was done', and Phipps had concluded that the French General Staff acted as a brake 
on the present French Government'. F0.371/22642 (W4579/83/41), Phipps to Halifax, 7 
April 1938.
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Their letters crossed on 13 April. Phipps then stated categorically that an 'indirect 
intimation' had been conveyed to him that Daladieris position 'would be greatly 
fortified' if he (Halifax) and Chamberlain could pay an early visit to Paris, and that 
he was certain that Sve cannot do better at present than the existing Daladier-
Bonnet com bination'.^ Phipps was notified on the 20th that the King had
(79)invited Daladier and Bonnet to stay at Windsor Castle on 28 April. As has been 
seen, Phipps was now initiating as well as executing British policy towards France. 
The Embassy's intervention in French internal politics created a precedent, and 
their surveillance of prominent British visitors increased as the Czech crisis 
deepened.
IL Daladier. Bonnet and the Mav Crisis
A) Hie Internal Situation
The F.O. regarded Daladieris cabinet as 'a great improvement on its 
predecessor1, ^  but Phipps noted cautiously that 'it remains to be seen how long 
virtual Parliamentary unanimity (can) endure without a real Government of 
National Union'/81^  On 19 April, he described the intrigues within the French 
Cabinet privately to Halifax. According to Phipps, Reynaud was convinced that
78) FO.800/311 (HZXIV/282). Phipps to Halifax, 13 April 1938 (Private1).
79) PHPP.2/21. D.Hoyar Millar (F.O.) to Phipps, 20 April 1938.
80) FO.371/21599 (C2858/55/17). Phipps tel., 10 April 1938 & minute by Barclay. Its principal 
composition was: Daladier (President of the Council & Minister of National Defence); 
Chautemps (Wee President); Reynaud (Finance); Sarraut (Interior); Bonnet (Foreign 
Affairs); La Chambre (Air); Zay (Education); Charpentier de Ribes (Pensions); Mandel
(Colonies). This Cabinet retained the same composition throughout the Munich crisis &
remained virtually unchanged at the outbreak of the war.
81) FO.371/21599 (C304/55/17). Phipps tel., 14 April 1938.
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the administration could not last without Socialist participation (and would 
therefore not take over finance); Chautemps was jealous of Daladier and wanted 
the Quai d'Orsay; Mandel wanted to 'tighten the Soviet connection' while Herriot, 
'the arch villain of the intrigue', wanted 'a grand Ministere from Thorez to Marin'. 
Bonnet had told Phipps (and Chautemps had agreed) that such a ministry 
composed of'diametrical opposites' would 'never be able to agree on a single point 
o f home or foreign policy1. Phipps hoped that Daladier would return 'with some 
kudos' from London which would transform his transitory Government into 'a long
lived one', otherwise:
Herriot is the most likely alternative and his views on foreign policy 
are incredibly foolish and even dangerous. He came to see me last 
week and spoke again in a similar strain. His candidate for the Quai 
d'Orsay was the ineffable Paul-Boncour, and he only finally 
consented to Bonnet in order to avoid the hated Chautemps! He 
weeps with Boncour over Red Spain: he revels in Soviet blood 
baths and feels convinced they will enormously increase the 
efficiency of the beloved Red Army. I do not believe that Daladier 
to be a really strong man, despite his determined aspect, but he is 
certainly better than the "jellyfish", Herriot.(82)
Halifax regarded Phipps's private letter as sufficiently important to send a copy to
(831 (84)the Kingv who was 'greatly interested in its contents'.
In late June the divisions in the Popular Front intensified^85^ but it was clear
to the Embassy that 'neither the Communists nor the Socialists' wanted the
82) FO.800/311 (HZXIV7284). Phipps to Halifax (Private'), 19 April 1938. Phipps conveniently 
forgot to mention that Herriot was also veiy pro-British. Phipps himself had reported only a 
fortnight earlier on an incident in the Chamber when an article in Humanity1 attacking 
Chamberlain was quoted and Herriot was loudly applauded by the whole house when he 
stated that when Franco-British friendship was in question the whole Chamber was in 
agreement'. FO.371/21590 (C2740/13/17) Phipps tel., 7 April 1938.
83) FO.800/311 (H/XIV/286). Hoyar Millar (F.O.) to Sir Alexander Hardinge, 25 April 1938. 
This information was regarded as being useful to the King in connection with his 
forthcoming State Visit to Paris on 28 June-1 July.
84) Ibid. (H/XTV/287). Hardinge to Hoyar Millar (F.O.), 26 April 1938.
85) FO.371/21600 (C6310/55/17). Phipps tel., 24 June & minute by Barclay 27.2.38.
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break-up of the Front Populaire.^  Daladier needed to balance this left wing
support against right wing support especially those of financial circles. As Susan
Bindoff Butterworth pointed out, 'Daladier's freedom of action, initially
circumscribed by the situation of April, became more constrained as the crisis 
(87)mounted'. '  Even without British pressure, the internal political (and financial) 
situation would act as a constraint on his policy towards Czechoslovakia. Phipps 
was, therefore, fully justified in reporting on it in such great detail to London.
B) Bonnet and Foreign Affairs
In early April, Phipps had been instructed to warn the French Government 
verbally that, in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, the Anglo-
French military situation would be unfavourable, and that
any such misconception of the military situation and of the 
probability of action by HMG, whether on the part of either the 
French or the Czechoslovak Government, would increase the 
danger of an already dangerous situation. Unless the French & 
Czechoslovak Governments can be brought to face the realities of 
the present position, it is to be feared that the Czechoslovak 
Government will not realise the necessity of making drastic 
concessions to the German minority.
The French and the British Governments should, therefore, *use all their influence 
in Prague' to urge the Czechs to reach a settlement with the German minority by
direct negotiations with Henlein/88^
86) FO.432/4. Part X, no.3 Campbell (Paris) to Halifax, 6 July 1938, Report on events in France 
in the 2nd quarter of 1938.
87) Susan Bindoff Butterworth. Daladier and the Munich Crisis: a Reappraisal', Journal of 
Contemporary History, vol 9, no.3, July 1974.
88) FO.371/21715 (C2770/1941/18). Halifax to Phipps, 11 April 1938. These instructions had 
been agreed by the Cabinet on 6 April and at the Foreign Policy Committee meeting on 7 
April 1938 (Ibid). Strang had minuted that 'no step need be taken at Berlin for the present 
and that nothing could be hoped from enlisting Yugoslavia & Roumania'. (Ibid).
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Bonnet's response to Phipps's dem arche^ was initially regarded by the F.O. as 
'satisfactory' and his 'much more helpful attitude' was contrasted favourably with 
that of Paul-Boncour/90^
Despite the disturbing news from Bonnet on the 27th that Frangois-Poncet 
'and other French personnages') had heard from Goering that 'Germany meant to 
settle the question of Czechoslovakia this Summer at the latest', and Bonnet even
feared that they could 'act forcibly1 in M ay/91^  Phipps kept his sang froid. Reynaud 
told him that France would be 'absolutely bound' to go to the assistance of
Czechoslovakia, and appeared relieved when Phipps told him that he
could not imagine why Germany should use force, with the 
attendant risk of the Russo-Czech & Franco-Czech Pacts coming 
into play, when she could clearly strangle Czechoslovak economy 
by closing Hamburg & the Elbe to her, and by other measures of 
economic pressure.
Curwell regarded Phipps's reply as being 'much to the point', and Sargent was
amused by Reynaud's relief 'at the thought that economic strangulation of
(92)Czechoslovakia might get France out of its dilemma... J
The Embassy's long report on France, produced in anticipation of the 
French Minister's visit to London, was generally praised by the F.O The annex on 
the French army was optimistic, those on the economic situation and the French
89) Phipps carried out his instructions on 13 April, Ibid (C3009/1941/18). This included his 
warning to Bonnet not to interpret Chamberlain's declarations 'trop large* (DDF. 2, IX, 
no.172 (f/note 3), 13 April 1938.
90) Ibid. (C3052/1941/18). Phipps tel., 14 April 1938 & minute by Roberts. Vansittart had 
expressed the hope that HMG would not allow themselves 'to drift into pressing 
Czechoslovakia into making unreasonable demands'. Ibid. (C3065/1941/18). F.O. minute 
by Vansittart* 8 April 1938.
91) FO.371/21716 (C3477/1941/18). Phipps tel., 27 April 1938.
92) FO.371/21716 (C3523/1941/18). Phipps tel., 28 April 1938 and minutes by Curwell & 
Sargent
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navy and air force were more gloomy . Phipps reiterated that there was a 'strong 
movement in Right circles against France fighting for Czechoslovakia unless 
assured of British support', the Radical Socialists were divided over the issue, and 
that it was 'less certain' than its predecessors that the present French Government 
would carry out (its) undertaking to the letter1. Barclay drew attention to Phipps's
'perceptive advice' that
The French are at present in a mood extremely receptive to advice 
from HMG. I consider that it would be most valuable if a tactful 
opportunity could be taken of impressing on MDaladier & 
MBonnet while in London the extreme importance, if 
Franco-British collaboration in Europe is to carry its full weight, for 
France to set her financial house in order; and thereby to secure a 
period of continuity and stability. (93)
As anticipated by Phipps, the British took the lead during their meeting
(94)with the French ministers in London on 28 and 29 April which did not, however, 
completely dispel mutual Anglo-French suspicion. The Cabinet was disturbed by 
Phipps's information from his 'old friend' Quinones de Leon (a deeply biased 
source) that 'enormous quantities of arms and munitions were pouring across the 
French frontier1 for the Spanish Government forces, possibly preparatory to any
93) FO.371/21599 (C3388/55/17). Phipps to Halifax, 24 April 1938. (Report on France prior to 
visit of the French Ministers). Annex A  on the economic situation was produced by the 
Commercial Counsellor, those in B. on the French army, navy & air force were by the Asst 
military, the naval & air force attaches respectively. Strang told Phipps that it was 'most 
valuable* (Ibid) Strang to Phipps, 2 May 1938 & minute by Barclay.
94) DBFP. 3, 1, no. 164. Record of Anglo-French Conversation held at 10 Downing Street on 
April 28 & 29, 1938. Reynaud had informed Phipps that the French Cabinet had instructed 
Daladier & Bonnet to stand firm in London regarding necessity for France to honour all 
Treaty obligations', to which Sargent had minuted that they cannot carry out these 
instructions'. FO.371/21612 (C3509/1050/17) Phipps tel. 27 April & minute by Sargent, 29 
April 1938.
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agreement to close the French border/95^  The F.O. were also alarmed at his report 
of 'exaggerated interpretations' by the French press which had assumed that 
'military co-operation' had committed Britain to the active support of France' if the 
latter assisted the Czechs in the event of German aggression/96^  However, after 
Phipps had told Daladier that 'it had been made clear in London that HMG could
not assume any fresh military commitments'/97^  it was Very noticeable' that the
(98)French press abandoned some of its 'exaggerated interpretations'.
Phipps's report on the views ofPatenotre, the Minister of National
Economy, also gave rise to some concern in London. Patendtre considered that
If  Czechoslovakia were attacked by Germany, France would be 
obliged to honour her obligations by mobilizing immediately, in the 
hope that England would come in, and that with the Czech army 
and the Russian air force, the Anglo-Franco-Russian-Czech 
combination will be stronger than Germany.
Strang minuted that while Patenotre was not advocating a preventive war, 'there 
are many people in France (and Czechoslovakia) who think there is a good deal to
(99)be said for having a war now, rather than in the future'.
95) FO.371/21591 (C3988/13/17). Cabinet Conclusions 22(38), 4 May 1938. Quinones de Ldon, 
the former ambassador of King Alphonso XID & Franco's official representative in Paris, 
was Phipp's regular source for matters appertaining to alleged French breaches of the Non- 
Intervention Agreement. For Phipps's description of him as 'an old friend of mine', and the 
similarity of their views, see FO.371/22643 (W5319/W5320/83/41). Phipps tels 26 & 27 
April, 1938.
96) FO.371/21591 (C3720/13/17). Phipps tel., 2 May 1938. Pertinax, Sauerwein, Nizan & 
d'Ormeson were amongst those French journalists who assumed that 'G.B. was now bound to 
support France in any action taken by the latter on behalf of Czechoslovakia'. Ibid. 
(C3891/13/17) minute by Strang, and Strang to Phipps, 4 May 1938.
97) Ibid. (C3720/13/17). Phipps tel., 2 May 1938.
98) Ibid. (C3891/13/17). Phipps to Strang, 5 May 1938. Halifax had instructed Phipps to again 
raise this issue with Daladier (ibid, Strang to Phipps, 4 May 1938).
99) FO.371/21675 (C4037/132/18). Phipps tel., 7 May 1938, and minute by Strang, 10 & 19 
May 1938.
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Patenotre and two other Ministers - Reynaud (Justice) and Mandel 
(Colonies) continued this theme at a dinner for Stephen King-Hall in Paris. Phipps 
reported that all three had stated that Germany could 'at any time become a direct 
threat', and that time was on her side as she was 'outstripping Britain and France'. 
Phipps considered their views especially interesting as he regarded them as the 
three 'most intelligent and determined members of Daladier’s cabinet' occupying
Tcey positions in the centre of French politics'.^100'* The F.O. noted that while they 
had expressed the same opinions as Daladier at the London conference (but 'even 
more outspokenly1), they were still unable to suggest how the French could offer 
effective support to the Czechs.*'101'* These two despatches relating to Patenotre 
marked the emergence of Phipps's obsession with a soi disant *war party* within the 
French Cabinet to which he would allude with increasing bitterness at the height of 
the Munich crisis.
C) The Mav Week-end Crisis
On 20 May, there were mounting rumours of German troop concentrations 
in Bavaria and Saxony which were denied by the German State Secretary who
claimed that they had 'emanated from Czech sources'/102^  The French Deuxieme 
Bureau noted this unusual activity, adding that 'cette activite anormale vient d'etre
100) Ibid. (C4416/132/18). Phipps tel., 17 May 1938.
101) FO.371/21675 (C4416/132/18). Phipps tel., 17 May 1938. Minutes by Strang & VansittarL 
Meanwhile the F.O. had noted that the only reply the French gave to the question of how 
they would assist the Czechs was an invasion of Libya'. FO.371/21591(C4095/13/17) 
Phipps to Halifax, 6 May 1938 (Encl. in) Interview between Col. Beaumont-Nesbitt & Col. 
Petitbon, & minutes by Strang & Cadogan, 11 & 12 May 1938.
102) FO.371/21719 (C4583 & C4666/1941/18). Henderson (Berlin) tels 20 & 21 May 1938.
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confirmee par l'etat-major tchecoslovaque*/ 1 °3^  Simultaneously, Phipps reported
that de Brinon, who had recently returned from Germany, had informed the
Embassy that Goering had told him that 'the Czech affair would be liquidated this
summer amicably, if Benes saw reason, but liquidated1, and that he (Brinon) had
notified Daladier; Roberts noted apprehensively that 'so far the Germans have held
new")in, despite the shooting of the two Sudeten farmers'.
On 21 May, Bonnet summoned Phipps to the Quai d'Orsay and informed
him that he had heard that the
Czechs had mobilized two classes without consulting French 
beforehand. He (Bonnet) is therefore going to warn Czechoslovak 
Minister in Paris what serious consequences this may have and how 
unfortunate such hasty action is. MFA will tell M.Osusky that 
Czechs must on no account proceed to any further mobilization 
without consulting France or Great Britain. His Excellency assured 
me that French Government would apply all possible pressure upon 
Prague to reach a peaceful settlement of the Sudeten question.(105)
Phipps gave Bonnet his own personal view that the Czechs had 'put themselves in 
the wrong' over mobilization without consultation and by the killing of the two 
Germans, and he hoped that Bonnet would speak 'most severely* to Osusky and 
even warn him that the 'Czechoslovak Government had in effect broken their treaty 
with the French by mobilizing two classes'. Cambon telephoned from London in his
presence to advise Bonnet that instructions were being sent to Henderson:
to warn (the) German Government of (the) extreme danger o f using 
force which would probably compel France to come to (the) help of 
Czechoslovakia and mean that Britain would stand by France.
103) DDF. 2e, IX, no.386. Note du 2e Bureau de l'&at-major de l'arm£e, 20 mai 1938.
104) FO.371/21719 (C4634/1941/18). Phipps to Halifax, 21 May 1938 and minute by Roberts. 
Phipps added that Brinon, of course, is noted for his pro-German propensities but he 
seemed genuinely alarmed*. Henderson had also reported that the Nazi 'extremists' were
pressing for 'immediate action in Czechoslovakia'. Ibid (C4665/1941/18) Henderson 
(Berlin), 18 May 1938.
105) DBFP. 3,1, No.256. Phipps to Halifax, 21 May 1938.
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Bonnet added that Fran9ois-Poncet was 'most pessimistic' and had reported a Very 
dangerous atmosphere in Berlin'/106'* Phipps derived the impression that he was 
'only too anxious to follow the British lead at Prague' in order to avert war but that 
if German aggression took place, 'it seems certain that France would aid the 
Czechs'; and Bonnet had, in fact, informed the press to this effect immediately
before their interview/107^
Phipps was concerned, however, that Bonnet may have received the 'wrong 
impression' from Cambon that the warning Henderson had been instructed to give 
in Berlin \vent further than in fact it did'. He therefore arranged for Campbell, who 
had replaced Lloyd Thomas as the Embassy's Minister, to read Henderson's
instructions to Massigli who promised to inform Bonnet immediately/108^
In an important statement on 22 May, Halifax told Phipps that it was 
imperative that the French Government 'should not be under any illusions' 
regarding the British attitude in the event of a breakdown in negotiations. While a
warning had been made to Berlin
it might be highly dangerous if French Government were to read 
more into these warnings than is justified by their terms. HMG 
would of course always honour their pledge to come to the 
assistance of France if she were the victim of unprovoked 
aggression by Germany. In that event they would be bound to 
employ all the forces at their command. If, however, the French 
Government were to assume that HMG would at once take joint 
military action with them to preserve Czechoslovakia against
106) Ibid.
107) FO,371/21720 (C4693/1941/18). Phipps to Halifax, 21 May 1938, At a press conference, 
Bonnet had reaffirmed publicly that the Trench would observe her treaty obligations in (the) 
event of German aggression1 although he hoped that the Sudeten problem 'could be settled 
amicably1. (Ibid C4694/1941/18) Phipps tel. 21 May 1938.
108) FO.21720 (C4695/1941/18). Phipps to Halifax, 22 May 1938. Lloyd Thomas had died on 
22 February and was replaced by Campbell in May.
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German aggression, it is only fair to warn them that our statement 
does not warrant any such assumption.
Halifax reiterated that Britain and France would be unable to  prevent from 
Germany from over-running Czechoslovakia1. 1^09^
On 23 May, Phipps read Halifax's telegram clarifying the British position to 
Bonnet/110^  The authentic voice of the English Governess' is missing from the
account which he sent to London but is recorded in the French documents:
Sir Eric Phipps a ajoute que, parmi les mesures pour lesquelles le 
gouvemement fran?ais doit consulter, avant de les prendre, le 
gouvemement britannique, il y a la mobilisation partielle ou 
generale. H a termine en disant qu'il convenait de faire un effort 
considerable a Prague en vue de l'amener a une vue prudente de la 
situation et a lui faire comprendre la necessite d'un reglement 
amiable de la question des Sudetes.(l 11)
Bonnet, who appeared to be relieved that the British Government were taking the 
lead, promised that his Government would not take action without consulting 
London and agreed to 'readily put any pressure' on the Czechs which HMG 
thought necessary to achieve a peaceful solution. Phipps, who again revealed his 
hostility towards Benes, remarked sharply that 'it behoved the Czechs to be more 
than reasonable, for (the) alternative for them would be total annihilation'. Bonnet
went further and added that
if Czechoslovakia were really unreasonable the French Government 
might well declare that France considered herself released from her 
bond. M.Bonnet remarked that all the French Government desired 
was not to be placed before the dreadful alternative of breaking 
their pledge or of beginning another world war.(l 12)
109) Ibid. (C4695/1941/18). Halifax to Phipps, 22 May 1938 (4.30pm). Halifax advised Phipps 
separately that it would be 'all the more effective1 if Bonnet could advise the Czechs to 
countermand their military measures. Ibid. (C4692/1941/18). FO. to Phipps, 22 May 1938 
(11.10pm).
110) FO.371/21721 (C4722/1941/18). Phipps to Halifax, 23 May 1938.
111) DDF. 2e, DC no.419 Communication de l'ambassade de Grande-Bretagne au D^partement 
(Note remise par sir Eric Phipps le 22 mai k 23h. 15, de la part de lord Halifax).
112) FO.371/21721 (C4722/1941/18). Phipps to Halifax, 23 May 1938.
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He also concurred with Phipps's view that neither the French nor the Czech press 
should appear to be too triumphant about the outcome of the crisis or imply, in any
way, that Hitler had been humiliated/113^
Bonnet reassured Phipps on the 24th that he had again spoken *with the 
utmost severity1 to Osusky who had returned to Prague, presumably for 
consultations, and that Hodza and Krofta 'were moderate and reasonable but Benes 
less so'. This was the cue for Phipps to reveal his own personal attitude towards
Benes (an by implication the Czechs):
I (Phipps) added that this did not surprise me, having during the 
years I spent in Vienna deplored the persistent refusal o f M.Benes 
to help Austria. At the Hague Reparations Conference M.Benes far 
from helping Austria had produced a ridiculous bill against her, well 
knowing that she could not pay a penny for it.
Phipps again urged Bonnet to bring Very firm and persistent' pressure to bear on 
Benes and not to allow him *to wreck the now brighter chances of a peaceful
settlement'/114^
The May crisis cemented Phipps's friendship with Bonnet, who increasingly 
regarded him as a close confidant, which intensified as the latter's differences with 
Daladier became more apparent. This was confirmed later in the month when 
Bonnet told him that Daladieris 'private and secret' conversation with Welczeck 
was 'of a friendly nature' but he did not (or was unable to) reveal any details. He 
also confided to Phipps that he himself had had 'a long talk' with Welczeck in
113) Ibid. (C4761/1941/18). Phipps to Halifex, 23 May, 1938.
114) Ibid. (C4841/1941/18). Phipps to Halifax, 24 May, 1938.
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which he had emphasized the Anglo-French pressure on the Czechs/115'* The F.O.’s 
attitude was summarized by Halifax's reminder to Phipps that Bonnet had told him 
earlier that 'if Czechoslovakia were really unreasonable the French Government 
might well declare that France considered herself released from her bond1, and that
he (Halifax) felt that the time had now come for such a warning to be issued/116* 
Its urgency was emphasized by the Chiefs of Staffs review of plans for an 
emergency which revealed 'an alarming number of serious deficiencies to be made
good' before Britain could be 'anything like ready to meet sudden aggression'/117* 
As is well known, the consequences of the May week-end crisis were 
profound. There is general agreement that no aggressive German troop movements
appear to have taken place/118* Its effect was to produce, from a furious Hitler, 
his military directive of 30 May to 'smash Czechoslovakia at the earliest available 
opportunity1^119*and, as D.C. Watt said, *to bring about that opportunity
US) FO.371/21722 (C4994/1941/18). Phipps to Halifax, 26 May 1938. Daladier had spoken 
movingly in London about his war-time experiences in the trenches (Bonnet was also a war 
veteran). His 'private & secret* conversation with Welczeck as 'one serviceman to another1 to 
avoid another conflict is summarized in Documents on German Foreign Policy. D, n, 
no. 194 Welczeck to the German Foreign Ministry. According to Welczeck, Daladier was 
impressed by his references to 'a group of war mongers in Prague, backed by Russophile 
elements & international Jewry*. He further stated that Daladier was 'anti-semitic'. Whether 
Daladier was attempting to ingratiate himself with Welczeck or the latter on his masters in 
Berlin or whether this statement was simply factual, remains unverified.
116) F0.371/21723 (C5234/1941/18). F.O. to Phipps, 31 May 1938.
117) FO.371/21722 (C5222/1941/18). C.I.D. 1432-B (COS 733) Review of Plans for an 
Emergency. Minute by R.L. Speaght, 7 June 1938.
118) See, for example, Christopher Thome, The Approach of War 1938-39. London 1967, p.63; 
A. J.P. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War. London (Penguin edit) 1964, p.206; 
Duroselle op.cit, pp.338.
119) Documents on German Foreign Policy. D. n, no.221.
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himself Z120^  Its significance for Anglo-French relations was no less far reaching. 
Halifax's note of 22 May, that Britain would not intervene to  preserve 
Czechoslovakia', was described by Duroselle as of an 'extreme secheresse et d'un
ton autoritaire'^ 121^  and it virtually forbade the French Government from taking any 
initiative. It could also be said to have legitimized Phipps's role as the English 
Governess' at Paris. The inter-action of these factors would produce the Munich 
crisis, and elevate his Paris Embassy to the zenith of its importance.
HL Towards the Munich Crisis (June - August 19381
a) The French Commitment to Czechoslovakia
Phipps's instructions on 31 May had been to urge the French Government
( \ 22)to exert the greatest possible pressure' on Benes without delayv and, due to
Bonnet's continual evasions/123\his remained an important activity throughout out 
this period. His dislike of Benes and of the Czechs was noted previously and, as a 
corollary, he emphasized the views of those French personalities who were 
opposed to fighting for Czechoslovakia. On 14 June, he reported that Caillaux had
120) D.C. Watt, Hitler's Visit to Rome & the May Crisis', JCH. 9,1, Jan.1974 p.31
121) Duroselle, op.dt., p.338.
122) FO.371/21723 (C5234/1941/18). Halifax to Phipps, 31 May 1938. Halifax had agreed to 
Bonnet's request that representations to Prague should be made separately as a joint 
demarche would 'only encourage the Germans to be more intransigent'. Ibid 
(C5277/1941/18) Phipps tel. 1 June and Halifax to Phipps, 2 June 1938.
123) The F.O. were dissatisfied with Bonnet's memorandum to Benes (which Phipps had 
provided to them on 27 June). Sargent minuted that 'as we expected M.Bonnet has wriggled 
out of his promise', and that he suspected that L6ger and the officials of the Quai d'Orsay 
were 'also largely to blame, as we know that throughout they have done their utmost to 
protect the Czech Government from any real pressure by the French Government'. 
F0.371/21725 (C6378/1941/18), minute by Sargent 29 June 1938.
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reiterated that Trance would never fight for Czechoslovakia' and that the French 
Government had acted Very indiscreetly^124^  Mistier, the Chairman of the Foreign 
Affairs Commission of the Chamber, whom the F.O. regarded as 'a reliable 
interpreter of French intentions', had echoed Caillaux's views/125^
In a discussion with Bonnet on 2 July, Phipps reported that he had agreed
with Frangois-Poncet and Henderson that
Germany is bent on the disruption of a Czechoslovakia which, allied 
to Russia, constitutes a perpetual menace to Germany. I added that 
I agreed entirely with this view. When I was in Berlin the fact that 
Czechoslovakia was allied to the Soviet seemed to fill the Nazis 
with a fury which I believed to be genuine.(126)
Bonnet told him on the 16th that pressure would continue on Benes particularly as
the latter was sounding out Russian help. Phipps, who was alarmed, replied that
'this seemed to me to indicate what a dangerous frame of mind M.Benes was in and
(127)how desirable it was to speak plainly to him, and M.Bonnet agreed'. J Strang 
minuted that Phipps had been Very wise' to have taken the opportunity of
124) FO.371/21724 (C5805/1941/18). Phipps to Halifax, 14 June 1938.
125) Ibid. (C5806/1941/18). Phipps to Halifax, 14 June 1938. Mistier was anti-war in 1939, D. 
Cameron Watt, How War Began. London 1989, pp. 545 & 584.
126) FO.371/21726 (C6624/1941/18). Phipps to Sargent, 2 July 1938. The italics are Phipps's.
127) FO.371/21728 (C7155/1941/18). Phipps tel., 16 July 1938. Phipps’ was on leave in 
England from 4-16 July where he saw Chamberlain on at least one occasion when, together 
with other guests, he attended a lunch at 10 Downing Street on 8 July. Neville Chamberlain 
Papers, Birmingham University, NC12/1/1 f  lunch lists'). Any other meetings which he may 
have had with Chamberlain during this period are not recorded.
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'repeating the warning to Bonnet'/128^
At the end of August 1938, the Embassy's views were generally in 
accordance with those of the Foreign Office and this included Phipps's hostility
(129)towards some of the permanent officials of the Quai d'Orsay. y Only Vansittart,
who would attempt to stiffen the resolve of the French Government during the 
Munich crisis, appears to have 'strongly deprecated' pressurizing France into
dishonouring her treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia.^130^
B) The View from the Paris Embassy
The view from the Embassy throughout the Summer of 1938 remained 
sanguine and was characterized by a certain complacency (which contrasted 
sharply with their hysterical reaction at the height of the Czech crisis), and this was 
also reflected in the narrowing of the base of its reporting. Five main factors 
underlay the Embassy's assumptions during this period:
128) FO.371/21728 (C7155/1941/18). Minute by Strang, 20 July 1938. Phipps's reiteration of 
the warning was effective; Bonnet specifically referred to it in his note to Lacroix on 17 July 
in which he stated that, in view of the talks with the Sudeten leaders, it was necessary to 
explain the French position clearly to the Czechs. DDF. 2 X, no.222. Note remise par 
Bonnet a Lacroix, hfin.de France a Prague, 17 juillet 1938. On 20 July, Bonnet read out to 
Osusky the relevant passages from Halifax's memorandum of 22 May regarding the British 
attitude and reiterated to him that 'la France, comme 1'Angleterre n'irait pas k la guerre' over 
the Sudeten question. DDF. 2, X, no.238. Note du Ministre des Affaires dtrang&res sur sa 
conversation du 20 juillet avec M. Osusky. The document contains a brief minute by 
Daladier that 'elle rdsulte des conseils des ministres et non de la decision d'un ministre'. 
Ibid (note 2, p.437). For Halifax's very important memorandum of 22 May 1938, see p.162.
129) Massigli had told Campbell that the 'Czech barrier1 should be maintained and that 
'Czechoslovakia was useful as a military base for French aircraft against Germany'. Mallet 
minuted that 'there was scant chance of settling the Czech question unless the Quai d'Orsay 
was overruled', and Sargent added that Massigli was 'quite hopeless'. FO.371/21731 
(C8329/1941/18) Campbell (Paris) to Sargent 13 August & minutes by Mallet & Sargent, 22 
& 27 August 1938.
130) FO.371/21734 (C9004/1941/18). F.O. minute by Vansittart, 27 August 1938.
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(a) In conjunction with his instructions from London, Phipps remained 
confident of his ability to put pressure on the French Government to pressurize 
Benes into making concessions to the Sudeten Germans, (b) The deterioration in 
Franco-Italian relations provided a distraction from the Czech problem while, 
simultaneously, Phipps shared Chamberlain and Halifax's somewhat facile 
optimism, partly engendered by the signing of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, that 
Mussolini could be weaned away from Hitler, (c) Many of the Embassy's unspoken 
assumptions (including their right to intervene in French internal affairs) were 
common currency in certain influential circles in Paris, (d) The comparative 
stability of the French Government as compared to its predecessors, (e) 
Preparations for the Royal Visit to Paris in July 1938 absorbed a large amount of 
Phipps's time and energy and facilitated the Embassy's almost total immersion in 
the Paris milieu.
Phipps's assessment of Franco-Italian relations in June 1938 revealed that 
his attitude was realistic albeit hopeful. He reported that Daladier and Bonnet were 
extremely concerned about Italy's seeming determination to humiliate France', and 
that Leger had insisted that he had 'consistently advised' the French Government to 
show themselves as reasonable as possible to the Italians but that it was clear that 
'Italy has no intention of being friendly to France, even to the France of Daladier
and Bonnet as opposed to that of Blum and Boncour*. This was because:
Mussolini had got what he wanted over Ethiopia at Geneva, and 
therefore only wished to humiliate France and thereby separate her 
from Great Britain. This separation would undoubtedly take place if 
ever HMG put the Anglo-Italian Agreement into force while France 
was being "bafouee" at Rome.(131)
131) FO.800/311 (H/IV/292). Phipps to Halifax, 16 June 1938.
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Earlier, Phipps had admonished Leger for being Very negative' towards Italy. He 
admitted, however, that Mussolini's Genoa speech had come as a shock and was 
resented 'on the Right as well as the (French) Left'. Bonnet and Daladier were 
disturbed by 'the discourteous way1 the French Government had been treated, and 
they wanted Perth to be instructed to pressurize the Italians into immediately
resuming conversations with them in Rome/132'*
Fortunately, Phipps had ignored the excessively biased pro-Italian views of 
Vladimir Poliakoff, a somewhat shady Russian emigre journalist and one of the 
Embassy's regular sources, which Campbell had reported at considerable length on
8 June/133^  Poliakoff considered that Russian influence was 'alarmingly strong and 
wide-spread' and that the French situation was 'so rotten', and its statesmen 'so 
inadequate', that HMG should 'discreetly intervene', (Campbell had replied that, 'as 
he knew, this sort of thing was not at all in our line1). Leeper had warned Phipps
about Poliakoff and Vansittart had minuted that he was
really astonished that the Embassy should spend so much energy in 
reporting M.Poliakoflf (& MXaval). The former is entirely in the 
Italian pocket, and has consistently stooped to every form of 
fabrication. He is so unreliable and biased - for good reasons - that 
he was barred from our missions at one time. It looks as if he still 
ought to be... (134)
132) F0.371/22426 (R4132, R4281, R4824, R4861, R4881 & R5293/240/22).- Phipps's tels of 21 
April, IS, 16 & 17 May and 3 June 1938. Nevertheless Halifax made it clear that the 
Anglo-Italian Agreement could not be delayed until Franco-Italian differences were settled. 
Ibid (C5818/240/22) Cabinet Conclusions 29(38), 22 June 1938.
133) FO.371/21612 (C5815/1050/17). Campbell (Paris) to Cadogan, 8 June 1938.
134) FO.371/21612 (C5816/1050/17). Minute by Vansittart, 18 June 1938. The reference to 
Leepefs warning is in Campbell's despatch op.cit Vansittart was also apparently convinced 
that Poliakoff was receiving money from the Germans. The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver 
Harvev 1937-40. edited by J.Harvey, London 1970, p. 167. For his earlier activities as an 
interloper, see Nicholas Rostow, Anglo-French Relations 1934-36. London 1984, pp.94-5.
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More bizarre was that similar views had been expressed to Perowne that 
morning by Mrs James Hazell Hyde, a well-known French political hostess and the 
mother-in-law of M.Patenotre, the Minister of National Economy, who told him 
that French foreign policy must be directed by Britain, and that the Radical 
Socialists needed to obtain 'funds for propaganda and organization1. They would 
be unable to raise the them from their own supporters and it would be necessary 
therefore
that England should, in the interests of the establishment of joint- 
Franco-British foreign policy under British direction, supply the 
necessary amount, which Mrs Hyde estimated at between 60 & 80 
million francs. If G.B. did this the eventual Socialist Radical 
administration would faithfully "march" at any behest as regards 
foreign affairs of the Cabinet of London.
Like Campbell, Perowne had replied that the proposal involved interference in the 
internal affairs of another country Svhich was quite unheard o£ even if HMG
disposed money for such a purpose, which was not the case'.*'135'*
Doubtless if Vansittart had remained permanent under secretary he would 
have railed at the Embassy for ’reporting every ephemeral utterance at inordinate
length1 as he did in October 1937.^ 136^  These views were, however, a further 
indication that the desire for British interference in French affairs was not confined 
to the Embassy or the F.O., but was actively encouraged by certain French
135) Ibid. (C5815/1050/17). Campbell (Paris) to Cadogan, 8 June 1938. Perowne appears to have 
forgotten (or have been ignorant of) the circumstances surrounding Paul-Boncour's failure to 
be reappointed MFA in April 1938.
136) See p. 107.
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(137)personnages, and were a part of the Paris milieu.
Foremost amongst them was Bonnet who was more malleable and closer to 
the F.O.'s views on Italy than Daladier. Bonnet increasingly portrayed himself to 
Phipps as a close confidant, and regarded the latter as a conduit to the British 
Government for them to put pressure on Daladier to change his attitude towards 
Italy. Halifax's visit to Paris in connection with the Royal Visit provided an 
opportunity. Bonnet told Phipps on 16 June that he hoped that Halifax would 
impress on Herriot and his friends *the wisdom of the French Government's
policy'/138^  Phipps therefore suggested to Halifax Very privately and confidentially*
that he (Halifax) should
lay great stress with Daladier on the importance you attach to the 
Pyrenees frontier remaining closed. The fact is, Daladier is inclined 
to listen to the syren voices of Mandel, Reynaud & Herriot, who 
sing pro-Soviet and anti-dictator, particularly anti-Mussolini songs 
to him. Bonnet will probably have Herriot invited to the luncheon in 
order that you may help to convert him. Herriot, as Bonnet 
remarked, is sound in so far as he puts the Anglo-French Entente 
no. 1 on the list of French requisites; but he puts the Soviet Pact too 
close a second, and attaches an undue importance to it.(139)
137) The French themselves were not immune from interfering in the internal affairs of others. 
In Jan. 1938 Phipps had been instructed to warn the Quai d'Orsay that French interference in 
internal Romanian affairs would 'rouse the fury of the nationalists elements' and only benefit 
the Iron Guard. F0.371/22451 (R204/26/37) RHoare (Bucharest) to Sargent, 31 Dec. 1937, 
and Sargent to Phipps (ibid) 7 January 1938. Ironically, Strang told Phipps that the 
French were contemplating appointing 'a strong man' (as ambassador) to Bucharest *who 
would have instructions to bring the Romanians to heel' (Ibid). Shades of Phipps and the 
English Governess'. In Oct 1939 the French interfered in the reconstruction of the Polish 
Govemment-in-exile, see for e.g., Yves Beauvois, Les relations franco-polonaises pendant la 
Prole de Guerre. Paris 1989, passim.
138) FO.371/21612 (C7408/1050/17) Phipps tel. 16 July & minute by Strang, 18 July 1938.
139) FO.800/311 (H/X3V/293). Phipps to Halifax, 23 June 1938. Halifax took Phipps's advice 
and, at a lunch at the Quai d'Orsay, and in the presence of Herriot & Blum, he 
complimented Bonnet on closing the Spanish frontier. DDF: 2, X, no.237 Conversations 
Halifax-Daladier- Bonnet 20 juillet 1938, p.436, note 1. It was Phipps himself however, 
who, on 30 June, had successfully obtained an unenthusiastic assurance from Daladier to 
keep the Spanish frontier closed after he had impressed upon the absolutely vital 
importance' the British Government attached to its 'continual closure'. FO.371/22427 
(R5954/240/22) Phipps tel., 30 June 1938. For Vansittart's subsequently severe criticism of 
Phipps on this issue, see ch.8.
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This was the origin of the triangle which Cowling stated Phipps had 
'created' in which 'he pressed Halifax (on Bonnet's behalf to neutralise the pressures 
Daladier received from Mandel, Reynaud and Herriot' and which would develop in
early 1939 to include Frangois-Poncet, the French ambassador to Rom e/140'* 
Caillaux also 'greatly approved' Bonnet's (and the British Government's) policy 
towards Italy/14 ^  As President of the Finance Commission of the Senate his 
views were regarded as significant which was an additionally convenient reason for 
Phipps to quote them continually. The latter must have been greatly relieved that 
Caillaux was adamant that Herriot would not become President of France in May 
1939, and that the entire Senate would vote against him 'owing to his well-known
and absurd subservience to Soviet influence'/142^  Also agreeable to the Embassy
were his views on the Czechs:
Caillaux has no trust in the good sense of Benes who, he thinks, will 
never be reasonable until he is told that neither France nor Gt.
Britain will fight to prevent a full measure of autonomy being 
granted to the Sudeten Germans.
Significantly, Phipps told the F.O. that he 'could only confirm everything Caillaux 
said about Bonnet and remark that I always found it a pleasure to work with him'. 
Barclay minuted that Caillaux was 'a shrewd observer' and that his comments were
interesting/143^
140) Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler. British politics & British policy 1933-1940. 
London 1975, p.285. Phipps did not 'create' the triangle as Cowling suggested. It emerged 
through a convergence of circumstances and he utilized it fully with Halifax's continual 
approval.
141) FO.371/21612 (C6636/1050/17). Phipps tel., 3 July 1938.
142) Ibid.
143) Ibid. Minute by Barclay.
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Laval and Flandin's views on the European crisis also reinforced those of 
the Embassy and were reported in some detail to London. Laval alleged that 
Mussolini was 'furious with the Quai d'Orsay1, Germany and Italy were working in 
unison, and that there would be a war before the Autumn. His views on the internal 
situation were even more pessimistic: the financial situation was Very bad' and
Daladier was 'heading for disaster1/ 144^  His prophecy of another Ministere en 
route' in the Autumn (providing that war had not broken out) consisting of Herriot, 
Paul-Boncour and Blum must have filled Phipps and the F.O. with apprehension. 
Flandin was also reported to have bitterly criticised successive Popular Front 
Governments especially their attitude towards the Spanish civil war and towards 
which, he maintained, 'official France was not neutral'. Phipps was presumably 
unaware that Oliver Harvey, Halifax's private secretary, had minuted (for his chiefs 
benefit) that his friend, Palewski, who was Reynaud's private secretary, had 
telephone him from Paris to say that Flandin's speech had caused 'great resentment'
in French circles'
particularly by his allegation that an order for general mobilization 
had been prepared during the week-end crisis over Czechoslovakia.
This was a travesty of the truth and nothing of the kind had 
occurred. I had no doubt that although the call was described as a 
personal one, Reynaud intended it to be brought to your 
notice.(145)
Even before the Munich crisis erupted, the base of the Embassy's reporting 
had therefore narrowed and Phipps was predominantly emphasising the views of 
those French personalities whom he believed to be fully in accord with 
Chamberlain's appeasement policies. Those whom he judged to be opposed to
144) Ibid. (C5816/1050/17). Phipps tel., 10 June 1938.
145) FO.371/21599 (C5767/55/17). Phipps tel & minute by O.Harvey, 13 June 1938.
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them were neither ignored, dismissed or ridiculed. His account of Herriot's 
support of Republican Spain, and his alleged 'fanaticism' towards Italy, for 
example, could easily have been a description of his own views during the Munich 
crisis:
At times M.Herriot, so physically different, reminded me of Hitler: 
the same veiled and glassy gaze fixed exclusively upon what he 
wishes to see, and the same imperviousness to any argument or idea 
opposed to his own.(146)
Despite his reported criticisms of the French Government, , and the parlous 
financial situation/147^  Phipps was aware that Daladieris position was, in fact, 
sufficiently secure for the latter to mount a successful assault on the hitherto 
sacrosanct concept of the forty hour week/148'* one of the most important 
concessions obtained by Blum's Popular Front Government in 1936. Two other 
factors, however, also contributed to the Embassy's complacency which contrasted 
with their almost hysterical reaction in mid-September: a) the Royal Visit to Paris, 
and b) the French reaction to the German build-up,
In January 1938, Phipps had reassured Cadogan, who had expressed 
anxiety regarding the unstable situation in France, that he 'had no qualms about the 
(Royal) Visit' and that, on the contrary, 'it would be an excellent move' which 
would have 'a most healthy effect' on Hitler and Mussolini, 'who like to think that
(149}the streets of Paris are running in blood'. Consequently Phipps, who was
146) F0.371/22427 (R5955/240/22). Phipps tel., 1 July 1938.
147) Both Daladier & Bonnet were disturbed by the French tendency to hoard gold, the 
subsequent gold losses and its effect on the franc. Chamberlain was unable to offer any 
'material assistance' to the French. PREM1/267 Daladier to Chamberlain, 12 August 1938; 
Campbell tel. 13 August; Chamberlain to Daladier, 17 August 1938.
148) FO.371/21600 (C7807/55/17). Campbell tel., 31 July 1938.
149) FO.371/21606 (C174/174/17). Phipps to Cadogan, 10 January 1938. The initiative for the 
State Visit appears to have come from the British side.
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summoned by King George VI to London to discuss 'certain details connected with 
the visit'/150^  regarded himself as being personally responsible for its success/151^  
The result was that preparations absorbed the Embassy's time and energy from 
May to June while their final despatches describing its outcome from the provinces 
which Phipps had instructed the Consular Officers to submit in detail, extended
into September/152^  While enormously successful, and a triumphant reassertion of
the Entente Cordiale/153^ its effect was to facilitate the Embassy's almost total 
absorption in the Paris milieu and to make it overestimate its ability to influence, or 
rather to manipulate, events in Paris. This latter aspect was reinforced, not only by
150) FO.371/21607 (C4171/174/17). Phipps tel., 11 May 1938.
151) Memories of King Alexander's assassination at Marseilles were comparatively fresh and 
anxieties concerning the visit were not, therefore, confined to the British side. Harvey 
confirmed that Phipps had spoken to Halifax about the anxiety felt by some members of the 
French Cabinet and 'the danger of an attack by the Gestapo'. He felt that 'it was a terrible 
risk and the chance of ruining Anglo-French relations for a generation might well tempt the 
Nazi gangsters', however, to call it off now would be almost as bad'. Oliver Harvev Papers. 
British Library. 56381 Diary III March 6,1938 to July 1,1938. Entry for 9 May 1938.
152) FO.371/21608 (C9481/174/17). Phipps to Halifax, 1 September 1938. Phipps had 
instructed the Consular Officers to remain at their posts and 'report in due course what 
celebrations, if any, had been organized in their districts in connection with the Royal Visit'. 
This was a further reflection of his anxiety & the way in which he felt personally 
responsible for its success.
153) The French desperately wanted it to succeed. Despite the parlous state of the economy, the 
Chamber unanimously approved a bill to raise a further 24 million francs in connection with 
the Royal Visit FO.371/21607 (C5722/174/17) Phipps tel; 12 June 1938. Halifax told the 
Cabinet that it was 'a notable success' and that he had 'no doubt at all about the valuable 
political effect which the visit had'. FO.371/21608 C7734/174/17) Cabinet Conclusions 
35(38) 27 July 1938. For an excellent account, see Richard Dubreuil, La visite des 
souverains britanniques' in La France et les Francais en 1938-1939. ed. R.R£mond et 
J.Bourdin, Paris 1978, pp.77-94 which confirms that an examination of the French press 
during this period 'laisse l'impression d'un incontestable elan d'unanimite', p.81. Dubreuil 
omitted, however, to mention the alleged conspiracy by Catalan seperatists to organize an 
assassination attempt on the King & Queen in Paris which was reported by General Franco's 
Nationalist Intelligence Service but which was not taken seriously by the Paris Embassy. 
F0.371/ 21607 (C6062/174/17) Thomas (Hendaye) tel. 17 June 1938.
I
I
i
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Phipps's role during the May crisis, but also by his successful pressure on Daladier 
in June to keep the Spanish frontier closed. 1^54^
Despite (or perhaps because of) French pressure on Czechoslovakia, the 
French reaction to the German military build up in July and August was initially 
characterized by complacency. General Gamelin continued to maintain the
'remarkable sang froid' which Phipps had attributed to him earlier/1 ^ a n d  Roberts 
noted on 9 August that the Czechs and the French were surprisingly confident 
about the immediate future'/156'* By 10 August, however, the F.O. were 
sufficiently disturbed by the War Office's information regarding the scale of the 
'German measures' to instruct the Embassy to ascertain Bonnet's views/157^  and
the latter told Campbell on the 14th that he had
mentioned the question of (the) German manoeuvres to Massigli 
and he, like M.Bonnet said that they would enquire what the 
military authorities thought & knew. (He) expressed no views and 
showed no nervousness but remarked that people in England 
seemed to be taking a very black view of things.(158)
Bonnet's sanguine attitude towards the German military measures appears 
to have rubbed off on Phipps and, again, provides a sharp contrast with the 
former's collapse and the latter*s hysteria at the height of the crisis. By late August,
154) See f/note 139; for Vansittart's subsequently severe criticism of Phipps on this latter issue, 
see Ch.8.
155) Gamelin told Beaumont-Nesbitt on 2 July that the Germans were not yet ready for war as 
they lacked basic materiel such as petrol & oil. FO.371/21675 (C6872/132/18) Campbell, 2 
July 1938 (encl. Military attaches memo).
156) FO.371/21667 (C8066/65/18). Minute by Roberts, 9 August 1938.
157) FO.371/21667 (C8098/65/18). Col. van Cutsem (War Office) to Roberts (F.O.), 9 August 
1938; ibid, (C8068/65/18). F.O. to Campbell, 10 August 1938.
158) F.O.371/21668 (C8375/65/18). Campbell to Sargent, 14 August 1938; Bullitt had also 
noticed the 'almost uncanny calm of the French', see Ch.7.
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however, the French attitude began to change/159"* Colonel Gauche told Colonel 
Fraser, who had replaced Beaumont-Nesbitt as the Embassy's military attache, on 
3 0 August that
everyone recognized that the German active army is mobilized...
From the military point of view Germany is ready for war again 
against Czechoslovakia with a couverture on (the) western front 
and it rests entirely with (the) political side if it is to be averted. The 
German Government is still under the impression that neither 
France nor Britain will fight to save Czechoslovakia...
Roberts commented acidly that 'it is surprising that the French should only now be 
waking up to the significance of all these measures'/160^
The French decision makers, and the Embassy, would have soon T)e waking 
up' to the devastating impact of the Vuillemin and Lindbergh visits to Germany 
with its concomitant realisation of the desperate state of the French air force
vis-a-vis the Luftwaffe/161^  and this would be a major factor underlying Phipps's
159) On 25 August, the Deuxigme Bureau stated that the additional evidence confirmed their 
report of the 24th that Hitler would attack Czechoslovakia on 25 September, DDF. 2, X, 
no.485. 2e Bureau de FEtat-Major de l'Arm^e (Compte Rendu du renseignements, Paris 25 
aout 1938).
160) FO.371/21668 (C8975/65/18). Campbell encl. 30 August 1938 (Conversation between 
Military attache & Col. Gauche); ibid minute by Roberts, 31 Aug. 1938. Col. Gauchg's 
conclusions are elaborated in the Deuxi&me Bureau's report of 30 Aug. 1938. DDF. 2, X, 
no.506. Colonel Fraser had succeeded Col. Beaumont-Nesbitt as military attache at Paris on 
22 August 1938. Colonel (later Major-General) Beaumont-Nesbitt had been recalled by the 
War Office and was appointed Deputy Director, then Director, of Military Intelligence 
(1939-40).
161) General Vuillemin's visit to Germany was discussed at the Cabinet meeting of 30 August at 
which Henderson was present It was stated that Vuillemin had been 'a good deal impressed, 
in an unfavourable sense' by Goering (and the Luftwaffe). Their conclusions were that *we 
continue to impress on the French that they should consult us before taking any action 
which might involve them in war* and that they would further consider the situation as it 
arose. CAB.23/94 Cabinet meeting of 30 August 1938. For Vuillemin's account of his visit, 
see DDF. 2, X, No.429 Fran^ois-Poncet (Berlin) k Bonnet, 21 aout 1938 and ibid No.444 
Compte rendu du G£n£ral chef d'6tat-major de l'Armde de l'air, 23 aout 1938.
pessimistic reports during the crisis. Colonel Gauche told the military attache on 
31 August that 'we must consider the whole of the (French) army as mobilized and 
ready to fight'. Colonel Fraser reported that whether the French were really 
prepared to do so 'seems a little uncertain' and that while Gauche was certain that 
the German occupation of Czechoslovakia meant a European war, Mendl was
convinced that Trench will not fight except in self-defence'/162^  Phipps's own 
personal views, which were reserved for his 'all that is best in France is against war1 
despatch of 24 September, would strike the Foreign Office with 'a sense of
. 063) outrage.
162) WO. 106/5413. Colonel Fraser (Paris) to Col. van Cutsem (War Office), 31 August 1938. 
Fraser's reference to Sir Charles Mendl was a reminder of the important role the latter 
played as the Embassy's press attach^. For a description of his background, see Ch.3.
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CHAPTER 7
THE MUNICH CRISTS - SEPTEMBER 1938(1)
Phipps's reaction to the Munich crisis severely damaged his reputation at 
the Foreign Office from which it never completely recovered. His reports between 
1 and 24 September (until Chamberlain's meeting with Hitler at Godesberg) 
remained, however, calm and comparatively objective, and he continued to urge 
the French Government: (a) to co-operate fully in intensifying Anglo-French 
pressure on Benes to make concessions to the Sudeten Germans, and (b) not to 
take any steps without consulting the British Government. Both fell well within 
the framework of his general instructions and he was complimented, at least twice, 
by Halifax for his diplomatic skills. Hardly anything in these pre-Godesberg 
despatches prepared the Foreign Office for the impact of his notorious 'all that is 
best in France is against war1 telegrams of the 24th which would strike Strang and
(2)
the F.O. with 'a sense of outrage'. J
(A) Towards Berchtesgaden (1-14 September 1938)
During the early period of the crisis, Phipps reported a range of views but, 
until Godesberg on the 24th, he refrained from expressing his innermost anxieties 
to the F.O. Bullitt, who had also noticed 'the almost uncanny calm of the French 
during the (German) build-up' and who was equally conscious of the weakness of 
the French air force, told him on the 2nd that France would 'undoubtedly fight for
1) There is a vast & growing literature on the Munich crisis and this chapter is therefore 
confined to those aspects which relate directly to Phipps's Paris Embassy.
2) Lord Strang, At Home and Abroad. London 1956, p. 136.
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(3)Czechoslovakia because her very existence is at stake1. J Phipps was aware,
of
however,jthe lengths to which Bonnet would go in order to avoid war. The latter 
told him that he had informed Welczeck that France would be 'quite ready to 
accept any solution proposed by Lord Runciman' and that if this was rejected by 
Benes, Trance would consider herself released from her engagements to
Czechoslovakia'.^
During the crisis, Phipps increasingly allied himself with those elements in 
France (notably Bonnet, Flandin and Caillaux) who were 'against war at any price'. 
His despatch of the 2nd confirmed his growing obsession with a soi disant Svar 
party* in France, and it is significant that he should have attributed his source to 
Flandin. Phipps had told Bonnet that he had heard 'alarmist rumours indirectly 
from Flandin that war was inevitable and was being precipitated by Herriot, 
Mandel and Reynaud' and he sounded him out as to 'any possible desire for war 
amongst public men in France'. Bonnet assured him that Herriot's 'one bogey1 was 
Mussolini ('and not the Germans') and that Mandel ('though not Reynaud') was 
bellicose but fortunately he was isolated in the Cabinet and that 'his (Mandel's)
feelings were doubtless prompted by his Jewish origin'.^
Phipps's doubts concerning French intentions surfaced during his 
conversation with Daladier on the 8th. The latter has been positive that if Germany
3) FO.371/21734 (C9157/1941/18). Phipps tel., 2 September 1938.
4) FO.371/21734 (C9163/1941/18). Phipps tel., 2 Sept 1938.
Welczeck reported to Berlin that Bonnet had informed him that the pressure being exerted 
on the Prague Government was much greater than was supposed* and that 'the Czechoslovak 
Government would be forced to accept Runciman's verdict resulting in a fulfilment of 
70-90% of the Sudeten Germans' demands'. DGFP.D. Vol n, no.422 Welczeck to German 
Foreign Ministry, 2 September 1938.
5) FO.371/21735 (C9155/1941/18). Phipps tel., 2 September. 1938.
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invaded Czechoslovakia, 'the French would march to a man' because they realised 
that 'this will not be for les beaux veux of the Czechs but for their own skins' as 
Germany would, \vith enormously increased strength turn against France'. Daladier 
insisted that Gamelin had assured him that *he would be able to undertake a series 
of limited offensives'. Phipps's officially expressed view was that Trench action
would follow pretty soon on any German attack on Czechoslovakia'.^ Privately. 
however, after continual exposure to Bonnet's defeatist views, it appears that he
was somewhat taken aback by Daladier*s firmness; Cambon told Strang that
what Daladier told Sir Eric Phipps was that if Germany attacked 
Czechoslovakia, France would "mobilize and declare war"; that 
Phipps had appeared surprised at this statement, and that his 
surprise had surprised M.Daladier.(7)
Phipps, however, retained all of his old self-confidence at this stage, as is 
evident from his conversation with Bonnet on the 10th. Bonnet had asked him for 
a copy of the warning which had been conveyed to him on 22 May defining the
British attitude in the event of German aggression upon Czechoslovakia. '  He 
repeated that he would accept any plan for a settlement o f the Sudeten problem 
that either HMG or Lord Runciman might put forward', and Roberts minuted that
6) FO. 371/21596 (C9420/36/17). Phipps tel., 8 September 1938.
7) FO. 371/21596 (C9420/36/17). Minute by Strang, 9 September 1938.
Ldger had told Phipps on the 5th that Coxbin had notified the Quai d'Orsay that 'several 
political men' in Britain including members of the Government thought that the French 
Government had reacted with insufficient vigour to the provocative military measures of the 
Germans'. FO.371/21596 (C9403/36/17). Phipps to Halifax, 5 September 1938.
8) Ibid (C9559/1941/18). Phipps tel., 10 September. 1938. The F.O. agreed that Phipps could 
provide Bonnet with a copy of Halifax's telegram of 22 May but he was instructed to say that 
•you are not repeating to him the representations contained therein, but are merely at his 
request handing him a copy'. Ibid. F.O. to Phipps, 11 September. 1938, for the text, see
p. 162.
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Bonnet 'could not have been more categorical'.^
Phipps informed Halifax privately that during their conversation, Bonnet
had asked him not 'as the Ambassador1 but 'as a friend1 the question:
Supposing the Germans attacked Czechoslovakia & France 
mobilized, as she at once would. Supposing France then turned to 
Great Britain and said "We are going to march; will you march with 
us?" What would our answer be? Bonnet said it was tremendously 
important to know, and if the question were put it would be 
tremendously important that the answer should be immediate and 
quite plain, one way or another.(lO)
Phipps had replied that he could not answer a hypothetical question and that he 'did 
not believe that HMG could either1; there were many different variations on what 
constituted an act of aggression and he 'could not conceive of a cut-and-dried reply 
that would apply to all of them'. Bonnet asked him to treat the matter as 
confidential and he did not want his question to be 'officially recorded'. Phipps 
explained to him that their situations were different as France was bound by a 
definite pact and Britain was not. Bonnet then reiterated that the French would
accept any plan suggested by Runciman or HMG, and Phipps's impression was that
Bonnet, perhaps more than Daladier, and certainly much more than 
Mandel, Reynaud & Co., is desperately anxious for a possible way 
out of this impasse without being obliged to fight. I of course 
always indicate that, although Lord Runciman may produce a plan 
as a last card, it would be greatly preferable that (the) last card 
should not have to be played. The ideal solution remains one 
agreed upon by the Sudeten (sic) & Czechoslovakia. (11)
9) Ibid (C9541/1941/18). Phipps tel 10 September. 1938 & minute by Roberts, 12 September 
1938.
10) FO.371/21737 (C9740/1941/18). Phipps to Halifax, 10 September. 1938 Private & 
Confidential'. Bonnet's note of his conversation with Phipps on 10 September, whom he 
found 'comme toujours... extremement comprehensif, is almost identical to Phipps's own 
account to Halifax, DDR 2, XI, no.78 Note du Ministre, 10 September 1938
11) Ibid. Phipps's italics.
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Phipps's letter was circularized at the Cabinet meeting on 12 September 
where Halifax, who told his colleagues that he had had insufficient time to consult
(12)
the F.O., obtained their approval for the 'general line' of his reply. Halifax 
complimented Phipps on his 'admirable language' to Bonnet and told him that, as he 
had correctly stated, *the question could not be disassociated from the 
circumstances in which they are posed, which are necessarily at this stage 
completely hypothetical', and that HMG would also be unwilling to commit the 
Dominions. Halifax concluded in the wording which had been agreed by the 
Cabinet:
So far, therefore, as I am in a position to give any answer at this 
stage to M.Bonnet's question, it would have to be that, while HMG 
would never allow the security of France to be threatened, they are 
unable to make precise statements of the character of their future 
action, or the time at which it would be taken, in circumstances that 
they cannot at present foresee.(13)
Above all, it was Phipps's controlled and confident response to the crisis on 
13 September which revealed that, until Godesberg, he had kept his sang froid and 
still appeared to believe that the conflict could be resolved peacefully. Hitler's 
violent speech at Nuremberg, assuring the Sudeten Germans that they were 'neither
(14)
defenceless nor deserted', had unleashed riots in the Sudentenland on the 13th. 
During that afternoon and evening, Phipps sent a total of eight telegrams to 
London in a day which culminated in Chamberlain's personal message to Hitler that 
he would fly immediately to Germany to meet him. These telephoned despatches,
12) CAB.23/95 Cabinet meet of 12 September. 1938 (Cab.37(38). FO.371/21737 
(C9740/1941/18). Memo by Halifax, 13 September. 1938 CP 197(38). The Cabinet also 
derided that they should 'neither put a break on the French nor yet apply the accelerator*; that 
further discussions should await Hitler’s Nuremberg speech that evening, and that the Chiefs 
of Staff should prepare an up-to-date assessment of the (strategic) situation.
13) FO.371/21737 (C9740/1941/18). Halifax to Phipps, 12 September 1938.
14) Christopher Thome, The Approach of War. 1938-39. London 1967, p.71
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reflecting the deterioration in French morale, played an important role in 
precipitating Chamberlain's decision and were also an indication of the strain under 
which Phipps was labouring.
1) Phipps reported at 1.00am that Leger had enquired whether they had 
considered his suggestion regarding a Four Power Conference; Emile Roche, who 
was 'in close contact with Caillaux', had hinted in La Republique that this was the 
best way out of the impasse', and Phipps considered that pubtic opinion was 
'becoming more and more ready, in order to avoid war, to accept even the solution
of a plebiscite for autonomy outside the Reich'/1
2) At 1.35pm he informed the F.O. that Bonnet had telephoned him, 
'begging' that, in view of the grave situation in Czechoslovakia, Runciman should 
immediately issue a declaration stating that lie is about to propose a plan 
calculated to bridge over differences between the two parties'; Bonnet told Phipps 
that 'the whole question of peace or war may now only be a matter of minutes
instead of days'. ^
3) At 6.15pm he further reported that Bonnet had told him confidentially
that if Runciman adopted the Karlsbad programme the French Government would
be ready to 'press it upon the Czechs'. Phipps added that Bonnet seemed
07}'completely to have lost his nerve and to be ready for any solution to avoid war*.
15) FO.371/21737 (C9654/1941/18). Phipps tel. 13 September 1938 (1.00pm). 1st tel. L^ger had 
suggested to Phipps on the 11th that a Four Power Conference should be summoned to 
discuss a general settlement'. FO.371/21736 (C9560/1941/18). Phipps tel. 11 September. 
1938.
16) FO.371/21737 (C9655/1941/18). Phipps tel., 13 September. 1938 (1.25pm) 2nd Tel
17) Ibid. (C9703/1941/18). Ibid (6.15pm). 3rd Tel.
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4) Phipps's despatch at 7.10pm was, perhaps, his most important of the 
day. Bonnet had been Veiy upset' and had told him that 'peace must be 
preserved at any price as neither France nor Great Britain were ready for war1. 
Colonel Lindbergh had returned from Germany 'horrified at the over-whelming 
strength' of the Luftwaffe and the terrible weakness' of the other powers: Bonnet 
had predicted that British and French cities would be 'wiped out' and that 
retaliation would be ineffective. Phipps had found his collapse 'so sudden and 
extraordinary that he was seeking an immediate interview with Daladier.
5) At 7.30pm, Phipps reported that Bonnet had repeated his proposal for a 
four power conference to avert war, and that this would not obviate Runciman's
efforts/19^
6) Phipps reported at 8.30pm that he had seen Daladier and that he had 
been careful 'not to give away MBonnet' during his conversation as this could have 
provoked a cabinet crisis. Daladier was disturbed by the crisis 'and felt that every 
minute was now precious'. Phipps asked him 'point blank' whether he adhered to 
the policy which he had enunciated on 8 September, viz. that 'if German troops 
cross the Czechoslovak frontier, the French will march to a man'. Daladier replied,
18) Ibid. (C9704/1941/18). Ibid. (7.10pm). 4th Tel.
19) Ibid. (C9707/1941/18). Ibid. (7.30pm). 5th Tel. Bonnet's memoirs (which are notoriously 
unreliable) fails to mention his role in the events of 13 Sept His official note of his 
conversation with Phipps confirms his concern with Lindbergh's report but omits his 
hysterical description of the effects of German aerial bombing. It also adds two important 
items which are missing from Phipps's despatches:
a) Bonnet's alleged remark that he had been surprised by a note seemingly emanating from 
the F.O. giving the impression that 'l'Angleterre acceptait voluntiers l'id6e de la guerre k 
propos l'affaire tch£coslovaque' especially as he had recently been reminded of the terms of 
their note of 22 May, and Phipps's purported reply that HMG's position remained unchanged.
b) that speaking personally, Phipps 'ne me cacha pas qu'il y a avait au Foreign Office deux 
tendances et que ces tendances, etaient tout k frit oppos&s sur la question de la paix ou de la 
guerre'. DDF. 2, XI, no. 125 Note duMmistre, 13 Septembre 1938.
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*but with evident lack of enthusiasm', that 'if (the) German used force (the) French
would be obliged also'. Phipps concluded that:
(The) Daladier of today was quite a different one to the M.Daladier 
of September 8, and his tone & language were very different indeed.
I fear (the) French have been bluffing, although I have continually 
pointed out to them that one cannot bluff Hitler. Rather than give in 
to it, which would mean actual suicide, he would in (the) last resort 
prefer war.(20)
7) At 8.30pm, Phipps further reported that Daladier appeared to prefer a 
Three Power Conference, providing Hitler agreed, but Phipps thought that this 
would be 'most unlikely '^ Daladier's demand, to speak to Chamberlain on the 
telephone, was refused by Cadogan who insisted that he 'must give a message 
through Phipps'/22^
8) Finally at 10.10pm on 13 September, Phipps read the Very urgent 
message' which Daladier had dictated to him for Chamberlain's immediate 
attention. Daladier stated that events were out of control and that
20) FO.371/21737 (C9708/1941/18). Phipps tel., 13 Sept 1938 (8.30pm). 6th Tel.
21) Ibid. (C9709/1941/18). Ibid. (8.30pm). 7th Tel. According to Alexander Werth's colourful 
account Phipps had two meetings with Daladier on 13 September: one in the afternoon & 
another in the evening. Werth stated that Phipps was at the Opera Comique that night and 
on receiving a message from Daladier 'asking to see him at once', he 'jumped into a taxi and 
drove to the War Office'. On leaving he was purported to have 'dropped the enigmatic 
phrase: "II faut que cette chamaillerie cesse'. Alexander Werth, The Twilight of France. 
London 1942, pp.237-8. Phipps reported only one meeting with Daladier that day (in the 
evening). Given the sequence of his telegrams, and the fret that he had reported at 7.10pm 
that he was seeking an immediate interview with Daladier, his legendary visit to the Opera 
Comique in an already extremely busy day appears to be dubious, and the usually reliable 
Werth may have been mistaken. The most recent biographer of Daladier appears to have 
completely ignored the events of 13-16 September, Elisabeth du Reau, Edouard Daladier. 
Paris 1993, especially pp.254-258.
22) The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-45. ed. D.Dilks, London 1971, p.97. Bullitt was 
under the misapprehension that Daladier had telephoned Chamberlain & had proposed a 
conference personally to him but that 'Chamberlain whose French is not good, had difficulty 
in understanding and the message was finally transmitted through the British Ambassador in 
Paris'. FRUS. Vol I (General) 1938, Bullitt to Secretaiy of State, 14 Sept. 1938, p.594. Bullitt 
must have obtained this misinformation (which he passed on to Washington) either from 
Phipps or from Daladier himself.
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the entry of German troops into Czechoslovakia must at all costs be 
prevented. If not France will be faced with her obligation, viz: 
automatic necessity to fulfil her engagement.
Daladier suggested that Runciman should immediately make his plan public and, if 
possible, arrange personally for the two sides to be brought together. If this was 
not sufficient he suggested immediately proposing a Three Power Meeting and
(23)perhaps later, 'a more general settlement with the other additional powers'. 1
On 14 September, Chamberlain told the Cabinet that he had considered 
putting his 'Z Plan' into operation at the end of the week but that he had been 
overtaken by events. Amongst the three specific events which he mentioned, two 
had been relayed by Phipps in his despatches of the 13th:
a) Chamberlain referred to the remarkable communication* from Phipps describing 
Bonnet's collapse, and he pointed out that the latter 'seemed thoroughly cowed', 
convinced that French and British cities would be devastated, and that he had been 
frightened by Lindbergh's report, (b) He also singled out Phipps's comments that 
he had found Daladier 'a very different person from what he had been on 8 
September1, and the tatter's remark that Germany had to be prevented 'at all costs' 
from invading Czechoslovakia because France Svould be faced with her 
obligations'; Chamberlain thought that Daladier*s language was 'significant', (c) 
The news of the Sudeten German ultimatum to the Czechs, the tatter's refusal, and 
Henlein's announcement that negotiations had been broken off. ^
23) FO.371/21737 (C9710/1941/18). Phipps tel., 13 Sept. 1938 (10.10pm). 8th Tel. Cadogan 
noted that when Daladier*s message arrived 'it was not quite as limp as Bonnet, but had very
little backbone' Cadogan diaries pilks), op.cit, pp.97-98.
24) CAB.23/95. Cabinet Meeting of 14 September 1938 Cab.38(38).
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With these factors in mind, the Cabinet endorsed Chamberlain's suggestion 
that 'Plan Z' should be put into operation immediately, and his personal message to
Hitler (via Ribbentrop) was despatched to Berlin that day. '  Cadogan's diaries 
provide additional confirmation that Phipps's despatches of 13 September played a 
vital role in the Cabinet's decision/26^
B) Towards Godesherg (14/15-23 September 1938^
Phipps had retained his sang froid after Bonnet's reported collapse and the 
momentous events of 13 September. This was undoubtedly facilitated by the 
optimism generated by Chamberlain's visit to Hitler at Berchtesgaden news reached
(2J)
the Embassy at 12.40am on the 14th. 1 Phipps described the atmosphere in Paris
privately to Halifax on the 14th. ^  Bonnet had appeared to be 'genuinely pleased' 
by Halifax's negative response to his question of whether Britain would march with 
France, and he had even agreed to provide him with it in writing as 'ammunition to 
fire off at any war mongers either in or outside the (French) Cabinet' although he
25) CAB.23/95. The Cabinet recorded their *whole hearted approval' of Chamberlain's personal 
initiative & endorsed Halifax's reply to Phipps's private & confidential letter of 10 Sept For 
Chamberlain's message to Hitler, see DBFP. 3, 2, no.862 Halifax to Henderson, 13 Sept. 
1938.
26) This was confirmed by Cadogan's diary entry for 13 Sept His meeting with the Ministers 
that morning had been 'pretty inconclusive', by 7.30pm, however, telegrams were arriving 
from Paris 'showing that Bonnet was completely deflated' and that Daladier had demanded to 
speak to Chamberlain on the telephone. By 11pm, Bonnet's messages showed that he at 
least was panicking, and the situation slipping; P.M. decided on Plan Z\ Cadogan Diaries 
(ed. Dilks), op.cit., p.98.
27) Phipps was instructed to deliver Chamberlain's message to Daladier that, before deciding on 
the laser's proposal, he would explore the *possibility of direct action in Berlin'. 
FO.371/21737 (C9708/1941/18). Halifax to Phipps, 14 Sept 1938, 12.40am. The 
background to Chamberlain's decision and his more detailed instructions were sent to Phipps 
at 4.10pm Ibid. (C970/1941/18).
28) FO.800/311 (HZXIV). Phipps to Halifax, 14 September 1938.
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(Phipps) thought that Mandel was 'the only one of that kidney in the Cabinet'. 
Phipps had always regarded Bonnet as being 'reasonable and prudent' over
Germany and Italy, and he believed that his collapse had been due to:
1) The realisation that the German danger is "ante portas".
2) Litvinov's evasions at Geneva on September 11, and
3) Lindbergh's hair raising report on the vastness and excellence of 
the German air force, and the terrible shortcomings of all others.
Guy La Chambre, the Minister of the Air who was also acutely aware of the 
serious deficiencies of the French air force, had been 'especially rattled' by 
Lindbergh's description of the poor state of the Soviet air force. As for Daladier,
Phipps warned Halifax that
The fact is Daladier always talks bigger than he acts. His enemies 
say he is "un taureau a comes de limafon", and I fear this is rather 
true. But as reported, whatever the texture of his horns, they were 
much less apparent yesterday than they were on September 8th, for 
instance.
Bonnet had read him 'a mysterious telegram' from Corbin to the effect that Halifax
had gone further than his previous declarations and had said that:
l'Angleterre viendrait a notre secours, non pas si la France etait 
menacee, mais si elle se trouvait engagee dans un conflit avec 
l'Allemagne pour avoir execute ses engagements avec la 
Tchecoslovaquie.
Phipps had been unable to determine whether Halifax had made this statement and 
he told the latter that he was 'always careful' to hand Bonnet copies of his 
despatches reporting his conversations with Corbin 'so that there should not be any 
misunderstanding or magnifying of your language'.
Phipps reported further on the 14th that there was no doubt that, in order
to avoid war, French public opinion would welcome Sudeten autonomy 'outside
(29)the Reich, if imposed on the Czechs by the British and French Governments'.
29) FO.371/21737 (C9724/1941/18). Phipps tel. 14 Sept 1938 (12.00 noon).
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Bonnet had gone further during their interview/30^ and had told him that Trance 
would accept any solution of (the) Czechoslovak question to avoid war1 adding 
that Sve cannot sacrifice ten million men in order to prevent three and a half million 
Sudeten from joining the Reich' and that, in the last resort, they would agree to a 
plebiscite. Bonnet was also concerned by Litvinov's indication at Geneva that, in 
the event of aggression, the USSR would consult the League Council and *would 
not act directly in defence of Czechoslovakia and he feared that Trance could not 
fight, alone in the first instance, on three fronts, viz. Germany, Italy and Spain'. He 
was also angry with the Czechs whom, he alleged, would mobilize without 
consulting France and had therefore given a broad hint' to Benes that French 
obligations towards Czechoslovakia may have to be reconsidered. Bonnet
concluded by informing Phipps that
we are not ready for war and must therefore make (the) most 
far-reaching concessions to the Sudetens and to Germany, adding 
that this must be done in spite of (the) Czechs and Soviets quickly, 
in order to forestall any aggression by Germany. (31)
Roberts minuted that 'the French are now ready to consider any scheme to avoid 
German aggression' and that they were 'searching for excuses to put the blame on 
the Czechs and Soviets'. Summarizing the events of 13/14 September, Mallet 
stated succinctly that Trench opinion has developed, or perhaps one should say
30) Ibid. (C9740/1941/18). Phipps tel. 14 Sept. 1938. (2.20pm).
31) FO.371/21737 (C9740/1941/18). Phipps tel, 14 Sept 1938 (2.20pm). Bonnet & Phipps's 
views on the Czechs were close. Phipps had told Bullitt, somewhat disingenuously that 
morning, that 'it had become clear to the British Government that the trouble maker in the 
present situation was Benes' and that Tor the first time yesterday1 the French Government had 
become 'convinced' of this. Bullitt commented that it had seemed to him for some that 
Bonnet shared this view*. Anticipating his telegram of 24 Sept, Phipps added that the 
French at the present time were ready for peace at almost any price'. FRUS- Vol I (General) 
1938, p.595, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 14 Sept 1938.
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C32')collapsed, in a very rapid manner.
Phipps reported at 10pm that Daladier had 'not looked very pleased' at the 
hews of Chamberlain's decision to meet Hitler as he had wanted a meeting 'a
tro is'/33^  but that Bonnet, Leger, Millerand, Herriot and Reynaud had all hastened 
to express their appreciation to him in very warm terms. A slight note o f discord
was struck by Bonnet's comment that:
he (Bonnet) and other members of the French Government had been 
rung up yesterday on the telephone from London by well-known 
British Members of Parliament enquiring whether it was true that 
the French Government had changed their attitude in the last few 
days. He remarked smilingly that it was difficult enough to answer 
questions of French Parliamentarians without having to reply to 
awkward questions from foreign ones over the telephone.(34)
(35)On the 16th, Phipps told Halifax privately v that Bonnet was 'perturbed' 
because he had heard from the Czech Legation in Paris that Masaiyk had stated 
that Phipps had reported on the 13th that he had been told by Bonnet that Trance 
would not assist Czechoslovakia even if that state were attacked by Germany1. 
Phipps thought that Masaryk could have 'picked up in the F.O. or elsewhere
something of the substance of my telegram 244 Secret of September 13'/36^  and he 
was concerned that, if a leak had occurred, this would place him in a Very
32) Ibid. Minutes by Roberts & Mallet
33) Ibid. (C9796/1941/18). Phipps tel., 14 Sept 1938 (10.00pm). Halifax had explained the 
background to Chamberlain's decision at 4.10pm, and had instructed Phipps to immediately 
inform the French Government At 4.45pm, he further informed the Embassy that Hitler had 
agreed to a meeting for the following day. Ibid. (C9708/1941/18). Halifax to Phipps, 14 
Sept 1938 (two tels).
34) FO.371/21737 (C9782/1941/18). Phipps tel., 15 September 1938.
35) FO.800/311 (HZXIV/299). Phipps to Halifax, 16 Sept 1938.
36) This telegram had reported Bonnet's statement that *peace must be preserved at any price' 
and Bonnet's collapse and had been despatched at 7.10pm on 13 September 1938. See i/note 
18 for reference.
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awkward position' with Bonnet. The latter had exclaimed to him, with some 
bravado, that 'Tout de meme il ne faudrait pas que les Anglais nous poussent a la 
guerre', which he had heatedly denied.
Bonnet had also complained to Phipps again about the *belligerent attitude' 
of sections of the British press, and also Churchill and General Spears's telephone 
calls to Paris enquiring whether there had been a recent change in the French 
attitude. Phipps shared Bonnet's hostility towards those advocates of a firmer 
Anglo-French policy towards any potential German aggression towards 
Czechoslovakia, and he commented sharply to Halifax that 'our M.P.'s should 
realise that whatever they say by telephone of any interest probably goes to the 
Germans and certainly to those French who had best not hear it'. He also reminded 
Halifax of the difference between Daladier's brave words' on the 8th and his 'more 
cautious statement of 13th', and that Bonnet had repeated that any plan submitted 
by Chamberlain or Runciman would be accepted by the French Government and
imposed on the Czechs. His own impressions were that
despite Bonnet's rather braver language to me today (braver) 
because war seems rather more remote, that I feel pretty certain that 
the French will by no means resort automatically to arms, even if 
the German forces cross the Czechoslovak frontier. They will, I 
believe, examine very closely the circumstances in which the 
"aggression" takes place, and I do not suppose we shall blame them 
for caution in this respect.(37)
Cadogan, Mallet and Strang all denied 'hinting at the contents' or speaking to 
anyone 'outside official circle' about the substance of Phipps's telegram of 13
37) FO.800/311 (HZXIV/299). Phipps to Halifax, 16 September 1938.
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September/38'* While the origins of the leak remains obscure, the original source of 
the garbled version may well have been Vansittart.
Almost predictably, it was Vansittart, in fact, who first introduced a 
discordant note into the consensus at the F.O. regarding the objectivity of the 
Embassy's reports. He told Halifax that he was 'uneasy' and 'perhaps unfounded
suspicions' had occurred to him but
It seems to me odd that all we know definitely as to the attitude of 
the French Government is really as to the attitude of Bonnet. We do 
not know much about Daladier, for we have only one telegram 
which seemed to show that he was possibly weakening, and as to 
the attitude of all the rest of the French Cabinet we know really 
nothing. I should have thought that before we come to any decision 
we ought to make more certain where the French really stand. It is 
conceivable that Bonnet does not really represent the whole... (39)
Vansittart was concerned that they might get the 'unenviable responsibility* of
taking the lead before we know where France really stood', and that this would
(40)damage both Anglo-French and Ango-American relations. '  Cadogan thought 
that this had been largely answered by the invitation' to Daladier and Bonnet to 
come to London immediately/41^
Phipps advised Halifax privately that it would be Very desirable' if the 
French ministers could be questioned individually and separately in different rooms 
when they come to London. Lindbergh's report could provide a 'peg' on which to
38) Ibid. Minutes by Cadogan, Mallet & Strang.
39) Ibid. (H/XIV/301). Memorandum by Vansittart to Halifax, 17 Sept. 1938.
40) Ibid.
41) Ibid. Minute by Cadogan, 17 September 1938.
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hang questions regarding the *true state' of the French air force and he explained 
that
Bonnet almost collapsed when he mentioned this report to me, 
whereas Daladier affected hardly to have heard of it. Which spoke 
the truth? Or were both lying, the one from funk, and the other 
from over-assurance? Veracity is not, I regret to say, the strongest 
point of the average French politician, but there is rather a better 
chance of extracting the truth from him when he is not in the 
presence of another Frenchman. This applies with added force in the 
present case, for Bonnet undoubtedly has his eye on the Presidence 
du Conseil.(42)
On 19 September, the French Ministerial Council unanimously approved of
(431the solution proposed in (the) agreement with the British Government'. As is 
well known, this 'solution' consisted in putting intense pressure on Benes to accept 
the Anglo-French plan which would have satisfied virtually all o f Hitler's 
Berchtesgaden demands. Phipps played an important role in this, inter alia, by 
pressing Bonnet into issuing the necessary instructions to Lacroix to support 
Newton's representations in Prague which began on the 19th, immediately after the 
London meeting.
Bonnet's information, that the Czechs had not decided whether to appeal to 
arbitration or to accept the Anglo-French plan, provided a striking confirmation of 
the way in which Phipps extended his brief and was playing a leading role in the 
decision making process. Bonnet had telephoned him 'in great excitement' while he 
was lunching with Bullitt on the 20th, and told him that if Benes appealed to
42) FO.800/311 (H/XtV/300). Phipps to Halifax, 17 Sept 1938. Ironically, in a separate 
despatch to the F.O. on the same day, Phipps had reported that Col. Petitbon had given the 
military attach^ a more complete statement of General Gamelin's views on possible French 
action in the event of war, and that this had corresponded to the views expressed to him by 
Leger on 4 Sept & Daladier on 8 Sept. FO. 371/21596 (C10082/36/17). Phipps tel. 17 Sept 
1938. For Leger and Daladiefs statements, see op.dt
43) FO.371/21739 (C10106/1941/18). Phipps tel., 19 Sept 1938. For the Anglo-French 
conversation in London on 18 Sept, see DBFP. 3,2, no.928.
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(44)arbitration the German army would 'enter Czechoslovakia tonight*. 7 Bonnet was
instructing Lacroix to urge Benes to immediately accept the Anglo-French plan and
(45)begged' Phipps that Newton should make immediate demarche in Prague.
Bullitt reported that Phipps had told him that
he (Phipps) said he had replied to Bonnet that he was so sure of the 
position of his Government that, without consulting his 
Government, he would at once telephone to Praha (sic) and tell the 
British Minister to express the opinion to the Czechoslovak 
Government that if the Czechoslovak Government should appeal 
for arbitration German troops would enter Czechoslovakia 
tonight.(46)
According to Bullitt, Phipps had added that the British and French 
Governments had made it 'entirely clear* to Benes that if he rejected the 
Anglo-French plan and German troops invaded Czechoslovakia, 'no support' would 
be given to the Czechs 'either by Britain or France', and that Phipps then 
telephoned Newton in Prague and the F.O. in London who were 'in entire accord
with his views and actions'/47^  The Foreign Office minutes confirm that Strang 
telephoned the contents of Phipps's despatch to Cadogan 'at his house' and, on his 
instructions, saw Chamberlain who authorized his suggestion that Newton should 
support Lacroix in Prague. Strang then telephone Newton who told him that he
had 'already acted on Paris telegram 265' and that
He (Newton) had explained to the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister 
that he had no instructions, but that he was certain that HMG would 
wish to associate himself fully and whole heartedly with what the 
French Minister had said. Mr Newton told me that he had added a
44) FRUS. Vol I (General) 1938. Bullitt to the Seer, of State, 20 Sept. 1938.
45) FO.371/21739 (C10187/1941/18). Phipps tel., 20 Sept 1938 (2.15pm).
46) FRUS. op.dt, p.627.
47) Ibid.
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waming to the Czechoslovak Government against any bargaining on 
their answers.(48)
The Paris Embassy's action may have prompted Halifax into expressing his 
appreciation of Phipps's services by thanking him personally for his letter during
(49)the crisis which were 'most useful' to him.
Phipps's collusion with Bonnet's defeatist attitude, and his active role in 
discouraging the French Government from any positive action in support of 
Czechoslovakia, was again demonstrated on the 20th and 21st. Bonnet had told 
him that 'elements on the Left in Paris' were pressurising Benes to reject the 
Anglo-French plan. Phipps therefore suggested that Benes should be warned that 
unless he gave a 'straightforward acceptance', France and Britain would 'wash their
hands of Czechoslovakia in the face of a German attack'/50^  Bonnet agreed and 
was emphatic that, if Benes were evasive, a joint communication along these lines 
should be made to him immediately/51^  Phipps also advised Bonnet to speak 
severely to Osusky, and the former promised to do so immediately and also to 
warn the Czechoslovak Government/52^  He also warned Halifax that Churchill 
and Spears were in Paris, 'giving bad advice to Osusky and to certain French
48) FO.371/21739 (CIO187/1941/18). Minute by Strang. 20 Sept 1938.
49) FO.800/311 (HZXTV/302). Halifax to Phipps, 20 Sept 1938.
50) FO.371/21739 (C10207/1941/18). Phipps tel., 20 Sept 1938 7.45pm.
51) Ibid. (C10208/1941/18). Phipps tel., 20 Sept 1938. 8.30pm.
52) Ibid. (C10319/1941/18). Phipps tel., 21 Sept 1938. 5.5pm. The Czechoslovak Government 
replied on 21 Sept that, 'under the pressure of urgent insistence culminating in (the) British 
communications of 21 September*, they 'sadly accepted) the French & British proposals'. 
Ibid. (C10320/1941/18). Newton (Prague), 21 Sept 1938.
-199-
politicians^53\meaning that they should resist the German demands), which was a 
source of immense irritation both to Bonnet and to himself. Despite Bonnet's 
assurance to him that there was no truth' in the rumours that several members of 
the Government had wanted to resign, Phipps heard, on the 21st, that Mandel, 
Reynaud and Champetier de Ribes 'had actually offered their resignations to
Daladier' who had refused to accept them.
Subsequent events deprived Phipps of any important initiative in the 
decision making process until 24 September albeit he remained extremely active in 
liaising between Paris and London. This included relaying Halifax's urgent 
message to Leger on the 22nd asking whether, in view of the lack of news from
Godesberg and reports of Sudetendeutsch incursions into Egerland/55\h e  advice
53) Ibid. (C10319/1941/18). Phipps tel., 21 Septl938. Churchill was in Paris (20-22 Sept) to 
stiffen the French resolve and he successfully dissuaded his friends, Reynaud & Mandel, 
from resigning from the Government. DDF. 2, XI, no.281 Corbin k Bonnet, 22 Septl938; 
W.S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm. London 1946, p.309. Bonnet later remaiked 
sarcastically that, H est vrai qu'il suffit de parcourir les Memories de Churchill pour 
constater quil considerait dans cette periode comme le Premier d'Angleterre... et de France!' 
Georges Bonnet, Le Ouai d'Orsav sous trois republiques. Paris 1961, p.218. General Spears 
saw Leger on the 22nd and reported his disturbing findings to Vansittart (See f/note 56).
54) F0.371/21600 (C10459/55/17). Phipps tel., 22 Sept. 1938
55) FO.371/21775 (C10631/4839/18). Halifax to Phipps, 22 Sept 1938. 5.15pm.
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to Prague not to mobilize should be withdrawn/56^  Leger*s concurrence,^and the
suspension of the proposed communication to Prague on Chamberlain's advice.
Summarizing the latest French reactions to the Czech crisis on the 22nd, 
Phipps reported that it was 'causing acute heart break among the various political 
parties', and that 'all hopes are fastened on Chamberlain's conversations at
Godesberg'/59^  By 6pm on the 23rd, it was obvious that the talks had reached 
deadlock, and Phipps was requested to obtain a statement from the French 
Government regarding their intentions in the event of a German attack on
Czechoslovakia/60^  Fatefully for Phipps, and precipitating his 'all that is best in 
France' telegram of the 24th, he was also instructed to provide his personal
56) Ibid. General Spears saw Llger on the 22nd and reported his disturbing conversation to 
Vansittart. L6ger told him that Bonnet had two or three documents the purpose of which is 
that the British Government was in no circumstances prepared to be involved in war over 
Czechoslovakia'. Pressed by an amazed Spears, L6ger added that 'it was quite clear from the 
documents that we would not even consent to go to war in support of France if she became 
involved in a war over Czechoslovakia', and that Bonnet 'had told this to the French 
Government'. Spears also gathered that Leger had not seen these documents himself nor had 
he seen Phipps Tor some time'. Spears Papers (Churchill College Archives), SPRS.1/245, 
Spears to Vansittart, 23 September 1938. Vansittart passed this letter to the F.O. who 
produced a lengthy memorandum on this topic on 23 September. The F.O. concluded that, 
after Phipps's clarification of the Halifax-Coibin Conversations (see f/note 27) and his 
subsequent assurances, % on Sept 22 MLdger still professed to believe that we would not 
fight over Czechoslovakia in any circumstances, one cannot escape the conclusion that his 
misrepresentation of our attitude was deliberate'. Mallet agreed with Spears's suggestion that 
Bonnet was 'preparing a dossier for his future protection'. FO.371/21745 (C12085/1941/18). 
Minutes by Speaight & Mallet, 29 Sept. & 3 Oct 1938.
57) FO.371/21770 (C10398/4786/18). Phipps tel., 22 Sept 1938. 6.30pm.
58) The Embassy were notified at 10.10pm that Chamberlain had issued a statement urging all 
the parties to refrain from action of any kind that might interfere with (the) progress of (the) 
conversation'. The proposed Anglo-French communication to Prague was therefore 
suspended. Ibid (C10640 & C10400/4786/18). Halifax to Phipps, 22 Sept. 1938 (10.10pm) & 
Phipps tel. 22 Sept 1938 (11.0pm).
59) FO.371/21600 (C10460/55/17). Phipps tel., 22 September 1938.
60) Ibid. (C10665/1941/18). F.O. to Phipps, 23 September 1938. 6.5pm.
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impressions of 'feeling in political and public opinion'/61'* In the meantime, he 
reported that Litvinov had stated that 'Russia would come in after France had 
already come in’ which Bonnet regarded as late and limited help'/62'*
C) 'All that is best in France' (24-31 September 19381
The immediate cause of Phipps's 'all that is best in France' despatch can be 
traced back to the early morning of the 24th when he was instructed to 
communicate a copy of the memoranda containing Hitler's Godsberg demands to
the French Government/63^  and Chamberlain had emphasised that they constituted
Hitler's last w ord'/64^  This was followed by the news at noon on the 24th that the 
Socialist Radical Group in the Chamber had expressed full confidence in Daladier 
to  defend the interests of France', and that Cot had made an authorised press
statement to the effect that:
France had gone to the extreme limit of concessions. She cannot 
cede more. M.Daladier authorises me to say that if Germany carries 
out a coup de force against Czechoslovakia, France would fulfil her 
commitments.(65)
Phipps's despatch a t^ ^ p m  provided some clues to his own personal views 
which he would express more fully some two hours later. General Gamelin had
61) Ibid.
62) FO.371/21777 (C10586/5302/18). Phipps tel., 23 Sept 1938.
63) FO.371/21740 (C10561/1941/18). Brit Delegation (Godesberg) to Phipps, 24 September 
1938. 3am.
64) Ibid. (C10560/1941/18). Brit Deleg. (Godesberg) to Newton (Prague, 24 Sept 1938. 
10.10am (Repeated to Paris).
65) FO. 371/21740 (C10574/1941/18). Phipps tel., 24 Sept.1938. (12.30pm).
66) Ibid. (C10589/1941/18). Phipps tel., 24 Sept 1938 (3pm) & minute by Speaight Vansittart 
had noted earlier that Phipps relied heavily on a narrow range of sources for his assessment 
of the situation in France. See p. 192.
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informed Colonel Fraser that Daladier had told him that, *the only way to save 
peace now was to demonstrate that France was prepared to fight', and he had 
enumerated the latest French preparations. Bonnet, on the other hand, had asked 
for more time to consider Halifax's question regarding French intentions. Flandin 
had called on him (Phipps) spontaneously to inform him that 'all (the) peasant class 
were against war and although in case of necessity they would march, their hearts 
would not be in it'. Phipps added that this was confirmed by several of his other 
sources and, significantly, he referred to his despatch of 3 July 'in which M. 
Caillaux (had) used similar language in regard to (the) war in Spain'. Flandin's 
pessimistic conclusions which Phipps quoted could well have been an expression of 
his own views:
In the event of initial reverses and heavy air bombardments they 
would agitate for an early peace. Communist leaders who are the 
most active in egging on war are already telling their men if there 
were these heavy air bombardments they would rise up, declare that 
France had been betrayed by her Government and set up a 
communist regime.
Phipps's impression was that the deputies who represented agricultural
constituencies would be 'most reluctant' to vote for war, and he concluded that:
It is impossible however to foretell precise reactions of public 
opinion beforehand as public opinion would depend on 
circumstances of German aggression and amount of bloodshed 
thereby.
Phipps's telegram at 5.45pm reporting his 'purely personal impression'/67^
struck Strang and the Foreign Office with 'a sense of o u t r a g e ' A n y  analysis of 
their response, Phipps's motives for his apparent volte-face and its consequences, 
requires this telegram to be cited in full:
67) FO.371/21740 (C10602/1941/18). Phipps tel., 24 September 1938. (5.45pm)
68) Lord Strang, At Home and Abroad. London 1956, p. 136.
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Unless German aggression were so brutal, bloody & prolonged 
(through gallantry of Czechoslovak resistance) as to infuriate 
French public opinion to the extent of making it lose its reason, war 
now would be most unpopular in France. I think therefore that 
HMG should realise extreme danger of even appearing to 
encourage small, but noisy & corrupt war group here.
All that is best in France is against war, almost at any price (hence 
the really deep & pathetic gratitude shown to our Prime Minister).
Unless we are sure of considerable initial successes we shall find all 
that is best in France, as well as all that is worst, turn against us and 
accuse us of egging French on to fight what must have seemed from 
the outset a losing battle.
To embark upon what will presumably be the biggest conflict in 
history with our ally, who will fight, if fight she must, without eyes 
(Air Force) and without real heart must surely give us furiously to 
think.
It may be asked why I have not reported sooner in the above sense.
The answer is that up to the last hour the French have hypnotised 
themselves into believing that peace depended upon Great Britain, 
and not upon Herr Hitler. They were convinced, that is to say, that 
if Great Britain spoke with sufficient firmness Herr Hitler would 
collapse. Only now do they realise that Herr Hitler may well be 
meaning to take on both our countries.
Chamberlain read this highly influential telegram to the Cabinet on the 24th when 
he provided them with an account of his meeting with Hitler as G odesberg.^ Its 
significance can be assessed by Chamberlain's comment on the 25th, immediately 
prior to the crucial meeting with the French Ministers in London that evening, that 
'in the last analysis it seemed likely that Czechoslovakia's attitude was determined 
by the attitude of France and that sooner or later the French Government would
have to define their attitude'/70^
Strang's sense of outrage at this despatch was shared by Harvey, Sargent, 
Cadogan and, inevitably, Vansittart. Oliver Harvey noted that:
69) CAB.23/95. Cabinet Conclusions 42(38), Saturday, 24 September 1938.
70) Ibid. Cabinet Conclusions 43(38), Saturday, 25 September 1938. According to Bullitt, 
Bonnet believed that 'it would be folly to destroy the continent of Europe on the issue of 
whether Hitler took these (Sudetenland) districts on 25th September or the 25th October1, and 
that Phipps had expressed 'exactly the same opinion'. FRUS. Vol I (General) 1938, Bullitt to 
Secretary of State, 24 September 1938, p.641.
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I have never seen anything like the defeatist stuff which Phipps is 
now sending us. He is either not reporting honestly feeling in 
France or else is taking no trouble to find out opinions which may 
be unpalatable to HMG. It is tragic that at such a time we have 
three such wretched Ambassadors (Rome, Berlin and Paris).(71)
Sargent, who, as has been seen from their private and strictly unofficial
correspondence, had been close at one time to Phipps, was now extremely critical:
Sir E.Phipps's generalisations on the moral question are I think 
unfair and misleading. Far from strengthening his arguments they 
tend to make me suspect them. For instance I don't know what 
reason he has for damning the "war group" as corrupt, anymore 
than he is entitled to assert that all that is best in France is against 
war. The picture cannot possibly be just a contrast between black 
and white - between good and bad - As a matter of fact I should 
have thought that there might be a good deal of "corruption" among 
the "good" peace party. For instance what about Flandin & 
Caillaux to mention only two.
As for the corruption of the war group I think that Sir E.Phipps 
should be asked to explain & substantiate this charge (Does he 
include General Gamelin in this group? Is he corrupt). The last 
paragraph of this tel. does not read to my mind very 
convincingly.(72)
Cadogan also purported to be puzzled by the reference to the 'corrupt war group'
and thought that Phipps should be asked to  amplify his telegram'/73-*
Vansittart, who had now emerged openly as Phipps's most powerful
detractor, expressed his shrewd and telling criticism sardonically:
If Sir E.Phipps really believes that MM. Caillaux, Flandin & Bonnet 
are "all that is best in France", I think he grievously underrated 
France, and I am surprised at such an under-estimate on his part. He 
talks of a "noisy & corrupt war group here". I should not hesitate 
for a moment to apply both these epithets to MM. Caillaux, Flandin 
and Bonnet.(74)
71) The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvev 1937-1940. edited by J. Harvey, London, 1970, 
p. 195. (Entry for 24 September 1938).
72) FO. 371/21740 (C10602/1941/18). Minute by Sargent, 24 Sept1938.
73) Ibid. Minute by Cadogan, 25 Sept 1938.
74) Ibid. Minute by Vansittart, 24 Sept 1938.
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In answer to Phipps's rhetorical question why he had not reported sooner 'in the 
above sense', Vansittart retorted that he had done so, 'for he has most frequently 
quoted MM. Bonnet, Flandin and Caillaux'. He wanted the 'field of enquiry1 
widened, and compared Phipps's reports unfavourably with those of Thomas 
Cadett, 'the very well-informed Times correspondent in Paris', who was the bete 
noir of the Embassy. Vansittart urged that immediate reports be obtained from all 
the British consuls, Tor provincial feeling in France is extremely important at a
moment of this sort', and he concluded that
I feel bound to take these reports with some caution because our 
Embassy as a whole in Paris has frequently been described to me by 
French people, who are also among "all that is best in France" as 
being very defeatist.
I must not be understood as contradicting this telegram, because 
after the surprising collapse of MM Bonnet & Daladier a week ago,
I naturally have my own reasons for not believing the French 
renaissance until I see it. What I do say, however, is that the basis 
of a telegram like this is too narrow, and is indeed founded not on 
what is "best in France", but what is morally & notoriously worst. I 
should have thought that even if the inside of MM. Bonnet &
Flandin were not a matter of some public comment, as indeed it is, 
the past of M.Caillaux, at least speaks for itself.(75)
Following up these suggestions, and 'in order to complete our information 
as to the feeling among public men', Cadogan asked Phipps on the 25th to ascertain 
immediately the views of Generals Gamelin and Weygand, Marshal Petain, Herriot, 
Blum, Reynaud, Marin, Laval, Chautemps and Cardinal Verdier, and to instruct the 
Embassy's Commercial Counsellor and Financial Advisor to collect those of
75) FO. 371/21740 (C106021/1941/18). Minute by Vansittart, 24 Septl938. Vansittart's 
reference to the Embassy frequently being described to him by French people... as being very 
defeatist* may also have related to his letter from Gen. Spears describing his conversation 
with Leger on 22 Sept Spears stated that *what does seem to be the fact is that a very 
pessimistic view seems to have been received by those who conferred with our Ambassador...' 
Spears Papers. Churchill College, SPRS 1/245, Brig.Gen.Spears to Vansittart, 23 September 
1938.
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commercial and financial circles. Cadogan, who was opposed to a 'total surrender1
to Hitler's Godesberg demands, concluded coldly that
We do not entirely understand your reference in your tel. no.292 to 
(a) "small but noisy & corrupt war group here". By "war group" 
you surely do not include all those who feel that France must carry 
out her treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia. If so, what precisely 
does this group consist of and what does it represent and what are 
your reasons for describing it as "corrupt"? (76)
Phipps was told to instruct the Superintending Consular Officers to immediately 
furnish reports on French provincial feeling which they should send directly to the
F.O ./77'* in order, as Harvey confided to his diary, to 'prevent the Embassy from
doctoring them'/78*
In the meantime, completely oblivious to the impact of his earlier despatch 
and entirely unaware of Cadogan's rejoinder, Phipps's telegram at 1.15pm on the 
25th consisted entirely of Caillaux's pessimistic and apocalyptic views on the 
effects of a future war. Caillaux had 'definitely assured him' that a large majority of 
the French people were against war, that further pressure should be put on Benes
fwho was under Soviet influence'), and that
War with Germany means war with Poland, Hungary and Japan. In 
the air our towns will be wiped out, our women and children will be
76) Ibid. Cadogan to Phipps, 25 September 1938. (10.15pm).Cadogan's coldness towards Phipps 
related to his own opposition to Chamberlain's total surrender* to Hitler's Godesberg 
demands. Cadogan was 'still more horrified' to find that Chamberlain had 'hypnotised 
Halifax who capitulates totally'. Ruminating on his attempts to change Halifax's mind, 
Cadogan wrote, 1 know that there is a shattering telegram from Phipps about (the position in 
France', and that Britain & France were 'in no position to fight' but Td rather be beat than 
dishonoured... how can we hold Egypt, India & the rest'. Cadogan Diaries (Dilks), op.cit, 
entry for Sat 24 Sept 1938, pp. 103-4. The impact of Phipps's telegram was, therefore 
profound. As is well known, Cadogan succeeded in changing Halifax's mind.
77) F0.371/21740/(C10602/1941/18). F.O. to Phipps, 25 Sept. 1938,7.30pm. The instructions to 
obtain supplementary information quickly from the Consular Officers came from Halifax. 
Ibid, Minute by Halifax, 24 Sept 1938.
78) Harvey noted the F.O. could not trust Phipps's 'defeatist telegram', feared that the Embassy 
would doctor those from the Consuls, and complained that Phipps only quoted the opinions 
of Caillaux & Flandin. Harvev Diaries, op.cit, p.200 (entry for 27 Sept 1938).
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slaughtered. The French Army will fight magnificently. It will be 
incidentally safer in its Maginot Line than civilians. Heavy air 
bombardments of factories around Paris may well cause another 
Commune.(79)
Phipps's reputation at the F.O. was now at its nadir and, as the mood in Paris grew 
calmer, Vansittart described the Embassy's telegrams as these two hysterical 
outbursts of a few days ago'/80^  Bullitt's judgement on the 25th, that Phipps 'who 
like Bonnet is for peace at any price continues to hope that his Government and the
French will abandon the Czechs completely in order to avoid a general 
(81)war*, 'appeared to have been a harsh but a fair assessment.
What then were the factors and motives underlying these despatches? First 
and foremost, it will be seen from the foregoing that all of Phipps's accumulated 
fears from Berlin, his anxieties and inhibitions in Paris, and his deeply rooted 
prejudices were encapsulated and expressed openly in his 'all that is best in France' 
despatch. The impact of Berlin, his awareness of the extent of German rearmament 
(compared to Britain's perceived unpreparedness), and his conviction that Hitler
could not be bluffed have been emphasised previously.^ Hitler and Goering's 
farewell remarks to him in Berlin, that he would now have the opportunity of 
comparing the order1 reigning in Berlin with the disorder and civil strife rampant'
79) FO.371/21740 (C10624/1941/18). Phipps tel., 25 Sept 1938. 1.15pm.
80) Ibid. (C10602/1941/18). Minute by Vansittart, 27 Sept1938.
81) Bullitt received a translation of Hitler's Godsberg demands from Phipps on the morning of 25 
Sept. and had told him that he 'could not see how any Government could conceivably accept 
such a proposal', his assessment of Phipps's views then followed. FRUS. 1938 (Gen 1) vol.l. 
Bullitt to Sec.of. State, 25 Sept 1938.
82) See Chapter 2.
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in Paris/83 Wist have haunted him as he witnessed the full extent of French 
weakness including the parlous state of the French air force.
Central to the background of these despatches are: (a) the role of 
Chamberlain - his relationship with the F.O. and his influence on Phipps, and (b) In 
uneasy equilibrium between Chamberlain and the F.O. - Phipps's objective and 
subjective assessment of an extremely dangerous situation including personal and 
psychological factors.
Three aspects of Chamberlain's policy are particularly relevant:- his search
for an agreement with Germany and Italy: his impatience with the Foreign Office,
(84)and his contempt for the French. y Chamberlain's criticism of the F.O., and the 
extent of his interference in the operation of foreign policy is well documented, for 
example, he told his sister in September 1937 that he was 'not too happy about the
(85)F.O. who seem to me to have no imagination and no courage'. '  Commenting on
Eden's speech in November 1937, Chamberlain wrote that
...(it) shows again a characteristic of the F.O. mind which I have 
frequently noticed before. They never can keep the major objects of 
foreign policy in mind with the result that they make abstractions 
for themselves by endeavouring to give smart answers to some 
provocative foreign statement.(86)
83) See Ch.2.
84) Chamberlain described the French as 'an impossible people... their only idea seems take as 
much and give as little as they possibly can*. Neville Chamberlain Papers. Birmingham 
University. NC18/1/1017 Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 22 August 1937. For 
Chamberlain's derogatory views on France see pp. 125-6 and passim.
85) NC18/1/1020. Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 12 Sept. 1937.
86) NC18/1/1027. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 6 November 1937.
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Chamberlain had arrived at the conclusion that Eden 'did not want to talk either to
(87)Hitler or Mussolini as I did (and) he was right to go, and he thank(ed) God' for
(88}Halifax's steady unruffled Foreign Secretary who never causes me any worry1. 
The most complete statement of his views on foreign policy, however, was made in 
August 1937: 'I believe the double policy of rearmament and better relations with 
Germany and Italy will carry us safely through the danger period if only the F.O.
will play up1/ 89'*
Regarding Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain had decided in March 1938 that it 
was indefensible and that *you have only to look at the map to see that nothing that 
France or we could do could save Czechoslovakia from being overrun by the 
Germans if they wanted to'. He had therefore 'abandoned any idea o f giving
guarantees to Czechoslovakia or to France in connection with her obligations to
(90)that country1. J In September 1938, he added that \ve should be wrong to allow
the most vital decision that any country to take, the decision as to peace or war, to
(91)pass out of our hands' into that of another country.
The Foreign Office had a virtual monopoly on the foreign policy decision 
making process under Baldwin's premiership, and its erosion under Chamberlain 
was resented. Like Vansittart and Sargent, Phipps belonged to predominant
87) NC18/1/1040. N.Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 27 February 1937.
88) NC18/1/1053. N.Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 22 May 1938. That is until Halifax's 
rejection of Hitler's Godesberg demands.
89) NC18/1/1014. N.Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 1 August 1938.
90) NC18/1/1042. N.Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 20 March 1938.
91) NC18/1/1068. N.Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 11 September 1938.
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'pro-French group' in the F.O. whose influence Chamberlain was attempting to 
break u p /92^  and this group tended to be critical of Chamberlain's appeasement 
policies. Phipps's peers at the F.O. automatically assumed that, as a member of 
their group, he shared their views. Hence the bitterness o f their response to his 
despatches in September 1938 which they perceived as his final defection from 
their ranks and as an act akin to betrayal on his part.
Phipps's dilemma was that, even before the Czech crisis, he had evolved 
into a convinced and devoted follower of Chamberlain to whom, after Munich, he
(931would pay obsequious tribute. This conflicted, to a certain extent, with his 
ardent Francophile sympathies which inhibited him (and others in the F.O.) from 
fully expressing their anxieties regarding France which they tended to reveal mostly 
only to each other or in moments of crisis. Hence Sargent and Vansittart's strictly 
private warnings to him in late 1937, that 'sensitive' information (i.e. Svhat critics of 
the present French Government say about the latter1) should be conveyed in a 
despatch or a private letter, and not in savings telegrams which went 'automatically
to Cabinet Ministers' and were 'fastened upon by some of our critics'. '  As 
indicated previously, despite the F.O.'s eager acceptance of Phipps's more
92) This group was described by R.A. Butler, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, to an anonymous official at the German Embassy in London who reported it to the 
Wilhelmstrasse. Butler added that Eden shared this attitude, that Henderson's appointment to 
Berlin represented the first breach in the French line* followed by the 'side-tracking* of 
Vansittart, and that Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's 'closest advisor*, was regarded as 
'decidedly pro-German'. Documents on German Foreign Policy. D, vol I, no. 128 
Memorandum, 25 February 1938. The editorial note states that 'this memorandum was 
written on the letter-head of the German Embassy in London but it has not been possible to 
determine its origin further*. (Ibid, tfnote 71, p.223). Phipps was not mentioned in the 
memorandum. This theme was elaborated in Felix Gilbert's essay, Two British 
Ambassadors: Perth & Henderson', The Diplomats, ed. by Craig & Gilbert, Vol. 2, pp.550, 
from whom the term 'pro-French group' was derived.
93) See p.227.
94) Seep. 80&93.
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optimistic assessments, there was a deep undercurrent of unease and an unspoken 
assumption on both their parts that France was, in fact, fundamentally weak and
(95)unstable. 3 The Royal Visit to Paris provided a rare example of these doubts and 
anxieties surfacing and being articulated officially despite Phipps's reassurances/96^  
Chamberlain, on the other hand, was suspicious and contemptuous of the French 
and readily accepted Phipps's more pessimistic assessments from Paris/97"*
Phipps attempted to reconcile his intense Francophile sympathies with his 
ardent support of Chamberlain's appeasement policies by restricting his main 
sources to those whom he considered suitable for his purposes. They represented a 
very narrow strata of French society, and were drawn entirely from the Paris
(9g\
milieuv justifying the F.O.'s criticism that he was blanketing out other views. This 
would, in fact, increase after Munich and, with Mendl's enthusiastic help, it would 
be extended to attempting to control all the information emanating from the
95) Seep. 115-6.
96) The taboo against criticising the French Army or the reliability of France was strong and 
lasted beyond the inter-war period. The British failure of perception in assessing the low 
morale of the French Army in May 1940 (despite the Duke of Windsor's report) has been 
described as an intelligence failure as spectacular as that of the Americans at Pearl Harbour. 
D.C. Watt, 'Le moral de l'armee frangaise tel que se le representaient les Britanniques en 
1939 et 1940: une faillite des services de renseignements?', in Francais et Britarmiqnes dans 
la drole de guerre. Paris 1979, pp.201-2. Channon related that Londonderry was convinced 
that his political prospects had been blighted because he had argued with Churchill before 
the war that Trance was rotten and unreliable and could not be depended upon'. Churchill 
'lost his temper, being a fanatical francophile; and could not forgive Londonderry then and 
certainly not later*. Quoted in Francois Kersaudy, Churchill and de Gaulle. London 1981, 
p.381.
97) For Chamberlain's views on France, see pp 125-6 and passim.
98) For example, the idea of a 'small but noisy & corrupt war group' was commonly held in these 
(mostly business) circles. Flandin had referred to a Var party' on 2 Sept (see f/note 5). The 
industrialist, Marcel Boussac, a friend of Bonnet, stated on the 26th that H y'avait a Paris un 
partie de la guerre inspire par les Juifs (sic) et qui comprend des communistes, des 
socialistes...' and that Bonnet had told him that they 'menait une active campagne dans les 
couloirs du Palais-Bourbon' and were 'jusqu' alors y avait eu pour ainsi dire libre cours et 
sans opposition'. Quoted by du Reau, op.cit, p.271.
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Embassy. Phipps's main sources - Bonnet, Flandin and Caillaux, not only shared 
his views on appeasement but also his prejudices - hostility to the Popular Front, 
dislike of Benes, hatred of communism and, at least in the case of Caillaux,
anti-semitism/""* In short, they represented the most reactionary and defeatist 
elements in France. His description of them as 'all that is best in France', 
represented more than 'hysteria' (to use Vansittart's phrase) or a failure of 
sensibility - it also identified him completely with their views, arousing the F.O.'s
criticism and hostility/100"* Henceforth they would regard his reports with the 
suspicion that they had hitherto reserved for those of Nevile Henderson.
On a personal level, Phipps was a curious mixture of opportunism and 
conviction. Opportunism in the sense of tactics which frequently became 
indistinguishable from his prejudices. Conviction in the sense that his views grew 
more rigid (especially after the Munich crisis) and he became obsessed with the 
correctness of Chamberlain's policies and increasingly intolerant of those whom he 
perceived as being opposed to them. His sense of insecurity has been alluded to 
previously: his long struggle to obtain (and retain) the Paris Ambassadorship which 
had eluded his father, Sir Constantine Phipps; the tension created by the hostility of 
his brother-in-law, Sir Robert Vansittart, and his psychological dependency on his
99) Phipps's anti-semitism surfaced in November 1938, see Ch.8.
100) Apart from Bonnet, Flandin & Caillaux, another of Phipps's main sources was regarded 
with grave suspicion by the F.O. Quinones de L&m, Franco's agent in Paris, was Phipps's 
main source of information on the Popular Front's breaches of the Non-Intervention 
Agreement, and could hardly be described as an impartial witness. De Leon was also 
severely criticized by Vansittart whose close friend, Senor Ayala, the former Spanish 
Ambassador in London, considered him 'unreliable and indeed unbalanced'. Vansittart was 
surprised that Phipps 'should report in frill and by telephone the outpourings of this 
lightweight', and Halifax agreed to restrict his communications to 'circulation in the F.O.'. 
FO.371/22646 (W6704/83/41). Phipps tel., 25 May 1938, minutes by Vansittart and 
Halifax, 26 May 1938.
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protector, Sir Maurice Hankey.^101^  To these may be added the bitterness 
generated by the opposition to Chamberlain and Bonnet's policies (in London and 
Paris)/102^ and the sheer physical and mental exhaustion incurred during a period of 
intense crisis. Above all, his understandable concern for the fate of his six children 
in a war which was foreseen as being terrible and which, he felt, must be avoided
'at almost any price'/103^  His cynicism and wit masked a deep pessimism which 
turned, at least temporarily, to despair and then briefly to hysteria.
Any analysis of Phipps's 'all that is best in France' telegram reveals, in fact, 
that this was a projection of his own fears and anxieties which he attributed to the 
French. Phipps was almost 63 at the time of the Czech crisis and, on the eve of his 
retirement, after almost forty years of diplomatic service, he was faced with the 
imminent prospect of) to use his own words, *the biggest conflict in history1. Like 
Chamberlain, the avoidance of war was uppermost in his mind, and the 'deep and 
pathetic gratitude' shown to our Prime Minister1 which he attributed to 'all that is 
best in France' was a manifestation of his own feelings towards Chamberlain and he 
had emerged as, to use Hankey's phrase, 'a convinced believer in and a powerful
exponent of the Chamberlain-Halifax policy1/ 104^
101) Hankey had retired at the end of July in order 'not to miss the chance of the vacancy on the 
Suez Canal Board'. PHPP.3/3 Hankey to Phipps, 25 May 1938. The temporary loss of 
Hankey's crucial psychological support in late Sept 1938 may have contributed to Phipps's 
nervous tension during the crisis.
102) See, for e.g. his impassioned letter to Chamberlain on 30 Sept 1938 immediately after the 
crisis, cited on p. 227 and also Ch.8.
103) Phipps's foreboding were justified. His eldest son was killed on active service during the
second world war.
104) FO.794/16. Hankey to Halifax, 14 November 1938. See chapter 8.
Unfortunately, Phipps's exaggerated, intemperate and revealing language 
obscured a profound warning to the F.O. which had been gestating since his arrival 
in Paris in April 1937. His reference to 'a losing battle' was realistic - even without 
the crucial question of French morale, in terms of demography and industrial 
capacity alone, it was obvious that the military disparity between France and
Germany was too great/105^  Furthermore, he was only too keenly aware, partly 
from Hankey's information, of the deficiencies and problems connected with the 
British rearmament programme. On the crucial question of French morale and 
military effectiveness, as ambassador he saw most of his service attache's reports 
and his covering letters forwarding them to London frequently highlighted 
important aspects. Three reports from his attaches and a French report (all 
previously forwarded to the F.O.) provided the crucial background to his 'all that is 
best in France' telegram of 24th September.
1. Colonel Fraser's conversation with Colonel Gauche, the head of the 
French Deuxieme Bureau, on 20 September. Fraser had repeated that Kiihlenthal, 
the German military attache, was convinced that there would be no European war
to which Gauche had replied:
"Of course there will be no European War, since we are not going 
to fight". He (Gauche) went on to say that they would not face the 
risk of the German air threat - since their material was so superior 
that they (the French) were powerless to deal with it.
105) General Jean Delmas spoke of 'la faiblesse fondamentale de la puissance militaire frangaise 
en 1938'. For a short but excellent survey of French military strength & industrial capacity 
vis-a-vis Germany in 1938 and associated problems: the weakness of France's East 
European allies, the absence of a military alliance with the USSR, and the dependence on 
Britain, see his La perception de la puissance militaire frangaise' in La Puissance en Europe 
1938-1940. edited by Ren6 Girault & Robert Frank, Paris 1984, pp.127-140 (especially 
p.135).
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Phipps had pointedly directed Halifax's attention to this remark in his covering 
letter to the F.O., and the report was printed and circularized to the Cabinet/106'*
2. Colonel Fraser's conversation with General Dentz, the Deputy Chief of 
the French General Staffj on 22 September. Dentz stated that the French General 
Staffs information was that 'German troops would occupy Czechoslovakia on 24 
September1 and that Chamberlain would be presented with a fait accompli at
Godesberg. Fraser responded;
I said "What then since you don't intend to fight" and went on to 
suggest that the situation had deteriorated since Colonel 
Lindbergh's visit and his stories of the German Air Force. General 
Dentz did not react; he merely pointed out that French cities would 
be laid in ruins and that they had no means of defence. They were 
now paying the price of years of neglect of their Air Force.
On the instructions of Cadogan and Halifax, this report was also circulated to the 
Cabinet.(107)
3. Amongst the vast amount of material forwarded by the Embassy on the 
weak state of the French air force, Phipps's despatch of 16 September stands out in 
importance. Phipps stated that the French Air Ministry had recently provided the 
Air Commission of the Chamber with a description of the French Air Force which 
revealed 'its considerable inferiority to the Assistant Air Attache's estimate, and 
that
106) FO.371/21669 (C10467/65/18). Phipps tels 21 Sept 1938 (and enclosure from Col. Fraser, 
military attache, to Phipps 22 Sept 1938). Mallet had minuted that Lindbergh's visit appears 
to have had a catastrophic effect on France' and that 'the French appeared to be exaggerating 
their own weakness and German strength'.
107) FO.371/21740 (C10441/1941/18). Phipps tel 22 Sept 1938 (& enclosure from Col. Fraser). 
Roberts m inuted that this was further confirmation that the French do not intend to fight 
because of the weakness of their airforce'. General Dentz's defeatism in 1938 was in 
striking contrast to his role during the Syrian Campaign in 1941 when his pro-Vichy forces 
strongly resisted a mixed Allied force including Australian & Free French troops. See, for 
e.g. Geoffrey Warner, Iraq & Syria 1941. London 1974, pp. 122-158.
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the knowledge of this probably contributed to Bonnet's gloom early 
this week and to the feelings of pessimism which were manifested in 
Government circles. One Frenchman aptly described France with 
her magnificent army and adequate navy as a strong man with no 
eyes.
Phipps commented that this lamentable state of affairs' confirmed Caillaux's 
estimates to him on November 1937, and the Air Attache's subsequent reports,
while Roberts minuted that it was
even worse than we had supposed and fully explained French 
reluctance to be drawn into a war in which they would have to take 
the offensive to achieve any useful result.(108)
It will be observed that Phipps's reference to the French having to fight Svithout 
eyes (air force)' in his 'all that is best in France' telegram was an almost direct 
quotation from this earlier despatch and that this description must have impressed 
him deeply.
4. This despatch was followed by the Air Attache's information from 
Delaplanque on the 17th that the expansion programme of the French Air Force 
would soon break down and that the French aircraft industry was producing 45
aircraft per month while Germany was producing approximately 60o/109^  Curwell 
commented that 'even we' produce 'about half the (German) quantity* while Sargent 
minuted bravely that M. Delaplanque is a journalist in close touch with Caillaux
and therefore prejudiced and anxious to draw as black a picture as possible'/110^
The Air Ministry, however, concluded that:
in every way, numbers quality of aircraft, technical and 
administrative organisation, factory organisation, designs, general
108) FO.371/21596 (C9944/36/17). Phipps tel., 16 Sept & minute by Robert, 17 Sept 1938.
109) Ibid. (C10028/36/17). Phipps tel., 17 Septl938 (& encl. memo by air attache).
110) Ibid. Minutes by Curwell & Sargent, 19 & 23 Sept 1938.
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vulnerability, France is hopelessly outclassed by Germany in 
everything to do with air warfare/111^
The Vuillemin and Lindbergh reports on the efficiency and strength of the 
Luftwaffe, which were cited earlier, dealt a devastating blow to French morale and
both were discussed by the Cabinet/112^  General Vuillemin, the Chief of the French 
Air Staff, had warned the French Government previously about the weakness of its 
air force. He returned from his visit to Germany (on 16-21 August) convinced that 
the French Air Force would be destroyed by the Luftwaffe within 14 days of
operations'113^  As a close personal friend of Bonnet (their families spent their
holidays together/114^  he must have personally conveyed his despair to the latter. 
Phipps was correct in assessing that this, together with the similarly devastating 
report of Lindbergh (whom Kingsley Wood, the Secretary of State for Air,
described as having become *the unwitting tool of the Germans')/115^  precipitated 
Bonnet's collapse on the 13th. He failed to realise, however, that immersed in his 
narrow Paris milieu, and reliant on a handful of reactionary French politicians for 
his main sources, he too had succumbed to the corrosive and contaminating effects 
of their prevalent defeatism.
111) FO.371/21596 (C10163/36/1). Wing Commander Goddard (Air Ministry) to Mallet 
(F.O.), 19 Sept. 1938. Minute by Curwell, 20 Sept 1938.
112) Vuillemin's report had been discussed by the Cabinet on 30 Aug., (See p.178, i/note 
161).Lindbergh's visit to Germany was discussed by the Cabinet on 25 Sept. CAB.23/95 
Cabinet Concl.43(38), 25 September 1938.
113) J.B. Duroselle, La decadence 1932-1939. Paris 1979, pp.341-2. Vuillemin's remarks 
provides a good example of the unreliability of Georges Bonnet's memoirs: in Dans la 
Tourment 1938-1948. Paris 1971, p.46, he attributes these remarks as having been made 
some days before the Anschluss, and in his earlier volume, le Onai d'Orsav sous trois 
rgpubliques. Paris 1961, p.208 to the aftermath of Vuillemin's visit to Germany.
114) Henri Nogueres, Munich or the Phonev Peace. London 1965, p.89.
115) CAB.23/95 Cabinet Conclusions 43(38), 25 September 1938. Kingsley Wood concluded by 
saying that Lindbergh had given 'a fair, if somewhat superficial estimate of the relative 
strengths of the French, Russian & German air forces'.
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Hugh Dalton, in fact, confirmed that Phipps was 'most defeatist' when he 
called on him on 23 September. The latter immediately referred to Trench
weakness in the air1, and told him that
If the French Air Force was knocked out early, not only would 
there be no air defence for Paris and other large towns, but a French 
Army attacking the Siegfried Line would have lost its eyes, whereas 
the Germans would still have theirs. He referred to the "Lindbergh 
Report", and seemed to take it seriously...
Phipps had stated that *we have missed one preventive train after another* and 
feared that 'now no train will reach a preventive terminus'. Foreshadowing his 'all 
that is best in France' telegram, he did not believe that the French would march 
unless they were actually attacked but that 'if the Germans go into Czechoslovakia 
and brutalise the Czechs beyond a certain point, opinion here might find this 
intolerable'. In short, Dalton found him 'drifting with the tide' and making no effort 
to move against it. He recorded that someone who knew Phipps well told him a 
few days later that Thipps was a better man when he was in Berlin'/116^
In the event, and in reply to Cadogan's angry telegram, of the 25th, Phipps 
climbed down. He explained, on the 26th, that 'public opinion clearly changes 
rapidly with rapid changes in (the) situation', his despatch had been sent before
Hitler's latest demands' were known, and that:
By "(a) small but noisy and corrupt war group", I mean the 
Communists who are paid by Moscow & have been working for 
war for months. A well-known French Minister has also been 
advocating a preventative (sic) war for many months.(l 17)
116) Hugh Dalton, The fateful Years. Memoirs 1931-1945. London, 1957, pp. 190-191.
117) FO.371/21741 (C10727/1941/18). Phipps tel., 26 Sept.1938 (11.48pm) & minute by 
Barclay, 26 Sept 1938. Phipps's statement that his 'all that is best in France* despatch had 
been senthefore Hitler's latest demands were known' may have been disingenuous. The 
F.O. had informed him on 23 Sept that Chamberlain had stated that his interview with 
Hitler had been 'most unsatisfactory'. The latter had 'regarded the Anglo-French plan as 
unacceptable', its operation 'would be too slow*, and Chamberlain was considering writing 
to Hitler 'making it clear that British & French opinion could not accept his demands'. 
FO.371/21740 (C10511/1941/18). F.O. to Phipps, 23 Sept 1938. Furthermore, important 
telegrams (to & from) Prague were usually repeated to Paris.
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Barclay minuted that 'presumably the well-known Minister was Georges 
Mandel1.^ 118^
As if attempting to make amends for his pessimistic attitude, Phipps, further 
reported on the 26th that the French public were showing 'calm and resolution', 
opinion had *undergone a complete change since Hitler's last demands have become 
known', and that Herriot, the President of the Chamber, had confirmed that 'a
complete swing-over of public opinion' had occurred:
He (Herriot) assures me that there is an overwhelming majority in 
the Chamber (that) will now be for resistance. He says there is no 
kind of enthusiasm for war in the country, but a firm & melancholy 
determination to resist.(119)
On the morning of the 27th, he reported that Jeanneny, the President of the Senate,
•who naturally abhors war1, felt that it was now 'practically inevitable' and that
If  we give way to Hitler's latest demands we should only be 
postponing the evil day and he would then turn with renewed 
prestige and strength against France. MJeanneny assured me 
feeling in the whole country though grave even sad, was absolutely 
firm. Realisation was general that it was either war now or a little 
later and that we now have a better change of victory. He does not 
fear Communist trouble in case of heavy air raids. (120)
Vansittart, who had no intention of letting Phipps off the hook so easily, minuted 
that TLet us now ask the Embassy in Paris how they reconcile these telegrams and 
others like them, with their two hysterical outbursts of a few days ago', and
Cadogan agreed that this might be considered later/121'*
118) FO.371/21741 (C10727/1941/18). Minute by Barclay, 26 September 1938. Mandel had 
infuriated Bonnet and Phipps by telephoning Benes several times during the crisis telling 
him that he was 'the head of a free and independent nation' and urging him to resist the 
Anglo-French demands. DDF. 2e, XI, No.252 Note du Ministre. 22 Sept 1938, i/note 2. 
For Phipps's less inhibited comments on Mandel including references to his Jewish 
ancestry, see Ch.8.
119) Ibid. (C10713/1941/18). Phipps tel., 26 Sept.1938; (2.15am).
120) Ibid. (C10804/1941/18). Phipps tel., 27 Sept.1938 (10.55am).
121) FO.371/21740 (C10602/1941/18). Minutes by Vansittart and Cadogan, 27 Sept
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Barclay commented on the 27th that the Paris Embassy had reported that 
French opinion had undergone a change 'since Hitler's last demands had become 
known', and that the reports from the principal Consular posts confirmed Herriot's
opinion (as expressed to Phipps) that 'there is no kind of enthusiasm for war in the
( 122)country but a firm and melancholy determination to resist'. The Consular 
reports from Lyons, Marseilles, Lille, Strasbourg, Nantes, Rouen, and Havre, 
together with Phipps's reports of his 'most recent conversation with leading 
Frenchmen' (copies of all of which were sent to the Service Departments) enabled
Mallet to summarise French feeling as follows:
There is little enthusiasm for war but a growing feeling that it is a 
question, not of fighting for Czechoslovakia, but of engaging now 
in an otherwise inevitable struggle for the very life of France. 
Resignation is the dominant feeling but it is coupled with one of 
determination and the country is falling in solidly behind the 
Government now that they have made every possible effort to 
preserve peace.(123)
Phipps reported that the Financial Advisor had found that 'while there is no 
enthusiasm for war, people are resolute', and the Commercial Advisor found that 
the opinion of the ordinary French businessman has hardened during the last few 
days' as a result of Britain and France having gone to *the limit of possible 
concessions'. The latter added that there was also the feeling that war is inevitable 
now or later1 and that the 'petit-bourgeois' were reluctant to risk their lives for the
122) FO.371/21741 (C10713/1941/18). Minute by Barclay, 27 Sept 1938. Amongst items of 
particular interest in the Consular Reports were: the French decision to guarantee 
Czechoslovakia was wrong but it should be honoured' (Rouen); 'If Germany invades 
Czechoslovakia and it resists people realise that it is war now - everyone is pessimistic, 
hoping against hope' (Havre); there is no enthusiasm for war but there should be no 
trouble should it break out.., if war comes it will be accepted with resignation' 
(Marseilles). The original reports are in Ibid including C10715-C10718; C10726; 
C10753/1941/18 and are dated 26 Sept 1938.
123) Ibid. Minute by Mallet, 27 Sept 1938.
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Czechs but that the workers appears to be in favour of France honouring her 
obligations/124^  Cadogan minuted that he thought that a subsequent telegram had 
arrived from Phipps 'swinging right back again' and, in a rare moment of false 
modesty, added that, *these kaleidoscopic changes are much too rapid for anyone
as slow-witted as m yself/125^
Ironically, amongst those whose views Phipps was instructed to report, 
Cardinal Verdier, the Archbishop of Paris, who was regarded as a liberal and 
whose sympathies for the working classes were well known, came closest to
endorsing Phipps's views:
Apart from (the) Communists nobody in France wants a war over 
the present issues. French are prepared to fight and will obey 
without exception if honour demands it. But they do not consider it 
opportune or necessary and still refuse to believe that war will 
come. (The) Communists pushed for war in Spain and they are 
pushing for war now. In so acting they are obeying Moscow. They 
will of course say that France and Great Britain have dishonoured 
themselves if we now compromise. After all only questions of amor 
propre now divide us. The mass of French people would not 
consider dishonourable certain further more concessions necessary 
to ensure peace. In future war may be necessary, but they know 
neither France nor Great Britain are well prepared now. Peasants 
would be very hostile... He repeated again and again that (the)
French are ready to obey in (the) last resort if honour demands, but 
without any enthusiasm.
Barclay minuted that, Cardinal Verdier's views were 'not altogether in accord with 
the other reports we have received on the state of French public opinion'; Speaight 
thought that his suggestion that Svar is being worked up by communists is absurd' 
while Mallet commented that this was 'the Vatican's anti-communist line'. Sargent 
retorted that
124) FO.371/21741 (C10713/1941/18). Minute by Barclay, 27 Sept 1938. The Embassy's report 
on feeling in financial circles is in Ibid (C10755/1941/18).
125) Ibid. Minute by Cadogan, 28 Sept 1938.
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Of course the Communists are working for a war... that is quite 
irrelevant to our question which was that French public opinion was 
as to the hateful dilemma of honouring or dishonouring France's 
treaty obligations. (126)
To summarize briefly: the impact of Phipps's despatches was profound but
he was excessively influenced by the narrowness of the milieux in which the
Embassy operated and this aspect was criticized by the F.O. Chamberlain placed
considerable importance on the reports of his diplomatic representatives in the field
(especially when they appeared to confirm his own predilections) and was greatly 
(127)influenced by them. v '  Cadogan had admitted that he was bewildered by the
(128)kaleidoscopic changes in the French mood immediately after Munich. '  Is it 
possible, therefore, to assess the accuracy of Phipps's highly subjective reports in 
late September 1938?
The difficulties involved in attempting to assess French public opinion 
during this period are considerable, and were described by J.L. Cremieux-Brilhac
(129)as tentative hasardeuse. As a distinguished French historian, author of the 
monumental Les Franpais de l'an 40. who as a young student was mobilized in
126) Ibid. (C10824/1941/18). Phipps tel. 27 Sept 1938 and minutes by Barclay, Speaight, 
Mallet and Sargent, 27-28 Sept 1938.
127) Chamberlain told the Cabinet on 12 September that Henderson *was on the spot and 
familiar with the local atmosphere' and that 'it was impossible for us to disregard the 
Ambassador's strongly expressed opinion'. CAB.23/95 Cabinet meeting of 12 September 
1938. During the Munich crisis, Chamberlain regarded this as applying to Phipps's 
opinions as well. For certain similarities between Henderson and Phipps's views, see Ch.8.
128) Seep.218.
129) J.L. Cremieux-Brilhac, Les Francais de l'an 40. vol 1, Paris 1990, p. 18. See also the essay 
by Pascal Oiy, L' opinion publique et la "puissance" frangaise vers 1938: quelques jalons', 
La puissance en Europe 1938-1940. edited by Reng Girault and Robert Frank, Paris 1984, 
pp.341-348.
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1938, perhaps Cremieux-Brilhac's own private temoignage provides the most
authoritative interim judgement:
L'opinion publique fran^aise dans le semaine le plus critique de 
septembre 1938 etait mauvaise, je veux dire tres peu dispose a faire 
une guerre done elle ne comprenait pas la necessite puisque.
a) on avait accepte de negoder et done de faire des concessions 
depuis l'entree en action de Runciman; il etait difficile de mobiliser 
les esprits pour ce que beaucoup de gens consideraient comme une 
affaire de procedure:
b) la campagne anti-guerre, anti-sovietique et meme anti-tcheque 
battait son plein depuis l'Oeuvre jusqu'a Je suis partout. La 
mobilisation militaire ne s'est pas bien faite (contrairement a 
aout/septembre 1939).
Cela dit je trouve la formulation de Phipps excessif: almost at any 
price est juste pour une large fraction de l'opinion (majorite de la 
droite et syndicats padfistes). All that is best in France me parait 
force, excessif.(130)
D) Munich and its Immediate Aftermath
After the visit of the French ministers to London on 25-26 September to
discuss Bitier's Godsberg demands/131^  Phipps found himself reverting to his 
customary role as Bonnet's confident. Immediately after the latter return to Paris, 
on the evening of the 26th, he was summoned by Bonnet to the Quai d'Orsay and
asked the following questions:-
Supposing that, as a result of German aggression on 
Czechoslovakia, France mobilised and proceeded to an act of war 
against Germany, will Great Britain:
1) Mobilise immediately and at the same time as France?
2) Introduce conscription? 3) Pool ('mettre en commun') 
the economic and financial resources of the two countries?
Bonnet explained to him that he and Daladier had 'thought it best' to ask these 
questions 'after their visit (to London) rather than verbally1 in order to give HMG
130) Letter from Jean-Louis Cremieux-Brilhac, 10 July 1993.
131) See DBFP. 3, n, nos 1093 & 1096 Anglo French Meeting at 10 Downing Street, Record of 
conversation, 25 & 26 September 1938.
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the time 'to consider them carefully1. Phipps added that Caillaux had told him the 
previous day that he would also have asked whether conscription would be
introduced 'if he were President of the Council'/132^
Neither Vansittart's nor the F.O's comments on Caillaux's latest utterances 
were recorded on this occasion. After Hankey*s retirement as Secretary of the 
Cabinet and of the CID, and therefore no longer at the centre of power, Phipps 
was deprived of his authoritative advice (albeit conveyed in a strictly informal and 
033}irregular manner). } Sargent had also ceased his occasional, and highly irregular, 
practice of sending Phipps copies of the minutes which he had appended to his 
despatches and of informal, private, letters outlining desired policy. This, perhaps, 
now reflected their increasing estrangement. Phipps had no way of knowing, 
therefore, the extremely negative effect which his continual references to Caillaux's 
reactionary and defeatist views were having on the F.O. Neither were there any 
specific references in their responses and communications to him. Conscious of 
Vansittart's threatening presence looming in the background, and the virulent 
opposition to aspects of Chamberlain's policy in London and Paris, Phipps was 
uneasily aware that his position was being undermined, and he blamed the Prime 
Minister's critics with increasing bitterness for adding to the tension and to his own 
personal insecurity.
132) FO.371/21741 (C10756/1941/18). Phipps tel 'Secret', 26 Sept 1938. Bonnet's note of their 
conversation (which is similar to that of Phipps) is in DDF.2.X1. no.379 Note du Ministre: 
Conversation avec Sir E.Phipps, 26 Sept 1938.
133) For Vansittart's attack on Phipps in November, in which he specifically mentioned the 
latter*s continual references to Caillaux's views, see Ch. 8. Hankey remained an immensely 
influential figure even after his retirement, and strongly defended Phipps in a letter to 
Halifax in November. The question of Phipps's retirement (on the grounds of his age) had 
arisen, and Hankey again intervened successfully. (See Ch.8).
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The swings in French opinion continued. On the 27th, Phipps reported 
Bonnet's remark that feeling was 'more optimistic in Government circles' and they 
considered that Chamberlain's statement that morning was 'admirable and most
helpful'/134^  Blum and Martin called separately at the Embassy to express their 
appreciation for Chamberlain's 'continual efforts for peace' and both emphasised 
that the French people would be unable to understand why they should go to war 
on a question of procedure. Blum added that 'if it became clear* that Hitler had
decided to destroy Czechoslovakia then
France would march to the last man without war enthusiasm but 
with the firm conviction that war was inevitable and had therefore 
better come now and without previous dishonour. (135)
Marin, who had expressed very similar views, concluded that 'if France were 
attacked the matter would be different, but for France to attack first would be 
folly1. As if attempting to convey additional authority to Marin's words, Phipps
added that M. Caillaux used this last phrase to me on September 25'Z136^
On the morning of the 28th, Phipps again expressed his personal views on 
French opinion directly, and somewhat boldly, to Chamberlain via the Foreign 
Office:
You will have seen from my recent telegrams tenor of opinion of 
notable Frenchmen of quite different political shades on (the) 
present position. That position has only become clear to the French 
public in the last hours and since the publication of (the Sudeten) 
areas map.
134) FO.371/21741 (C10813/1941/18). Phipps tel., 27 September 1938.
135) Ibid. (C10815/1941/18). Phipps tel., 27 Sept 1938.
136) FO.371/21742 (C10919/1941/18). Phipps tel., 27 Septl938. 9.40am. Phipps also 
summarised Flandin's letter in the right wing Temps expressing his personal opposition to 
French military intervention in the Sudeten-Czech crisis. FO.371/21741 
(C10814/1941/18). Phipps tel., 27 Septl938.
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Phipps told Chamberlain, almost defiantly, that it was now his duty 'to repeat word 
for word' his 'considered views' as reported in his ('all that is best for France') 
telegram of 24 September. Bonnet had assured him that Benes, 'through his 
Ministers in London and Paris', had been conducting 'a regular campaign against 
yourself and the French Government and working in with all the forces in favour of 
a preventive war1. Phipps reported that only Communist Party favoured war, 'even
the Socialists' were divided and that
Representatives of 200 deputies are going to M.Daladier this 
morning and then to President of the Republic to protest against 
being led into war on a mere question of procedure. France is 
prepared to march to the last man to defend herself if attacked but 
will not fight with any heart in a hopeless offensive war against 
Germany, for which she is not prepared.(137)
Curiously, there was no officially recorded protest by the F.O. to this 
reiteration of Phipps's 'all that is best for France' views in this later despatch. 
Phipps's reply to Cadogan's furious rejoinder to his earlier telegram had stressed
(138)that it had been despatched before Hitler's latest demands had become known'.
This merely represented a tactical climb down and he had adhered consistently to 
his original views. Apart from the question of whether he had actually known of 
Hitler's 'latest demands' at the time, and it could have been feasible, his latest 
despatch reiterating the same views, even more forcibly, was patently despatched 
well after they had been publicized. Whether it was because Phipps's despatch was 
addressed to Chamberlain, and this caused in the F.O. some reluctance to criticize
137) FO.371/21742 (C10913/1941/18). Phipps tel. Tor Prime Minister, 28 Sept 1938. 11.40am
138) Later, Phipps was anxious to clarify Daladier’s statement on 25 Sept that Hitler's 
memorandum of the 23rd had only reached him that morning. Phipps stated that '(the) 
taking down of (the) Godesberg telegram no.9 to me by telephone from F.O. was completed 
at about 8.35pm on Sept 24' and then immediately deciphered. FO.371/21741 
(C10871/1941/18). Phipps tel. 27 Sept. His 'all that is best in France' despatch was 
telephoned to the F.O. at 5.45pm on the same day, ie. 24 Sept 1938.
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it, or whether, after receiving the reports from the Consular Officers they decided 
that, despite its exaggerated and unacceptable language, his original assessment 
contained an element of truth, is a moot point. In the event, Barclay minuted, 
somewhat anxiously, that Trench opinion has hardened and was now resigning 
itself to the inevitability of war with Germany (and) there now seems to have been
(139)a sudden reversal of feeling'. J Copies of this despatch were circulated to the 
King, Chamberlain, Halifax and Cadogan.
After strongly expressing his personal views on the morning of the 28th, 
Phipps immediately notified the F.O. that the French Government were pressing for 
a reply to Bonnet's questions posed in his telegram of the 26th marked
'immediate'/140'* Whether his pessimistic assessment had been a deliberate attempt 
to influence Halifax's reply is a debatable point. In the event, Halifax replied 
cautiously to Bonnet's three questions at 8.20pm, and there was no mention of 
conscription.
Further manifestations of French pacifism were forwarded by the Embassy 
on the 28th. Phipps reported that Daladier had received Chichery, the President of 
the Socialist Radical group of the Chamber, who asked him *to continue his
courageous efforts in favour of peace' and who also stated that;
M.Daladier was completely informed of the feelings of Parliament 
and of the country and that he would know how to interpret them in 
the best interests of France, even, if necessary by the appropriate 
measures.
139) FO.371/21742 (C10913/1941/18). Minute by Barclay, 28 Sept 1938. This may have been 
the Paris Embassy's despatch which Cadogan had in mind when he minuted that 'these 
kaleidoscopic changes are much too rapid for anyone as slow witted as myself. See p.218
140) FO.371/21742. (C10920/1941/18). Phipps tel., 28 Sept 1938.11.45am. It appears from 
Creswell's minute that the F.O.'s previous minutes, 'all bearing on the attitude of (the) 
French Government and people' were consulted before Halifax made his reply.
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Representatives of the Parliamentary group of the Socialist Party and of the Union 
Socialiste et Republicaine Party were received by Daladier's Chef de Cabinet, and 
they urged him that 'everything should be done to safe-guard peace'. 
Representatives of the minority groups of the Right, led by Marin, also saw 
Daladier, and later President Lebrun, urging him not to order general mobilisation 
without consulting Parliament to which Daladier had agreed. Phipps himself was 
visited by several deputies and by Leon Bailby, th e . proprietor of
Jour-Echo-de-Paris, who, according to Phipps:
impressed upon me their repugnance for a war over the present 
issue and their indignation at the really criminal and Bolshevik 
attempts to render a general conflagration inevitable.
These views coincided with Phipps's own, and Barclay minuted that this was 'more 
evidence of anti-war feeling in France'/141^
The negative impact of Phipps's reports on the crisis can be assessed by 
Sargent's minute of the 28th. Sargent was convinced that it was 'becoming 
increasingly evident that Hitler wants war, and above all war with us, and that he is 
determined to have it'. He therefore suggested, somewhat quixotically, that the 
Czechoslovak Government should be urged to accept the memorandum of the 24th 
to show the world that *we have all been forced into war by Hitler and not - to use 
Sir Eric Phipps's phrase - by any "small noisy and corrupt war group'. Vansittart 
commented sardonically that 'if anyone wants more proof, he should have his head
examined'/142^
141) FO.371/21743 (C11019/1941/18). Phipps tel. 28 Sept 1938 & minutes by Barclay, 29 Sept 
1938.
142) F0.371/21744 (Cl 1294/1941/18). F.O. Minute by Sargent to Cadogan, 28 Sept 1938. 
More cautiously, Cadogan minuted that the Cabinet had 'definitely decided against this 
line' the previous evening, and added that *1 really dont think the world should want any 
further proof of Hitler's insincerity or guilt'. Ibid.
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On the morning of the 29th, immediately prior to the Munich Conference,
Bonnet 'begged' Phipps to urge Halifax.
how absolutely vital he felt it was that an arrangement should be 
reached over (the) Sudeten question at Munich at almost any price. 
M.Bonnet tells that after that, and in the near future, we must make 
up our minds to proceed gradually to a peaceful modification of 
many existing frontiers in Europe, as the Treaty of Versailles has 
collapsed. (143)
Bonnet could not have expressed his defeatist views more clearly, and there is no
evidence that Phipps ever attempted to contradict them.
Flandin, the second member of the triumvirate of Phipps's main sources,
was even more vociferous in his anti-war views. His 'Appeal to the French people',
stating that they were being deceived into thinking that war was inevitable, was
published in Doriot's extreme right wing newspaper La Liberte and the edition was
confiscated on the orders of Sarraut, the Minister of the Interior. Flandin's appeal
then appeared in the Right Wing Socialist Radical paper Republique. and he
(144)threatened to interpellate Sarraut on this issue in the Chamber.
Phipps's own personal views were expressed in a slightly hysterical letter of 
congratulation to Chamberlain in the immediate aftermath of the Munich 
Agreement on 30 September. After enclosing a letter from Millerand, the 
ex-President of the Republic, expressing the 'greatest admiration for yourself and
143) FO.371/21743 (Cl 1116/1941/18). Phipps tel., 29 Sept 1938.11.25am. Phipps and Bonnet 
had accompanied Daladier to Orly airport for the tatter's flight to Germany.
144) FO.371/21744 (Cl 11167/1941/18). Phipps tel., 29 Sept. 1938. The significance of 
Flandin's appeal in a fascist newspaper was ignored by Phipps. Doriot, who was probably 
the most formidable leader of French fascism in the 1930s, was an ex-communist, former 
mayor of the industrial city of Saint-Denis,and the leader of the PPF. See, for e.g. Gilbert 
D. Allardyce, The Political Transformation of Jacques Doriot', The Journal of 
Contemporary History, vol 1, no.l (1966), pp.56-74. During the second world war he was 
a founder of the Legion des Voluntaires contre le Bolshevisme and fought with the Waffen 
SS on the Russian front (Flandin became Foreign Minister in Petain's Vichy Regime).
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the wonderful work you have done in the cause of peace', Phipps added his own 
'warm and sincere congratulations for your noble efforts and the success that has 
crowned them1. He told Chamberlain that he had tried to report faithfully French 
feeling on the crisis from day to day', and that the tumultuous scenes on Daladier’s 
return had not occurred in Paris since the armistice. In two very revealing
passages, he showed his almost fanatical devotion to Chamberlain:
This morning at Munich Daladier felt grave misgivings as to the 
reception that awaited him here. This shows how surrounded he 
has been of late by the war-party - the mad and criminal war party, 
who, having missed every preventive train since Hitler's accession to 
power that might have led to a terminus of not too expensive 
victory, wished to embark in a train at this late hour that could only 
have led to utter destruction and chaos.
The evil forces working for war combined with foolish and 
misguided although patriotic forces, and I have had the distinct 
impression lately that those forces, both here and in England, were 
working their hardest to undermine your efforts.
Phipps concluded by telling Chamberlain that the true France knows what you 
have done and will give you the greatest welcome ever accorded to a foreign
statesman if and when you come to Paris' which he hoped would be soon.^145^
Chamberlain gratefully acknowledged Phipps's letter^146^ but it was left to
Halifax to explain to Phipps in November, the lessons of the crisis'/147^  Phipps
145) PHPP.3/1. Phipps to Chamberlain, 30 Sept 1938. Daladiefs 'grave misgivings', and his 
amazement at his reception, on his return from Munich were described vividly in 
Jean-Paul Sartre's novel The Reprieve (English transl, Penguin Bks 1963, pp.376-7) which 
has achieved the status of a primary source. Cited, for e.g. by du Eiau, op.cit, p.285. 
Chamberlain was inundated with letters of congratulation after the Munich Agreement, 
and a file of them is extant amongst his papers. NC. 13/9/1-119. Chamberlain & his wife 
visited Paris in November, See Ch.8.
146) PHPP.3/1.0.S. Cleverly (F.O.) to Phipps, 3 October 1938.
147) See ch.8.
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reserved his deeper feelings for an extraordinary private letter to his old friend and 
protector, Hankey, in which he revealed the depths of his bitterness (especially 
towards Vansittart) and his almost pathetic craving for some kind of 'outward and
visible sign' of appreciation for his services in Parish148'*
148) Ibid.
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CHAFTER 3
FROM MUNICH TO THE POLISH GUARANTEE 
(1 October_1938 - 31 March 19391 
Part T. 1 Octoher-31 December 1938
Phipps had emerged from the Munich crisis as a convinced and devoted 
follower of Chamberlain's appeasement policies. While retaining the support of 
Chamberlain and Halifax, his reputation at the F.O. had suffered a severe decline, 
and he was uneasily aware that the divisions between 10 Downing Street and the 
Foreign Office had increased. Consequently this period was marked by a heavy 
emphasis on the informal aspects, as his private and unofficial correspondence with 
Halifax, Chamberlain, Hankey and Horace Wilson makes clear, which enabled him 
to be less inhibited in emphasising his views. This overlapped with the official (or 
rather formal! aspect of the Embassy's activities which occasionally became a 
subjective division on Phipps's part since some of his private letters to Halifax were
forwarded to the F.O. and minuted by them/1'* While these separate, parallel, 
channels of communication could not be interpreted as constituting entirely 
different or contradictory policies, their important to a more complete picture of 
Phipps's Paris Embassy, and its activities, necessitates that they be treated 
separately.
1) There is a comparison with Henderson who, during the Munich crisis, frequently wrote to 
Halifax privately. According to a minute to Sargent and Mallet on 1 Sept 1938, they had 
seen all of these letters and, with Halifax's consent, the important ones had been copied and 
placed in the F.O. archives for reference. The minute stated that the great majority1 were 'in 
no way personal and concern questions which are simultaneously dealt with officially1. 
FO.371/21743/ (Cl 1048/1941/18 Private letters between Halifax and Henderson 20 March-4 
Sept 1938). There appears to have been no similar arrangement for Phipps's private letters. 
While copies of some of them can be found in the F0.371 files (and were therefore seen by 
the F.O), others were retained amongst Halifax's private papers and remained confidential.
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A) The Informal Aspects
(2)Bonnet's tribute to Phipps's services during the Munich crisis, '  and
Hankey's visit to Paris on 1-3 October '(during which Phipps undoubtedly 
unburdened himself to him), failed to assuage his frustration, resentment and his 
sense of insecurity which was aggravated by the question o f the renewal of his 
ambassadorship after April 1939. These accumulated feelings culminated in his 
extraordinarily bitter private letter to Hankey on 6  October. Phipps told him that 
Bassee, the political director of Havas, had informed him that Pertinax has seen 
Vansittart in London soon after 'my famous report' of 13 September (describing 
Bonnet's collapse), 'and before the leakage in the Epoque and Humanite'. and that 
'Van had told him about my report'. Vansittart was also alleged to have told 
Pertinax that he (Phipps) 'did not properly represent to the French Government the 
views of H.M. Government and that the P(rime) M(inister) would soon be 
overthrown as British public opinion was hostile to his foreign policy1. Phipps
added bitterly that
I shall not tell anyone else but you, for I quite see that our 
politicians do not care a damn whether the Ambassador in Paris is 
stabbed in the back by his brother-in-law. Moreover, it is, as you 
say, difficult to prove, for in a lying match I would back Van plus 
Pertinax against the honest Bassee.
He assured Hankey that he was 'not at all anxious' to be renewed as Ambassador 
and that he would prefer to Tiand on the very painful torch to a younger man in
2) PHPP.l/21. Bonnet to Halifax, 3 Oct. 1938. Halifax had replied somewhat cautiously that 'I 
feel sure that your kind words about him are justified'. Ibid. Halifax to Bonnet, 6 October 
1938.
3) Hankey Papers, HNKY 5/5. Hankey had visited Paris (1-3 Oct 1938) in connection with the 
monthly meeting of the Suez Board, See 252.
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April, and one, let us hope, without a treacherous relation in the F.O.', adding, on a
note of pathos, that
In order, however, that it should not be felt by all that I had been a 
lamentable failure here, it would, I think, be only fair that some 
"outward & visible sign" should be given me that this was not the 
case. I have not received any such sign since June 1934 when I was 
grudgingly given a GCMG, six months after Harry Chilton at 
Buenos Aires, who is over three years junior to me. I am now the 
senior member of the Service and shall have been at it for 40 years 
next January. I don't mind hard work, but underhand intrigue is 
discouraging and produces in me a feeling of tired disgust.
Phipps concluded that if it had not been for Hankey*s 'friendship and consistent help
(A')and encouragement' he would have 'thrown in (his) hand a long time ago'.
Hankey himself recorded that 'attempts have been made continuously both 
in our F.O. and in the Quai d'Orsay to sabotter both the Chamberlain peace policy 
and Phipps himself. He was also convinced that there was a campaign against 
Phipps in London where he was being described as a 'defeatist', and that *his secret
despatches are quoted to opposition French newspapers':
He (Phipps) showed me two extracts from French papers 
reproducing not incorrectly, what he had reported about an 
interview with Bonnet. That information could only have been 
received from the F.O. He has protested to Cadogan... Generally 
he finds the publicity of F.O. tendentious and not setting out the 
Government's policy adequately. All this he is inclined to attribute 
to Van who... remains in charge of all propaganda, and is almost 
certainly in touch with Churchill, Eden, the Labour leaders and with 
Leger in the Quai d'Orsay who is playing the same tricks over 
here.(5)
4) PHPP.3/3. Phipps to Hankey, 6 October 1938. There were elements of continuity in Phipps's 
letter. His craving for honours was nothing new - he had been 'extraordinarily keen' to accept 
the Legion of Honour in 1927, (see Ch.2) and Vansittart had been economical with the truth 
when he told Simon in 1934, in order to block Phipps's appointment to Paris, that the latter 
'never did a distant post', see Ch.2. Ironically, the Embassy had described Andrd Geraud 
(Tertinax') as 'a man of knowledge and conviction, fearless and likeable'. FO.432/4. Pt IX, 
no.34 Report on Leading Personalities in France for 1937.
5) Stephen Roskill, Hankev. Man of Secrets, vol 3, London 1974, p.390.
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Phipps had complained earlier to Halifax about the leak of this telegram, 
and the F.O. had denied divulging it to anyone 'outside official circles'.^ He again 
pursued the question with Halifax and Cadogan but neither were able to ascertain
whether it had occurred in London. The former wanted to speak to him about it
CDwhen he came to Londoir 1 while the latter added cryptically that he had 'an 
indication of which I am not at the moment in a position to give particulars' that it 
may have occurred in P a rish  Nevertheless, despite the lack of concrete evidence, 
Phipps still appeared to be convinced that Vansittart had been responsible for the 
leakage.
More important were the anticipated changes in French foreign policy and 
the possibility of a France-German rapprochement. Franfois-Poncet, Phipps's old 
colleague in Berlin, had been designated as the new French ambassador at Rome. 
Phipps informed Halifax privately that Bonnet had told him confidentially that 
Hitler had been extremely friendly to Fran5ois-Poncet during the latter*s valedictory 
interview with him at Berchtesgaden on 18 October. Hitler had wanted 'to reach
some rather spectacular agreement with France'^ and, although he was bitter that
6) See pp. 190-1.
7) PHPP. 1/21. Halifax to Phipps, 7 October 1938. Phipps had told Hankey that he was coming 
to London on 12 or 13 October 'chiefly for the France-Great Britain Association Banquet on 
the 18th'. HNKY.5/5, op.cit
8) PHPP.2/1. Cadogan to Phipps, 7 October 1938. Cadogan's mysterious 'indication' may have 
been the matter about which Halifax had wanted to discuss with Phipps when he visited 
London.
9) FO.800/311 (HZXIV/303). Phipps to Halifax, 'Private & Very Confidential', 20 Oct 1938. 
The Quai d'Orsay had prepared the ground for this as early as 3 Oct Massigli had noted that 
a Franco-German declaration analagous to the Anglo-German Declaration'... elle ne nous 
apporterait aucun dldment nouveau de s6curit6, mais elle n'en aurait pas moins une rdele 
valeur psychologique'. DDF. 2, XII, no.29 Note de la direction politique au sujet d'une 
eventuelle declaration franco-allemande', 2 octobre 1938.
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Munich had not resulted in an improvement in relations with Britain and France, he 
'ardently wished' to improve them with both countries. He contemplated a 
Franco-German declaration and had no desire to  make any difficulties for France in
Spain'. Phipps commented that
Frangois-Poncet, who I can guarantee is not inclined to undue 
optimism is, Bonnet declares, deeply impressed with Hitler’s 
genuine desire for general pacification and anxiety to avoid a 
European war. He expressed warm sympathy for Daladier and 
Bonnet and the hope that France would soon move in the direction 
of a Franco-German understanding.
Leger, on the other hand, whose views Phipps had sought on the post-Munich 
situation, was 'as convinced as ever* of France's inability to reach any 'arrangement' 
with Germany and Italy, and he had concluded that his views were 'hopelessly 
sterile'/10^
Halifax replied that Chamberlain was well disposed towards Phipps's idea 
that they should visit Paris, and that it could provide Chamberlain with the 
opportunity to 'rub into French ministers the importance we attach to putting their 
aircraft production in order1 which had again been high-lighted by the Very gloomy* 
reaction of the Chief of the Air Staff to his recent visit to France. He concluded, 
on a personal note, that he was 'still enjoying in retrospect the charm of your
(Phipps's) speech at the Anglo-French dinner1 which had taken place in London/11^
10) Ibid. (H/XIV/304). Phipps to Halifax, 'Secret', 24 October 1938. Bonnet also told Phipps that 
Bure, the owner of Ordre. to which Pertinax contributed, was in regular receipt of funds from 
Moscow.
11) Ibid. (H/XIV/305). Halifax to Phipps, Personal & Secret', 25 October 1938. Halifax told 
Chamberlain that he should 'see this letter from Phipps which is interesting1 and would be 
•willing to be guided by you as to whether it would be of any advantage to let others see it'. 
Ibid (H/XTV/306) Halifax to Chamberlain, Personal & Secret, 25 October 1938. Corbin had 
also admired Phipps's speech which he found 'moving*. DDF. 2, XII, no. 190 Coibin k 
Bonnet, 20 Oct 1938.
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Halifax's friendly and appreciative remarks were in marked contrast to 
Cadogan's derogatory diary entry for 14 October (Eric Phipps looked in - he is not
C12')
very enlightening1), and reflected Phipps's relaxed relationship with Halifax and 
Chamberlain on the one hand, and his uneasy relationship with the F.O. on the 
other. Halifax, who valued Phipps's services in Paris,^13^ also protected him from 
his (Halifax's) own private secretary, Oliver Harvey, who was one of Phipps's 
severest critics. } This was apparent in the reaction to Phipps's 'private and 
confidential' letter to him of 26 October:
Phipps had gleefully described Bonnet's mini-purge at the Quai d'Orsay in
the aftermath of Munich and that Caillaux had expressed to him his
great satisfaction at what he describes as the cleaning out o f the 
Augean stables at the Quai d'Orsay. He is much relieved at the 
departure of Massigli for Angora and the shunting of Comert to the 
American department.
Phipps had been evasive about Caillaux's enquiry concerning his own impression of 
Leger’s 'activities during the crisis'. Caillaux had wanted Leger to be shunted as
well but Phipps believed that
Legeris great wish is to cling on to his present post as long as 
possible. If he absolutely must leave he would like London. A bird, 
whose chirpings are not always reliable, has whispered to me that he 
might be shunted definitely by being appointed a Suez Canal 
Director. I shall believe that when I see it.
If  Daladier shares Bonnet's wish to reach some really 
comprehensive settlement with Italy and Germany Leger will 
certainly not work there for "con amore". When Italy is mentioned 
he looks like a cross between a mule and a viper.
12) The Diplomatic Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan. 1938-1945. London 1971, p. 115.
13) See for e.g. Halifax's positive reaction to Phipps's successful attempts to remove 
Paul-Boncour as foreign minister in March 1938, p. 152.
14) For Harvey's severe criticism of Phipps & his attack on his 'all that is best in France' telegram 
of 13 September 1938, see p. 200.
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Bonnet had *typically issued a communique white-washing* Comert. He had also 
assured Phipps that 'notwithstanding reports to the contrary he and Daladier saw 
eye to eye', to which Phipps acidly commented that, 'in that case the eyes must be
astigmatic'/15^
Phipps's letter produced an alarmed memorandum to Halifax from Harvey 
who was very concerned at the Embassy's activities and the possibility of a direct
Tranco-German agreement' which he linked together: -
I cannot help feeling that Sir E.Phipps is getting into dangerous 
waters if he lends himself in any way to the encouragement o f the 
removal of high officials in the Quai. Reports are already too 
current in Paris that the Embassy has been intervening overmuch in 
French internal political during the recent crisis. Sir C.Mendl was 
certainly far too active in particular. (16)
Harvey emphasised that Massigli and Comert had always been 'good friends of 
Britain' and that if Leger were removed *we may find ourselves badly short of 
friends in the Quai'. The pro-German elements in France would then be encouraged 
to 'reach an agrement with Germany behind our back and at our expense1 which 
would involve France disinteresting herself in Europe. The 'School of Flandin and 
Caillaux' favoured France 'abandoning the struggle and becoming a second class 
power', and he reminded Halifax of Caillaux's *treacherous activities in 1914' and
15) FO.800/311 (XZXIV/307). Phipps to Halifax, Private & Confidential', 26 October 1938. This 
despatch was seen by the F.O. Strang minuted that Llger had retained Daladiefs confidence 
while both Sargent & Cadogan agreed that 'Notwithstanding MMassigli's shortcomings I 
think that we may have reason to regret his departure from the Quai d'0rsay'.F0.371/21592 
(C14520/13/17). Minutes by Strang, Sargent & Cadogan, 17 & 18 November 1938. Ldger 
was a close friend of Daladier, see for e.g. the former's personal letter to the latter on his 
accession to the Presidency of the Council in January 1933, quoted in du Reau, p. 15. for 
Daladiefs attitude towards Bonnet, see Ch.9.
16) FO.800/311. (XZXIV/307). O.CHarvey to Halifax, 27 October 1938. Harvey's fears of a 
'direct Franco-German Agreement' were precipitated by Phipps's account of 
Frangois-Poncet's conversation with Hitler (and the manner in which Bonnet had emphasised 
its secrecy) as described in his letter to Halifax of 24 October 1938, see p.233. This 
memorandum (together with Halifax's reply) was also placed in the FO archives 
(FO.371/21631 (C13356/1050/17) and are reproduced in The Diplomatic D iaries o f Oliver 
Harvev 1937-1940. ed. by J.Harvey, London 1970, appendix M, pp.427-429
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that he was 'identified with high finance and his past reputation still stinks'. Harvey 
concluded that
French politicians being what they are and French opinion being 
easily influenced, I do not think one can exaggerate the importance 
to us of the Quai d'Orsay. The politicians come and go, the Quai 
remains. It represents the permanent element in French diplomacy.
If the basis of British policy remains close friendship with France 
and no separate agreements with Germany, and if our aim is to see 
France strengthen herself then we must beware of weakening the 
position of those like Leger and Massigli. They are absolutely sound 
on this policy, but if replaced they might be succeeded by a very 
different type of man.(17)
Halifax replied that they had discussed that matter, and that he did not 'see any
(ig\
evidence of Phipps acting unwisely in his letter1.
Halifax's appreciation of Phipps's services was undoubtedly facilitated by 
his awareness of the value of the tatter's close relationship with Bonnet, and certain 
other French personalities, which enabled Phipps to provide him with confidential 
information. This was evident in Halifax's concern at what had actually transpired 
during Fran?ois-Poncet's valedictory conversation at Berchtesgaden. The 
American ambassador had provided him with 'a somewhat different account' in 
which Hitler had apparently made direct reference to the Anglo-German Naval 
Agreement, and he wanted Phipps to make discreet enquiries about it;
Chamberlain told Halifax that he would be 'interested to see the reply1/ 1
17) FO.800/311 (XZXIV/307). Harvey to Halifax, 27 October 1938.
18) FO.800/311 (HZXIV/309). Halifax to Harvey, 28 October 1938. Technically speaking, 
Halifax was correct and there appears to be no direct evidence, either in Phipps's letter or 
elsewhere, of the Embassy's direct involvement in Bonnet's mini-purges at the Quai d'Orsay.
However, given Phipps's strongly held views, his dislike of the permanent officials at the 
Quai, and the record of the Embassy's previous involvement in French internal affairs, 
Harvey's allegations were probably justified.
19) Ibid. (H/XIV/312). Halifax to Phipps, 28 October & minute by Chamberlain, 29 Oct 1938.
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Frangois-Poncet, Phipps's old colleague in Berlin, who was in Paris en 
route for Rome, saw him on the 29th and Phipps discreetly refrained from pressing 
him immediately for further details. Frangois-Poncet felt that Mussolini was now 
*the key to Hitler, who is very subject to the influence of the Duce' but he realised 
that his new position at Rome would be difficult and Phipps, who saw him as a
potentially valuable channel to the Italians, put in a strong plea for him:
I fear that Frangois-Poncet will have a terribly uphill task at first and 
I hope you will instruct Perth to help him in every possible way 
directly he arrives in Rome (on November 7th). He is not a "grand 
seigneur", but a very honest and honourable man. His tongue is apt 
to be rather sharp, and he cannot refrain from a "bon mot" even at 
the risk of making an enemy, if the Italians are inclined to crab at 
first I feel sure Perth's approval and defence of him would be most 
valuable. He is whole-heartedly for Anglo-French collaboration. (20)
Halifax passed on his endorsement of Phipps's plea to Perth at Rome who was 'not
(21)too pessimistic about future possibilities'.
In reply to Phipps's point blank question on 1 November regarding 
references to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, Frangois-Poncet replied that 
Hitler had 'merely remarked that he had told Mr Chamberlain that circumstances 
might eventually compel him to consider whether or not that Agreement should be
revised'. Phipps thought that it was obvious that
either (1) Poncet does not wish to make mischief and was, therefore 
more outspoken to the U.S. Ambassador than to me, or (2) Mr 
Wilson (the U.S. Ambassador in Berlin) may have, quite 
unwittingly, slightly exaggerated what Poncet said to him. (IBs 
predecessor at Berlin, Mr Dodd, had a quite surprisingly firm grasp 
of the wrong end of every stick). Frangois-Poncet seemed anxious
20) FO.800/311 (H/XIV/13). Phipps to Halifax, Private & Very Confidential', 31 October 1938.
21) Ibid. (HZXIV/318 & 323). Halifax to Perth (Rome), 3 November 1938; Perth (Rome) to 
Halifax, 7 November 1938.
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to give me the impression that Hitler despite his complaints 
regarding our debates and regarding colonies, was not really 
disagreeable about Great Britain.(2 2 )
Frangois-Poncet also stated that Hitler would only be prepared to  stabilize the 
West if he gets a free hand in the East', and Phipps's self confessed cynicism came
to the fore in his comment that
It would therefore be well, in Frangois-Poncet's opinion, to get an 
undertaking from Hitler to consult with us before making any 
further move even in the East. It seems to me that if Hitler is 
determined to make this move in any case the less we are consulted 
the better; but perhaps this is too cynical a view to take.(23)
These private letters to Halifax described the initiation of the 
Franco-German Agreement of December 1938. Equally important, as his letter of 
1 November makes clear, is that they also look forward to Phipps's attempts to 
enlist Bonnet's support in pressurizing Daladier into making concessions to Italy
thus neutralizing Leger's supposedly anti-Italian influence:
Poncet does not believe that any secret military convention yet 
binds Italy to Germany; but he fears that if we let more than about 
three months elapse without a general settlement that may 
materialise. He thinks Mussolini would still welcome some 
understanding with France & Great Britain which would render him 
rather less dependent on Hitler's goodwill. In this connection, but 
very much between ourselves, he deplores Bonnet's weakness in not 
getting rid of Leger, who is hopelessly and incurably anti-Italian, 
and will do his best to "saboter" his (Frangois-Poncet's) efforts at 
Rome. Leger, it seems may also do this for personal reasons as a 
number of people here would like to see Frangois-Poncet in Leger's 
post as Secretary General... Frangois-Poncet says that Charveriat, 
Massigli's successor as Political Director, is merely a satellite of 
Leger's.(24)
22) FO.800/311 (H/XTV/314). Phipps to Halifax, Private & Confidential', 1 Nov. 1938. The 
printed French documents relating to Frangois-Poncet's farewell visit to Hitler do not contain 
any references to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement There is an abridged account in Le 
Livre Jaune Francais. Documents Diplomatiques 1938-39. Paris 1939, no. 18 Frangois-Poncet 
k Georges Bonnet, 20 octobre 1938, and a more complete version in Documents 
Diplomatiques Francais. 2e, XU no. 197 Ibid.
23) Ibid. (HZXIV/316). Phipps to Halifax, (Private & Confidential). 1 November 1938 (2nd
despatch).
24) Ibid.
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This private despatch overlapped with Halifax's long confidential letter to 
Phipps of 1 November in which he told him that 'German predominance in Central
Europe' was inevitable, and that
The greatest lesson of the crisis has been the unwisdom of basing a 
foreign policy on insufficient armed strength... I spoke of the efforts 
which we are making to fill up the gaps in our own defences and the 
importance we attach to France doing likewise. It is one thing to 
allow German expansion in Central Europe, which to my mind is a 
normal and natural thing, but we must be able to resist German 
expansion in Western Europe or else our whole position is 
undermined. It would be fatal to us to be caught again with 
insufficient strength.
Halifax feared that France could 'in certain circumstance turn so defeatist as to give 
up the struggle of maintaining adequate defences even for the safety of 
metropolitan France'. It was therefore of the utmost importance to encourage her 
to rearm as rapidly as possible otherwise *we might have to face alone the full 
weight of German military power in the West'. Halifax hoped that the 
Anglo-Italian Agreement would ameliorate relations with Italy, 'and that France 
would succeed in doing likewise', and that it would 'increase Mussolini's power of
manoeuvre' making him less dependent on H itle r.^
Phipps regarded Halifax's confidential letter as more valuable for his
guidance than 'an official despatch on a set subject', and he assured him that
I do not see any prospect of France turning so defeatist as to 
abandon the necessary defences for the safety of metropolitan 
France. I am convinced, moreover, that the French would fight like 
tigers to maintain their independence.(26)
This apparent conviction had not, however, prevent him from continuing to attack 
the soi-disant 'war party', and Daladier*s bitter complaint about General Spears's 
activities in Paris after the Munich agreement provided him with the opportunity of
25) FO.800/311 (HZXIV/314A). Halifax to Phipps, Confidential, 1 November 1938.
26) Ibid. (HZXTV/320). Phipps to Halifax, 7 Nov. 1938.
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conveying his views on the subject privately to Chamberlain, who would shortly be 
visiting Paris. Phipps told him that Spears had seen 'all the members of the war 
party such as Reynaud, Mandel and co. (sic)', and that Daladier was particularly
indignant by the fact that
Spears went to see General Maurin, formerly Minister for War, and 
actually told him that he (Spears) considered France to have been so 
completely disgraced that no right-thinking Englishman should 
shake a Frenchman's hand.
Phipps had confirmed to Daladier that Spears 'counted for nothing in England* and 
that Spears's 'chief raison d'etre during the war was that he spoke French rather 
better than English'. Using anti-semitism as a method of ingratiating himself on
Chamberlain, he added that
It is curious that Spears is a Jew and that his real name is Spiers.
When he changed it I remember that somebody suggested that his 
motto should be "Dum Spiro spearo".(27)
In the meantime, the question of the renewal of Phipps's ambassadorship on 
1 April had become the subject of the most intense informal activity involving, 
almost inevitably, his mentor, Hankey. Hankey told Phipps on 1 November that he 
was 'about to take up the question of your extension, whether you like it or not!'
27) FO.800/311 (HZXIV/319). Phipps to Chamberlain, 4 November 1938. There is no evidence 
to suggest that Spears was Jewish (see p.38). This was a partial attempt by Phipps to provide 
the war party1 with a motive (see, for e.g. his comments on Mandel's Jewish ancestry, ibid). 
As remarked previously, Phipps also used anti-semitism as a method of ingratiating himself 
with Chamberlain (& Halifax). Mendl told Phipps that he had heard 'on good authority1 that 
when Chamberlain visited Paris, Bonnet, was 'going to complain officially* about Vansittart's 
activities and 'in particular of a recent visit to Paris in which certain intrigues were set on 
foot'. PHPP.2/21. Mendl to Phipps, 8 November 1938. There appears to be no further 
reference to this in the British archives. Ironically, Mendl, whose Jewish ancestry was 
undisputed and who acted in tandem with Phipps, had himself been veiy friendly with Spears 
whom he habitually addressed as *Beaucaire'. Their correspondence appears to be extant for 
the years 1923-1931/2 only. Spears Papers, 1/230.
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adding, playfully, that 'I shan't tell you my p lan s!'^  On 28th, he reported that he
(29)had 'fired (his) big gun' and would have to lie low for a little'. 7 He was able to 
tell Phipps on the 30th that *what I have been working for will come off, but only 
for six months in the first instance', and that he was reluctant to 'say anything more
explicit in a posted letter1/ 30^
The *big gun', to which Hankey had referred, was his extremely effective 
letter to Halifax on 15 November, extolling Phipps's virtues as British ambassador 
at Paris. Hankey referred, inter alia, to Phipps's Very remarkable influence over 
French ministers', the fact that he was liked and trusted, the devotion of his staff 
and, 'such is the confidence in him that he knows many Cabinet secrets before they
reach the Cabinet', but
Above all, from the point of view of the public interest, Phipps is a 
convinced believer in and powerful exponent of the 
Chamberlain-Halifax policy. No-one can put it over the French as 
he, because he speaks with conviction and knows how to "get under 
their skins". He has proved this. We have a real national asset 
there. Phipps knows Paris as no-one else in the Embassy does, 
except possibly Mendel (sic) - a rare thing for an Ambassador. (31)
Hankey^ high opinion of Phipps was not universally shared at the F.O. 
Harvey recorded on the 17th that the Promotions Board had recommended against 
prolongation owing to the block in promotion; Phipps was Svell over age';
28) PHPP.3/3. Hankey to Phipps, 11 November 1938. Hankey also stated that *by next Spring 
and still more by next Summer we shall possess a very powerful defence indeed'. He warned 
Phipps, however, that only meagre resources were being given to the army and that, 'if 
France needs an army to help her - as she will - we shall be no better than in 1914, in fact 
worse'.
29) PHPP.3/3. Hankey to Phipps, 28 November 1938.
30) Ibid. Hankey to Phipps, 30 November 1938.
31) FO.794/16. Hankey to Halifax, 15 November 1938. Hankey also referred to Phipps's 
'astonishingly wide contacts over a wide range' whereas it was precisely the latter*s heavy 
reliance on a narrow range of contacts, viz. Bonnet, Caillaux & Flandin which brought him 
into such disrepute with the F.O.
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Cadogan and himself 'both feel strongly that he did not show up well during the
crisis and that Ronnie Campbell would be far better*, and that
H(alifax) had agreed to this when he received a letter from Hankey 
(now on the Suez Canal Co) praising Phipps to the skies as the 
greatest Ambassador ever! I think Phipps must have got him to do 
this - anyway, it shook H. and we are now trying to get him to 
agree on a compromise extension till the Autumn only. (32)
In the event, Halifax endorsed all of Hankey's comments about Phipps and
(33}was certain that this opinion is shared by all the authorities here1. The problem
*7
was, as he explained to Harding^ that
there is a great deal to be said in favour of keeping Phipps on in 
Paris where he has established an exceptionally good position for 
himself. On the other hand, by next Spring he will be 63 Vi and he 
has already, in fret, passed the age at which most Ambassadors 
have been retiring recently. There is, at the moment, too a very 
serious block in promotion in the Diplomatic Service.(34)
Phipps was kept in suspense during Chamberlain's visit to Paris and, despite his
(35)bravado statement, that he 'would not lift a finger to be renewed, J his effusion of
gratitude towards Hankey for his intervention suggested otherwise:
You are angelic, but also very wicked to have written to Halifax 
about my renewal. I have only known one indispensable person in 
my life and that is yourself: and this was clearly proved when you 
retired and were given three successors. If Cadogan or Ronnie 
Campbell come here all will go beautifully, but the intriguing Van 
would really be a disaster. Nothing was said to me during the visit 
about my future so I am still in the dark... Whatever the decision
32) The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvev 1937-1939. edit by J.Harvey, London 1970, 
pp.220-1. Harvey had recorded during the Czech crisis that Phipps had 'done his utmost to 
discourage the French from anything resembling positive action in fulfilment of their treaty 
with Czechoslovakia1, he had 'skilfully worked on Bonnet's fears and weakness' and had 
'consistently reported his views without seeking or encouraging the views of other more 
important Frenchmen such as Blum, Herriot, Reynaud or Mandel who stand for firmer 
policies'. Harvey did not consider it wise 'to blanket other opinions to the extent he has... 
HMG are entitled to know all sides and not only what they want to hear*. Ibid, p. 188 (Entry 
for 19 Sept. 1938). For Harvey and Cadogan's severe criticism of Phipps's all that is best in 
France' telegram, see Ch.7.
33) FO.794/16. Halifax to Hankey, 21 November 1938.
34) Ibid. Halifax to Sir A. Hardinge, 22 November, Halifax to Chamberlain, 21 November 1938.
35) See his letter to Hankey of 6 October 1938 cited on p.231-2.
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maybe I should like to know one way or the other as many plans 
have to be made before a big move like this, and we are barely five 
months off it now. (36)
Phipps's anxieties proved groundless. After Halifax had discussed the matter with 
Chamberlain, his appointment was extended for a further sue months, prolonging it
until 24 October 1 9 3 9 .^
Chamberlain had, in fact, been highly appreciation of Phipps's services and 
had regarded his visit to Paris as a great success to which, he told him he had 
'contributed so much'. He also assured Phipps that 'more than one of your guests 
(in Paris) spoke to me in warm terms about you and Lady Phipps and about the
(38}good work you had done for the Entente'. J Phipps replied that the French were 
certainly 'oveijoyed at your coming over1; the visit had, in fact, given Daladier *the 
necessary confidence' to adopt a firm attitude towards the general strike which, 
consequently had been 'a complete fiasco'/39^  He also assured Chamberlain that the
French understood, and had accepted, his prospective visit to Rome 'except the
(40)incorrigible "Pertinax", who of course tried to make trouble over it.
Thus reassured by Chamberlain, Phipps resumed his role as the 
self-appointed guardian of the Prime Minister's policies with renewed vigour. This
36) Hankey Papers, HNKY 5/5, Phipps to Hankey, 25 November 1938.
37) FO.794/16. Hardinge draft to F.O., 30 June 1939. Hardinge also explained that Phipps was 
appointed to Paris in April 1937 for only two years 'as he was already a year and a half over 
the normal retiring age of sixty when he took up his appointment'.
38) PHPP.3/1. Chamberlain to Phipps (handwritten), 30 November 1938.
39) Neville Chamberlain Papers. NC7/11/31/218. Phipps to Chamberlain, 1 Dec. 1938. Phipps
was correct in stating that the general strike had collapsed. Lefranc wrote; La gr6ve 
generate fut un echec brutal pour le CGT. Le gouvemement ayant requis les transports et les 
administrations et menac£ de sanctions les grdvists, le nombre des grdvdstes fut tits r6duit'. 
Georges Leftanc, Histoire du Front Populaire. Paris 1965, p.280.
40) Ibid.
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included censoring the text of Duff Cooper's speech which he was due to deliver in 
Paris immediately after the publication of the Franco-German Agreement. Phipps 
wanted him to lay more stress on closer Anglo-French co-operation', and to omit
two paragraphs which, he told Duff Cooper
would chiefly be welcomed and applauded by the Communists: 
coming from the lips of a man so well-known and respected here as 
yourself they would be considered unnecessarily harsh and 
wounding to the French President of the Council. To furnish 
ammunition in these critical times to M.Daladier's enemies is to 
furnish indirectly ammunition to Hitler or to... Stalin.(41)
Phipps explained to Chamberlain that parts of the speech were too harshly critical' 
of Daladier's policy, and he had therefore asked Andre Chaumeix of the Academie 
Fransaise, and 'a whole hearted admirer of your policy1, to impress upon Duff 
Cooper that it would be unfortunate if he provided ammunition 'for Daladier's
enemies on the left':
This Chaumeix did, and in general tried to impress upon Duff 
Cooper that the chief war mongers, in France at any rate, were the 
Communists and some of the Socialists. The Duff Coopers left first 
and Chaumeix told me he was surprised to find how bitterly Duff 
Cooper defended his anti-Munich thesis.(42)
In the event, Duff Cooper omitted the offending paragraphs and, at Phipps's
prompting, added that he had not realised that his visit to Paris would coincide
(43)with that of Ribbentrop. Chamberlain was grateful for Phipps's efforts to 'curb
Duff Cooper1 but still regarded the remainder of his speech as 'mischievous and
41) PHPP.3/1. Phipps to Duff Cooper, 6 December 1938.
42) PHPP.3/1. Phipps to Chamberlain, 7 December 1938. It will be recalled that Duff Cooper 
had resigned from the Cabinet over the Munich agreement
43) PHPP.3/1. Duff Cooper to Phipps, 7 December 1938. The former publicly confirmed that he 
had 'accepted certain alterations' which Phipps had suggested. Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget 
London 1953, p.254.
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(44)untimely enough'. J Phipps was able to reassure him however that 'nothing was 
said which could offend Daladier1^ 45^
Vansittart's visit to Paris in December was of considerably greater concern 
to Phipps who told Horace Wilson (who, as Chamberlain's closest adviser could be 
expected to pass the information on to him) about the subterranean activities of the 
Chief Diplomatic Adviser*. Vansittart had been 'entertained' by Thomas Cadett, the 
Times Correspondent in Paris and one of Chamberlain's most vociferous critics, 
whose simmering feud with the Embassy would erupt in January. Phipps had 
warned that Cadett had also invited Reynaud, Palewski (the tatter's chief
secretary), and Blum to this gathering' commenting bitterly that
These activities (of Vansittart) are, I am well aware, only a sample 
of what has been going on throughout my time as Ambassador - a 
time now rapidly drawing to a close. I can only hope that my 
successor will have an easier task here in this respect than I have 
had. Above all I earnestly hope that he will only be chosen after his 
loyalty to the PM*s policy of appeasement has been proved "beyond 
a peradventure". Otherwise the danger to that policy, already none 
too easy of executing owing to intrigues on both sides of the 
channel, will be greater than it need be.(46)
Phipps was less fortunate in keeping his private letter to Halifax of the 8  
December confidential. Halifax, who was going on a short holiday, asked Harvey 
to acknowledge it and, intentionally or otherwise, the tatter forwarded it to the 
F.O. where it met with a storm of criticism. Phipps had expounded the views of 
Montigny, the deputy for Sarthe, 'who is a great friend and admirer of Caillaux', at 
considerable length. Montigny had called upon him at the Embassy
44) Ibid. Chamberlain to Phipps, 8 December 1938.
45) Ibid. Phipps to Chamberlain, 8 December 1938 (& encl. Duff Cooper's letter).
46) PHPP.3/5. Phipps to Horace Wilson, 13 December 1938. Phipps had received this 
information from Mendl, PHPP.2/21 Mendl to Phipps, 13 December 1938.
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expressly to warn me that the French "war Party”, defeated by the 
Munich agreements and the wisdom of the British Prime Minister 
was again raising its head. He remarked that the "bellicists” apart 
from the Communists, who were openly paid by Russia & were 
unanimous in desiring war, cut across all parties in France. A 
minority of the Socialists, a minority of the Catholics and the great 
majority of the Jews were for war merely because they were 
anti-Nazi.
Montigny specifically warned Phipps against Georges Mandel, the Minister of the 
Colonies, whom he described as *the leader of the war-party in France and the most
dangerous man in the country1, and that
What the latteris motive might be, whether financial or racial 
(Mandel is a Jew and his real name is Rothschild, although no 
relation to the great banking magnates), or whether merely the 
remembrance of the war days when he wielded great power as the 
right hand man of Clemenceau, M.Montigny could not say, but the 
fret remained and, owing to his forceful personality and intelligence,
Mandel constituted a real danger for peace.(47)
Montigny had then attacked Mandel's campaign against any cession of the colonies 
which, he claimed, had ben launched 'in order to wreck' Daladier*s post Munich 
appeasement policy. Phipps reminded Halifax that, like Montigny, Bonnet had
informed him that he wanted to 'loosen French ties with Russia and Poland', and
(48)that Ribbentrop would probably 'press for this' when he visited Paris.
47) FO.371/21601 (C15350/55/17). Phipps to Halifax, Private & Confidential, 6 Dec. 1938. 
Phipps was pursing one of his favourite themes. He had quoted Caillaux to the effect that 
anti-semitism had increased because the French public 'realised that the chief war-mongers 
in the recent crisis were Jews (including the Paris Rothschilds)1. FO.371/21600 
(C12965/55/17). Phipps tel., 25 Oct 1938. However, some six months earlier Caillaux had 
shouted 'Juif insolent!' at Blum when he had replied to the former's 'rough heckling' and
there were similar racialist taunts in the Chamber. FO.432/4 (Part IX). Phipps to Halifax, 
13 April 1938.
48) Ibid.
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Phipps's private despatch to Halifax revealed that he was completely out of
(49}
step with current Foreign Office thinking. J There had been a great swing in
opinion at the F.O. since early November 1 9 3 8 ^  as a result of (a) Kristallnacht 
on the 10th (with its attendant hostile British press reaction against Nazi 
Germany)/5 ^ and (b) the intelligence reports, and other information, summarized
by Halifax at the Foreign Policy Committee meeting on the 14th/52^  Consequently 
the Central Department, Sargent and Vansittart were extremely critical of Phipps's 
views.
Roberts minuted that, 'there is not much to choose between M. Caillaux and 
his friends and M.Mandel as regards trustworthiness... the latter has at least the 
merit of being a patriot, whereas M.CaiUaux's claim to such a description are at
(53}
best doubtful. In a further breach with Phipps, Sargent minuted that
49) Phipps's views since the onset of the Czech crisis had increasingly resembled those of 
Henderson. Henderson also disliked Benes and the Czechs; the Soviet-Czech pact; Mandel, 
the Jews and the Communists. He had told Halifax in July that 'war would doubtless serve 
the purpose of all Jews, Communists and doctrinaires in the world for whom Nazism is 
anathema', a view which had been criticized by the F.O. FO.371/21730 & 21729 (C7868 & 
C77678/1941/18). Henderson (Berlin) to Cadogan, 22 July & Henderson to Halifax (and 
minutes), 26 July 1938.
50) See for example, the important collection of papers by Cadogan, Strang & the SIS in 
FO.371/21659 (C14471/42/18) Possible future course of British policy, 9 November 1938. 
These are discussed in Donald Lammers, From Whitehall after Munich; the F.O. and the 
future course of British Policy', The Historical Journal. 16, 1973.
51) The British reaction to Kristallnacht is analysed in D. Cameron Watt, op.cit., pp. 88-89.
52) CAB.27/624. Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy F.P. (36) 32nd Meeting, 14 November 
1938. Halifax stated, inter alia, that Hitler was dissatisfied with Munich, that 'as regards 
Germany the immediate objective should be the correction of the false impression that we 
were decadent, spineless and with impunity be kicked about', and that no useful purpose 
would be served by a further resumption at the present time of the Anglo-German 
conversations.
53) FO.371/21601 (C15350/55/17). Minute by Roberts, 13 December 1938.
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I am not so frightened of the French war party as Sir E.Phipps 
seems to be. In the first place the expression "war party" is merely 
a term of abuse, used to give a bad name to the dog. I am surprised 
at Sir E.Phipps using it. Secondly the so-called "war party" happens 
also to be the Anglophil party - a fact which Sir E.Phipps seems to 
forget. And thirdly, the fact that they are denounced by Caillaux 
and his followers is I should have thought, from the English point of 
view, a strong recommendation in their favour - French defaitism 
surely cannot be a British interest.(54)
Vansittart agreed with Sargent and commented, in his convoluted prose, that the
Paris Embassy 'continues to give us but one "son de cloche" and that
even this misleading picture gains little in resemblance to "all that is 
best in France" - I am quoting from the famous telegram of the 
crisis so describing MM Caillaux, Flandin and Bonnet! - by the 
invocation of a hanger on of one of this unsavoury trinity.(55)
B) The Formal Aspects
Phipps's informal despatches during this period had revealed the extent to 
which the Embassy was immersed in intrigues in Paris. His official despatches were 
dominated by the anticipated changes in French foreign policy which, after Munich, 
had freed them from the straight jacket of their commitments to the Czechs, 
culminating, in late December, with the Franco-German Declaration which 
coincided with the potentially dangerous increase in Franco-Italian tension. 
Independent sources revealed aspects of the French internal scene which were 
disturbing to the Foreign Office, and confirmed to them their diagnosis of the 
malaise which appeared to be gripping France. Phipps himself continued to rely 
heavily on *the unsavoury trinity1 (to use Vansittart's description) of Bonnet,
54) Ibid. Minute by Sargent Phipps was now temporarily addressing Sargent by his surname 
rather than by his familiar nickname Moley4 which reflected the change in their relationship. 
For an example of their former close friendship, see p.94.
55) FO.371/21601 (C15350/55/17). Minute by Vansittart, 23 December 1938.
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Caillaux and Flandin as his main sources albeit slightly more critically of the latter, 
possibly because of the odium he had attracted during the Munich crisis.
(57)These changes were initially described by Phipps on 12 October. } French 
opinion considered that Germany's influence in Central and Eastern Europe would 
be increased and that of France 'diminished if not extinguished' and Blum, amongst 
others, had, in fact, warned that French commitments to Poland and the USSR 
'should be reviewed'. He also highlighted two significant internal developments: 
(a) The Oeuvre (Socialist Radical) had approved the demand of the President of 
the Union Confederation des Anciens Combatants (representing six million 
ex-servicemen) for a 'non-political government of national safety1, and Phipps 
commented that this Veil reflects the general mood of search for a strong hand to 
lead France out of her troubles', (b) He warned (or rather admitted) for the first 
time that there was an undercurrent of defeatism in France (which did not, 
however, prevent him from continuing to attack the 'war party1 in early 
December) :-
It may indeed be said in general that the country now desires unity 
and a strong government and recognises the need for a further 
armaments effort particularly in the air. But there are undercurrents 
of defeatism which feel that France's future as a Great Power is 
dangerously compromised. This feeling is to be found among the 
pacifists of the Left and among M.Flandin's followers on the Right. 
Meanwhile at a moment of such uncertainty and depression French
56) Flandin had sent Hitler a telegram of congratulation after the Munich agreement for which, 
at ceremonies at the Arc de Trioumphe, he had his face slapped by Maitre Jacques Renouvin 
who 'declared that his presence would dishonour the Unknown Solder's Tomb'. 
FO.371/21600 (C14079/55/17). Phipps to Halifax, 17 November 1938.
57) FO.371/21612 (C12160/1050/17). Phipps tel., 12 October 1938. This document was 
reproduced in DBFP. 3, m, no.187.
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opinion and not least in financial circles is leaning heavily on Great 
Britain for leadership and guidance...(58)
These sombre views may have been influenced by the delayed Nice 
Consular District Officer's report on the local reaction to the Czech crisis in which 
he stated that 150,000 people had 'left Nice alone during the Crisis', and that the 
French Government had *taken no steps whatsoever for the protection of the
people'/59^  The 'under current of defeatism' to which Phipps referred had also been 
underlined by Colonel Fraser's conversation with General Dentz, the Deputy Chief 
of the French General Staff, that morning; Dentz stated that it was England rather
than France which was currently threatened, and that:
Germany wanted colonies and the easiest place to capture them was 
on the Scheldt and the Meuse. If  Germany attacked Holland or 
Belgium, England might consider it vital for her to fight; but he was 
not at all convinced that French public opinion would see it in the 
same way. He thought the French would be very inclined to say, "it 
is not our affair". He reiterated several times "take care of French 
public opinion... France does not intend to allow England to fight 
her battle with French soldiers".(60)
Phipps's reference to leaning heavily on Britain for leadership and guidance' 
related, subjectively, to his close rapport with Bonnet and would provide added 
justification for his increased interference in French internal affairs in early 1939.
58) FO.371/21612 (C12160/1050/17). Curiously, there were no F.O. minutes to this important 
despatch. The Embassy's report of a leading article in the semi-official Temps of 5 Oct, 
declaring that the recent crisis had shown the need for 'a revision of values in the sphere of 
foreign policy' was, however, minuted by the F.O. (Ibid. Cl 1695/1050/17), Phipps tel. 5 
Oct. 1938).
59) Ibid. (C12016/1050/17). Phipps tel., 8 Oct 1938 (Encl. copy of Nice Despatch no.33 of 4 
Oct 1938). There had also been 'something approaching panic at Monte Carlo' during the 
Crisis. FO.371/21613 (C12852/1050/17), Phipps tel. 22 Oct 1938 (encl. despatch from 
British Consul at Nice), minute by Barclay, 28 Oct1938.
60) DBFP. 3,3,189. Campbell (Paris) to Halifax, 12 October 1938 (Enel: Memorandum by the 
Military Attache, Colonel Fraser). Gen. Dentz later emphasised that he was only expressing 
a personal view.
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Phipps's second despatch of the 12th outlined the changes in French foreign 
policy in more detail. Bonnet had informed him that the Treaty of Versailles and 
'definitely crumbled away1; Britain and France should continue discussions with the 
dictators whilst pushing on rapidly with rearmament; and that he was considering
revising France's treaty commitments with Poland and the USSR because
he did not wish to risk finding the French Government placed again 
in the terrible position that it was owing to the Treaty with 
Czechoslovakia. France, in a word, must no longer be exposed to 
the dangers of being involved in war on behalf of Soviet Union or 
Poland as a result of circumstances over which she has no control.
Bonnet had quoted Coulondre's report from Moscow describing 'Soviet anger* at 
the Munich settlement and the Comintern's intention of stirring up trouble in 
France. He also stated that the hoped to appoint a French agent to Burgos within
the near future/61'*
This important despatch elicited a considerable discussion at the F.O., 
where its implications for Britain led to a division of opinion/62^  The Moscow 
Chancery complained that it was of 'such interest' that a copy should have been 
sent to them directly in the diplomatic bag/63'*and a long report on French foreign 
policy based entirely on Phipps's two despatches of 12 October was circulated to 
the Dominions/64^
The problems which these two despatches raised became intertwined with 
the question of French rearmament. Hankey had visited Paris in early October and
61) FO.371/21612 (C12161/1050/17). Phipps tel., 12 October 1938. (2nd despatch).
62) Ibid. Minute by Barclay, Sargent, Cadogan and Vansittart, 13,17 & 18 October 1938.
63) Ibid. Moscow Chancery to Northern Dept., 5 Nov.1938.
64) Ibid. (C12502/1050/17). Dominions Office circular tel. on French Foreign Policy, 18 October 
1938.
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his general impression had been one of 'intense relief and gratitude to the British 
Government in general and to the P(rime) M(inister) in particular'. Phipps had
confirmed Hankey's impressions and had emphasised that
Several French friends of mine have spoken to me in the same sense 
as General Weygand spoke to Sir Maurice and have urged how 
essential it now is that HMG should put continuous pressure on the 
French Government to set the French defences in order. They have 
also begged me to point out to individual members of the French 
Government how vital it is for French finances to be put on a sound 
basis...(65)
Phipps had wanted to deliver a message from Chamberlain 'on these lines'
to D aladier^but he was instructed to broach the topic with him and to emphasise
that he was only speaking 'personally and unofficially’. ^  Daladier’s assurance to 
Phipps, that considerable funds had been allocated to aviation in the forthcoming 
year and that he intended to create a Ministry of Supply specifically to deal with
these problems/68^  partly mollified the F.O.
Phipps's almost identical agreement with Bonnet's views were confirmed on 
3 November when the latter, 'in the seclusion of his sick room', confided to him 
how relieved he was that war had been averted by Chamberlain and that he had 
'castigated(d) in no measured terms the French war mongers' whom, he was 
certain, must have been aware of French military weakness. Bonnet then revealed
65) FO.371/21600 (Cl 1641/55/17). Phipps to Halifax, 4 October 1938; Hankey Papers, HNKY 
5/5 Memor. of Impressions in Paris by Sir Maurice Hankey, 1-3 Oct 1938. (Reprinted in 
DBFP. 3, m, no. 122).
66) FO.371/21600 (C11641/55/17). Phipps to Halifax, 4 October 1938.
67) Ibid. (C l1641/55/17). Halifax to Phipps, 28 October 1938.
68) FO.371/21613 (C13360/1050/17). Phipps thought that Raoul Dautiy, the Director of State 
Railways and a talented technocrat, would head the Ministry of Supply. It was not until 
September 1939, however, that Daladier created a Ministry of Armaments, headed by 
Dautiy.
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to him the events at the 'council of war* on 15 March, when Blum was Prime 
Minister and Paul-Boncour had been Foreign Minister, which had been called to 
'consider the possibility of French intervention in Spain'. Phipps reminded Halifax 
that he had cut short his dinner with Gamelin in order to interview Paul-Boncour at
the latteris home and that
(Paul Boncour) admitted to me the despatch of French troops to 
Spain was contemplated, whereupon I told him that he evidently 
wished to start a general conflagration. After a heated argument he 
led me into the next room where I discovered M. Herriot..: and the 
discussion continued until past midnight. Next morning early I saw 
Blum at his private house... I extracted from Blum a regretful 
half-promise that he would confine himself to a merely 
"hypocritical" intervention in Spain. What he heard at that Council 
from the lips of Generals Gamelin and Vullemin may have helped to 
make him keep his promise.(69)
Bonnet explained to Phipps that he realised that intervention would 'entail a 
serious risk of war on three fronts viz. the Alps, the Pyrenees and the Rhine', and 
had questioned the military advisers closely. Gamelin had told him (Bonnet) that 
'certain limited offensives' were possible but that the war would be mainly in the 
air, and that Poland and Rumania would never allow the transit of Soviet troops 
across their territories. Vuillemin had been even more pessimistic, and had stated 
that all the Czech aerodromes would be 'entirely destroyed' by the Germans and no
Soviet aeroplanes would be able to land there. Phipps added that
M.Bonnet further me that during the recent international crisis 
General Vuillemin had declared that a fortnight after the outbreak of 
hostilities the entire French air force would be destroyed by the 
Germans (this confirms what M.Pierre Berenger told me on Sept.
28, see my tel.640 Saving of Sept.30). (Bonnet) finally said that
69) FO.371/21613 (C13372/1050/17). Phipps tel., 3 November 1938. For Phipps's earlier 
description of these events and his pressure on Daladier not to reappoint Paul-Boncour as 
MFA, see Ch.6. The Comite Permanent de la defense nationale met on 15 March 1938 not 
on 17 March as Phipps erroneously stated.
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General Vuillemin had announced his intention of resigning his post 
as Chief of the Air Staff in the event of France declaring war on 
Germany.(70)
This telegram provided Phipps with additional self-justification for his role in 
preventing Daladier from reappointing Paul-Boncour, and Halifax considered it 
sufficiently important for copies to be sent to Chamberlain, the War Office, the
Admiralty, the Air Ministry and the C.I.d / 71^
Nevertheless by mid-November, and despite Phipps's reassurances, the F.O. 
were concerned by the evidence from other sources of the malaise which appeared 
to be gripping France which, in their frequently uncritical reiteration of the views of 
the most reactionary and defeatist elements the Embassy appeared to be reflecting 
rather than responding to. Two independent reports in particular were regarded by 
them as important and they were incorporated directly into their instructions to 
Phipps.
1) Ashton Gwatkin's interview with Dr Schairer, who had just returned 
from Paris on 21 November where he had seen Reynaud whom he described as 'a 
staunch friend of England and of the English alliance'. Dr Schairer had warned, 
however, that
some of his (Reynaud's) colleagues are already intriguing with 
Hitler's and Ribbentrop's emissaries especially Bonnet, Lamoureux,
Flandin. These are all corrupt fellows. Bonnet is connected with a 
bank (Lazards) (sic) which has large sums locked up in Germany;
70) Ibid. Bonnet's account of Vuillemin's pessimistic views follows closely the official French 
account of the meeting. fDDF. 2, VUI no.446 Proces verbal Comitd permanent de la defense 
nationale, 15 mars 1938) except that there is no mention of Gen. Vuillemin's threat to resign. 
Bonnet, who was not a minister at the time, did not attend (and presumably was not entitled 
to attend) the meeting. The circumstances under which he questioned the military advisors 
'closely' as he alleged must, therefore, remain a matter of conjecture. He may, however, have 
received details of this meeting from Gen. Vuillemin. For the close relationship between 
their families and Vuillemin's repeated prophecies regarding the destruction of the French air 
force, see pp. 213-4.
71) FO.371/21613 (C13372/1050/17). Minutes by Mallet & Harvey, 8 & 9 Nov.1938. It was 
not, however, given 'political distribution as it was regarded as highly confidential.
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Lamoureux, true to his name, keeps too many women to remain 
independent; Flandin is notorious. All these men would make a 
settlement with Hitler at almost any price. They have recently 
supported proposals from German sources... Daladier is nothing - 
•the body of a bull with the heart of a cow1 - he is pushed this way 
and that by the last speaker...
Roberts commented that 'this fits in with other information we have', and Makins 
minuted that 'this is of considerable interest and probably not very wide of the
m ark'™
2) Kenneth de Courcy's report on the European situation (gleaned 'from 
very reliable sources') that there was a persistent leakage of French Cabinet secrets 
into Germany and that de Brinon was one of the main channels of communication 
between Paris and Berlin. De Courcy alleged that at least two members of the 
French Cabinet were 'not in an independent situation'; Brinon had obtained 'some
of his information' from one of them, and that
I believe, for example, that many of the papers relating to financial 
scandals in which these two Ministers have been involved are now 
in the possession of the German Government, and that de Brinon is 
aware of this. It will be recalled that de Brinon is the leader writer 
of l'lnformation the principal French financial newspaper, and in that 
position has great influence upon the Stock Markets. He has 
already received the close attention of the Surete Generate, and it 
may be well to encourage them in their activities.(73)
Inskip, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, stated in the C.LD.'s 
covering note that Courcy's reports had been 'quite remarkable in their anticipation 
of what has happened'. Echoing Dr Schairer's earlier information, Roberts thought 
that the French ministers referred to was Bonnet and the other, possibly
72) FO.371/21665 (C14758/62/18). F.O. memorandum (F.A Gwatidn), 22 Nov. 1938. & 
minutes by Roberts & Makins. Dr Reinhold Schairer was 'a German refugee and 
educationalist at the University of London', who acted as an intermediary between Dr 
Goerdeler (& the German opposition) and Arthur Young (& the F.O.). Sidney Aster, 1939. 
the Making of the Second World War. London 1973, p.39.
73) FO.371/21675 (C14251/132/18). Sellar (CID) to Jebb (FO), 18 Nov. 1938. (Encl. in, De 
Courcy's report on the European Situation). For Brinon's pro-German proclivities, see p. 146.
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Lamoureux while Cadogan told Inskip that this ‘fitted in with our other
information'. Sargent minuted:
As regards France all the reports we receive seem to show that she 
is passing through a very unhealthy phase and requires very careful 
watching. I think this might be impressed on the Paris Embassy 
privately.(74)
De Courcy’s information was directly incorporated, therefore, into Sargent's
warning to Phipps on 29 November that:
This is, I think the first time we have heard the suggestion that de 
Brinon is in German pay, and sells French Cabinet secrets to the 
Germans. On the other hand, it is clear from your reports and from 
reports which have reached us from our own secret sources that 
France is passing through a very unhealthy phase and requires very 
careful watching, both as regards the internal situation and the risk 
lest certain elements in French public life might prove unduly 
susceptible to German blandishments. I am sure you are fully alive 
to the dangers to which the enclosed note draws attention and will 
continue to keep a close eye on them.(75)
Sargent had emphasised that de Courcy's report should be 'regarded as 
secret,' and that his previous reports had generally 'turned out to be rather 
accu ra te '.^  His letter appeared to have scant effect. A week later, Phipps was 
still enthusiastically expounding the views of Caillaux's defeatist entourage and 
attacking the soi-disant 'war party* at great length in a 'private and confidential' 
letter to Halifax which was inadvertently seen by the Foreign Office and bitterly
criticized by them /77^
74) Ibid. Minute by Roberts; Cadogan to Inskip, 21 Nov, minute by Sargent, 23 Nov. 1938. 
Kenneth de Courcy was the Hon. Secretary of the Imperial Policy Group (1934-39) & 
travelled as the group's chief observer of Foreign Affairs in Europe & America 1935-39 with 
special missions of enquiry to Mussolini, Benes, Schuschningg etc. He was also the 
proprietor of the Intelligence Digest 1938-76. Who's Who. 1991.
75) Ibid. Sargent to Phipps, 'Secret', 29 November 1938.
76) FO.371/21675 (C14251/132/18). Sargent to Phipps, 'Secret', 29 November 1938.
77) FO.371/21601 (C155550/55/17). Phipps to Halifax, Private & Confidential', 6 December
1938. See p.246-9 for its contents and the caustic FO minutes.
-260-
The F.O. continued to be concerned by the Very unhealthy phase' in France 
which did not appear to perturb the Embassy. On 13 December, Phipps reported 
without comment the increase in support for the extreme right wing PSF (formerly 
the Croix de Feu) and quoted Bonnet's remark that a socialist had told him 
(Bonnet) that he hoped that Daladier would not dissolve the Chamber in the near
future, 'as the result would be a terribly reactionary Chamber1. Strang minuted that
We generally find it easier to work with Left-ish Governments in 
France than with Right-ish governments. There is a good deal of 
latent anti-British feeling in the right wing (Sargent added '& 
defaitism1). And the Right Wing might perhaps make terms with 
Germany over Eastern Europe (Sargent added 'and colonies1^ and 
with Italy (over Spain) and leave us isolated in Europe. (78)
In this respect, and the Embassy's warning on 12 October that the French 
were searching for 'a strong hand', Phipps's earlier interview with Marshal Petain 
was significant. Petain, who warmly approved of Chamberlain's policy, regarded 
the French Army as 'good' but her military aviation 'non-existent'. He was not 
hopeful for the future of France although he admitted Tier wonderful powers of 
recovery when all seemed lost', and he regarded the 'spiritual forces o f France' to 
be 'receding at the same time as her economic and financial resources'. Phipps's 
private information was that Petain was prepared to form a Cabinet 'if public 
opinion should demand it' probably with Laval as foreign minister. Mallet 
wondered 'how far the ancient and embittered Petain and the right wing Caillaux 
were really representative of French opinion', and suggested that
78) Ibid. (C15422/55/17). Phipps tel., 13 Dec. 1938 and minute by Strang, 14 December 1938. 
Colonel de la Rocque, the leader of the PSF, claimed that it had between one million and two 
million paid-up members in 1938. Eugene Weber, Trance' in The European Right: A 
Historical Profile, edited by Hans Rogger and Eugene Weber, London 1965, p. 106.
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a rather wider field of French opinion would have to be canvassed 
before one could safely assume that France does not possess that 
abiding vitality to which Sir E. Phipps himself paid tribute in the 
conclusions of his despatches of November 26 last and... of January 
24.(79)
Ironically, Chamberlain informed his sister that Phipps had laid on a large dinner 
for him during his visit to Paris with 40 or 50 guests. He had spoken to 'a good 
many ministers, ex-ministers and guests' but that 'the one who made the greatest
impression on me was Petain'/80^
Against this uneasy internal background, two inter-related events 
dominated the Embassy's reports in December. On the 1st, Fran5ois-Poncet
reported the cries of'Tunis, Corsica and Savoy!' in the Italian Chamber and, on 
the 6th, Ribbentrop arrived in Paris to sign the Franco-German Declaration.
Initially, Bonnet told Phipps that he did not take the demonstration in the
(82)Italian Chamber too seriously and that Spain was 'the real bone of contention'.
By the 26th, however, he was sufficiently anxious to summon Phipps who reported 
that
he (Bonnet) fears that Mussolini rendered desperate by the poor 
result of his foreign policy and consequent popular discontent, may 
decide to provoke a general conflagration in the hope of deriving 
some benefit therefrom.
79) FO. 371/21613 (C12967/1050/17). Phipps tel., 26 Oct. 1938 and minute by Mallet, 27 Oct
1938. It will be recalled that Phipps was instructed to seek Petain's views during the Czech 
crisis.
80) Neville Chamberlain Papers. NC18/1/1077. N. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 27 
November 1938. Chamberlain had added that He is now 81 or 82 but., vigorous and with a 
fine martial expression that was veiy attractive'.
81) DDF. 2, XII, no.l Fran^ois-Poncet (Rome) k G. Bonnet 1 dfcembre 1938.
82) FO.371/22657. (W15932/83/41). Phipps tel., 2 December 1938. Phipps had also reported 
that the anti-French manifestations had made a profound impression in France and had 
aroused 'considerable depth of feeling*. F0.371/22427 (R9591/240/22) Phipps tel., 2 
December 1938.
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Bonnet reiterated that the French Government were 'absolutely determined' not to 
cede any territory to the Italians, and Phipps confirmed that they would be swept
away by French public opinion if they tried'/83^
Despite this apparent firmness, Bonnet's tendency towards compromise 
immediately reasserted itself and he told Phipps that some topics could eventually 
be discussed including Italian representation on the Suez Board (to which Phipps 
objected), and that he did not believe that Germany was encouraging Italy to make 
its 'absurd claims' which could lead to war. Apparently Coulondre had reported his 
impressions that the Germans did not approve of the Italian demands and were 
'aiming at the Ukraine and wanted to buy off Poland rather than attack her*. This 
opening provided Phipps with the opportunity of asking Bonnet \vhat the French 
Government would do if Germany attacked Poland', but he only received the
'evasive answer that such an attack now seemed very unlikely1.
Ribbentrop's visit to Paris, to which this question related was, in fact, of 
considerable concern to the F.O. Phipps reported that Bonnet had alleged that 
Ribbentrop, while complaining about the attitude of the British press and the 
parliamentary opposition, had stated that Germany was 'absolutely determined to
83) FO.371/22429 (R10238 & R10085/240/22). Phipps tel of 19 & 26 Dec. 1938.
84) Ibid. Phipps's review of Franco-Italian relations on 19 Dec., was highly sympathetic to the 
French position. He explained that 'successive French Governments had been anxious to 
re-establish friendship with Italy as a makeweight against Germany', and that persistent 
French efforts 'to improve the atmosphere' had 'only met with a rebuff. He concluded that 
Spain was the main obstacle, and that Left, Centre & the General Staff were 'alarmed at the 
establishment of Germany & Italy on the French lines of communications'. FO.371/22429 
(R10098/240/22) Phipps to Halifax, 19 Dec. 1938. Ingram regarded it as a Very useful 
survey1 & wanted to take copies of the print to Rome for the visit (Ibid, Minute by Ingram, 27 
Dec). Only Perth dissented from this favourable F.O. view and attempted to defend the 
Italian position. DBFP. 3, ID, no.488 Perth (Rome), 31 Dec. 1938.
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(85)stand by the Anglo-German declaration at Munich'. * He had apparently further 
assured Bonnet that he laiew nothing about Italian claims against France', and the 
tatter's distinct impression was that they 'were not backed by Germany1. Bonnet 
was adamant that if Halifax and Chamberlain 'speak firmly on this subject in Rome
next week these absurd claims will be abandoned'/86'* The press had mostly
adopted a 'remarkably moderate attitude' towards the visit and the attitude of the
(87)public was one of'polite indifference' to which Roberts added 'and scepticism'.
According to Bonnet the colonial question had not been raised neither had
(88)Ribbentrop insisted on any modification of France's eastern pacts. '  Leger had
explained to Phipps that Daladier had deliberately not participated in the
(89)conversations 'in order to mark their unofficial and limited character*.
Nevertheless, despite these apparently reassuring reports, the F.O. were 
deeply suspicious of Bonnet and, like Sargent, Cadogan was concerned about
85) FO.371/21659 (C15102/42/18). Phipps tel., 7 December 1938.
86) PHPP.1/21. Phipps to Halifax, 'Private & Very Confidential1, 7 Dec. 1938. The Italians had 
denounced the 1935 Agreement, and Bonnet was aware that Chamberlain had stated in the 
Commons that le gouvemement britannique n'ont pas d'engagements envers la France au cas 
d'une attaque italienne contre celle-la'. (DDF, xm , no. 115. Note du ministre, 13 decembre; 
see also Ibid, no. 102 Note du Secretariat General auDepartement, 12 dec. 1938).
87) FO.371/21673 (C15164/85/18). Phipps tel., 7 Dec. 1938 & minute by Robers. Criticism was 
largely confined to Pertinax in the Ordre. Kerillis in the Epoque. and Humanity and 
Populaire: Wladimir d'Ormesson warned in (Figaro) that the impression should not be given 
that France has washed her hands of everything east of the Rhine*.
88) Ibid. (C15195/85/18). Phipps tel., 8 December 1938. As will be seen, this was a matter of 
considerable concern to the F.O. Phipps had told Halifax on 5 December that Ribbentrop
would probably press for a modification of France's eastern pacts and that Bonnet had told 
him that he wished to 'loosen the ties that bind France to Russia & Poland'.
89) FO.371/21789 (C15268/11169/18). Phipps tel., 9 December 1938.
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'what and how much M.Bonnet may have given away'/90^  These suspicions were 
compounded by the Embassy's reports of speculations in the French press 
regarding what Bonnet had revealed to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Chamber on the 14th, to which Makins had commented sardonically that Bonnet's
(91)statement had not been 'remarkable' for its clanty.
Sargent therefore informed Phipps on the 22nd that the F.O. were 
concerned about the ramifications for France and Britain of a German attack on 
Poland, and that Bonnet's account of the discussions which he had given to Phipps 
were
quite anodyne and considerably at variance with what we believe 
from other sources to be the ruling disposition at the present 
moment in Germany. We are also inclined to suspect that 
Ribbentrop may have left Paris with the impression that Bonnet had 
given him a free hand to do what he likes in Eastern Europe, 
without interference from France, much as Mussolini inferred from 
Laval's attitude in Rome in January 1935 that he had a free hand in 
Abyssinia, so far as France was concemed.(92)
If this occurred, a potentially powerful Germany could threaten the security of 
Britain and France and, above all, the latter could then be faced with carrying out
90) FO.371/21809 (C14878/2688/55). Minutes by Sargent & Cadogan, 13 Dec. 1938. Much of 
Bonnet's account of his conversation with Ribbentrop (as he reported it to Phipps) does not 
appear in the proces verbal of the conversation 'redigd par le Secretary-General'. (DDF. 2, 
Xm , no.58 Note by Sec.Gen), but this is an edited version.
91) FO.371/21613 (C15506 & C15624/1050/17). Phipps tels 15 & 16 Dec. 1938 and minute by 
Makins. Neither was the text of Bonnet's brief conclusions to the Committee very informative 
(Ibid, C15623/1050/17) minute by Roberts 19 Dec. 1938. When asked point blank during the 
proceedings, Bonnet denied that he had given Germany a free hand in the east, 'and had 
added that the pacts of France with Poland held entirely*. (Ibid. C15866/1050/17) Phipps tel., 
22 December 1938.
92) FO.371/21809 (C14878/2688/55). Sargent to Phipps, 22 December 1938. Sargent's 
assessment of the 'ruling disposition* in Germany was similar to that of Fran^ois-Poncet 
Curiously, the latter had also used the expression 'a free hand in the East* in his comments to 
his farewell conversation with Hitler: 'le Fuhrer reste fid&le £ sa preoccupation de disjoindre 
le bloc franco-anglais et de stabiliser la paix £ l'ouest, pour avoir les mains fibres £ l'est'. 
DDF. 2, XII, no. 197 Fran^ois-Poncet (Berlin) £ Bonnet, 20 octobre 1938. For the 
controversy surrounding the Declaration, see the essays by Adam Adamthwaite & Fernand 
L'Huilfier in Les relations franco-allemandes.
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their treaty obligations towards Poland. As in the case of Czechoslovakia, 'this 
decision would greatly depend on how far France could count on British support', 
and the F.O. were attempting to define their attitude to such an eventually. Sargent
concluded that Phipps had been authorised by Halifax to
explore the subject discreetly with Bonnet, though you should 
carefully avoid, when doing so, giving any impression that we desire 
France to repudiate her obligations to Poland. You may find it 
possible, when this subject is under discussion to discover from 
Bonnet exactly what passed between him and Ribbentrop on the 
question of France's Eastern treaties, and how much he may have 
given away...(93)
Phipps replied that he had already tried to broach the subject with Bonnet 
who had been very evasive and that 'the French are like us in disliking to cross
bridges before they reach them'. His own impression, however, was that:
The French will scratch their heads long and thoroughly before they 
rush into war on behalf of Beck's Poland or Stalin's Russia. If they 
do decide to fight, it will be because they think they have a very 
good chance of victory, but not because of any old-fashioned ideas 
of honouring their signatures. Personally I believe that the French 
will fight to the last man in defence of French territory, metropolitan 
or colonial, against Italy. I also believe the French would fight if 
Great Britain were attacked by Germany. My belief already strong, 
on this latter point will increase with every increase in our strength 
at sea, in the air and on land. (Phipps's italics).(94)
Barclay commented that 'all the evidence appeared to support Phipps's view that 
the French will be very loth to go to war1 on behalf of Poland and the USSR while
Strang minuted that Phipps had summed up the position accurately and that this
(95)confirmed Colonel Fraser's views regarding Poland.
93) Ibid.
94) FO.371/21809 (C14878/2688/55). Phipps to Sargent, 28 December 1938. It will be recalled
that on 1 November, Phipps had told Halifax privately, and somewhat cynically, that if Hitler 
was determined to move in the east, the less we are consulted the better*, see p.239.
95) Ibid. Minutes by Barclay & Strang, 30 & 31 December 1938.
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Meanwhile, Bonnet told Phipps on the 31st that he wanted to 'slacken both 
these pacts but was unwilling to approach the Polish or Soviet Governments on
this matter1 which confirmed the tatter's impression that 'there will not be any
alacrity here... to help Stalin or Beck against Hitler1. Barclay commented that
Not ten days before this conversation Bonnet asserted emphatically 
to Sir E. Phipps that the French pacts with Poland and Russia held 
entirely. Now he admits that circumstances with regard to both 
pacts have completely altered and that he would be glad to slacken 
them both still further. There seems to be no reason to doubt this
statement - or the inference drawn by Phipps.(96)
n . 1 .January March.1222
As is well known, this period - which included the further deterioration in
Anglo-German and Franco-Italian relations; the war scares (leading to an outright
British guarantee to France on 6 February) and staff conversation between the two 
(97)countries) and, above all, the German occupation of Prague which marked a 
turning point in British appeasement policy towards Germany, were amongst the 
most crucial events in the immediate origins of the second world w ar/98-* Their 
significance for the evolution of Phipps's Paris Embassy was that it prepared the 
ground for their more systematic involvement in Franco-Italian relations and in a 
more intense pressure on the French Government to make concessions to Italy, 
culminating in the full-scale emergence of Phipps as the English Governess' after 
the British guarantee to Poland.
96) FO.371/22912 (C150/90/17). Phipps to Sargent, 31 Dec. & min. by Barclay.
97) For the background to the decisions to give the Guarantee to France and to initiate Staff 
conversations, see N.H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy, vol 1, London 1976, pp.654-5. They were 
tightly controlled from London and Phipps's role in them was confined to carrying out his 
instructions.
98) 1939 has been covered exhaustively by Sidney Aster (op.cit) and especially by D. Cameron 
Watt, How War Began. London 1989.
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A) The W ar Scares and Franco-Italian Tension
Phipps was present on 10 January when Chamberlain and Halifax (en route 
to Rome) met informally with Daladier and Bonnet who were both adamant that
the French Government would not make concessions to Italy/"'* The Rome 
conversations^1 °°')had confirmed Chamberlain's belief in Mussolini as 'the key to
Hitler*. The rumours of an imminent German attack in the w es/101 ^ coincided, 
however, with a sharp increase in Franco-Italian tension. By mid-February the 
French had responded to a violently anti-French article in the Italian press^102^ by 
sending reinforcements to Tunis and the Italians reciprocated by threatening to 
substantially reinforce their garrison in Libya/103'* Halifax, who was very
99) DBFP. 3, 3, no.496. Phipps to Halifax, Confidential, 11 January 1939. (Enclosure in) 
Memoranda: gist of conversations.
100) Ibid. no.500. Perth (Rome) to Sir.J.Simon, 14 January 1939 (Conversations between British 
& Italian Ministers, Rome, Jan. 11-14,1939). Mussolini had confirmed to Chamberlain & 
Halifax that he regarded Spain 'as the main obstacle to Franco-Italian relations' since, he 
alleged, France was sending aid to the Republicans. He was repeating his comment to 
Franfois-Poncet during their first interview that 'la question espagnole est le principal 
obstacle aux bonnes relations fianco-italiennes'. DDF. 2, XII, no.433. Fran^ois-Poncet 
(Rome) k G.Bonnet, 29 novembre 1938.
101) The Embassy's service attaches reported that they had received similar information from the 
Deuxi&me Bureau. DBFP. 3, 3 nos 522, 536 & 553, 7-19 January 1939. Phipps was 
instructed in late January to notify the French Government that their reports indicated that 
Hitler was 'considering an attack on the Western Powers as a preliminary to subsequent 
action in the East'; the danger period would be towards the end of February*, and that a 
German invasion of Holland would be regarded as a casus belli. Ibid. no.40. Halifax to 
Phipps, 28 January 1939. Phipps had also received a copy of a Very confidential' report 
from the French military attach^ in Berlin in Berlin containing similar information. 
FO.371/22963 (C1231/15/18), Report by French military attache, 10 January 1939.
102) FO.371/23793 (R1120/7/22) Perth (Rome) tel., 14 Feb. 1939 & minute by Noble 7.2.39; 
Ibid (R1175//7/22) minutes by Noble & Halifax, 12 Feb. 1939; ibid. F.O. to Perth (Rome) 25 
Feb.1939. The offending article in Relarinni Tntemazinnale of 11.3.39 concluded that 'if 
Italian aspirations are not realised by negotiations, they will be realised by force'. Halifax
found Ciano's attitude thoroughly unsatisfactory' and had instructed Perth to express HMG's 
'surprise' at his 'refusal to discuss the statement that Italy was prepared to attack France if 
the latter did not make unspecified concessions'.
103) DBFP. 3,4, no.346. Perth (Rome) to Halifax, 27 February 1939.
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conscious of the implications of the British guarantee to France of 6 February, 
believed that the situation was 'beginning to drift dangerously1/ 104) While 
disclaiming any attempt at mediation, he instructed Phipps to suggest tactfully to 
Bonnet that their good offices were available for a 'mutual reduction of 
Franco-Italian troop concentrations' and to improve the atmosphere between
them.(105>
Bonnet informed Phipps on 2 March that further French reinforcements to
North Africa would cease provided that the Italians reciprocated 1^06') and that it 
would be impossible to begin conversations with them until all of their Volunteers' 
had left Spain/107) His firmness, as usual, did not last long and, on the 4th, he told
Phipps that he wanted Perth (rather than Frangois-Poncet) to inform Ciano that
The French Government do not dream of attacking the Italians in 
Libya or anywhere else... it was absurd for (the) Italians to fear a 
French attack as the latter have no claims against Italy whereas the 
Italian press continue to advance fantastic claims against 
France.(108)
Frangois-Poncet had 'preche la fermete' during the recrudescence of Italian hostility 
towards France/109)and Bonnet's decision was based on the former’s new 
information on 1 March that
104) FO.371/23793/ (R1379/7/22). Halifax to Phipps, 28 February 1939.
105) Ibid. (R1379/7/22). Halifax to Phipps, 28 February 1939. Cadogan had also discounted any 
intention of mediation and had told Corbin that they were 'simply concerned at possible 
dangers that might result from troop movements and were anxious to do anything that 
might be possible to avert the danger*. Ibid (R1475/7/22) minute by Cadogan, 2 March
1939.
106) Ibid. (R1461/7/20). Phipps tel., 2 March 1939.
107) Ibid. (R1457/7/22). Phipps to Halifax, 2 March 1939.
108) Ibid. (R1483/7/22). Phipps tel., 4 March 1939.
109) DDF. 2, XIV, no. 130. Frangois-Poncet (Rome) k Paris, 16 fevrier 1939.
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Mussolini souhaiterait a l'heure actueUe que l'Angleterre prit 
l'initiative d'amorcer une negotiation franco-italienne. Si la 
Grande-Bretagne ne s*y detidait pas d'eUe-meme peut-etre 
provoquerait-il un incident, pour amener a intervenir comme 
mediatrice.(llO)
Bonnet's request may have acted as a catalyst and created a precedent for 
active British involvement (or rather interference) in Franco-Italian relations. It 
also coincided with Cadogan's attempt to prevent Frangois-Poncet from spreading
alarmist rumours in Rome that war was inevitable/111^  Phipps reported, on the eve 
o f the German occupation of Prague, that Bonnet had confirmed that he would 
prefer the demarche to be made through Perth, 1^12^ and it was carried out on the
B) The Embassy, the Press and the Emergence of the ’English Governess' 
Like Chamberlain and Halifax, Phipps perceived that the potentially 
dangerous international situation (and the outright British guarantee to France) had 
made it more imperative than ever that French policy should be closely aligned 
with that of Britain. While the Embassy's previous interference in French internal 
affairs had tended to be on an ad hoc basis (most notably in March 1938 to prevent 
Daladier from reappointing Paul Boncour as foreign minister), this period marks
110) Ibid. no. 238. Frangois-Poncet (Rome) a Bonnet, 1 mars 1939.
111) Cadogan had informed Phipps on 6 March that Perth was worried by Frangois-Poncet's 
attitude in Rome, 'apparently he telling eveiyone that war is inevitable' which was 'causing 
concern in certain circles'. Phipps, who conveniently remembered Poncet's ' 'excessive 
pessimism' at Berlin, replied that he had seen Bonnet who would drop a 'personal hint' in a 
private letter to Poncet PHPP.2/1. Cadogan to Phipps & Phipps to Cadogan, 6 &13 March
1939.
112) FO.371/23793 (R1661/7/22). Phipps tel., 13 March 1939. The Southern Dept believed that
Bonnet's proposals were 'more or less similar' to the F.O.'s original suggestion. Ibid. Minute 
by Noble, 14 March 1938.
113) Ibid. (R1796/7/22). Perth (Rome) tel., 16 March 1939.
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the systematic emergence of Phipps (especially in the of Franco-Italian relations), 
as the 'English Governess' (to use Bedarida's phrase). In this, he acted on 
instructions from Halifax (and ultimately on the authority of Chamberlain) or else, 
given his perception of the exigencies of the situation, on his own initiative but 
always with their official or unofficial support. This situation was facilitated by
rumours of a growing division between Bonnet and Daladier over Italy/114^
As a preliminary, Phipps and Mendl had attempted to extend their writ to 
controlling all of the information emanating from the Embassy, and had conducted 
a feud against those British and French journalist (Pertinax and Cadett with Werth,
Tabouis and David Scott as lesser targets^115\vhom they regarded as being bitterly 
opposed to Chamberlain's appeasement policy. Fortunately for the Embassy 
Pertinax was also the bete noir of Daladier, and Cadett that of Bonnet. Daladier 
had, in fact, been so incensed by the attacks on him in Humanite and by Pertinax in 
Ordre that he had proposed a decree law in early November 1938 to prevent press
attacks on prominent citizens/116^  Phipps regarded Pertinax with particular 
loathing, not only for the militancy of his anti-appeasement views, but also for his 
supposed association with Vansittart who appeared to be leaking information to
114) For example, Daladier’s firm speech in the Chamber refusing to cede 'an inch of territory* 
was rumoured to have been made in response to the lamentable impression left by Bonnet's 
speech'. FO.371/22912 (C1091 & C l126/90/17) Phipps tels 27 & 28 Jan 1939 and minute 
by Roberts.
115) Pertinax' (of L'Ordre); Thomas Cadett (of the Times); Alexander Werth (of the 
Manchester Guardian); David Scott (of the News Chronicle), and Genigve Tabouis (of 
l'Oeuvre).
116) F0.371/21613 (C13323 & C14017/1083/17). Phipps tels 2 &17 November 1938. 
Amongst these decree laws was one enabling the Foreign Minister to 'invoke legal 
proceedings against any newspaper publishing statements offensive to foreign governments 
or their leaders'. The Left wing press was very critical and the decrees were dropped. (Ibid).
-271-
hin/117^ and, at least since November 1938, he had been banned from the 
Embassy/118^
Phipps felt his personal position threatened by Pertinax and, on 19 January, 
he told Halifax bitterly that Pertinax had spread the rumour that his appointment 
had been prolonged for only six months because the F.O. considered me too 
pacifist'; Pertinax had apparently added that his informant was Charles Peake (of
the F.O.'s News Department), and Phipps commented that
It is (a) strange and rather discouraging coincidence that this is the 
second occasion where I have found Pertinax attacking me under 
cover of the F.O. If  Peake did say this to Pertinax it would convey 
to the latter that there are two different policies in Downing 
Street...(119)
The Embassy's feud with Bonnet's bete noir. Thomas Cadett, which had 
been simmering since the Munich crisis was a more serious affair and it involved 
the French Government as well as the Embassy and the Foreign Office. The F.O.'s 
attempts to unravel the affair shed unwelcome light on the seamier aspects of the 
Embassy's activities from which both Phipps and Mendl emerged further 
discredited in their eyes.
On 30 January, Bonnet had protested officially to Phipps (on behalf of 
Daladier and himself) against what he described as Cadett's 'poisonous and 
perfidious message' in the Times which had distorted the remarks he had made 'in
117) For Vansittart's connections with Pertinax, see p.229.
118) FO.371/21600 (C14023/55/17). Minute by Barclay, 21 November 1938, who also stated 
that Pertinax 'has recently shown himself very hostile to HMG'.
119) FO.794/16. Phipps to Halifax, 19 January 1939. Charles Peake was a member of the F.O's 
Press Dept Presumably the first occasion on which Pertinax had attacked Phipps 'under 
cover of the F.O.' was in late Sept/early Oct 1938 which had produced Phipps's bitter 
complaint to Hankey, see p.229. Phipps himself had told Bonnet during the Munich crisis 
that there were two tendencies at the F.O. which were opposed to each other, see p. 184 
i/note 19.
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the strictest confidence' to journalists after a Cabinet meeting. He was particularly 
incensed by Cadett's insinuation that there may be differences between Daladier 
and himself over Italian claims' which, Bonnet alleged, were 'completely false'. 
Bonnet claimed that Cadett had persistently reported 'in a sense similar to the 
violent attacks made upon him by his bitterest enemies among the French 
communists and socialists', and he wanted the editor of the Times to warn Cadett 
that such messages were 'calculated to cause trouble between the British and 
French Governments', and to urge him to 'show more tact in future'. Cambon, the 
French Charge d'Affaires, had also been instructed to bring the matter to Halifax's
attention/120^ and he informed Sargent that Bonnet wanted Cadett to be expelled
from France. ^ 121^
Cadogan directed that the most suspicious members of the office, and 
those with the most sensitive noses for the more scabrous form of intrigue' should
collaborate in advising him how to proceed in the affair, and he suggested the
(122)names of Peake, Strang and Sargent. '  Peake established that one of the nine 
journalists, to whom Bonnet had spoken, had related the story to Cadett and had 
added that Daladier had been 'extremely annoyed' and had summoned Bonnet to 
discuss it with him. Apparently, the Cabinet had not supported Bonnet's proposal 
that a French agent should immediately be sent to General Franco, and Bonnet had 
told the journalists that he was 'personally in favour of a less rigidly negative
120) FO.371/22912 (C1234/90/17). Phipps tel., 30 January 1939.
121) Ibid. (C2268/90/17). Minute by O. Sargent, 6 February 1939.
122) FO. 371/22912 (C1404/90/17). F.O. minute. 3 February 1939.
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attitude to Italian claims than is M.Daladier* and that he wanted them to  bear this 
in mind'/123)
Peake commented that while Cadett may have been 'injudicious1 to have 
published the story, no breach of confidence had occurred as he had not been 
present at the briefing. Furthermore, it was published in the Manchester Guardian 
and the News Chronicle, as well as in the French press, but Bonnet had 
concentrated his attack entirely on the Times. He regretted that such a serious 
complaint about Cadett should have occurred while his relations with the Embassy 
were 'so strained', and emphasised that Cadett was 'a close close friend and 
confident of Reynaud, who was 'at daggers drawn with Bonnet', and that Bonnet 
had been 'pursuing a vendetta against Cadett since last September1 who had 
responded vigorously. Peake added that no other foreign minister had complained 
about Cadett, in fact, Delbos had trusted him implicitly. A French journalist, who 
was unsympathetic towards Cadett's views, had told him that Bonnet and Phipps 
were 'so obviously making common cause' against Cadett that it was gaining the
latter sympathy/124^
Cadogan asked rhetorically what the F.O. was supposed to do about the 
affair, and referred to 'the unsavoury facts' of the case/125"* While Dawson, the 
editor of the Times, could not be reproached, Cadogan thought that he could be
123) Ibid. (C1234/90/17) Minute by Peake, 1 Feb. 1939; C1404/90/17 Peake to Cadogan, 1 
February 1939.
124) Ibid (both references).
125) Ibid. (C1404/90/17). Minute by Cadogan, 2 February 1939.
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advised of Bonnet's complaint and that 'some discretion' should be exercised/126^
Peake, who never doubted the veracity of Cadett's version of events which had
been confirmed to him 'from too many sources', drafted a letter to Dawson on 
(127)Halifax's instructions^ which proved unnecessary as the latter discussed it
personally with him instead/128'*
In the meantime, on 31 Januaiy, Phipps had forwarded the hostile criticism 
of Cadett's report which had appeared in LHomme Libre and in L*Action Franpaise 
which drew Peake's comment that the former was Bonnet's newspaper and the 
latter was disreputable/129^  Phipps followed this on 2 February with an extract 
from Le Matin strongly attacking 'the disseminators of false information' who 
provided ammunition to 'the war seekers in every country* and which mentioned
Cadett/130^  Vansittart, who had compared the Embassy's reports unfavourably 
with those of Cadett, repeated Peake's criticism adding that Le Matin 'never had a
clean record' and that
One could hardly have a more typical example than this article 
which tries to link Mr Cadett with "the disseminators of false war 
news". The attempted connection is quite dishonest, and it is 
weighting the scales unfairly for Sir C.Mendl or Sir E. Phipps to 
send home this kind of garbage...It will be widely known or guessed 
by both French & British journalists - on the basis of best form - 
that our Embassy in Paris is backing Bonnet in a complaint which he 
should either have made of general application or not made at all.
126) FO.371/22912 (C1234/90/17). Minute by Cadogan, 1 Feb. 1939.
127) Ibid. Minute by Peake 3 Feb 1939 & draft letter to G.Dawson from Sec. of State.
128) Ibid. Minute by Halifax, 7 February 1939.
129) Ibid. (C1254/90/17). Phipps tel. 31 Jan. 1939 & minute by Peake 2 Feb. 1939. Peake told 
Cadogan that Bonnet had recently acquired 47% of the shares in L'Homme Libre (Ibid. 
C1404/90/17), 1 Feb. 1939).
130) Ibid (C1404/90/17). Phipps tel., 2 Feb. 1939.
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Vansittart warned that the Paris Embassy had been 'much attacked for the past 
year1, and that it should therefore be 'all the more careful to be "au-dessus de la 
melee" in a matter of this kind'. With more than his usual bitterness towards his 
brother-in-law, he asked the F.O. to tell Phipps that lie has done his bit in this 
matter - which is making quite a transient stink in the journalistic world - and that
he and his had far better keep out of it in future'.^131'*
Peake confirmed that Le Matin's reputation was 'most unsavoury' adding 
revealingly that
It is notorious that MBuneau-Varalla (sic) its proprietor, was 
bought by the Italians at the time of the Abyssinian crisis and has 
been the recipient of largest sums of money from the fonds secrets 
for the last 6 months at least. For this reason I could wish that the 
"va et vient" between him and Sir Charles Mendl were less the 
subject of comment by French journalists than it is.
He also regarded it as being unusual for an Ambassador to 'accept and pass on to 
the F.O. a complaint against a leading British correspondent without first sending
for him and asking for his statement of the case'/132^
The Cadett affair dragged on during the height of the war scares in 
February 1939, providing the Foreign Office with an irritating and time consuming 
distraction from more urgent matters. On the 9th, Peake minuted that MacDonald, 
the Diplomatic Correspondent of the Times, had, on the instructions of the Editor,
told him that during the previous week
Mr Cadett... had been rung by Sir.C.Mendl who had told him on the 
instructions of HM Ambassador that it was the policy of HMG to 
minimise Franco-Italian differences. The Ambassador greatly hoped
131) Ibid (C1404/90/17). Minute by Vansittart, 3 Feb. 1939. According to Phipps, Vansittart 
had been 'entertained* by Cadett in Paris in December 1938, see p.246.
132) FO.371/22912 (C1404/90/17). Minute by Charles Peake, 3 February 1939. Buneau-Varilla 
was a fanatical anti-communist and an old acquaintance of Phipps whose information was 
notoriously unreliable. Phipps had used him as a confidential source in October 1937 in 
order to denigrate Llger. See p.96.
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that the Times correspondent would eschew all sensationalism in 
reporting these differences and generally conform itself to the 
British Government line.
Cadett was 'incensed by these instructions', and the Editor felt that the telephone 
message had not been very happily conceived'. Peake had reassured MacDonald 
that there was nothing in Cadett's recent despatches to which the F.O. objected,
and that he would speak to Mendl about it personally, adding that
Something ought to be done to stop this constant feud between the 
Times correspondent in Paris and the Embassy. It is undignified 
and unnecessary and is contrary to the interests of the Times and of 
the public service.
Phipps had spoken to him about Cadett's attitude during the Munich crisis \vith the 
strongest censure' but he (Peake) thought that 'it would be difficult to see anything 
particularly objectionable' in what he had written. Peake thought that it was 
pointless to mention the matter to Phipps whom he regarded as being 'deeply 
prejudiced' against Cadett but he would 'certainly speak to Mendl' when he saw
him again. ^ 133^  Sargent minuted that Cambon had spoken to him twice about the 
affair, Bonnet was 'out for his (Cadett's) blood' and wanted to demand his 
expulsion 'on the strength of the present incident'; he had told Cambon that the 
idea of expelling the Times correspondent in Paris' was 'quite inconceivable' and 
that he 'could not believe that the French Government could even contemplate such
i (134) action'.
Cadogan advised Phipps on 20 February that Bonnet had wanted to expel 
Cadett and that Sargent had warned Cambon that this would 'produce a most
133) FO.371/22912 (C2268/90/17). Peake to Cadogan, 9 Februaiy 1939. This minute formed
the basis of Cadogan's letter to Phipps on 20 Februaiy 'after a detailed enquiry into the 
history of this affair* (minute by Makins n.d.), ibid.
134) Ibid. Minute by Sargent, 6 February 1939.
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deplorable effect' and should 'on no account be resorted to', and that this must have 
been reported to the Quai d'Orsay since Cadett was to  be given another chance'. 
Nevertheless Cadogan wanted Phipps to impress upon Bonnet the danger of his 
idea of expelling Cadett', and he was reproachful towards both Phipps and Mendl. 
The latter should have asked Cadett for an explanation which, Cadogan added, lias 
taken a good deal of trouble to elicit for ourselves', and the Embassy 'should have 
had it out with him personally. He also professed surprise at the way in which 
Phipps had quoted the three highly prejudiced French newspapers as evidence
against Cadett/135^
Phipps replied on the 22nd that he was enclosing a minute by Mendl which 
was self explanatory, adding that Mendl performs his duties most faithfully. 
Summoning all his diplomatic skills, Phipps explained, somewhat disingenuously, 
that he had cited I/Homme Libre precisely because it was 'Bonnet's organ' and that 
'it would be useful for the F.O. to know what it is saying about, Cadett'. He, and 
other British journalists who shared his views, had not taken up his offer in 
September to visit the Embassy because they \vere not in sympathy with the 
Munich and subsequent policy of HMG'. Bonnet was grateful that Halifax had 
spoken to Dawson and, as for the possibility of Bonnet expelling Cadett, he 
(Phipps) could 'guarantee that I would squelch it '/136^
135) Ibid. (Cl 182/90/17). Cadogan to Phipps, 20 February 1939. Cadogan's long letter was sent 
on Strang's suggestion and incorporated the information contained in Peake's minute of 9 
February (see i/note 133).
136) FO.371/22912. (C2720/90/17). Phipps to Cadogan, 22 February 1939. Unintentionally 
emphasising his close relationship with Bonnet, Phipps had previously sent Halifax an 
extract from LUomme Libre containing a flattering description of his (Phipps's) speech at a 
banquet in Paris. Ibid. (C1865/281/17). Phipps to Halifax, 8 February 1939.
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Mendl stated that his relationship with Cadett until the Munich crisis was 
'of the warmest' but that an incident had occurred in September. The Comtesse de 
Montgomerie, who was partly English and Very pro-British', had recounted to him 
that
she had been shocked, when dining with M.Paul Reynaud, that 
when he was called to the telephone he had said, coming back 
laughing, 'T was called to the telephone by Cadett who speaks of a 
second visit the P.M was going to make to Hitler, had said "This 
time he will I suppose go in livery". The Comtesse... said that she 
had been horrified that a correspondent representing an English 
paper of the calibre of the Times could speak of the English P.M. at 
such a moment in such terms to a foreign minister. I agreed, and 
said that it was deplorable.
The Comtesse had presumably mentioned Mendl's 'disgust' to Cadett, and their 
relations became cooler. Regarding Cadett's expulsion, Mendl stated that he had 
immediately seen Bassee (the Political Director of Havas) and advised him that 
such a step was 'unthinkable and that he should advise both Bonnet and Bressy (the 
latteris private secretary) of the deplorable effect it would have in England'. Bassee 
informed him that 'the idea had been dismissed', and Mendl, in somewhat breathless 
prose, showed an unintentionally comic concern for Cadett's welfare and for his 
finer feelings:
Having got this idea of expelling him dismissed, I did not think it 
advisable or necessary to hurt Cadett's feelings, as I felt sure any 
such thing would have hurt his rather delicate feelings. I heard some 
days afterwards that he was told of this threat by someone else in an 
agency, who heard it from the Quai. I may add also that I spoke to 
Bressy in the same sense as I spoke to Bassee, though not in such 
words as to Bassee, who is, as Your Excellency knows, an intimate 
friend of mine. (137)
137) Ibid. Mendl minute to Phipps, 22 Februaiy 1939.
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(138')Strang minuted that he hoped that 'we can let this episode die'.
David Scott of the News Chronicle, whose relations with Mendl had also 
cooled since September, was another recalcitrant British journalist who had refused 
to accept the Embassy's version of events. Phipps told his confident, Horace 
Wilson, in January that Scott had made 'a mischievous speech' at the American 
Club in Paris attacking Chamberlain's policy and declaring that his position at home 
•was weak'. Mack, his head of Chancery, had severely admonished Scott whom 
Phipps described as 'a foolish, feather-brained fellow like the worthy Vernon
Bartlett'/139^  Horace Wilson was pleased that Phipps had been 'able to chastise
Scott' but thought that
you will be very busy if you take in hand the job of correcting all the 
funny little people that go over to Paris & get caught up in the 
queer backwaters there! Perhaps in practice they don't do much 
harm (though if I were here I should share your annoyance) at a 
time when we are steadily enhancing our position - at home and 
abroad - by quietly getting on with the job and by refusing to be 
driven off the course by puffs, whether from within or without. My 
impression is that its consistency and persistency of the P.M s policy 
are telling more and more...
Wilson concluded that Chamberlain was 'impressing the people who really matter',
and thought that Phipps would agree that
the more we build up Chamberlain the greater is the contribution we 
can make to the sense of firmness which we must develop a bit if 
we are to see it grow into a sense of security in Europe. All my 
information is that his stock is rising in all the hemispheres!(140)
138) Ibid. Minute by Strang, 8 March 1939. Cadett himself merely received a mild reproach 
from the Editor of the Times. G.Dawson to T.Cadett, 1 February 1939 cited in The History 
of the Times, vol 5, London 1984, p.80 which briefly mentions the affair, ibid pp.79-80.
139) PHPP.3/5. Phipps to Horace Wilson, 27 January 1939. Phipps added that Spears was in
Paris again 'making as much trouble as he can and abusing the P.M to Frenchmen, but I 
think the French at last realise that Spears's only "raison d'Stre" is that he talks French better 
than English'.
140) Ibid. Horace Wilson to Phipps, 2 February 1939.
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Phipps, in his unrecorded reply, would undoubtedly have agreed with Wilson's 
conclusion. Doubtless too that Chamberlain, who told his sister a few days later
that he wished 'the press could be controlled a bit better'/141\vould also have
approved of Phipps's treatment of Cadett and Scott/142'*
Allied to the Embassy's attitude towards the press, Vansittart's complaint 
that Phipps was putting intense pressure on the French to close their frontier with 
Spain, also foreshadowed the more systematic emergence of Phipps as the English 
Governess'. Reinforcing the mutual hostility between the two men, and 
increasingly embittered as his influence diminished, Vansittart saw Phipps as 
embodying those aspects of Chamberlain's appeasement policies which he most 
disliked. This included official British non-intervention policy regarding the 
Italians in Spain which Phipps zealously supported for personal as well as for 
professional reasons. As early as June 1938, and contrary to Phipps’s views,
Vansittart had stated that it was not in British interests that Franco should w in/143^
141) N.Chamberlain Papers. NC18/1/1085, Neville Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 12 
February 1939. For Chamberlain's relationship with the media, see Richard Cockett, 
Twilight of Truth. London 1989 and especially P.M. Taylor & Nicholas Pronay, 'An 
Improper Use of Broadcasting*, Journal of Contemporary History. 19, 3, (1984).
142) A further example of Phipps's treatment of the Press was his personal, and severe, 
admonition of the Editor of the Continental Daily Mail, whom he had summoned to the 
Embassy, for incorrectly announcing that Daladier's visit to Tunisia & Corsica would be 
accompanied by 23 French warships. Daladier & Bonnet were Very upset' by the message, 
and the latter complained that Pertinax and Tabouis were sending 'false reports' to the 
British press 'without any indication being given of ther origin' which were then used to 
foment a press campaign in Paris by “unscrupulous journalists'. Nichols minuted that 
Phipps had 'acted with great thoroughness' and hoped that Bonnet was now mollified'. 
FO.371/22249 (R10253/240/22) Phipps tel. 28 December 1938 and minute by Nichols 29 
December 1938.
143) Vansittart had warned that 'it is not in our interest that Franco should win', and that *we 
should not therefore press the French any further about their frontier so long as the Italians 
are supplying Franco...and we should use upon Mussolini pressure at least equal to that 
which we have put upon the French in order to deter them both from sending such supplies 
and from bombing our ships'. FO.371/22627 (W8723/29/41). Memo (by Vansittart) 
discussing the trend of HMG's policy in regard to Italy and Spain, 27 June 1938.
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On 16 January 1939 Vansittart had told Halifax that he was 'greatly perturbed' to 
discover that when the French military attache at Barcelona had 'made an 
impassioned appeal' to Daladier for arms to the Republicans, the latter had replied 
that *this was impossible owing to the attitude of His Majesty's Government'. The 
military attache had then warned him that Barcelona would fall before the Spring. 
Vansittart considered Daladier's remark 'singularly ominous', Chamberlain had
denied publicly that the French had been pressurised into closing their frontier but
Sir E. Phipps by his telegram of June 30th, has shown most clearly 
and undeniably that he has put very great pressure indeed on the 
French to keep their frontier closed. The French will, and are 
entitled to, quote the Ambassador against the Prime Minister so 
long as the Ambassador's action is not disavowed. The French 
consider honestly that they have been subjected to pressure by 
ourselves because we want Franco to win; and if Franco does win 
they will not unnaturally quote the official action of H.Ms 
Ambassador - in flagrant contradiction of the assurances of the 
Prime Minister.(144)
Vansittart was concerned that the French would blame the British 
Government for a situation which would 'create a great storm in France', and which
could prove 'disastrous' for French and British interests:
surely at least we ought to prevent this situation from arising by 
making it immediately clear to the French that Sir E. Phipps had no 
right to speak as he did and that he was (to the best of my 
knowledge) speaking without instructions. (Vansittart's italics).
He reiterated that a Franco victory would be 'disastrous to our interests', and that
the Italians had kept up a flow of military assistance to Franco:
and yet we allowed Sir E. Phipps to act as he did on June 30th, 
since when the French frontier has been so tightly sealed that all 
Mussolini can find to complain about is that some flour has been 
allowed through, and he has the effrontery to rank that with Italy's 
export of men, guns, shells, aviators and aeroplanes.(145)
144) FO.371/24115 W973/5/41). Vansittart to Halifax, 16 January 1939.
145) Ibid.
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Coulson of the Western Department minuted that Phipps had 'only urged 
the French Government to keep their frontier closed to enable the
Non-Intervention Committee's plan to come into operation'/146'* On 6  July, the 
F.O. specially exonerated him from the accusation that he had exerted pressure on 
the French Govemmen/147\a s  Vansittart had suggested) in order to appease
Mussolini/148^  Given Phipps's surfeit of zeal, this had, however, taken place, 
Coulson later admitted that, 'Once the frontier was closed Sir.E.Phipps then, not 
apparently acting under instructions, impressed upon the French Government the 
importance of keeping the frontier closed' - to which Vansittart retorted that this
146) Ibid, Minute by Coulson, 21 January 1939.
147) This was described in the F.O.'s brief for Chamberlain's parliamentary answer on 6 July in 
which he denied that the French had been pressurised into closing their frontier. Phipps had 
been instructed on June 7 to obtain Bonnet's consent, the latter agreed, and de Ldon 
informed Phipps that lie was satisfied that the frontier had been closed'. On 30 June. 
Phipps had impressed on Daladier the importance which HMG attached to the 'confirmed 
closure of the Pyreness frontier in order to give reasonable time for the British 
non-intervention plan to come into operation', and Daladier gave the assurances. The brief 
concluded that 'all that has been done therefore is to ask the French Government if they 
would close their frontier in certain circumstances & to represent to them the undesirability 
of re-opening the frontier now that it has been closed'. FO.371/22627 (W8723/29/41), 
D.Maclean to F.Roberts, 5 July 1938.
148) On 4 July 1938, the Acting British Agent at Burgos was informed that 'the Nationalist Govt 
are satisfied that the French have loyally closed their frontier*, and Perth was instructed to 
report this to Ciano to obtain a quid pro quo from the Italians. FO.371/22627 
(W8723/29/41) F.O. to Perth (Rome), 12 July 1938. Halifax told the Cabinet on 27 July 
1938 that the French Ministers had 'displayed no feeling that they had been pushed by us 
into action', and had told him that 'in closing the French frontier they had acted on their 
own responsibility in the interests of non-intervention'. CAB.23/94. Cabinet Conclusions, 27 
July 1938, folio 219.
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was precisely the point that he had made/149^  As in the case of his intervention 
over Paul-Boncour's reappointment in March 1938, Phipps's action met with 
Halifax's and the F.O.'s discreet approval.
149) FO.371/24116 (W1855/5/41). Minute by Coulson, 19 January 1938 and marginal comment 
by Vansittart In pursuit of his conviction that the appeasement of Italy at France's expense 
was harmful, Vansittart was almost as hostile to Perth as he was towards Phipps. See, for 
e.g. his vehement attack on Perth in his minute of 21 February 1939. FO.371/23793 
(R1174/7/22). Circumstantial evidence also suggests that Halifax and Chamberlain (via 
Phipps) may have pressurised the French in February 1939 into recognising General Franco 
'le plus tbt possible'. They agreed, however, to Daladier and Bonnet's request to delay British 
recognition until 27 February. DDF. 2, XIV no 92. Phipps communication au Ministre, 10 
fSvrier and no.217 Communication t£16phonique de Phipps, 26 fevrier 1939. Marshal 
Petain presented his letters of credence as French Ambassador at Burgos on 24 March 1939.
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■CHAPTER 9
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. RETIREMENT & CONCLUSION 
( \1  March - 23 October 19391
L The 'English Governess* (17 March - 24 August 1939)
During this crucial period Phipps acted as an Anglo-French conduit 
conveying and explaining British, and relaying French, policy during their 
negotiations leading to the guarantees to Poland, Rumania, Greece and Turkey,
and also the torturtuous negotiations with the U SSR.^ His main role, however, 
was to put pressure on the French Government, more specifically on Daladier, to 
make concessions to Italy. Phipps was not the initiator of this policy, the decision 
for which was taken at the highest Cabinet level and which was supported by the 
F.O. Since, however, he was able to influence Anglo-French policy, he was more 
than merely its enthusiastic instrument. Given his general instructions, his formal 
and informal activities converged as did his private convictions and his official brief 
which he pursued with the utmost zeal. The return of Italy to the Stresa front was 
an ideal which Phipps had consistently advocated since 1935 and which he had
(2)reiterated in his valedictory telegram from Berlin. The minimizing of 
Franco-Italian tension was a priority which had led Phipps and Mendl into 
attempting to control all the information emanating from the Embassy and, in the
1) Telegrams between Moscow and the F.O. were repeated to Paris during the 
Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations. They were seen by the Cambridge spy, Donald Maclean, 
who was a third secretary at the Paris Embassy, and he was thus able to advise the Russians 
of the British response, as Stalin raised the stakes and drew closer to Hitler1. Robert Cecil A  
Divided Life: a biography of Donald Maclean. London 1988, p.54. For speculation 
regarding his controller in Paris, see ibid, pp.55-57.
2) For Phipps's valedictory telegram from Berlin in April 1937, see ch.2.
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(3)case of Cadett, it had complicated the Embassy1 relations with the F.O. As has 
been seen, the Embassy had intervened previously in French internal affairs but 
mostly on an ad hoc basis. It is this period, however, where it became more 
systematic which justified Bedarida's description of British policy towards France
as *La gouvemante anglaise.
The problem of Franco-Italian relations was, however, temporarily 
overshadowed by the impact of the far reaching events of 15 March and Phipps, 
amongst others, was not immune from the spate of alarmist rumours which
followed Prague/5^
A) The British Derision to Intervene in Franco-Italian Relations
By mid March the F.O. had discerned two viewpoints in French policy 
towards Italy: (a) Bonnet's, that an attempt should be made to reach a
settlement, ^ and  (b) Daladier*s, which was one of complete intransigence regarding 
any French concession to Italy. Rumours of these divisions were rife in Paris; 
Phipps's 'well informed' French source had notified him that Daladier was taking 
the Secret Service funds 'out of Bonnet's hands' and would control them himself) 
and that he would probably replace him with Chautemps during the Presidential
3) See ch.8.
4) Frangois-Bedarida, 'La "gouvemante anglaise", Edouard Daladier. Chef de Gouvemement 
avril 1938 - sentembre 1939. sous la direction de Rene Remond et Janine Bourdin, Paris 
1977, pp.228-239.
5) For example Phipps informed Halifax privately that his secret & reliable source in Germany 
had warned him that Hitler wanted to make war on Great Britain before June or July'; that 
the Wehrmacht was reluctant to fight Britain & France, and that 'no credence whatsoever 
should be placed on anything the Germans might say to Henderson'. FO.800/315 (H/XV/136)
Phipps to Halifax, 17 March 1938. Reprinted in DBFP. 3, IV, App.I. (IX).
6) See for e.g. FO.371/23794 (R2012/7/22). Minute by Sargent, 21 March 1939.
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elections.^ Baudouin's secret mission to Rome added a temporary complication 
to this apparently clear cut division, and Gladwyn Jebb noted that Bonnet had 'for
some time been negotiating behind our backs' and with Daladier*s 'cognisance' but
(S')that these unofficial negotiations had broken down. J Nevertheless, Cadogan
(9)minuted that such negotiations should be encouraged.
In an influential memorandum of the 27th, de Courcy informed 
Chamberlain that Laval and his friends had 'asked us to urge upon London the
necessity of pressing Daladier into capitulation', and he cautioned prudence/10^  
Jebb minuted that this should be accompanied by an announcement of conscription 
which would enable the French to 'discard (sic) from strength and not from 
weakness'; Cadogan agreed and added that in other countries, conscription was
regarded as 'ffifi test of sincerity'/11^
The Italian attitude towards France appeared to have undergone a change 
in late March. On the 28th, Bonnet told Phipps that Fran?ois-Poncet had reported
7) FO.800/311 (H/XIV/351). Phipps to Halifax, 31 March 1939. Halifax replied that he and 
Bonnet 'got on well together, although I know that he is not eveiybody's cup of tea', 
PHPP.1/22 Halifax to Phipps, 6 April 1939.
8) FO.371/23794 (R1939/7/22). F.O. minute by G.Jebb & Jebb to Cadogan, 21 March. For 
Baudouin's conversations with Ciano see DDF. 2, XIV no.46. For Baudouin's secret mission 
to Rome and Brinon's to Berlin (without the knowledge of the French ambassadors) see ibid 
no. 112 Fran^ois-Poncet (Rome) i  G. Bonnet, 14 fSvrier 1939. In fact, Daladier told Baudoin 
on 20 March that 'Aucune negotiation ne peut s'ouvrir tant que le climat franco-italien n'est 
pas ameliore... les demarches plus ou moins secretes, puis rapidement revel6es, sont de 
nature & affaibler le moral de la France'. DDF. 2, XV, no.91 Daladier k Baudouin, 30 mars 
1939.
9) Ibid. (R193/7/22). Minute by Cadogan, 28 March 1939.
10) Ibid. (R193/7/22). K. de Courcy to N. Chamberlain, Secret & Confidential, 27 March 1939.
11) FO.371/23794 (R2193/7/22). Minutes by Jebb & Cadogan, 28 March 1939.
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(12)that the atmosphere was more favourable for Franco-Italian discussionsv '  and, on 
4 April, Ciano informed Perth that I f  France was prepared to take the initiative 
Italy would not refuse discussion' but Cadogan advised that 'until the Albanian 
situation is clarified... we must hold our hand'/13^  Halifax, however, who had read 
Perth's telegram to the Cabinet on 5 April, instructed Phipps to communicate its 
contents to Bonnet and to suggest to him that he (Bonnet) could raise the matter
with Guariglia, the Italian ambassador at Paris, ‘without compromising himself/14'* 
In the meantime, Perth reported on 6  April that Fran$ois-Poncet was now 
'most anxious' that Franco-Italian conversations should begin. Poncet, who shared 
Perth's view that the Italians were also anxious to begin talks, had written to 
Bonnet privately and had sent a courier to Paris but Daladier was 'extremely 
obstinate' and was 'strongly opposed to any conversations with Italy*. Poncet 
wondered, therefore whether London could 'influence the French Government to
facilitate better relations with Italy1/ 1 Phipps was immediately advised that Perth's 
telegram had 'considerable bearing' on his previous instructions and that it would 
be left to his discretion to decide whether he could 'safely give advice and make 
suggestions' to Daladier and Bonnet 'on the lines suggested by
M.Fran$ois-Poncet'/16^  Phipps replied that in view of the Italian attack on
12) Ibid. (R2085/7/22). Phipps tel., 28 March & minute by Sargent, 31 March 1939.
13) Ibid. (R2392/7/22). Perth (Rome), 4 April 1939 & minute by Cadogan, 6 April 1939.
14) Ibid. (R2576/7/22). Cabinet Conclusions, 5 April 1939.
15) Ibid. (R2393/7/22). Perth (Rome), 6 April 1939. Frangois-Poncet complained bitterly to the 
Quai d'Orsay on 15 April that it was regrettable that he had not been authorised since 15 
March to establish contact with the Italian Government and that 'cette situation le rgduit k un 
rble de simple spectateur et equivant k une suspension des relations diplomatiques'. DDF. 2, 
XV, no.409 Rome k Paris, 15 avril 1939
16) FO.371/23794 (R2393/7/22). F.O. to Phipps, 6 April 1939.
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Albania, he would not be acting on his instructions and Noble minuted that his
decision was 'clearly right1 and that the F.O. could not 'press the French to open
(17")negotiations with the Italians under the present circumstances'.
An added complication was that the British Government were in the 
process of giving a guarantee to Greece (which would be directed against any 
potential Italian aggression), and Halifax urgently needed to know whether the
French Government would take similar a c tio n .^  In fact, Daladier told Phipps on
9 April that he 'entirely approved' of Halifax's actions, and
he said solemnly that if Corfu or any other point (sic) o f Greek 
territory were attacked and Great Britain helped Greece to resist, 
the French Government would also help and would declare war on 
Italy.
Daladier added that he had no faith in Italian assurances and that they were dealing 
•with gangsters who merely seek to throw dust in our eyes'. ^
Nevertheless the Cabinet decided on 19 April to renew pressure on the 
French Government. Chamberlain, who had stated that Franfois-Poncet was 
convinced that it should be possible to obtain a Franco-Italian settlement if the 
French Government could be persuaded to take the first step, added that 'the 
French were not doing their share in smoothing out difficulties with Italy*. Halifax 
then quoted Bonnet's views as reported by Phipps on the 17th that the French 
Government would 'be ready to make reasonable concessions over the Suez Canal
17) Ibid. (R2508/7/22). Phipps tel. 7 April 1939. Bonnet hastened to inform Phipps that France 
*was not bound in any way to defend Albania', ibid.
18) PBFP. 3, V no. 100 Halifax to Phipps, 9 April 1939.
19) PHPP.1/22. Phipps to Halifax, 9 April 1939. The French documents confirm that Phipps 
'ayant demand  ^si le gouvemement fran^is participerait dventuellement k cette assistance (to 
Greece), Daladier 'a 6t£ rdpondu affirmativement'. DDF. 2, XV, no.354 Bonnet k Corbin, 12 
avril 1939.
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and Jibuti etc. (sic)'. This was the catalyst for Chamberlain's suggestion that 'it was 
time the French took some action themselves', and Halifax agreed to put 'suitable
pressure on the French Government to this e n d '.^
Phipps was therefore advised on the 20th that, in consequence of the Italian 
attack on Albania, his decision not to act on his previous instructions was correct 
but that he should now provide Bonnet with the substance of Perth's despatch of
19 April and to inform him that
from other information which has reached us there is some 
indication that the Italians genuinely fear that they may become 
involved in war with France as the result of some incident for which 
Italy was not directly responsible.
Halifax had no illusions about Mussolini's moderation but he thought that it was a 
risk worth taking especially as Bonnet had indicated that the French Government 
would be able to make 'certain concessions'. Phipps was instructed to do his 
utmost to induce the French to 'reestablish contacts with the Italians', and to 
emphasise that *we will give them our entire support in resisting any unreasonable 
claims that Italy may put forward'. He was also advised, confidentially, that Perth 
had been instructed to urge the Italians to make the first advance 'direct and 
privately to the French Government' but that this information should be withheld
20) F0371/23794 (R3106/7/22). Cabinet conclusions 21 (39) 19 April 1939. Halifax had cited 
Phipps's despatch of 17 April fDBFP. 3, V X, no. 194) reporting that Bonnet, who felt that 
'peace or war may be decided within the next two or three weeks', had urged HMG to send 
Loraine to Rome as soon as possible (as Perth's successor) as his presence 'may just turn the 
scale and make the Italians reasonable'.
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from the French as 'it would only encourage them to do nothing pending results of 
my demarche in Rome1. ^
B) The "English Governess* (21 April - 24 August 1939)
Phipps regarded his interview with Bonnet, whom as he had anticipated
(22)was 'in agreement with HMG', as 'quite satisfactory1. J His interview with
Daladier on the 22nd proved more difficult even though his hand had been
strengthened by Chamberlain's forthcoming announcement of conscription and
Perth's valedictory interview with Mussolini (which had been repeated to Paris) and
which revealed, not only the tatter's professed 'anxiety for peace' but also the full
(23)scope of Baudouin's secret mission to Rome. J Keeping Perth's despatch secret, 
Phipps skilfully used 'every possible argument to bear upon him (Daladier)' 
including a reference to his 'old friend Berthelot', Leger's predecessor at the Quai 
d'Orsay, whose Violent Italophobia' may have been 'inherited by some of (its) 
permanent officials' and a warning to Daladier 'not to attach undue importance to 
secret service reports regarding sinister Italian intentions'. Phipps told him that
21) Ibid. (R3077/7/22). F.O. to Phipps, 20 April 1939. Perth had stated on the 19th that his 
informant had told him that Mussolini was 'probably very worried' and anxious for France to 
make a gesture. Perth said that Mussolini believed that he had been 'rebuffed by the French'; 
he reminded the F.O. that the latter had told Chamberlain that lie will not use his influence 
in favour of peace, i.e. to check Hitler, until the French show their willingness to talk', and 
he reiterated that the French attitude towards Italy 'may well be the key to the situation'. 
DBFP. 3, V, no.214 Perth (Rome) to Halifax, 19 April 1939.
22) FO.371/23794 (R3144/7/22). Phipps tel. 21 April 1939.
23) FO.371/23795 (R3166/7/22). Phipps tel., 22 April 1939. Mussolini had told Perth that he 
was 'really anxious for peace* and that Italian claims on France were 'mainly juridical and 
administrative', e.g. the status of Italians in Tunis. Perth was amazed by his revelation of the 
scope of Baudouin's secret mission to Rome. According to Mussolini, Baudouin had, on the 
instructions of the French Government, communicated to the Italians 'what France was 
prepared to offer* in considerable detail. These French proposals had been accepted by the 
Italians as the basis of negotiations with the proviso that they took place through 'ordinary 
diplomatic channels'. DBFP. 3, V, 242 Perth (Rome) to Halifax, 21 April 1939. For the 
French record of the Baudouin conversation, see DDF. 2, XIV, no.46.
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France and Great Britain were getting stronger and stronger 
materially: a slight sign from the former that she was ready to listen 
to reasonable claims by Italy could not possibly be interpreted as 
proof of weakness... If Italian claims proved preposterous a firm 
French negative could close the talks.
He laid 'great emphasis' on Perth and Franfois-Poncet's experience of the dictators,
their conviction that Franco-Italian relations were the key to peace or war1 and that
Our distinct impression was that Mussolini still wished to avoid 
war, from which he and his country knew they had most to lose. If 
we were wrong the harm done was infinitesimal compared to our 
gain if we were right.
Phipps therefore suggested that Fran$ois-Poncet could see Ciano before Hitler's
speech on 28 April to discuss several minor questions and, at a favourable moment,
(24)casually ask him 'what in effect Italy's claims were'.
Daladier, who was extremely friendly during the interview, was convinced
that the Italian Government were 'gangsters' and that Chamberlain and himself had
ben 'bluffed and lied to at Munich'. He told Phipps that
The Albanian outrage had rendered conversations almost 
impossible. Moslem opinion was violently anti-Italian in 
consequence and he (Daladier) had received countless messages and 
telegrams from North African Chieftains expressing intense loyalty 
to France, hatred of Italy and calling upon French Government to 
show utmost firmness. If nations in French North Africa heard (and 
Italians would trumpet it abroad) that the French Government had 
asked what Italy wanted, they would despite them and French 
prestige there would be reduced to zero.
24) FO.371/23795 (R3166/7/22). Phipps tel., 21 April 1939 (also in PHFP. 1/20). 
Notwithstanding his reference to Berthelot's alleged Violent Italophobia', Phipps recorded in 
his unpublished memoir that Berthelot was the most interesting and fascinating personality 
that I ever met'. PHPP.;9/1. Diplomatic Light and Shade, p. 113.
Phipps's assumption that Daladier paid considerable attention to the secret service 
reports was correct In late January 1939 Daladier had been secretly informed by the Service 
de Renseignement (which had deciphered a series of messages from Rome) of Tobjectif de la 
diplomatic de Mussolini' in the Mediterranean, Djibouti, Tunisia and elsewhere. Elizabeth 
du Riau, Edouard Daladier. Paris 1993, p.309, French military intelligence on Italy was, in 
fact, excellent See Robert J.Young, Trench Military Intelligence and the Franco-Italian 
Alliance 1933-1939'. The Historical Journal. 28.1 (1985), p.167.
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In short, Daladier feared 'a trap laid purposely by the Italian gangsters' to destroy
North African solidarity with France, and although he promised to consider the
(25)matter, Phipps was not optimistic about the outcome.
During his interview with Daladier, Phipps had made 'great play1 with 
Chamberlain's forthcoming announcement of conscription^ and he endeavoured
unsuccessfully to have it advanced to the 25th (instead of the 26th) in order to
(27)achieve the maximum effect. '  Daladier and Bonnet were 'deeply grateful' for this
'great step'^w hich Phipps immediately attempted to capitalise on. He told 
Bonnet on the 27th that he hoped that, now that this had been effected, 'a serious 
attempt would be made to establish contacts between France and Italy*; Bonnet 
then, Hinder the seal of secrecy1, read him Franfois-Poncet's telegram reporting that 
Ciano had told him that there was nothing that could not be settled amicably 
between France and Italy* and that Italy had no territorial claims against France. In 
a preliminary step towards their full scale collusion to pressurise Daladier, Bonnet
25) Ibid.
26) Ibid. (R3577/7/22). Phipps tel., 22 April 1939.
27) Ibid. (R3563/7/22). Phipps tel., 22 April 1939. Phipps had told Bullitt that this was a 
response to Daladier*s 'impassioned appeal* to have the announcement made before Hitler's 
speech on 28 April. FRUS. I (1939) Bullitt to Seer, of State, 19 April 1939, p. 169. Hankey 
told Phipps that 'serious people' were irritated by the French pressure on the British to 
introduce conscription when they (the French) 'have spent all their money in funk-holes (the 
Maginot Line) and grossly neglected the main offensive weapon of modem war, the air 
force’. PHPP.3/3 Hankey to Phipps, 24 April 1939.
28) DBFP. 3, V, no.294 Phipps to Halifax, 26 April 1939. Halifax told the Cabinet on the 26th 
that there was no further news regarding the suggestion that the French Govt should make 
an approach to Italy but the announcement of conscription would 'enable France to make 
such an approach from strength and not weakness'. CAB.23/99 Cabinet Conclusions, 4 (39), 
meeting of 26 April 1939.
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asked Phipps somewhat slyly to inform Daladier Tiow much importance HMG
C29)
attaches to the establishment of contact between France and Italy1.
Phipps reported to Halifax privately on the 28th that he had seen Daladier 
at the Rumanian luncheon' and, while not revealing Bonnet's information 
concerning Fran9ois-Poncet's satisfactory conversation with Ciano, he had again
emphasised the British announcement of conscription and had told him that
now that HMG had taken a step which I know had caused him and 
the French in general such pleasure too, I hoped he on his side 
would give great pleasure to HMG too by losing no chance of 
establishing contact with the Italian Government. If  the latter 
showed themselves unreasonable he (Daladier) could respond by a 
resounding "mot de Cambronne" and nobody would be the worse 
off. If) on the other hand, they were reasonable it would make a 
very great difference to the whole international situation.
Daladier again promised to consider the matter but refrained from mentioning the 
Franfois-Poncet-Ciano conversation which Phipps felt 'it would be difficult for him 
to ignore'. Phipps had also spoken very discreetly to Campinchi, Reynaud, 
Saurraut and Mandel about Italy but they were 'all rabid on this subject and feel 
that moderation towards the Italian gangsters is positively dangerous' as it would
only encourage their demands/30^
Bonnet, who was 'delighted' that Phipps had spoken to Daladier Svithout 
giving him (Bonnet) away*, had shown him Fransois-Poncet's private letter stating 
that 'it would be utterly criminal to let the chance slip' and expressing his disbelief
29) FO.371/23795 (R3350/7/22). Phipps tel., 27 April 1939. Ciano had stated that the Italian 
demands were: (1) a free port at Jibuti; (2) Share in Jibuti railway; (3) Two Italian 
directorships on Suez Canal Board; (4) prolongation of 1896 Agreement regarding Italy. 
Bonnet admitted that he had heard unofficially from Baudouin about the Italian attitude but 
that it was Tar more satisfactory' to have received 'an official pronouncement* from Ciano.
30) FO.800/311 (H7XIV/355). Phipps to Halifax, Personal & Secret, 28 April 1939. Phipps 
informed the F.O. separately that Daladier had told him that Hitler, 'whatever he may 
pretend* was 'greatly impressed by conscription in Britain' and that without it his speech 
would have been more violent Phipps also reported that the announcement had been 
generally welcomed in France including the French Left F0.371 22971 (C6162/15/18). 
Phipps tel., 28 April 1939.
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that Mussolini was preparing a trap to wreck French prestige in North Africa. 
Phipps then revealed Bonnet's increasingly active role in their collusion which
would be an important factor throughout:
Bonnet will tell me when he wants me to attack Daladier again. 
Meanwhile I am glad that you spoke to Corbin on April 26th.
Bonnet remarked to me "You know Daladier is easier to influence 
than I am!” When saying this he looked sly and proud. At the same 
time he was good enough to remark that I had an influence over 
Daladier. (31)
Nichols informed Phipps that the F.O. were 'most appreciative' of the way in which
(32)he had handled the question of Franco-Italian relations.
In early May, an impatient Halifax told Phipps that he wished that Sve could
get Daladier to move on the Italian thing' and that
I do feel in my bones that Dantzig (sic) is dangerous: that Musso 
wants to play with us and curb Hitler: but that he won't do this 
unless and until we can get going with France. I have just seen Eric 
Perth who is my confident to Musso - and Ciano - an(d) now men 
of peace: I hope he is right.(33)
Grandi had convinced Halifax that Mussolini wanted 'to get on with Franco-Italian 
conversation' but felt that it would be extremely difficult to influence Hitler 'unless
31) FO.800/311 (H/XTV/355). Phipps to Halifax, Personal and Secret, 28 April 1939. (Also in 
PHPP. 1/22). Bonnet drove Phipps back to the Quai d'Orsay after the Rumanian luncheon for 
the French Government', presumably just after he had spoken to Daladier.
32) PHPP.2/19. P.Nichols (F.O.) to Phipps, Most Secret, 29 April 1939. Nichols letter also 
contained all the F.O.'s information from Very secret sources' regarding Baudouin's 
activities.
33) PHPP.1/22. Halifax to Phipps (Handwritten), 1 May 1939.
34) PHPP.1/22. Halifax to Phipps, Private and Confidential, 2 May 1939.
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Loraine, who had succeeded Perth as British ambassador at Rome, had 
been informed by Gafencu that Mussolini had 'stated categorically that he was not 
making any territorial claims on France' and was awaiting a British or a French
initiative/35^  Phipps reported on the 5th that Bonnet, who had received similar 
reports from Gafencu (via Frangois-Poncet), had agreed that the latteris talks with 
Ciano should continue. He also reminded Halifax that Daladier was resisting the 
conversations and that Leger, 'who held forth in a most anti-Italian vein to Sir P. 
Loraine and myself on May 1', was even more antagonistic to them. In order to 
'strengthen Bonnet's hands', Phipps had provided him with a copy of Halifax's 
despatch of 1 May in which the latter had emphasised to Corbin the desirability of
enlisting Mussolini's aid in restraining Hitler/36^
Phipps's despatch was minuted extensively by the F.O. Ingram doubted 
whether anything further could be done immediately and that the conclusion of a
military agreement between Italy and Germany would 'only make the French less
(37)inclined than ever to come to terms with the Italians'. '  Sargent agreed that there 
was
abundant evidence to show that the Italians are making 
unprecedented efforts at the moment to get talks started with the 
French without having to lose face by making the first open and 
official contact. We must suppose that Italy's anxiety is in large 
measure due to the fact that the Italian Government wish when
35) DBFP. 3, V, no.369 Loraine (Rome) to Halifax, 5 May 1939. Frangois-Poncet had seen 
Gafencu and was discouraged by Paris's response to his reports on the nature of the Italian 
claims', ibid. no.370 Loraine to Halifax, 5 May 1939.
36) FO.371/23795 (R3675/7/22). Phipps tel., 5 May 1939, see also DDF. 2, XVI no.76. Loraine 
had asked Phipps to arrange a private interview with Bonnet in Paris. FO.800/311 
(H/XIV/352 & 3). Loraine to Phipps, 6 April & Phipps to Halifax, Private & Confidential, 7 
April 1939.
37) Ibid. Minute by Ingram, 8 May 1939. The Vatican's suggestion of a five power conference 
to discuss Franco-Italian differences (and the Danzig question) had been rejected by Bonnet 
on 5 May, and Leger considered that such a conference would be Very dangerous'. DBFP. 3, 
V, nos.375 & 418, Phipps to Halifax, 5 & 8 May 1939.
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negotiating the treaty of alliance with Germany, to which they are 
now committed, to be able to argue that they have re-established 
normal relations with France and to that extent are no longer 
dependent on Germany for diplomatic and military support as 
hitherto. Mussolini may also be hoping by normalising his relations 
with France he will reassure and gratify his own public who are 
terrified of getting involved in a war with England and France.
Sargent concluded that the F.O. knew from Phipps that Bonnet favoured talks 
while Daladier and Leger opposed them and that, 'since Bonnet's influence has 
presumably declined of late', negotiations would not be possible unless they could 
'get Daladier to revise his present attitude'. Cadogan agreed that the problem was 
that Daladier could not be certain of obtaining a quid pro quo from the Italians
while Vansittart advised caution:
We have already pressed (the French) twice, and must now be 
careful not to slam the Quai d'Orsay too much on this topic. (1)
These things get around and dont make relations or results any 
easier. (2) French feelings on this topic go wider than the Quai.(38)
Halifax informed the Cabinet on 10 May that he would speak to Daladier 
about Franco-Italian relations when he went to Geneva for a meeting of the
Council of the League/39'* Meanwhile, Phipps told him privately that 'I hope (and
38) FO.371/23795 (R3675/7/22). Minutes by Ingram, Sargent, Cadogan and Vansittart, 8-13 
May 1939. Sargent's conclusion was confirmation that the F.O. perceived that, in the last 
analysis, Daladier was the principal decision maker on the French side. For the latter*s 
distrust of Bonnet, see footnote 141.
39) CAB.23/99. Cabinet Conclusions 27(39) Meeting of 10 May 1939. Halifax repeated at the 
Cabinet meeting of 17 May that he proposed to speak to Daladier and Bonnet on his way to 
Geneva and to tell them that France was making a mistake in not willing to take some 
advantage of the feelers which were continuously being put out from Rome'. Ibid Meet 28 
(39) 17 May 1939. Corbin had already explained Daladier's position to Halifax on the 8th, 
and had added that London did not appear to understand the gravity of the problem facing 
the French in Tunisia. They had to take into account, not only the French public 'qui n'est 
pas precisdment enclin aux concessions en ce moment* but also, a recurring theme, the 
moslem population of North Africa 'qui verrait un 6chec dans une concession inopportune ou 
injustifi6e' as well as Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean. MAE Papiers 1940 
(Sous-Serie: Ldger), vol 12. Corbin (Londres) k Lgger (Quai d'Orsay), 9 mai 1939, ff 
215-216.
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Bonnet in his heart of hearts also hopes) that you will urge your point of view upon 
Daladier regarding Spain, Italy etc. with considerable force'. ^
On 20 May, Daladier told Halifax in Paris that the Franco-Italian situation 
had not changed. Ciano had spontaneously informed Frangois-Poncet of the Italian 
claims, but the effect would be that France would be making great concessions to 
a country who had firmly placed herself in the opposite camp, and would enjoy no
reciprocity1. He was adamant that
it was impossible for France to make such concessions in present 
circumstances... To agree to the Italian demand would be damaging 
to the prestige and interests of France. The Moslem population in 
North Africa would think that Mussolini was the stronger...(41)
Phipps, who attended the conversations, then asked 'ce que devraient etre les 
concessions attendues de lltalie', to which Daladier replied, 'qu'avant tout, le
gouvemement italien qui conserve 1.800.000 hommes sous les armes devrait
(42)demobilised. '  Daladier concluded that:
he had already stated this publicly with the unanimous approval of 
the French Council of Ministers. France could not abandon any of 
her rights without reciprocity. The shouts in the Italian Chamber 
about Corsica and Nice at a time when France was threatened by a 
general strike had created a tremendous effect in France. He 
doubted whether the general disposition of the Italian Government 
would change merely as a result of two or three concessions like a 
free port at Jibuti. Italy was now in Germany's hand... (43)
40) F0.800/311/(HZXTVZ357). Phipps to Halifax, Private & Confidential, 8 May 1939.
41) DBFP. 3, v, no.570 Record of Conversation between the Seer, of State and Daladier & 
Bonnet at the Ministry of War in Paris, 20 May 1939. The Anglo-Soviet negotiations, 
Danzig & Spain were also discussed at this meeting.
42) DDF. 2, XVI, no.243. Compte rendu. Notes prises au cours de l'entretien franco-britannique
du 20 mai 1939 entre M.Daladier, M.Georges Bonnet et Lord Halifax de passage & Paris se 
rendant a Geneve.
43) DBFP. 3, V; 570. Record of Conversation, op.cit
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In the event, Halifax was compelled to admit that he 'failed to move 
(44)Daladier1. * Partly influenced by Loraine's anxious despatch of 23rd urging a
response to Mussolini's latest speeches in order that *we should bum no bridges
(45)which one day (the) Italians might wish to recross', Halifax asked Phipps on the 
26th whether in the light of Loraine's telegram, a personal letter from Chamberlain
would induce Daladier to  modify the negative attitude which he adopted in his
(46)conversation with me on 20 May1. Phipps strongly advised waiting until the 
atmosphere improved and the Italian press attacks against France ceased, and 
Sargent accepted his advice/47^
However, Halifax, who had recalled Daladieris remark that if the Italians 
demobilised he 'might be ready to consider certain concessions', instructed Phipps 
to ascertain whether the French Government Svould be willing to authorise us to 
sound the Italians as to their willingness to play their role in such an
arrangement'/48^  Phipps replied that in view of Loraine's account of his interview 
with Mussolini he did not propose to act on Halifax's instructions until he heard
further from him as 'we should thereby risk upsetting the French without any
(49)chance of inducing Mussolini to demobilize'. 1 Cadogan agreed with Noble that
44) FO.800/31 l(HZXIV/359). Halifax to Sir J. Colville, 26 May 1939. Halifax added that 
'unfortunately' Daladier had been immensely impressed by his reception by *his North 
African Arabs' but that if the Italians 'demobilized a bit' in Libya the situation would be 
eased. He was considering action along these lines at Rome but it was Veiy difficult to 
extract an undertaking from the Italians when one cannot feel sure that the French will 
honour the bargain if by any accident it should come off.
45) DBFP. 3, V, no.593. Loraine to Cadogan, 23 May 1939.
46) FO.371/23795 (R4391/7/22). Halifax to Phipps, 26 May 1939.
47) Ibid. (R4396/7/22). Phipps tel 27 May & minute by Sargent, 31 May 1939.
48) Ibid. (R4410/7/22). Halifax to Phipps, 27 May 1939.
49) Ibid. (R4490/7/22). Phipps tel., 31 May 1939.
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it would be better to delay action as Phipps had suggested. ^  Phipps, who on 1 
June had reported his information from 'a highly placed person in the Italian 
Embassy* that there was 'great unrest and depression in Italy*, was personally 
convinced that a slight effort by the French would elicit a French response; he
warned however that
Daladier is more and more under the influence of MXeger, who has 
made him change his attitude to the Italian Ambassador during the 
last few months. The complaint was made that the Embassy was 
cut off from official contacts.(51)
Halifax informed the Cabinet on 7 June that the Franco-Italian discussions
had not progressed and that Chamberlain was considering sending a personal letter
(’52’)to Daladier *urging him strongly to agree to discussions with Italy*. '  Chamberlain 
told his sister that he still believed that their best plan was *to keep up contacts with 
Rome* where he was positive that \var is looked upon with horror* but that Paris
was the stumbling block:
Leger the F.O. permanent official is strongly anti-Italian and he 
seems to have great influence with Daladier who refuses to do 
more. I am thinking of putting strong personal pressure on him to 
be more forthcoming, both with Italy and Spain and for that 
purpose have got Eric Phipps over under cover of the Russian 
affair. I have kept him till Monday when I hope to thrash things out 
with him. Meanwhile we don't get much further with the 
Bolshies.(53)
Phipps himself was probably not privy to the secret that he was being 
recalled to London 'under cover of the Russian affair1; the discussions in London 
over the negotiations with the USSR were genuine, and Seeds had also been
50) Ibid. (R4490/7/22). Minute by Noble & Cadogan, 1 June 1939.
51) Ibid. R4558/7/22). Phipps tel. Highly Confidential, 3 June 1939.
52) CAB.23/99. Cabinet Conclusions 31 (39). Meeting of 7 June 1939.
53) Chamberlain Papers. NC.18/1/1102. N.Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 10 June 1939.
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(54)recalled from Moscow as a matter of urgency. Daladier had, m fact, told 
Phipps, before the latter left for London on 8 June, that any delay in concluding the 
negotiations with the Soviets would only encourage Hitler to seize Danzig/55^  
Chamberlain discussed the question of whether he should personally write to 
Daladier with Halifax and Phipps on the 12th, ^ a n d  it was decided to defer any
decision for a fortnight until the possibilities of an agreement with the USSR
(57)became clearer. '  The short delay had apparently been Phipps's idea, and he 
requested Chamberlain's permission to  be allowed to handle this matter 
personally1. ^  In the meantime, he was provided with copies of the various 
tentative drafts' to take back and study in Pans.
54) Phipps was instructed on 6 June to visit London in order to take part in the drafting of fresh 
instructions for Sir W.Seeds'. DBFP. 3, VI, p.2, f/note 1. Seeds was also recalled as a matter 
of urgency to participate in the discussions. DBFP. 3, V, no.720 Halifax to Seeds (Moscow), 
6 June 1939. On 6 June, Sargent told Cambon that Seeds & Phipps had been recalled to 
London in connection with the Soviet negotiations. FO.371/23067 (C8146/3356/18) minute 
by Sargent, 6 June 1939.
55) PHPP.1/23. Phipps to Halifax, 8 June 1939. (Reprinted in DBFP. 3, VI, no.2)
56) PREM1/329. Minute by J.W. (?), 12 June 1939.
57) F0.371/23795/(R4872/7/22). Minute by Ingram, 15 June 1939.
58) CAB.23/100. Cabinet conclusions 33(39). Meeting of 21 June 1939.
59) F0371/23795 (R4872/7/22). Minute by Sargent, 16 June 1939. Halifax had requested
Mallet to provide Phipps with the 'original letter to Daladier prepared at no. 10'; the draft 
prepared by the F.O., and Vansittart's rough draft PHPP.1/23, Mallet (F.O.) to Phipps, 12 
June 1939. Sargent had told Vansittart that Horace Wilson's draft 'appeared so ill-calculated 
to produce the desired result that the Department and I have now attempted to put up a 
counter draft which Alec (Cadogan) wished you to see...', and that it would have made 
Daladier 'hopping mad'. Vansittart replied that I f  we are contemplating still further 
persistence, we shall have to be extraordinarily careful how we put this unsavoury 
proposition if we are not merely to compromise ourselves without achieving anything but a 
negatively irritated result' and that most of France felt that way and it was 'a great mistake to 
suppose the feeling is confined to Daladier and the Quai d'Orsay'. F0.371/23795
(R4872/7/22) Sargent to Vansittart; Vansittart to Sargent, 7 & 8 June 1939.
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Immediately after his return to Paris on 13 June, Phipps saw Bonnet who
admitted that Franco-Italian relations had reached an impasse and
then quite spontaneously suggested that another approach should be 
made to Daladier on this subject, preferably by means of a message 
from you the Prime Minister to the President of the Council, 
delivered by myself. Also, and without any kind of prompting from 
me, Bonnet said that the favourable time to do this would be once 
the Soviet agreement had been concluded.
To avoid any suspicion of collusion, Bonnet wanted Phipps to make it clear to 
Daladier that his demarche was on the direct instructions of Halifax or 
Cham berlain.^ Daladier contemplated proroguing Parliament for two years but if 
there was a British announcement of an election in the Autumn it would provide 
ammunition to his opponents. Bonnet therefore 'begged' Phipps to pass on 
Daladieris personal request that Chamberlain should refrain from announcing any 
intention of holding an election in the Autumn, and Phipps told the latter that this 
would strengthen their hand when 'making your appeal over Italo-French
relationsl^61^  His account of Daladier's intention to prorogue Parliament made 
Chamberlain's 'mouth water1, and he 'gladly acceded to his request' that no 
announcement should be made before August/62^  He also agreed to Phipps's 
suggestion that they should 'await events in Moscow1 before putting the 'appeal' 
into operation/63^
On 22 June, Phipps informed Chamberlain and Halifax that 'directly Bonnet 
thinks the moment propitious he will, in strict confidence, tell me when I should
60) PHPP.3/1. Phipps to Chamberlain/Halifax, Private & Very Confidential, 13 June 1938. (Also 
inPREM. 1/329).
61) Ibid. Phipps to Chamberlain (& copy to Halifax) 13 June 1939 (2nd letter).
62) Ibid. Chamberlain to Phipps, 14 June 1939 (Also in PREM. 1/329).
63) Ibid. Chamberlain to Phipps, 14 June 1939 (2nd letter).
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again approach Daladier on this subject' ^  and, on the 28th, he repeated that this
would probably be after the conclusion of the Soviet negotiations.^ Sargent and
Cadogan agreed with Phipps that it would be advisable to await its outcome/66^  
Halifax told Phipps that there was continued evidence of Musso's extreme
discomfort1 and that
if we want him to pull his weight over Danzig, I feel pretty sure it 
would be easier for him to do so if he could at least get out of the 
position of having his issues with France entirely side-tracked.
He complained that the Russian business... blocks everything'.^
On the 7 July, Phipps informed Chamberlain and Halifax that Bonnet 
thought that Daladier should be tackled the following week. Phipps therefore
sought permission
to make it clear that I am making this appeal on direct instructions 
from yourself/the P.M. that you (the P.M.) have had great pleasure 
in acceding to several requests made recently by Daladier, e.g. 
guarantee for Rumania, conscription, preventing any mention in the 
Press regarding an autumn election in Great Britain, etc., and that 
now I have been instructed to urge with the utmost earnestness that 
a step should be taken that can at the worst do no great harm and at 
the best may prevent a general conflagration.
He also sought authorization to inform Daladier that 'we will get an assurance from 
the Italians... that they will confine their demands to the four they put forward
unofficially', ^ a n d  Halifax confirmed that Chamberlain had agreed to his
64) PHPP.1/23. Phipps to Halifax & Chamberlain, Private & Confidential, 22 June 1939.
65) PREM 1/329. Phipps to Halifax & Chamberlain, 28 June 1939.
66) FO.371/23795 (R4872/7/22). Minutes by Sargent & Cadogan, 28 & 29 June 1939.
67) PHPP.1/23. Halifax to Phipps, 7 July 1939. Halifax also told Phipps that Bruce, the 
Australian High Commissioner, had informed him that Australian opinion was 'getting a bit 
restive with what they thought was the French habit of missing opportunities: Italy, Spain 
etc'
68) PHPP.1/23. Phipps to Chamberlain & Halifax, 7 July 1939. The four 'unofficial Italian 
demands' which Ciano had made were Tunisia, Jibuti port, Jibuti Railway & Suez Canal 
Directorship. See 1/note 29.
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suggestion/69^  Bonnet had strongly advised him when 'making (the) appeal' to 
hand Daladier a short letter from Chamberlain which Phipps now urgently 
requested^  in time for his interview with Daladier on the 14th before going on
leave, and he suggested to Sargent that it should be brief and that he himself would
(711'set out the necessary arguments' verbally. J After F.O. discussions with 
Chamberlain, a revised version of Vansittart's draft was sent by bag to the Embassy
on the night of the 1 3 th .^
On 14 July, Phipps reported directly to Chamberlain that he had seen 
Daladier and 'read to and left with him' his letter. Chamberlain had told Daladier 
that he had asked Phipps to 'enlarge further on what I have said', and, after reading
out a French translation, he therefore told Daladier that
I had had the great pleasure on at least three occasions lately of 
telling him that you had granted three of his requests, viz., 
conscription, our guarantee for Rumania, and the avoidance of any 
public mention of the likelihood of elections in Great Britain in 
order not to render it more difficult for the French Government to 
postpone their elections for another two years from May. I added 
that Franco-Italian relations were a subject to which you attached 
the highest importance, for you felt that on it probably hung the 
question of war or peace.
69) FO.800/311 (HZXTV/369). Halifax to Phipps, 10 July 1939. Chamberlain told Phipps 
separately that he 'entirely concurred' with Halifax's letter and that he could assure Daladier 
that they would try to obtain such an assurance from the Italians. PHPP.3/1 Chamberlain to 
Phipps, 10 July 1939.
70) FO.371/23795 (R5631/7/22). Phipps to F.O. (Deciphered message), Personal & Most 
Confidential, 11 July 1939. Phipps had suggested to Henderson, who was en route to Berlin, 
that he should visit Bonnet and then arranged for him to do so incognito. Henderson 
emphasised to Bonnet that Mussolini's intervention during the Munich crisis had been 
decisive, he was 'the one man in Europe' who could play a similar role 'if the crisis became 
acute', and that he therefore 'deplored the hesitation of the French Government in opening 
their conversations with the Italians'. DBFP. 3, VI, no.296 Henderson (Berlin) to Halifax, 11 
July 1939.
71) Ibid (R5780/7/22). F.O. Minute (Sargent) re his telephone conversation with Phipps, 13 July 
1939.
72) Ibid (R5780/7/22). Minute by Ingram, 17 July 1939; PHPP.1/23 Halifax to Phipps, 13 July 
1939.
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Daladier had reiterated his old fear of an Italian trap' and its 'deplorable' effect' on 
the Moslems of North Africa. He noted Phipps's assurance that HMG would try to 
obtain an Italian assurance that 'their demands would be confined to the four points 
put forward unofficially but complained that when Frangois-Poncet had asked 
whether they could be put forward officially, Ciano had promised to ask Mussolini 
but they had not received any reply. Phipps urged Daladier, who was 'most 
friendly1, to give a positive reply and he 'promised faithfully that he would try to 
satisfy Chamberlain's request. Phipps was not, however, Very hopeful' of its 
outcome and reported that Bonnet was convinced of the soundness of 
Chamberlain's arguments but was too frightened of Daladier to back it up' while 
Leger, on the other hand, continued to be Violently anti-Italian' and urged his
views on Daladier \vith vehemence and iteration'. ^
Phipps informed Chamberlain that he was leaving for London within a few 
days and that Daladier's reply would be 'handed to Campbell here or sent to Corbin
to deliver to you'/74^  He went on leave in England from 16 July to 24 A u g u st^
73) PREM. 1/329. Phipps to Chamberlain, 14 July 1939. Also in PHPP.3/1 and printed in DBFP. 
3, VI, no.326. Chamberlain's letter to Daladier, 13 July 1939 is in ibid; FO.371/23796 
(R5780/7/22); PHPP.3/1, and printed in DBFP. 3, VI, no.317.
74) Ibid. Halifax told the Cabinet on 19 July that Phipps had spoken to Daladier who 'had 
undertaken to consider the matter but his response had not been very encouraging1. 
CAB.23/100. Cabinet Conclusions 38 (39), 19 July 1939. Du R6au commented that 'Sur ce 
point, il £tait clair que la France refusait de s'aligner et de suivre le voie propos^e par 
Londres... Conseiller par Llger, Daladier avait choisi la fermete'. Du Reau, op.cit.p334.
75) DBFP. 3, VI, p.358, tfnote 6.
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and played no further role in the events of this p e rio d .^
Q  Images of France and Aspects of the Embassy
Phipps's reputation, and the images of France which he sent back to
(77)London were always inextricably intertwined. Harvey noted on 3 May that
Phipps continues to intrigue against Daladier through Bonnet and to send us
(78)patently one-sided accounts of French opinion'. '  Harvey was well aware that 
Phipps's 'intrigues against Daladier* took place within the framework of his general 
instructions to induce the French Government to negotiate with Italy and that they 
were officially sanctioned by their mutual chie£ Halifax. His criticism of Phipps's 
'patently one-sided accounts of French opinion' was, however, at least up to 
Prague, justified. The most blatant example was his despatch in January 1939 in 
which he had attributed opinions to Blum and Mandel which he had received at 
third hand (and in the case of Patendtre at second hand) which was severely
76) Daladier’s letter to Chamberlain of 24 July & Chamberlain's reply of 3 August 1939 are in 
PREM 1/329 & FO.371/23796 (R6343/7/22) and printed in DBFP. 3, VI, nos 428 & 536. 
Copies were forwarded to the Embassy, FO.371/23796 (R6343/7/22) Ingram (F.O.) to 
Campbell (Paris) 11 August 1939 and are extent in PHPP. 5/8. Vansittart considered 
Daladier*s letter 'a very well reasoned & friendly one' which gave 'rather a convincing record 
of his previous attempts'; Chamberlain's reply, leaving the door open for a further approach, 
seemed to him to be 'just right'. FO.371/23796 (R6343/7/22). Minute by Vansittart, 9 August 
1939.
77) See.p.242 for Harvey's description of Cadogan's views on this connection.
78) Harvey diaries, op.cit (Entry for 3 May 1939), p.286. Both Harvey and Tyrell (whom Phipps 
had wanted to succeed as Ambassador at Paris in 1933/4) did not think that a Franco-Italian 
agreement would make any difference, and the latter felt that 'it would be wrong to press 
Daladier any more'. Ibid, 5 June, p.295.
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criticized by the F .o /79^  On the other hand, his four page despatch detailing the 
views of their bete noin Caillaux, on the international situation in late March 1939 
was, surprisingly, circulated to the Cabinet after he had reminded them that the
latter was a 'highly influential figure' in the Senate. 1
While Phipps's views on Italy remained consistent, and he continued to be 
vigilant of any opposition to Chamberlain's policy in Paris/81^  his attitude towards 
resisting German aggression had hardened after Prague and he fully supported the
new orientation of British policy. He considered that it was essential for
(82)conscription to be adopted in order to show that Britain *was in earnest, '  he 
wanted Britain to support Poland 'to the utmost' in resisting German demands 
(otherwise 'the entire edifice of resistance to Germany which was being built might
(83)
crumble') and he wanted the Americans to change their Neutrality Act. The 
occasional doubts which he harboured were influenced by Hankey, who told him
79) FO.371/23792 (R388/7/22). Phipps tel., 16 January 1939. Strang had minuted that their 
testimony has been somewhat coloured in transit' and that Phipps was attempting to discredit 
Mandel whose views he disliked. Sargent refused to believe, in view of Phipps's friendly 
relations with so many French politicians, that he had to rely upon 'anonymous third parties' 
for the views which he easily could have obtained at first hand. Vansittart commented 
scathingly that 'no Embassy has a right to send this third hand and shoddy material, 
particularly when it is not fair to those whom it dislikes'; he concluded that 'the last 
paragraph is evidently pro-Bonnet, with whom Phipps is very intimate' and that 'the Embassy 
should not indulge in telegrams of this kind or overweight the scales in 1939 with the views 
of the Journal des Debats and the Temps and "les 200 families" just as we got too much of 
Bonnet-Flandin-Caillaiix in 1938!' (Ibid) Minutes by Strang, Sargent & Vansittart, 18 & 23 
January 1939.
80) FO.371/22912 (C4286/90/17). Phipps tel., 27 March 1939. Caillaux's views were also 
surprisingly positive regarding the necessity of standing firm against Hitler. (Reproduced as 
a confidential print; FO.432/5, PlXI, no.28 Phipps to Halifax, 27 March 1939).
81) FO.800/311 (HZXTV/354). Phipps to Halifax, 25 April 1939. Phipps had again asked Duff 
Cooper to show him the draft of a speech which he would be making at the StGeorge's Day 
Banquet in Paris on 24 April.
82) FRUS- (Voll 1939). Bullitt to Secretary of State, 19 April 1939, p.169.
83) Ibid. Bullitt to Secretary of State, 29 April 1939, pp. 242-3.
-307-
privately that he 'felt instinctively that a number of mistakes have been made... 
which we shall soon be regretting'; that Sve cannot save these eastern nations'; 
Hitler would attack Poland as soon as he felt 'ready to hold us in the west' (using
the excuse that Germany was being encircled), and
for all the denials of Chamberlain and Halifax and the cant o f the 
Times he is being encircled... the only trouble is that with Italy on 
the wrong side the circle cannot be completed.(84)
These doubts were reflected in the apologetic note which crept into 
Phipps's report on the defeatist articles by Delebecque in Action Franyaise and 
Deat's Mourir pour Danzig' in Oeuvre, both of which dealt with French
commitments to Poland, and which reflected his own anxieties. He explained that
(he) felt bound to report the above articles which reflect an 
uneasiness which is probably felt among sections of French opinion 
lest M.Beck should precipitate a conflict without exhausting all 
reasonable possibilities of peaceful compromise in consultation with 
his ally.(85)
Phipps hastened to add, however, that Daladier had dismissed these views, the 
tatter's 'daily correspondence' was now 'in favour of resistance to German
aggression', and that
This development of opinion is borne out by views expressed to 
myself and to members of my staff by various Frenchmen who 
emphasise that Frenchmen everywhere now feel that they have had 
enough of Germany's aggressive policy.(86)
Moreover, Deat's article had elicited separate press statements from Daladier and
Bonnet reaffirming France's commitments towards Poland (Roberts was reassured
(87)to find them both 'in agreement in advocating a firm line' against Hitler), and it
84) PHPP. 1/22. Hankey to Phipps, 4 April 1939.
85) F0.371/23017 (C6547/54/18). Phipps tel., 4 May 1939.
86) Ibid. (C6547/54/18). Phipps tel., 4 May 1939.
87) FO.371/23018 (C6674/54/18). Phipps tel., 5 May 1939 and minute by Roberts, 8 May 1939.
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had also been widely criticized in the French press as being virtually 
indistinguishable from German propaganda. '  Above all, Phipps contrasted
current French opinion with that which existed during the Munich crisis, and
(89)Speaight was able to minute that the French attitude was 'encouraging.
The Embassy's positive reports on the new mood of determination in 
France produced, in turn, an enthusiastic response from the Foreign Office. 
Daladieris speeches on the radio and at the closure of the French Parliamentary 
session which appeared to have received general approval were regarded by the
F.O. as being 'firm and confident'/90^  His special powers had resulted in only
formal criticism', and his decree law proroguing Parliament until 1 June 1942 was
(91)passed virtually unopposed on 30 July. Only the continual revelations of the 
extent of German intrigue, subversion and propaganda in France appeared to mar
88) Ibid. (6901/54/18). Phipps tel., 10 Many 1939. Deat's article had also been attacked by the 
Right Wing Epoque and by Colonel de la Rocque in Petit Journal, ibid (C6674/54/18) Phipps 
tel., 5 May 1939.
89) Ibid. (C6901/54/18). Phipps tel., 10 May 1939, and minute by Speaight, 11 May 1939.
90) Ibid. (C8001 & C9083/25/17). Phipps tels 4 & 28 June 1939 and minutes by Makins &
Barclay, 6 June & 8 July 1939.
91) Ibid. (C9079 & C10606). Tels from Phipps & Campbell, 28 June & 30 July 1939.
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(92)this optimistic picture. J
Phipps's important despatch of 22 June describing Daladier's determination 
to resist German aggression also highlighted the activities of certain French 
politicians whose views the Embassy had hitherto enthusiastically reported to 
London. Daladier had told Phipps that his information was that Hitler intended to
incorporate Danzig into the Reich and that
The German Government is convinced that neither France nor 
Britain will do anything. Hitler hopes, on recent information from 
Paris, that certain French politicians (presumably Laval & Flandin) 
will prevent any serious action. As regards Great Britain, Hitler 
thinks she will not move.
Furthermore, Abetz, the Paris representative of the Dienstelle Ribbentrop, had 
telephoned openly to various people (in Paris) announcing a coup for Danzig for 
the week-end', and Daladier had told the German Charge d'Affaires that unless 
Abetz left voluntarily he would be expelled. Bonnet, however, disguised the 
expulsion order by refusing him an entry visa into France. Daladier had also 
instructed Bonnet to summon Welczeck immediately to emphasize that 'in the 
event of a conflict between Germany and Poland France would at once come to the
92) In July, Aubin of the Temps and Poirier of Figaro were arrested on charges of spying for the 
Germans. Mdme Bonnet had been unwittingly involved in the affair (which Daladier had 
hushed up) through her friendship with Elizabeth Buttner, a German agent FO.371/22939 
(C9855, C10260, C10354/9855/17). Tels by Phipps & Campbell, 13, 21 & 24 July, and 
FO.371/23039 (C10485/94/18) Campbell tel., 24 July 1939. Sargent had requested as much 
information as possible which proved difficult Eventually the Embassy asked Commander 
Dunderdale, head of the SIS station in Paris, to approach the Deuxi&me Bureau. A partial 
summary of their information was that the ramifications of Nazi propaganda extended to 
every walk of life and are found in the Press, cultural associations, films, railway and tourist 
agencies etc', and included the local German Chamber of Commerce. It was directed by Karl 
Otto Faber of the German Embassy in Paris, and the French investigation centred on Poirier, 
Aubin, Abetz, Bauer & Hirsch. FO.371/23039 (Cl 14894/94/18) Campbell to Sargent, 31 
July 1939. Claude Cockbum revealed in The Week that Hirsch, with Gestapo funds, had 
greatly influenced the French newspapers the Oeuvre and R6oublique and had practically 
purchased the Union Socialiste Republicaine with the 'honourable exception* of 
Paul-Boncour. FO.800/274 (Fr/39/2) Peake to Sargent, 27 July 1939. See also the post-war 
testimony of Pierre Comert in Les Evenements survenus en France de 1933 a 1945. Paris 
1947, vol. VII, p.2175.
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assistance of the latter1/ 93^  The effect of the interview was only partially weakened
by Bonnet, who described it to Phipps as 'a long and friendly conversation', since
(94)Welczeck was also handed a note reiterating Daladier's views.
The Embassy's newly founded objectivity even extended to individuals 
whom it had previously regarded as their bete noir. Phipps, who had hitherto 
included Campinchi, the Minister for Marine, amongst the soi disant war party 
reported that the latter had rebuked Lukasiewicz, the Polish Ambassador, for his
'ridiculously bellicose talk' and that
M.Campinchi... had pointed out to the Ambassador that in case of 
war in the near future Poland would in all probability be overrun 
within about 10 days after an intensive bombardment by 3,000 
aeroplanes. This had seemed to calm MXukasiewicz's ardour and 
had even caused him to pale quite considerably.
Phipps commented that this was 'remarkable coming from M. Campinchi, for during 
the September crisis he was violently anti-Munich; nor is he in the least defeatist 
now1, and the Foreign Office had this despatch copied to the Service
Departments/95^
93) FO.371/23021 (C9191/54/18). Phipps tel., 30 June 1939 (also in DBFP. 3, VI, no.186); 
Documents on German Foreign Policy. D, 6, no.640 Foreign Minister (Berlin) to Welczeck 
(Paris), 9 July 1939 which also includes Ribbentrop's furious reaction. See also DDF. 2e, 
XVII, p.443 f/note 3 and ibid XVIII,p.57f/note 3. Abetz's 'expulsion d6guis6e' was followed, 
significantly, by the arrest of two French Journalists: Aubin of the Temps and Poirier of 
Figaro on charges of receiving money from German sources. See the telegrams from Phipps 
& Campbell of 13-27 July 1939 in FO.371/22939 and also previous f/note. Phipps surmised 
that Daladier's source regarding an imminent German coup in Danzig was M. Simon' who, 
together with ex-Chancellor Wirth, obtained the information in Basle from 'a person 
connected with the Reichswehr who had come direct from Germany* to see Wirth. 
FO.371/23021 (C9232/54/18) Phipps tel., 1 July 1939.
94) FO.371/23021 (C9235/54/18). Phipps tel., 1 July 1939 (also in DBFP. 3, VI, no.212). 
Ribbentrop's response and Bonnet's rejoinder were forwarded by the latter to Halifax on 27 
July 1938: DBFP. 3, VI, no471 Bonnet to Halifax, 27 juillet 1939. These private letters were 
reprinted in Le Livre Jaune Francaise. Paris 1939, nos 163 & 168.
95) FO.371/23020 (C8591/54/18). Phipps tel., 16 June 1939 and minute by Speaght, 19 June 
1939, Welczeck had told Mendl that there was a war party headed by Campinchi and he was 
not sure Daladier, who was in some respects more like a Prussian than a Frenchman, was not 
coquetting with it'. FO.371/23019 (C7513/54/18). Phipps to Sargent (Enl. from Mendl), 22 
May 1939.
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This more objective approach did not prevent Phipps from continuing to 
pursue his role as the self-appointed guardian of Chamberlain's policies which was 
not solely confined to the question of Franco-Italian relations. In May, the delicate
question of Eden's invitation to speak at the Conference des Ambassadeurs had
(96) (97)arisen,v 'followed by invitations for him to speak elsewhere in Paris. Harvey
recorded gleefully that 'much annoyance had been caused to Phipps' by the 
announcement 'because he tried to prevent his coming!' Apparently Eden had 
asked Harvey to contact the Embassy and Phipps had replied that 'June was a bad 
month for lectures and it would be better to reconsider it in the Autumn'. Harvey
regarded this as tantamount to sabotage and Peake and himself
therefore arranged the whole thing ourselves through the Figaro 
correspondent in London who fixed it with A.E. and the 
Ambassadeurs people. Phipps and Charles Mendl are furious 
especially as the whole French Cabinet propose to give A.E. a 
banquet/ 98'1
(99)In the event, Phipps invited Eden and his wife to stay at the Embassyv '  and 
informed Halifax that he 'had a very small dinner for the Edens on the night of their 
arrival... we were only 1 2 , in black ties, and all supporters and admirers of the
96) Avon Papers. AP.13/2/JJ. Eden to Boutelleau, 15 May 1939; Ibid, AP.13/2/4A La 
Conference des Ambassadeurs, 18 May 1939. Paul Reynaud had been invited to preside over 
the conference which was not calculated to please the Embassy.
97) Ibid. AP.13/2/5E. R. de Margery to Eden, 19 May 1939. Eden had also accepted an 
invitation to speak at the Cercle Politique des Etrangers.
98) The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvev 1937-40. ed J.Harvey, London 1970, pp.290-1. 
(Entry for 20 May 1939). It will be recalled that Peake was involved in the Cadett affair, see 
Ch.8.
9°9) Avon Papers, AP13/2/5N. Phipps to Eden, 23 May 1939 (also in PHFP.3/2). Phipps's 
invitation was a warm one, and he also hoped that Eden would 'dine with us at least once 
during your visit, although I know that the French will fight to get you!' (Ibid). In fret, Eden 
received numerous invitations including those from Reynaud & Blum (Ibid, AP. 13/2/50, 
Eden to Phipps, 30 May 1939.
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policy of HMG'.(100)
Phipps explained to Chamberlain that he had asked the Edens to stay at the 
Embassy 'to prevent any irresponsible talk in Paris that Anthony had come to air
views contrary to your own'/101^  Chamberlain found nothing objectionable in 
Eden's lecture and, with his habitual vanity, he was pleased by Phipps's account of 
'the feeling about myself. In an oblique reference to Franco-Italian relations, he 
concluded that 'in our present troubles in the Far East I feel more than ever
conscious of the danger of quarrelling with all the strongest powers at once!' 1^02^  
Phipps replied that the Left were Very disappointed' that Eden had not taken up a 
'position very much in advance of yourself and Bonnet', they had been 'non-plussed'
by his invitation to stay at the Embassy and that
Altogether this was a good lesson for Peri, Kerillis, Pertinax & Co.
(not to mention Paul Reynaud and Mandel). British unity is as 
desirable and as wholesome for them as it is for the dictators.(103)
Pertinax had not, in fact, learned Phipps's 'good lesson' since his 
'mischievous wireless message' discussing the state of Anglo-French-Soviet 
negotiations was sent en clair to several American newspapers and had been 
intercepted by Bonnet. The latter complained 'most strongly* to Phipps that there 
were
unscrupulous people on both sides of the channel who continue 
trying to make bad blood between Great Britain and France and 
also to render war inevitable Bonnet declared emphatically that Mr 
Chamberlain had literally saved both our countries from supreme 
catastrophe last August and September. If we had gone to war then
100) PHPP.1/23. Phipps to Halifax, Personal, 16 June 1939 (also in FO.800/311, (HZXIV/363). 
The guests included Georges Bonnet and Andrg Maurois and their wives, Andrg Chaumeux 
and the Comte de Castellane. Avon Papers, 13/2/5R, Phipps to Eden, 4 June 1939. Phipps 
told Halifax that he would be writing separately to Chamberlain to describedEden's visit
101) PHPP.3/1 Phipps to Chamberlain, Private & Confidential, 16 June 1939.
102) Ibid. Neville Chamberlain to Phipps, Private & Confidential, 19 June 1939.
103) Ibid. Phipps to Chamberlain, 23 June 1939.
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France would have had only two aeroplanes capable of flying 450 
kilometres per hour.(104)
Phipps told Horace Wilson privately that Pertinax's message should be seen in the 
light of Daladier's comment to him on the 8 th that the Soviets were offended 
because Strang, instead of a more senior figure, was going to Moscow, and he was 
convinced that his remark had been inspired by Leger. He reminded Wilson that 
Leger was 'on the very closest terms of friendship' with Vansittart and that, as he 
had told him 'in the Prime Minister's room' the previous morning, Leger's influence
over Daladier was *unfortunately increasing daily'/105'* Wilson showed Phipps's
letter to Chamberlain who expressed his appreciation/106^
Phipps's reputation as an arch appeaser, his almost complete identification 
with Bonnet's views, and his frequently unfortunate style, left him vulnerable to 
attacks by his enemies who found no difficulty in ascribing negative motives to all 
of his activities. This inevitably affected his reputation even when it was unjustified. 
During this period Bullitt, the United States Ambassador at Paris, became the 
unwitting catalyst to the serious allegation that he (Phipps) had distorted or 
withheld important information regarding the Anglo-French negotiations with the 
USSR.
104) FO.800/311 (HXIV/360). Phipps to Halifax, 16 June 1939 (also in DBFP. 3, VI no.117.
105) PHPP.3/5. Phipps to Horace Wilson, Personal & Very Confidential, 13 June 1939.
Daladier's remark had been made to Phipps immediately before he was recalled to London 
on 8 June. FO.371/23067 (C8212/3356/18).
106) Ibid. Horace Wilson to Phipps, 15 June 1939.
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On 29 April, Bonnet had shown Bullitt the text of the latest French 
proposal to the Soviet U n i o n . B u l l i t t  reported on 5 May that he had seen
Vansittart in London and had asked him
why the British had refused to accept the French proposal which the 
Soviet Government had indicated its willingness to accept. 
Vansittart replied that he had no knowledge of any French proposal.
I expressed my amazement and he said that no French proposal had 
yet reached the British Government.
Bullitt informed him that his (Vansittart's) 'intimate friend Leger and also Daladier1 
had felt that the USSR would reject the British proposal and that he himself was 
positive that the French Government 'had expressed these views to the British 
Government and had made a constructive counter proposal'. Vansittart had then 
replied that
these views of Daladier's might have expressed by Bonnet to Sir 
Eric Phipps and by Sir Eric Phipps to the British Government in 
such watered down form that they had made no impression.
Vansittart regarded these proposals as being 'far superior to the British proposal', 
and he wanted Bullitt to see Leger and Daladier and urge the latter to telephone
Corbin immediately to convey them to the British Governments108^  Bullitt then 
asked Leger.
how on earth it could have been possible that the British 
Government had not received either the French proposal or the true 
views of the French Government with regard to the British 
proposals to the Soviet Union. He replied that conversations on 
this subject had been conducted by Bonnet with Sir Eric Phipps. He 
added that in point of fact both Bonnet and Sir Eric Phipps were 
opposed to bringing the Soviet Union into close cooperation with 
France & England.
Leger concluded that he had spoken to Campbell on the subject and had handed 
the French proposals to him, adding that 'it seemed evident from Vansittart's
107) Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol I (General), Bullitt to Secretary of State, 29 
April 1939, pp.242-3.
108) FRUS. Vol 1 (General) Bullitt to Secretary of State, 5 May 1939, pp.248-250.
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ignorance of the French proposal that the British Minister had not transmitted this 
information to his Government' Z109^
Vansittart and Leger's insinuations, that the Paris Embassy had withheld or 
doctored French reports regarding their negotiations with the USSR, if correct, 
would have constituted a serious deformation professionnelle on Phipps's part. 
His well-known hatred of communism, and his distrust of the Soviet Union (which
he shared with Chamberlain)/110\vould have provided him with a motive. But he 
was also an experienced and an astute diplomat who, as has been seen, usually 
operated within the framework of his general instructions. Phipps had in fact 
carefully reported all the negotiations including: (a) the new French proposals and
Bonnet's verbal remarks/ 11 ^ and (b) Campbell's conversation at the Quai d'Orsay
together with Leger's information/112^  in some detail to London. The false 
impression of Phipps's role in the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations created by
109) Ibid.
110) Chamberlain told his sister that 1 must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia'. 
Chamberlain Papers, NC18/1/1091, Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 26 March 1939.
111) Phipps's full survey of the new French proposals (and Lager's remarks) was forwarded to the 
F.O. on 3 May, FO.371/23065 (C6540/3356/18) Phipps tel. 3 May 1939 (printed in DBFP. 
3, V, no.350). Charveriat's 'oral communication' (made at Bonnet's request) was forwarded 
separately on the same date (Ibid C6541/3356/18 Phipps tel. 3 May 1939 (printed in DBFP. 
3, V, no.351). The Quai d'Orsay had communicated these new proposals to Suritz on 29 
April 1939, DDF. 2, XV, no.523 Communication au D£partement k l'Ambassade de URSS k 
Paris, 29 avril 1939. The French and British texts are identical. Phipps's information was 
incorporated into the F.O. Memoranda on the Anglo-Soviet negotiations dated 7 May 1939 
(Ibid, C7010/3356/18).
112) Campbell's conversation with Leger, and a copy of the formula proposed by the French 
Government', were communicated by the Embassy on 20 April, F0.371/23064 
(C5694/3356/18). Phipps to Sargent, 20 April 1939 (printed in DBFP. 3, V, no.241). 
Corbin informed the Quai d'Orsay on 25 April that Cadogan had received 'le dernier expose 
de vue fiangaises sur les propositions russes'. DDF. 2, XV, no484 Corbin k Bonnet, 25 avril
1938.
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Bullitt was left uncorrected and served to reinforce for posterity the entirely 
negative image of his Paris Embassy.
The question of Phipps's impending retirement in October arose during this 
period. On 20 May, Harvey recorded that 'propaganda for Phipps is beginning to
work heavily and obviously from all sides'/113^  As part of this 'propaganda', the 
indefatigable Hankey had spoken to Lothian and Geoffrey Dawson of the Times
who, as he told Phipps:
both agreed that it was monstrous from the point of view of the 
public interest that you should be leaving Paris in the Autumn.
Both of them especially Dawson are friends of Halifax, and I hope 
they would tackle him on the subject. I have not myself seen either 
the P.M. or Halifax, the latter of whom has been at Geneva... (114)
On 27 May, Harvey revealed a possibly less than altruistic motive for his continual
denigration of Phipps:
Alec (Cadogan) proposes that I should go to Paris in December as 
Minister in place of Ronnie Campbell, who will have to go when the 
other Ronnie Campbell goes there in November. It is very flattering 
and in some ways very tempting, but I don't want to go... on the 
other hand it looks as if I could not stay on much longer as Private 
Secretary.
Agonizing over his own future career possibilities, Harvey concluded that it was by 
no means certain that \ve shall get Phipps out in October1; Cadogan was
'anticipating a campaign for his renewal but he hopes to be able to resist i t '/115')
113) Haivey diaries, op.cit, (entry for 20 May 1939), p.291.
114) PHPP.3/3. Hankey to Phipps, 25 May 1939.
115) Harvey diaries, op.cit. (entry for 27 May 1939), pp.293-4. Ironically, Phipps himself had 
suggested in March 1938 that Harvey should succeed Hugh Lloyd Thomas as Minister at 
the Embassy, PHPP.2/1 Cadogan to Phipps, 4 March 1938. Confusingly, there were two 
Ronald Campbells in the diplomatic service: Sir Ronald Campbell, Ambassador at 
Belgrade (who eventually succeeded Phipps at Paris), and RI. Campbell, the Paris 
Embassy's Minister (who succeeded Sir Ronald at Belgrade). Lord Tyrell, who was a 
former ambassador to Paris, had heard that Vansittart would succeed Phipps at Paris and 
begged Harvey to warn Halifax of the consequences as 'Van was so much involved with 
French Party politics'; Harvey reassured him that such an appointment was improbable. 
Ibid (entry for 5 June 1939), pp.295-6.
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In fact, Phipps had informed Hankey on 13 July that Campbell ('from 
Belgrade1) would succeed him on 24 October. In an effusion of gratitude he told 
Hankey that it was entirely due to him that he had been appointed to Paris and that 
I t  has been a stormy time here, preceded by nearly four stormy years at Berlin, but
of course when the time to go comes it will leave a gap '/116-* As part of the 
process of winding down Phipps's Paris Embassy, Cadogan had already told him 
that Mendl, who would be 69 in December, was 'now employed from year to
year1/ 117^  Phipps himself whose leave in England ended on 24 August and who 
returned to Paris during the last ten days of peace would, in fact, be somewhat 
grudgingly offered an extension of a further six months which he refused to accept.
IL The End of Phipps's Paris Embassy. Conclusions and a Postscript 
(A) The Outbreak of W ar and Retirement (25 August-23 October 19391
Phipps played an active role in the immediate events leading to the French
declaration of war.^118^  Unlike his role during the Czech crisis when he sought to 
discourage the French from any kind of positive action, he interpreted his 
instructions positively and vigorously encouraged them to fulfil their obligations to
116) Hankey Papers, HNKY 5/5. Phipps to Hankey, 13 July 1939.
117) PHPP.2/1. Cadogan to Phipps, 7 July 1939. Halifax valued some of Mendl's occasional 
minutes highly which may have been responsible for his reprieve. He deemed Mendl's two 
minutes in May recording his conversation with Welczeck on the possibility of a war over 
Poland and the tatter's information on the eclipse of Bonnet, to have ben sufficiently 
important to be circulated to the Cabinet FO.371/23019 (C7512 & C7513/54/18) Phipps to 
Sargent (ends in), 20 May 1939, and minutes by Halifax & Kirkpatrick, 27 May & 1 June 
1939.
118) Phipps's brief was far ranging. His discussions with Bonnet included the problem of 
anti-British propaganda in the Middle East and its extension to the Magreb, and the 
question of the French attitude towards Japan. DDF. 2e, XIX, no.73, Bonnet au Gten&al 
Nogues (Resident General de France k Rabat), 27 aout 1939, and ibid no. 119 Bonnet k 
Corbin, 28 aout 1939.
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the Poles. He unreservedly supported the war against Nazi Germany without any 
trace of his former defeatism, and was highly critical of those French individuals 
whom he considered to be less enthusiastic in the pursuance of those aims than 
himself.
Instructed to inform Daladier in late August that Britain and France should 
immediately concert together in the event of a German aggression on Poland, 1^19^
to which Daladier entirely agreed, Phipps added:
I put it to him that if we failed in such case to fulfil our obligations 
we should have to fight Germany later on, dishonoured and without 
friends, with a Japan (now angered against Germany) probably 
ranged against us, and a contemptuous America. MDaladier 
heartily agreed. (120)
Remembering his instructions during the Czech crisis, Phipps also sought the views 
of a wide range of leading French personalities including Cardinal Verdier/121^  
The general consensus was that morale was high. Even Caillaux 'now (felt) 
strongly that only firmness could save the situation and was very happy* about the
French internal situation/122^
Two of Phipps's initiatives met with the approval of the F.O. (a) He urged
that, if Britain declared war on Germany in fulfilment of their guarantee to Poland:
they should do so either jointly with, or after the French 
Government; but not, if possible before. France is an old ally of 
Poland. It would be advisable that, in the event of war, emphasis 
should be laid in speeches and in press less on the fact that Great 
Britain is standing by Poland than by both Poland and France.
119) FO.371/22977 (C12044/15/18). Halifax to Phipps, 25 August 1939.
120) FO.371/22925 (C12096/281/17). Phipps tel., 26 August 1939.
121) For e.g. Chautemps, Marin & Cardinal Verdiefs views are recorded in FO.371/22978 
(C12208/15/18); FO. 371/22913 (C12209/90/17) & DBFP. 3, VI, no.44. Phipps tels 26, 27
& 28 August 1939. It will be recalled that Phipps had been instructed to obtain Cardinal 
Verdier*s views during the Munich crisis, see ch.7.
122) F0.371/22913 (C12337/90/17). Phipps tel., 28 August 1939.
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The F.O. considered that these observations were important, and Cadogan minuted 
that the first point was *being attended to '/123'* (b) They also agreed that Duff 
Cooper's article in Ordre on the breakdown of the Soviet negotiations was 'most 
mischievous'; Phipps had requested permission to inform the French Government 
that HMG would quite understand if in future, such articles, even written by an 
ex-Cabinet minister, were suppressed by the French censorship', and this was
granted/124^
On 31 August, the French resolve still appeared to be strong. Daladier told 
Phipps that he would rather resign than accept 'Mussolini's invitation to a second 
Munich on September 5 ' / 125^  General Pretalat told Colonel Fraser that morale was 
high throughout the country; the Reservists regarded war as preferable to twice 
yearly mobilisation, and Phipps confirmed that he had received similar information
from other sources/126^  The first cracks in the Government's resolve came late 
that night when Bonnet told Phipps that the French Government 'now realised that 
it would not be possible to decline the Italian proposal (of a conference)
123) FO.371/22913 (C12221/90/17). Phipps tel., 27 August 1939 and minutes by Barclay, 
Kirkpatrick & Cadogan, 28-29 August 1939.
124) Ibid. (C12492/90/17). Phipps tel., 30 August 1939 and minute by Barclay who described 
Duff Cooper's article as 'a very foolish one1; ibid F.O. to Campbell (Paris) 31 August 1939.
125) FO.371/22980 (C12544/15/18). Phipps tel., 31 August, 1939.
126) FO.371/22913 (C12566/90/17). Phipps tel., 31 August 1939. Phipps added that General 
Pretalat would be 'in command of the group of armies from the Swiss border to the North 
Sea in the event of war*.
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offhand'/127^
Following the German attack on Poland on 1 September, the Embassy
reported that the Council of Ministers had unanimously agreed to maintain 'firmly
028)the engagements undertaken by France'. } By noon, however, an anxious 
Halifax told Phipps that the delays in Paris were 'causing some misgivings here' and 
that *we shall be grateful for anything you can do to infuse courage and
029)determination into M.Bonnet\
On 2 September, Phipps who was sympathetic to the French dilemma, 
emphasised that 'every hour gained to enable French mobilisation to proceed 
unhindered is precious' and that Henderson should not 'act in advance of
Coulondre'.^130^  Chamberlain's parliamentary statement was expected at 3pm, and 
Phipps was instructed to 'obtain the French Government's concurrence at once' 
since 'it was impossible to wait for more than a limited time' and Anglo-French
responses should be 'simultaneous and identical'. 1^31')
127) FO.371/22980 (C12556/15/18). Phipps tel., 1 September 1939 (2.0am). L^ger was deeply 
opposed to the Italian suggestion of a conference which he regarded as a trap, Bonnet had 
replied with 'une extreme viguer1 that it was la  demiere minute pour Iviter la guerre i  
laquelle Hitler etait rdsolu'. DDF. 2, XIX, Addenda I, Extrait du journal de Georges 
Bonnet, Jeudi 31 aout 1939, 1.15pm conversation with L6ger. Daladier told Corbin that 'il 
est en prindpe absolument contraire a l'idde d'une conference'. Ibid, Addenda n, Compte 
rendus des joum&s des 30 et 31 aout, ler et 2 septembre 1939.
128) FO.371/22913 (C12762/90/17). Phipps tel., 1 Sept 1939. The delays preceding the British 
& French declarations of war have been described exhaustively in D. Cameron Watt, How 
War Came. London 1989, Sidney Aster, 1939 The Making of the Second World War. 
London 1973, Adam Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War. 
London 1977. See also J.B.Duroselle, La Decadence 1932-1939. Paris 1979, pp.481-493.
129) Ibid. (C12710/90/17). Halifax to Phipps, 1 Sept 1939 (11.55am). The F.O. continued to 
hold Bonnet responsible for the French delay, see p. 322.
130) Ibid. (C12710/90/17). Phipps tel., 2 Sept 1939 (9.35pm).
131) DBFP. 3, VII, no.700. Halifax to Phipps, 2 Sept 1939 (12.30pm). Halifax added that the 
French Govt had informed him that they were constitutionally bound to summon 
parliament in order to declare war, and that the French Parliament would be sitting at 3pm.
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Phipps reported that the French Government wanted a 48 hour limit and 
that he himself was convinced that their attitude was due solely to the request of 
the General Staff to evacuate large towns and enable general mobilisation to
(132)proceed smoothly, a view with which Halifax now agreed. } Nevertheless, 
Halifax explained to him that the French position was Very embarrassing to HMG'; 
a statement had to be made to Parliament in the evening and a 48 hour delay was
'quite impossible'/133^  Phipps replied that the French Government Tiad been unable 
to agree to less than 48 hours' as the evacuation was 'still in full swing' and the 
French Cabinet were still in session/134^  Against the background in London of 
increasing rebellion by the Cabinet and uproar in the Commons, Phipps telephoned 
the F.O. at 7.10pm confirming that Daladier had agreed to Chamberlain's statement 
but that Bonnet Tiad made difficulties' and that he (Phipps) had urged Daladier to 
agree on the time limit but the latter had been unable to do so without consulting
his Cabinet/135^  The debate shifted to a higher level: Chamberlain spoke to
132) F0.371/22981 (C12782 & C12791/15/18). Phipps tels., 2 Sept. 1939 (1.15pm & 1.30pm). 
The general feeling in the Commons was that the French were trying to run out of their 
engagements to Poland and were taking us with them'; Halifax, however, agreed with 
Phipps's explanation but could not convince some of the Cabinet, FO.800/317. Halifax; 'a 
Record of Events before the War1. Coibin confirmed that Daladier 'insiste de son cdt£ sur 
les considerations diplomatiques et techniques qui dictait notre attitude, et il invoque 
particuli6rement le sentiment de notre dtat-major1. DDF. 2, XIX, Addenda m , Corbin 
(Londres) & Bonnet, 7 septembre 1939. For Bonnet's role as the villain of the peace', see 
p.m.
133) DBFP. 3, VII, no.727. Minute by Cadogan (Tel. conversation between Halifax & Phipps), 2 
Sept 1939 (6.0pm). For Lukasiewicz's bitter comments on the 48 hour delay and his 
intense pressure on the French Government to immediately honour their commitments to 
Poland, see MAE, Papiers 1940, Papiers Fouques-Duparc, 56, fol.199-200, Lukasiewicz k 
Daladier, 2 septembre 1939. (Reprinted in DDF. 2e, XIX, no.399).
134) Ibid.
135) Ibid. no.730. Minute by Mallet, 2 September 1939.
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Daladier at 9.50pm and Halifax spoke to Bonnet at 4pm and 10.30pm.
On Sunday, 3 September, Phipps reported at 8.45am that Bonnet had 
informed him that the French time limit would 'only expire at 5am on Monday
( 137\
morning'. At 12.14pm, however he informed the F.O. that this had been 
advanced to 5pm that day 'in order to have as little divergence as possible from our
d3g\
action'. J In the event, the British ultimatum expired at 11am and, as Duroselle 
pointed out, La France, alliee de la Pologne depuis 1921, n'entrera en guerre que le 
3 septembre a 17 heures soit six heures apres la Grande Bretagne'/139'*
Following closely the views expressed in Sargent's minute of the 4 th /140-*
Cadogan wrote privately to Phipps on the 6 th that
In looking back at the crisis of the last few days, one cannot help 
suspecting that M.Bonnet was the villain of the piece. Although 
M.Bonnet has been defeated in the recent encounter, we must 
regard him as the rallying point of French defeatism and expect that 
he will continue to exert his baleful influence on French policy. He 
may well intrigue, whenever he can, to get France out of the war, or 
failing that to limit her war effort to a minimum...
Cadogan regarded it as 'difficult to establish confident and sincere collaboration
with the French' as long as Bonnet was at the Quai d'Orsay and that
What we should like, of course, to do is to take discreet measures 
with the object of getting Bonnet removed from office and ensuring 
that the Quai d'Orsay is placed in charge of an honest man. But I
136) Ibid. nos 716, 740 & 741. Minutes by Cadogan, 2 Sept. 1939 (4pm, 9.50pm, 10.30pm). 
Cadogan himself also had a telephone conversation with Bonnet at 5pm (ibid no.718). 
Bonnet had again brought up the question of a conference with Halifax ('& laquelle 
participera la Pologne'), and confirmed that he had told Phipps that 'Je desire 48 heures 
parce que c'est la demande de notre Etat-major*. DDF. 2, XIX, Addenda I, op.cit Samedi, 2 
septembre 1939. (14h 20) Halifax-Bonnet conversation.
137) DBFP. 3, VII, no.759. Phipps tel., 3 Sept 1939 (8.45am). Bonnet recorded that he had 
fixed this time with the agreement of Daladier & General Coulson, DDF. 2e, XIX Add. I, 
Extraits du journal de G.Bonnet, 3 Sept 1939.
138) Ibid. no.764. Phipps tel., 3 Sept 1939 (12.14pm).
139) Duroselle, op.cit, p.481.
140) FO.371/22982 (C13021/15/18). Minutes by Sargent & Cadogan, 4 Sept 1939.
-323-
confess that I do not quite see how this is to be done and we should 
be grateful for an expression of your views.(141)
Phipps minuted ironically in his spidery handwriting that 'Elegant solution
will probably be Herriot will get the Quai!' 1^42')- a comment which was prompted
by rumours in Paris of imminent Cabinet changes involving Herriot and which he
sought to confirm privately with Mandel and Reynaud/143^  In the event, Daladier
(144)himself replaced Bonnet as foreign minister on the 13th, and it is highly unlikely 
that Phipps was involved in the latte^s removal. Phipps, who had been closely 
identified with Bonnet's views (at least until late August 1939) and who never
lacked a strongly opportunistic streak, was compelled to admit discreetly that
there is general relief among the "durs" and on the Left at the 
 departure of Bonnet from MFA. Even among those who supported
141) Ibid. Cadogan to Phipps, Secret, 6 Sept 1939. (also in PHPP.2/1). Cadogan was puzzled 
why Daladier had retained Bonnet since their views differed and the latter *had practically 
no following in France1. In fact Welczeck had complained to Mendl that Daladier 
controlled foreign affairs and that it was difficult to do anything *when one knew that the 
man one was talking to (i.e. Bonnet) was not listened to by MDaladier*. FO.371/23019 
(C7513/54/18) Phipps to Sargent 22 May 1939 (Enclosure from Mendl). Daladier had told 
Bullitt in May that he distrusted Bonnet and was contemplating replacing him in the near 
future with Champ&ier de Ribes whom he trusted. FRUS. 1939, Vol I (General) Bullitt to 
Seer, of State, p. 180. Lukasiewicz had complained bitterly about Bonnet's unreliability in 
August and Daladier had told him to communicate in future either directly with himself or 
with L6ger in whom he had 'complete confidence*. Juliusz Lukasiewicz, Diplomat in Paris 
1936-39. Columbia, 1970, p.263. Daladier's relationship with Bonnet is scarcely touched 
upon in E. du Riau's biography of the former, op.cit.
142) PHPP.2/1. Cadogan to Phipps, Secret 6 September 1939, handwritten comment on the 
original by Phipps dated 8 Sept 1939.
143) Pietri had called on Phipps on 9 September to express his 'serious misgivings if Herriot was 
appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs owning to his anti-fascist activities'. The F.O. were 
also extremely uneasy about this possibility. FO.371/22910 (C13257/25/17) Phipps tel. 9 
Sept and minutes by Sargent & Cadogan, 10 &11 Sept. 1939. Both Mandel and Reynaud 
with whom Phipps had lunched privately and separately confirmed that Herriot *would go to 
the Quai d’Orsay'. FO.371/22913 (C13206 & C13449/90/17). Phipps tel., 7 & 10 Sept
1939.
144) FO.371/22910 (C13908/25/17). Phipps tel. 14 September 1939. Halifax, who appears to 
have forgotten his stem injunction to Phipps on 1 September to 'infuse courage and 
determination into Bonnet', somewhat exaggeratedly told the latter that he appreciated 'our 
collaboration and the personal relations of friendship that came of it' and referred to the 
loyal collaboration and mutual trust of our two Governments and... the conviction that they 
could have followed no other policy'. FO.800/311 (H/XIV/382) Halifax to Bonnet, 15 Sept 
1939; Bonnet's reply is in ibid (H/XTV/383).
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his policy last year, he was not considered to possess the requisite 
determination for the post of Foreign Minister in time of war. High 
officials at the MFA are also pleased at the change/145^
In fact, Duroselle's verdict, that les manoeuvres de Bonnet' were intended to delay 
le  plus possible' the French ultimatum to Germany in order to obtain Mussolini's
diplomatic intervention/146^  was unanswerable.
Phipps's own position at Paris was now reaching its denouement. Halifax 
had decided in May that, on the grounds of age and as Sir Ronald Campbell was 'a 
very suitable successor1, he was unable to recommend that Phipps's *term should be
further extended'/147^  In September 1939, however, Chamberlain and Halifax 
decided that 'it would be highly undesirable' to change Ambassadors at Paris and at 
Belgrade 'so soon after the outbreak of war1, and Phipps would therefore be
offered a further extension of six months/148^  Halifax, whose view of Phipps was
not always consistent, told him that
Although you have no doubt been looking forward to the rest which 
you have earned, I feel sure that we may count upon you for further 
sacrifice, and I need hardly add that it will be a particular 
satisfaction to me personally, if you feel able to stay on, to know 
that I can look forward to a continuation of the advice which your 
long experience renders you specially fitted to give. (149)
145) Ibid (C13909/25/17). Phipps tel., 15 September 1939. Phipps had continued to support 
Bonnet's desire to keep Italy out of the war, and reported that the latter had told him that 
Bullitt, amongst others, was 'urging the French Government to force the Italians into war* 
which was Very foolish'. FO.800/319. (H /XIX/62) Phipps to Halifax, Private & 
Confidential, 1 September 1939.
146) Duroselle, op.dt, p.482. Bonnet's intense concern with the Italian proposals is very evident 
in the French documents, see for e.g. MAE Papiers 39-40, Dossier Hoppenot 1, 
Chronologie, especially fol 58-62,1 Sept 1939.
147) FO.794/16. A.H.L. Hardinge (from Private Secretary), 30 June 1939.
148) Ibid. Mallet (F.O.) to Hardinge, 25 Sept & ibid Hardinge to Mallet, 26 Sept. 1939.
149) Ibid. Halifax to Phipps, 27 Sept 1939; PHPP.2/1 Cadogan to Phipps, 27 Sept 1939. 
Halifax had also 'expressed a very strong hope' to Hankey that Phipps Vould stay on* and, 
more surprisingly, Vansittart was also anxious for him to continue. PHPP.3/3 Hankey to 
Phipps, 27 Sept. 1939.
-325-
Phipps, who had decided that his retirement was now overdue, replied that 
he and Campbell had agreed that ‘there was no reason' at Belgrade or Paris why the 
moves should not take place, and that Cadogan had confirmed to the latter that 
they could take place as originally planned. He preferred this 'for various private 
reasons' but would obviously be available if Halifax still wanted him to stay on for
a further six months/150'* Phipps told Cadogan separately that he was certain that 
'Ronnie will do splendidly here' but that 'from the point of view of the service and 
on both general and personal grounds' he favoured the earlier date/151'* Halifax 
and Chamberlain felt that they were unable to press him to  stay on against his 
wishes and against the interests of his health' when Campbell was available/152^
Halifax appreciated his readiness to  stay on if necessary1 and told him that
While I am perfectly confident that Campbell will adequately fill 
your place, I shall miss the advice which your unique knowledge of 
France has enabled you to give to me as well as to my predecessors.
My regrets at your retirement will, however, be tempered with envy 
that you should now, at last, be able to enjoy your rest. (153)
Hankey, whose plan for Phipps to take his place on the Suez Canal Board had 
fallen through/154\vas even more fulsome in his praise. He told Phipps that he
was 'delighted' that his son, Henry
is to be on the staff of the greatest diplomat of the day, even in a 
very minor capacity and for a short time. If he is able to see 
anything of your methods he will never forget it.(155)
150) Ibid. Phipps to Halifax, 2 October 1939.
151) Ibid. Phipps to Cadogan, 2 October 1939.
152) Ibid. Harvey to Hardinge, 8 October, PHPP.2/1 Cadogan to Phipps, 7 Oct 1939.
153) FO.794/16. Halifax to Phipps, Personal, 11 October 1939. For Halifax's valedictory letter to 
Phipps, see p.326.
154) PHPP.3/3 Hankey to Phipps, 14 September 1939.
155) Ibid.
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The outbreak of war, his age, and his health were important factors in 
Phipps's decision to retire/156^  His temporary separation from Lady Phipps who
had apparently been evacuated to England^157^  was undoubtedly a contributory 
factor. Also highly relevant was Bonnet's removal from the Quai d'Orsay, and his 
realisation that he would be unable to establish the same close rapport with
Daladier who had added the Foreign Ministry to his other portfolios/158^
October 1939, Phipps's final month at the Paris Embassy, was particularly 
strenuous. He continued enthusiastically to support the war against Nazi Germany 
and, reversing his role during the Munich crisis, he identified himself with les durs' 
against the French defeatists.
Sargent had asked him to confirm whether the impression reported by a
Roumanian diplomat regarding French morale was correct/159^  In his long
156) Phipps's awareness of the onset of old age and that he was living through a fin de siecle had 
been foreshadowed by his speech in Paris to celebrate Empire Day in which he referred to 
himself as belonging, 'alas, to a generation now rapidly approaching extinction, that 
remembers the 24 May as the birthday of the great Queen whose memorable reign was the 
longest in our history'. FO.800/311 (HZXIV/358) Phipps to Halifax, 25 May 1939. Hankey 
told Phipps that *you have rather special reasons for retiring, particularly in view of the 
threat to your eyesight'. PHPP.3/3 Hankey to Phipps, 10 October 1939.
157) Hankey thought that things would be easier for Phipps if Lady Phipps 'at any rate paid you 
an occasional visit' especially as it was possible that 'the present lull may last some time'. 
PHPP.3/3 Hankey to Phipps, 27 September 1939.
158) Hankey, who deplored Phipps's 'departure from a post where you have made histoiy*, also 
realised that it would be impossible for him to maintain 'the same close contact' with 
Daladier (and Leger) as 'in former times'. PHPP.3/3 Hankey to Phipps, 10 October 1939.
159) FO.371/22913 (C15394/90/17). Sargent to Phipps, 29 Sept 1939. Sargent added that he 
was 'sony to have to add to (Phipps's) labours, but energy devoted to such a report at the 
present time would certainly not be wasted'.
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despatch of the 3rd which was given 'Special and War Cabinet distribution', Phipps 
replied that
The French Cabinet as a body is determined to do all that is 
necessary to end the constant peril of German aggression. It may 
contain individuals on the solidity of whose courage or character it 
is not possible to count, but I do not believe that at present at any 
rate such men are in a position to shake the resolution of their 
colleagues.
Phipps regarded those 'congenitally weak-kneed' politicians (such as Flandin and 
Mistier) and the 'political intriguers' as not being 'really dangerous'. The socialist 
and trade union leaders were divided (with Blum and Jouhaux advocating a speedy 
victory), and the Communists were 'now experiencing a bitter moral struggle 
between their loyalty to Stalin and natural patriotism'. He was convinced that the 
vast majority of the French nation realised that 'a thorough victory over Germany 
was necessary. The morale of the army was high, and Bonnet and his entourage 
would not be able to persuade the Government to accept peace 'at any price'. The 
main danger was that German propaganda was very active, and the enforced 
silence with respect to the British Expeditionary Force for some time made counter
measures difficult'/160^
Phipps concluded that the general morale of the French people was 
'fundamentally sound' and that their attitude towards the war 'coincides with ours'. 
He warned, however, that 'doubts and anxieties' could be exploited 'if things go
very ill or there appears to be any lack of determination or support on our p a rt/161^  
The Rumanian Report', that the French could 'show signs of weakness in 
Germany should launch a peace offensive against France alone with the object of
160) Ibid. (C15610/90/17). Phipps tel., 3 October 1939.
161) Ibid.
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detaching her from Great Britain', was brought up at the War Cabinet meeting on 
21 October, and Phipps was asked for a further up-to-date assessment of French
opinion/162^  He reported on the 23rd that the last three weeks had reinforced his 
conviction regarding the soundness of French morale and the 'firm determination' 
of the French army, and that the Consular Officers had also reported unanimously
that opinion in their districts was 'hard'.*'163'* Any political 'doubts and weakness' 
were mainly centred in Paris - Laval was an active intriguer, Mistier was 'also 
dangerous'; Bonnet, de Monzie and Pomaret, were Cabinet ministers who needed 
'constant watching', and Flandin's character liad not changed'. However, Daladier, 
backed by Reynaud and the majority of the Cabinet, retained the overwhelming
support of the country*. 1^64^
Phipps concluded that German propaganda continued to exploit potential 
Anglo-French weaknesses but that a German peace offensive would meet with a 
negative French response. In two passages carefully underlined by Vansittart, 
Phipps stated that: (a) now that Germany had 'revealed her war aim is the 
destruction of the British Empire' there was no sign of any French weakening, and 
(b) that
There is considerable fear in France that Great Britain will again 
wish to encourage a beaten Germany to greatness. If this fear were 
given definite shape, for e.g. through an announcement of war aims
162) FO.371/22913 (C17084/90/17). War Cabinet Conclusions 55(39), 21 Oct.1939. Ibid 
(C15610/90/17) F.O. to Phipps & Minute by Makins, 21 October 1939.
163) A survey of the political reports by the Superintending Consuls was forwarded by the 
Embassy on 3 October 1939. (ibid C15611/90/17).
164) Ibid. (C17161/90/17) Phipps tel., 23 October 1939. Phipps, who had invited Monzie to 
dine with him privately in order to ascertain his views, produced a fascinating account of his 
'mantle of impenetrability'. Monzie had told him that Italian neutrality 'must be preserved 
at all costs' and that he was 'keeping in close touch with the Italian Ambassador with that 
object in view*. Roberts minuted that Monzie was 'a thoroughly unattractive & dangerous 
member of the French Cabinet'. F0.371/22910 (C16506/25/17) Phipps tel., 22 Oct & 
minute by Roberts, 14 October 1939.
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disappointing to him, the Frenchman might well consider that it was 
not worth to continue the fight. France will be more than sceptical 
of peace terms based on a hope that kindness might divert the 
German mind from militarism & imperialism; these will not seem to 
her sufficient and she will want, besides terms which if the hope 
proves futile as in the past, will also make a repetition of German 
aggression physically impossible. (165)
In a rare compliment to his estranged brother-in-law, Vansittart minuted 
that he endorsed everything Phipps had said; they were 'not fighting to destroy 
Nazism but the whole of the Prussian caste system' and that, for the reasons 'so 
well explained by Sir Eric Phipps', they should hesitate before defining their war 
0^  (166) gtrang agre^jwith Vansittart that the last two paragraphs of Phipps's
telegram were important/167^
On 23 October, Phipps's reported his impression derived from his 
conversations with prominent French personalities prior to his departure from Paris 
which revealed the extent to which his opinions had evolved. Els greatest approval 
was now reserved for those towards whom he had hitherto been most critical: 
Mandel and Reynaud (of the soi-disant 'war party1), and Leon Blum whose attitude 
towards the war and towards Britain he regarded as being 'beyond reproach'. Only 
the views of Flandin, whom he had previously quoted with such enthusiasm, were 
now regarded as unsatisfactory. Flandin had been 'even more defeatist than I had 
supposed', and Phipps would 'not weary* Halifax with the objections I made to
165) FO.371/22913 (C17161/90/17). Phipps tel., 23 October 1939.
166) Ibid. (C17161/90/17). Vansittart to Halifax, 25 October 1939.
167) Ibid. Minute by Strang, 25 October 1939.
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(his) more mischievous remarks for I M ed to shake him in the slightest'/168^
Phipps departed for England, and for retirement on the same day/169^
Halifax told him, in his valedictory despatch, that he wanted
to take this occasion to convey to you an expression of warm 
appreciation on behalf of HMG for the services which you have 
rendered to them, and I would add my personal thanks for the ready 
assistance and wise counsel which you have afforded to me. I trust 
that you may long be spared to enjoy the leisure which you have so 
well deserved.(170)
B) Conclusions
"It is difficult to criticise a diplomat without knowing the 
instructions which he has received for the general policy, of which 
he is the slave, while the general policy itself is difficult to 
appreciate, even in wartime". Carcassonne (replied): "No, my 
friend, I am given to understand that the policy of (Robert) Murphy 
& of the Americans in Algiers is to a large extent personal. The 
State Department acts in accordance with their reports, which are 
false". (171)
168) FO.371/22910 (C17093/25/17). Phipps tel., 23 October 1939. General Gamelin was full 
of quiet confidence' and Herriot 'showed no signs of defeatism'. Laval was missing from 
these final conversations as was Daladier who fiad the support of the army and the people' 
(Ibid). Caillaux, a notable omission, was described separately as having shown 'no signs of 
defeatism' and was now advocating the French annexation of the left bank of the Rhine after 
Germany had been defeated. FO.371/22913 (C14285/90/17). Phipps tel., 18 Sept 1939. 
Phipps was sceptical of Daladier’s claim that Flandin, whom he considered a wealthy man, 
had received money from Germany (Daladier had also mentioned Laval and Mistier in this 
connection). FO.800/311 (HZXIV/386) Phipps to Halifax, 25 Sept. 1939.
169) FO.371/22936 (C17095/3249/17). Ronald Campbell (Paris) tel., 23 Oct. 1939.Ronald 
Campbell temporarily 'assumed charge' of the Embassy and then became Ambassador at 
Belgrade. £ ii Ronald Campbell had been designated as the Ambassador at Paris & Oliver 
Harvey was appointed as Minister.
170) Ibid. (C21020/3249/17). Halifax to Phipps, 27 December 1939. Hankey told Phipps that 
he 'greatly deplored' his 'departure from a post where you have made history* but that 
obviously 'no-one can stay for ever1. PHPP.3/3 Hankey to Phipps, 10 October 1939.
171) FO.898/203 (F.l/11). To P. W. Scarlett (F.O), 3 April 1943. Interview of March 26th with 
M  Carcassonne1 dated 27 March 1943. Interview conducted by an unknown French expert 
on North Africa with Pierre or Roger Carcassonne, one of the leaders of the French 
resistance in French North Africa.
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International History is, in many ways, the most personalised of all the 
(172)varieties of history. '  In the case of Phipps, psychological factors undoubtedly 
played an important role. He hated Nazi Germany and loved France and he had 
tried, desperately in 1934, to exchange his Berlin Ambassadorship for that of
Paris/173^  His tragedy was that he was fated, in the twilight of his diplomatic 
years, to personally witness the ascendancy of the former between 1933 and 1937, 
and the decline of the latter between 1937 and 1939. While his struggle to obtain, 
and retain, the greatly coveted Paris Embassy which had eluded his father, Sir 
Constantine Phipps; the mutual antagonism between Vansittart and himself; his 
prejudices, limitations and unspoken assumptions have been described in
detail/174^  in the last analysis, two principal factors remain:
(a) His experiences of Berlin (including his interviews with Hitler) were of 
such an intensity that they underpinned his entire approach at Paris, (b) His 
advent to the Ambassadorship at Paris coincided with Chamberlain's appointment 
as Prime Minister, and Phipps became the most devoted follower of Chamberlain's 
appeasement policies. It was the combination of these two factors, together with 
his aristocratic disdain for the Popular Front, which made him appear uniquely 
suited to the role of *the English Governess'. As with appeasement itself British 
tutelage of France especially as it related to Franco-Italian relations, had the active 
approval of, and was instigated by, the Cabinet and the Foreign Office. Its 
successes and failures cannot, therefore, be entirely attributed to Phipps.
172) This theme has been continually reiterated by Prof. D.C. Watt throughout his work 
especially in Personalities and Policies. London 1965.
173) See chapter 2.
174) See chapter 3.
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How successful then was Phipps's Paris Embassy, and was Commander 
Dunderdale's comment that 'all we thought the Embassy produced was gossip'/175^  
a fair assessment of its achievements and its performance? Above all, was Phipps's 
negative reputation as a 'defeatist-appeaser1 justified?
Ironically it was when Phipps was most successful in implementing the 
general guidelines of his instructions that he frequently received the most odium 
from the Foreign Office. Two examples will suffice: in preventing the French 
Government (a) from taking action over Czechoslovakia, and (b) from assisting the 
Spanish Republic. Haunted by his perception of French weakness vis-a-vis 
Germany, Phipps had ignored Talleyrand's warning to the aspiring diplomat (which
% (176}he himself had frequently quoted): 'surtout pasjde zele.
This zeal included an attempt to control all the information emanating from 
the Embassy (hence the Cadett affair) and a deliberate concentration on a handful 
of sources whose views either coincided with his own or which he found 
convenient to quote. These sources: Bonnet, Caillaux and Flandin were amongst 
the most reactionary and defeatist elements in France (albeit Caillaux underwent a 
belated transformation in late August 1939). All three were important French 
personalities but the criticism, that their opinions were quoted excessively to the 
exclusion of others, was justified. They only represented a narrow segment of 
French society, and it was Phipps's categorisation of them as 'all that is best in 
France' during the Munich crisis which produced an almost violent reaction from
175) Interview with Commander Dunderdale, 26 Sept 1984; for the circumstances of our 
interview, see p.42 f/note 38.
176) See p. 107 f/note 69. Phipps also quoted Talleyrand's advice in his unpublished memoir, 
T)iplomatic Light and Shade, p.86, PHPP.9/1.
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the Foreign Office and calls for his dismissal. Harvey put it succinctly during the 
Czech crisis:
he (Phipps) had given the definite impression that HMG wish to 
hold France back (which of course is true). Again over Spain he 
has consistently supported the Franco side and done his utmost to 
stop the French Government from helping Barcelona. In all this of 
course he has faithfully interpreted and anticipated the views of the 
present Cabinet. But I do not think it wise to blanket other opinion 
to the extent he has. HMG are entitled to know all sides and not 
only what they want to hear.(177)
Phipps was badly out of step with F.O. thinking during the very fluid 
international situation between November 1938 and January 1939, and he failed to 
take into account the full extent of the deterioration in Anglo-German relations. In 
November, his constant reiteration of Caillaux and his entourage's warning of the 
activities of the soi-disant "war party" and of Mandel's motives (and his Jewish 
ancestry) occurred against the background of Kristallnacht and the hostile British 
press criticism of Germany which had incensed Hitler. His vendetta against Cadett 
occurred during the war scares in January 1939, and the F.O.'s investigation into 
the affair unnecessarily strained their limited resources during the crisis. Neither of 
these examples were calculated to enhance his reputation.
Phipps's conversation in the late Spring of 1939 to an advocate of firm 
resistance to Hitler (which brought him rare praise from Vansittart) is less 
well-known. By August 1939, this had evolved into an ardent support of his old 
adversaries of the *war party1 against his former allies the 'defeatist-appeasers'. This 
transformation was most strikingly demonstrated in October 1939 when Marin had 
told him that 'he had four children and he would rather he and they were killed now
177) Harvey diaries, op.cit, (entry for 19 September 1938), p. 188.
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than that they should survive to become the slaves of Hitler*, and Phipps had 
•warmly echoed this sentiment'/178^
This conversion came too late to rehabilitate Phipps's reputation, and the 
F.O. gave the impression that they were conducting a clean sweep of the Paris
Embassy after his retirement/179^  In November 1939, for example, Cadogan
refused to press Phipps to reconsider his decision not to broadcast to France/180^  
Similarly, the legendary influence which Mendl was alleged to have wielded at the 
Embassy evaporated quickly. The F.O. were unhappy at the request of the head of 
the British Military Mission with Gamelin to have access to Mendl's daily 
memoranda to the Ambassador on the grounds that it consisted of 'political gossip 
circulating in Paris' and did not 'necessarily represent the Embassy's viewpoint' to
which Roberts added:
In fact, quite often it definitely does not do so. Major General 
Howard-Vyse (Head of the British Military Mission with Gamelin) 
would however naturally assume that it did and his judgement might 
be affected accordingly. (181)
178) FO.371/22910 (C15974/25/17). Phipps tel., 6 October 1939. As mentioned previously, 
Phipps had six children and his eldest son was killed in 1943 while on active service.
179) Significantly Duff Cooper (whose activities in Paris Phipps had attempted to curb in 1938 & 
1939), and Oliver Harvey (one of Phipps's bitterest critics), became, successively, the first 
two post-war British ambassadors to France.
180) FO.371/22942 (C19429/19429/17). Cadogan to Ogfivie (BBC), 28 November 1939. 
Phipps was later offered, and accepted, a further invitation to broadcast to France. 
FO.371/24324 (C2636/2636/17). Phipps to Kirkpatrick, 12 February 1940.
181) Ibid. (C20285/20285/17). Brig.General Beaumont Nesbitt to Strang, and minute by 
Roberts, 15 December 1939. Sir Ronald Campbell told Strang that it was 'not a daily press 
memoranda' but 'a confidential letter addressed by Mendl to the Ambassador giving an 
account of any interesting conversations' and that distribution outside the Embassy would 
'cramp Mendl's style and is otherwise open to objection'. Ibid, (C20846/20285/17). Both 
the Embassy & the F.O. were aware of the necessity of having 'a proper daily summary of 
the French press'. Ibid.
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The balance sheet of Phipps's achievements as 'the English Governess' 
included the prevention of Paul-Boncour's reappointment as foreign minister; the 
discouragement of any kind of action by the French Government to assist 
Czechoslovakia in September 1938, and a substantial contribution towards 
preventing them from assisting the Spanish Republic and encouraging them to keep 
the Franco-Spanish border closed. Since all of these activities were in conjunction 
with official British policy they can, within these narrow confines, be judged
successful/182^  Phipps's attempts, on the direct instructions of Chamberlain and 
with the full support of the Cabinet and the Foreign Office, to pressurise Daladier 
into making concessions to Mussolini must be judged unsuccessful. Italy’s 
neutrality in September 1939 was due to Mussolini's belated recognition of the full 
implications of the Pact of Steel, and of Hitler's attempts to drag him into a war for 
which he felt unprepared, rather than any British efforts to appease Italy.
Similarly, Phipps's reports and the images which he conveyed to London 
were the corollorary of his role as the English Governess'. While their sheer 
volume makes them more difficult to assess, he increasingly regarded himself as 
Chamberlain's man in Paris and they therefore varied from the objective to the 
highly subjective. At their worst they reflected his prejudices and unspoken 
assumptions which he equated with British interests and policies. Their influence 
on Chamberlain and the Cabinet, particularly during the Czech crisis, was always
182) Phipps's continual warnings to London (& his vigorous support for those of the Embassy's 
air attach^) regarding the weak state of the French air force, and his pleas for them to put 
pressure on the French Government were also effective. Colyer told Harvey on 27 May 1939 
that French aircraft production had 'at last turned the comer and is really at last going 
ahead'. Harvey diaries, op.cit, p.292. See also P.Fridenson & J. Lecuir, La France et la 
Grande Bretagne face aux problemes aeriens 1935 - mai 1940. Vincennes 1976, especially 
pp. 42-43, for the rapid increase in French aircraft production in 1939.
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greater than on the Foreign Office. The strongest images which he conveyed were 
of a French nation unprepared and unwilling to go to war in September 1938, but 
able and willing to do so in September 1939. In the last analysis, this accurately 
reflected the change in emphasis in British policy towards Nazi Germany after the 
German occupation of Prague.
Finally, it would be absurd to blame Phipps, who retired in October 1939, 
for not warning of the long and debilitating effects of the drole de guerre on French 
morale or for not predicting the French collapse in June 1940 as some of his critics 
have implied. Other later, and possibly more qualified, observers also failed to
consider the possibility of a decisive French defeat/183^  When it came, it was 
sudden and unexpected, and its scale was so complete that organised resistance 
only emerged after Operation Baibarossa in June 1941. Given his profound 
knowledge of France, and his tendency towards pessimism, it is not impossible that 
Phipps may have had a presentiment of those terrible events and that they were a 
subconscious motive in his decision to retire.
The French debacle of 1940 also led some of Phipps's Foreign Office 
critics to reassess the value of his warnings during the Munich crisis. Strang, for 
example, who had been 'outraged' by Phipps's 'all that is best France' telegram, later 
admitted that
in reporting that war would be unpopular in France and that there 
were many in positions of authority who were against war at almost 
any price, the Ambassador was probably not at fault in his 
judgement. Some of the dominant figures in governing circles in
183) Sir Ronald Campbell's political review of the general attitude of France during 1939 
(produced in lieu of the Annual Report) followed closely the lines of argument, and even the 
language, of Phipps's final despatches in October. FO.371/24324 (C1632/1632/17). Sir R. 
Campbell (Paris) to Halifax, 27 January 1940. For the British failure of perception in 
May/June 1940, see p.2// f/note 96.
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France had become deeply infected by the corroding spirit o f the 
times which was to produce its full effects in June 1940. (184)
Strang omitted to mention that during the crisis, and its immediate aftermath,
Phipps himself had been 'deeply infected by the corroding spirit of the times'.
Nevertheless, regardless of Phipps's motives, Ivone Kirkpatrick's partial
rehabilitation of the former was undoubtedly correct:
The Ambassador (Phipps) warned the Government that the French 
were against fighting and would not hesitate to take the first 
opportunity of blaming us for having dragged them into war. This 
diagnosis was later confirmed by the events of September 2, 1939, 
by the French refusal to allow offensive operations against Germany 
in 1939 and by the conduct of the French Cabinet in June 
1940.(185)
A Postscript
Phipps's sense of grievance continued after his retirement/186^  and his 
attempts to justify himself were unfortunate and only served to reinforce his
(137)
negative image. In 1941, he applied for permission to publish a book 
supposedly based on his Berlin diary which revealed a strange lack of proportion 
and of discretion in an ex-diplomat living in war-time Britain. In his detailed 
criticism, Frank Roberts singled out, inter alia, references to Dr Goebbels's 'charm
184) Lord Strang, At Home and Abroad London 1965, p. 136.
185) Ivone Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle. London 1959, p. 133.
186) Phipps's resentment was only partly assuaged by his recommendation for a high award. He 
told Hankey that, 'it warms the cockles of my heart to feel that my years in Berlin & Paris 
spent in circumstances of really peculiar difficulty (owing to constant stabs in the back from 
my relative in the F.O.), which you alone are able to realise, have received public 
recognition'. Hankey Papers, HNKY 5/5, Phipps to Hankey, 29 December 1940.
187) Phipps's reputation in Berlin also suffered a post-war decline. Replying to Sargent's query 
in 1949, the F.O's Research Dept were unable to confirm that Phipps had 'attempted to 
analyse Hitler's foreign policy & forecast its development and objectives'. Vansittart, who 
had been perfectly satisfied with Phipps's Berlin Embassy, discovered in retrospect that 
Baldwin's judgement (viz. too much wit and not enough warning') had 'not been unjust'. 
FO.370/2049 (L5749/81/402) Sargent to Passant, 11 Oct 1949 & C.HJFone to Sargent, 27 
October 1949; Sir Rbt Vansittart, The Mist Procession. London 1958, p.445. These 
judgements were excessively harsh, see chapter two.
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and good taste'; a consistently favourable portrait of Laval (which he regarded as 
being 'most unfortunate at the present moment'); warm support for the 
Anglo-German Naval Agreement; Phipps's belief that Hitler was sincere in not 
wanting war1; references to Lenin as the most dangerous microbe of all'; Hitler as 
'an idealist', and of the xenophobia of the Spanish Left'. Woodward's comment was
masterly understated:
it is not a diary or a general survey, but a reproduction verbatim of 
official despatches & confidential letters... the book gives out a 
feeling of superficiality, and I am afraid it might provide an 
opportunity to those critics who say that 
British-and-other-diplomats spent far too much of their time 
lunching & dining in a very narrow circle... (188)
The intemperate and self-indulgent views expressed by Phipps in his Berlin 
diary must throw grave doubts over any attempts to fully rehabilitate his 
reputation, and tarnishes the positive contribution which he made after the German 
occupation of Prague. Chamelion-like, he again attempted to redress balance in a 
letter to the Times in 1943 on Foreign Office Reform which constituted, indirectly,
his only published defence of his pre-war role:
what the British public should know is whether HM representatives 
abroad warned the Government from 1933 onwards o f the grave 
dangers ahead and, if so, why those warnings were disregarded.
How was it possible, for instance, that the country was allowed to 
remain in such complete ignorance of danger as to indulge in the 
farce of the peace ballot? In the years preceding the war only one 
prominent man had the courage to utter words of repeated warning 
against the growing German menace; but his was a cry in the 
wilderness. His reward is that he now leads the country to victory.
... Diplomats are accused of living too sheltered lives; but was it not 
rather the public that was allowed to live in a sheltered world of 
illusions while HM representatives abroad struggled with grim 
realities? Our political system seems to need some reform whereby 
public opinion will be properly enlightened by politicians with
188) FO.371/26579. F.O. Minute by F.K.Roberts, 25 November 1941 & minute by 
E.L. Woodward, 27 November 1941. Makins regarded it as 'superficial' and commented that 
'it is not a book of memoirs but scissors & paste with despatches & semi-official letters'. 
(Ibid). The original manuscript was only deposited amongst his papers in 1993 (PHPP. 
10/2). It remains unpublished as does his sentimental & romanticised memoir of his early 
diplomatic impressions, Diplomatic Light and Shade. (PHPP.9/1).
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sufficient courage to reveal the truth, however unpalatable to the 
nation. (189)
The reference to Churchill reads strangely in the light of his hostile attitude 
towards him especially during the Munich crisis. It constitutes yet another Phipps 
paradox and raises further questions. Did Phipps genuinely have second thoughts 
about his role in Paris or was it, perhaps, merely a spontaneous gesture of 
patriotism in the midst of war - a war which he had desperately tried to avoid and
in which his son was killed?*'190'*
Regardless of the answer, over a half of Phipps's forty year career in the 
F.O. and the diplomatic service had been spent in Paris/191'* Apropos Phipps's four 
years in Berlin, Franfois-Poncet told the post-war French Parliamentary 
Commission of Enquiry that the Germans had complained that, before Henderson's 
arrival, there had been two French ambassadors in Berlin - himself and Phipps and
that 'il n'y a pas d'ambassadeur d'Angleterre'/192'* Phipps's close friend, the 
Franco-Jewish writer Andre Maurois, recalled le  tendre amitie' of Phipps and his 
wife when they had tried to console him at their Wiltshire home over the week-end
of 15-17 June 1940 during the capitulation of France/193^  Vansittart, Phipps's 
fellow Francophile and alter ego, may therefore have written both of their epitaphs 
in the first stanza of his moving poem on the Entente Cordiale and the fall of 
France, with its curious echoes of'all that is best in France':-
189) Phipps’s letter to the Times. 3 February 1943.
190) One of Phipps's four sons was killed in action in the same year.
191) Halifax had acknowledged this in his valedictory telegram to Phipps, FO.371/22936 
(C21020/3249/17), 27 December 1939.
192) Les Evenements survenus en France de 1933 k 1945. vol 3, Paris 1947, p.769.
193) Andre Maurois, Memoires. Paris 1970, p.303
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Was I not faithful to you from the first?
When have I ever failed you since my youth?
I loved without illusion, knew the worst,
But felt the best was nearer to the truth.(194)
Such sentiments were alien to Chamberlain whose dislike of France had always 
been apparent and who had sought (through Phipps) to control its foreign
policy/195^  In a harsh and bitter judgement on the French in June 1940, he told his 
sister that
We are at any rate free of our obligations to the French who have 
been nothing but a liability to us. It would have been better if they 
had been neutral from the beginning.(196)
194) Sir Robert Vansittart's poem on the fall of France, '1904-1940' is quoted in its entirety in 
English & French in Elie J. Bois, La Malheur de la France, r&nts et tfrnnipnapes- London 
n.d., pp X-XI. Bois commented: 'en void le texte, qui restera dans les anthologies futures 
comme un des plus beaux cris de douleur airachgs k l'ame d'un po&te'.
195) For Chamberlain's views on France, see ch.5. For additional evidence of Chamberlain's 
hostility to the French see John Cairns, 'A Nation of Shopkeepers in Search of a Suitable 
France: 1919-1940', American Historical Review. 79 (1974), pp.710-743 espedally pp.729 
&731.
196) Keith Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain. London 1946, p.449. In a tragic twist of fate, 
Captain (later Vice-Admiral) Cedric Holland, the former naval attach^ at Phipps's Paris 
Embassy, was the emissary who conveyed the ultimatum leading to the British attack on the 
French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir on 3 July 1940. R.T. Thomas, Britain and Vichy France: the 
Dilemma of Anglo-French Relations 1940-42. London 1979, pp. 44-45.
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ATFJENPIXI
THE PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS AT PHIPPS’S PARIS EMBASSY. 1937-39.
Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenopotentiary:
Sir Eric Phipps (24 April 1937-23 Oct. 1939)
Envoy Extraordinary & Minister Plenopotentiary:
H. Lloyd Thomas (Aug 1935-Feb. 1938).
R.I. Campbell (May 1938-Dec 1939).
1st Secretary: M.R. Wright (2nd/lst Seer. Oct. 1936-Jan 1940)
J.V. Perowne (Feb 1936-Aug 1938)
W.H. Mack (Aug 1938 - June 1940).
2nd Secretary: A.R. Dew (May 1935-Sept 1938)
V.G. Lawford (3rd/2nd Seer. March 1937-Sept 1939).
3rd Secretary: D.D. Maclean (Sept 1938-June 1940).
Financial Advisor: E. Rowe-Dutton (Oct. 1934 - April 1939).
Commercial Counsellor: Sir J.R. Cahill (Feb. 1921 - July 1939)
Press Attache: Sir Charles Mendl (June 1926 - May 1940)
Naval Attache: Capt. Cedric Swinton Holland, RN (resid: Paris, Brussels,
Madrid, Lisbon & the Hague). (June 1938- June 1940).
Military Attaches: Lt.Col. Frederick George Beaumont-Nesbitt M.C. (Paris,
Madrid, Lisbon & Berne). (Feb. 1936-Aug. 1938).
Lt.Col. the Hon. William Fraser (Paris, Madrid, Lisbon & 
Beme) (Aug. 1938 - Nov. 1939).
Asst. Military Attaches: Capt. Christen Albert de Linde, RE (Paris, Madrid,
Lisbon) (Aug. 1936 - June 1940).
Capt. E.C. Richards (Paris, Madrid, Lisbon).
Major R.F.G. Jayne (Paris& Lisbon)
Air Attache: Wing Commander Douglas Colyer, DFC (Paris, Lisbon, Madrid)
(June 1936-June 1940).
Asst. Air Attache: Squadron Leader Chamberlayne (Paris, Madrid & Lisbon).
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